The fact is, Broussais is busier with his own opinions than with what Gall thought; and here is a specimen of his way of thinking: “The understanding and its different manifestations are,” says he, “the phenomena of the nervous actions.”[177] “The faculties,” says he further, “are the actions of the material organs,”[178] &c.
Broussais’s whole psycology is contained in these words. The organ, and the phenomenon produced by the organ. To speak more clearly, the organ and the action of the organ. To speak like Cabanis, the organ and the secretion of the organ, or thought.[179] That’s all!
The understanding, therefore, is merely a phenomenon, a product, an act. But if this be the case, how can there be a continuity of the moi? Now, the consciousness which gives me the unity of the moi, gives me not less assuredly the continuity of the moi. Descartes’ admirable words are: “I find that there is in us an intellectual memory.”[180]
The consciousness tells me that I am one, and Gall insists that I am multiple; the consciousness tells me I am free, and Gall avers that there is no moral liberty; the consciousness endows me with the continuity of my understanding, but Cabanis and Broussais tell me that my understanding is nothing but an act.
Philosophers will talk.