THE SIEGE OF ATLANTA.
General Howard, who, upon the 27th of July, according to the President’s appointment, assumed command of the Army of the Tennessee, vacant by General McPherson’s death, had put his army in motion while the events above detailed were taking place. The Army of the Tennessee was placed on the extreme right of General Sherman’s army, its right flank being held by General Logan. By this movement the whole lino was drawn out directly south, with its face to the eastward, and gradually winding around to the Macon road. The enemy perceiving this, massed his troops in the same direction. On the 28th, General Stewart’s corps advanced from Atlanta upon the Union right flank, and for several hours kept up a succession of fierce assaults upon General Logan’s troops. The assaults were as fiercely repelled, causing the rebels to retire again and again, with constantly lessening ranks, till compelled to retire entirely at four P. M., leaving their dead and wounded on the ground, after sustaining a loss of five thousand men. In this conflict the Union loss did not exceed six hundred.
About this time General Hooker resigned command of his corps, and was succeeded by General Slocum—whose place in turn, was temporarily filled by General H. S. Williams—General Slocum being absent in Vicksburg General Palmer also resigned command of his corps, and was succeeded by General Jeff. C. Davis; and General D. S. Stanley was placed in command of the Fourth corps, left vacant by the promotion of General Howard.
With his customary promptitude, General Sherman soon perceived that his last movement would not effect the dislodgment of Hood from Atlanta, and he accordingly changed his tactics. He still further extended the right wing of his army, with the view of outflanking Hood in that manner. The Twenty-third and Fourteenth were, therefore, during the 5th and 6th of August, transferred from their position on the left to the extreme right, where they joined the Fifteenth corps, and formed the army’s right flank.
While this movement was in progress, occasional demonstrations were made against the enemy, which only served to show that he was protected by defences of the strongest description, and was in a condition to maintain his position for a long period, unless dislodged by some master-piece of generalship on the part of the Union commander.
The Union army was now very much changed from its first position for the siege of Atlanta. Instead of threatening the city north and east, General Sherman’s left now covered the northern approaches to it, while his extreme right lay southwest and ran parallel to the railroad. The lines of his army were drawn about two and a half miles from the city, and between them and the enemy’s works lay a narrow strip of wooded country, which had been the scene of almost perpetual skirmishing between the opposing forces.
A movement against the enemy had now become of the first importance, as nothing could be gained to the National troops by delay, while Hood was every day strengthening the city’s defences, and adding to his army by organizing all the laborers, teamsters, and quartermasters’ men within Atlanta, and filling their places by negroes. Without haste, and after mature consideration as to the safest course to pursue, General Sherman, having satisfied himself that the rebel lines could not be taken except by a fearful sacrifice of life, determined upon the capture of Atlanta by a bold strategic movement. A new movement by the right flank was ordered, which would require the participation of nearly the whole army. One corps was withdrawn and sent to the intrenched position across the Chattahoochie, in order to preserve, in any event, communication with the base. The whole of the remaining army was ordered to move upon the south and southwest sides of the city, destroy the railroad communications, and thus place Atlanta beyond the possibility of obtaining supplies. Preparations for these operations were entered upon at once, and by the 16th General Sherman’s plans were virtually completed. On the 18th, General Kilpatrick, with five thousand men, made a raid, and struck the Macon railroad at Jonesboro’ and Lovejoy’s, and the Atlanta and West Point road at Fairburn. But the enemy resisted him at all points and he failed to inflict permanent injury upon the roads. Retreating, therefore, on the 22d instant, by way of Decatur, he brought in one hundred prisoners, and a piece of artillery. General Sherman now made no further delay in executing his plan to force Hood to abandon Atlanta. That plan, as already noted, consisted in changing the position of his lines, getting in between Atlanta and Macon, and thus cutting off Hood’s supplies. The scheme was brilliant, and was cleverly executed. A brisk engagement took place near Jonesboro’, on the 31st of August, in which the rebels under Hardee were severely defeated, which was accomplished with little loss to the Union arms. Finding himself thus dangerously situated, General Hood, on the 1st of September, ordered the evacuation of Atlanta—first taking care to burn the railroad rolling stock and all other material that would have been useful to the National army. On leaving the city he retreated to McDonough, whence, moving westward, he was able to join his forces to those of Hardee and S. D. Lee. Meanwhile, at daybreak on the 2d of September, the Union troops marched into Atlanta. “We have,” says General Sherman, announcing the capture of the city, “as the result of this quick, and, as I think, well-executed movement, twenty-seven guns, over three thousand prisoners, and have buried over four hundred rebel dead, and left as many wounded that could not be removed. The rebels have lost, besides the important city of Atlanta and their stores, about five hundred killed, twenty-five hundred wounded, and three thousand prisoners; whereas our aggregate loss will not foot up fifteen hundred. If that is not success I don’t know what is.”
To lose no time in the improvement of his victory, General Sherman, on the 4th of September, issued an order to the effect that the city of Atlanta being exclusively required for warlike purposes, all citizens must remove from it; and to expedite such removal, he entered into a truce with General Hood, and made arrangements with him for forwarding the citizens and their effects beyond the Federal lines. In connection with this event the following correspondence took place between the authorities of Atlanta and General Sherman.
“Sir: The undersigned, Mayor and two members of Council for the city of Atlanta, for the time being the only legal organ of the people of the said city to express their wants and wishes, ask leave most earnestly but respectfully to petition you to reconsider the order requiring them to leave Atlanta. At first view it struck us that the measure would involve extraordinary hardship and loss, but since we have seen the practical execution of it, so far as it has progressed, and the individual condition of many of the people, and heard the statements as to the inconvenience, loss and suffering attending it, we are satisfied that the amount of it will involve in the aggregate consequences appalling and heart-rending.
“Many poor women are in an advanced state of pregnancy; others have young children, whose husbands, for the greater part, are either in the army, prisoners, or dead. Some say: ‘I have such a one sick at my house; who will wait on them when I am gone?’ Others say: ‘What are we to do? we have no houses to go to, and no means to buy, build, or rent any; no parents, relatives, or friends to go to.’ Another says: ‘I will try and take this or that article of property; but such and such things I must leave behind, though I need them much.’ We reply to them: ‘General Sherman will carry your property to Rough and Ready, and then General Hood will take it thence on:’ and they will reply to that: ‘But I want to leave the railroad at such a place, and cannot get conveyance from thence on.’
“We only refer to a few facts to illustrate, in part, how this measure will operate in practice. As you advanced, the people north of us fell back, and before your arrival here a large portion of the people here had retired south; so that the country south of this is already crowded, and without sufficient houses to accommodate the people, and we are informed that many are now staying in churches and other outbuildings. This being so, how is it possible for the people still here (mostly women and children) to find shelter, and how can they live through the winter in the woods? no shelter or subsistence; in the midst of strangers who know them not, and without the power to assist them much if they were willing to do so.
“This is but a feeble picture of the consequences of this measure. You know the woe, the horror, and the suffering cannot be described by words. Imagination can only conceive of it, and we ask you to take these things into consideration. We know your mind and time are continually occupied with the duties of your command, which almost deters us from asking your attention to the matter, but we thought it might be that you had not considered the subject in all of its awful consequences, and that, on reflection, you, we hope, would not make this people an exception to mankind, for we know of no such instance ever having occurred—surely not in the United States. And what has this helpless people done, that they should be driven from their homes, to wander as strangers, outcasts, and exiles, and to subsist on charity?
“We do not know as yet the number of people still here. Of those who are here, a respectable number, if allowed to remain at home, could subsist for several months without assistance; and a respectable number for a much longer time, and who might not need assistance at any time.
“In conclusion, we most earnestly and solemnly petition you to reconsider this order, or modify it, and suffer this unfortunate people to remain at home and enjoy what little means they have.
GENERAL SHERMAN’S REPLY.
“Gentlemen: I have your letter of the 11th, in the nature of a petition, to revoke my orders removing all the inhabitants from Atlanta. I have read it carefully, and give full credit to your statements of the distress that will be occasioned by it, and yet shall not revoke my order, simply because my orders are not designed to meet the humanities of the case, but to prepare for the future struggles in which millions, yea, hundreds of millions of good people outside of Atlanta have a deep interest. We must have Peace, not only at Atlanta, but in all America. To secure this we must stop the war that now desolates our once happy and favored country. To stop war we must defeat the rebel armies that are arrayed against the laws and Constitution, which all must respect and obey. To defeat these armies we must prepare the way to reach them in their recesses provided with the arms and instruments which enable us to accomplish our purpose.
“Now, I know the vindictive nature of our enemy, and that we may have many years of military operations from this quarter, and therefore deem it wise and prudent to prepare in time. The use of Atlanta for warlike purposes is inconsistent with its character as a home for families. There will be no manufactures, commerce, or agriculture here for the maintenance of families, and sooner or later want will compel the inhabitants to go. Why not go now, when all the arrangements are completed for the transfer, instead of waiting till the plunging shot of contending armies will renew the scene of the past month? Of course, I do not apprehend any such thing at this moment, but you do not suppose that this army will be here till the war is over. I cannot discuss this subject with you fairly, because I cannot impart to you what I propose to do, but I assert that my military plans make it necessary for the inhabitants to go away, and I can only renew my offer of services to make their exodus in any direction as easy and comfortable as possible. You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will.
“War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war on our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. I know I had no hand in making this war, and I know I will make more sacrifices to-day than any of you to secure peace. But you cannot have peace and a division of our country. If the United States submits to a division now, it will not stop, but go on till we reap the fate of Mexico, which is eternal war. The United States does and must assert its authority wherever it has the power; if it relaxes one bit to pressure it is gone, and I know that such is not the national feeling. This feeling assumes various shapes, but always comes back to that of Union. Once admit the Union, once more acknowledge the authority of the National Government, and instead of devoting your houses, and streets, and roads, to the dread uses of war, I, and this army become at once your protectors and supporters, shielding you from danger, let it come from what quarter it may. I know that a few individuals cannot resist a torrent of error and passion such as has swept the South into rebellion; but you can point out, so that we may know those who desire a Government and those who insist on war and its desolation.
“You might as well appeal against the thunderstorm as against these terrible hardships of war. They are inevitable, and the only way the people of Atlanta can hope once more to live in peace and quiet at home is to stop this war, which can alone be done by admitting that it began in error, and is perpetuated in pride. We don’t want your negroes, or your horses, or your land, or anything you have, but we do want and will have a just obedience to the laws of the United States. That we will have, and if it involves the destruction of your improvements, we cannot help it. You have heretofore read public sentiment in your newspapers, that live by falsehood and excitement, and the quicker you seek for truth in other quarters, the better for you.
“I repeat, then, that, by the original compact of government, the United States had certain rights in Georgia which have never been relinquished and never will be; that the South began war by seizing forts, arsenals, mints, custom-houses, &c., &c., long before Mr. Lincoln was installed, and before the South had one jot or tittle of provocation. I myself have seen in Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mississippi hundreds and thousands of women and children fleeing from your armies and desperadoes, hungry and with bleeding feet. In Memphis, Vicksburg, and Mississippi, we fed thousands upon thousands of the families of rebel soldiers left on our hands, and whom we could not see starve. Now that war comes home to you, you feel very different; you deprecate its horrors, but did not feel them when you sent car-loads of soldiers and ammunition, and molded shell and shot, to carry war into Kentucky and Tennessee, and desolate the homes of hundreds and thousands of good people, who only asked to live in peace at their old homes, and under the Government of their inheritance.
“But these comparisons are idle. I want peace, and believe it can only be reached through Union and war; and I will ever conduct war purely with a view to perfect and early success.
“But, my dear sirs, when that peace does come, you may call on me for anything. Then I will share with you the last cracker, and watch with you to shield your homes and families against danger from every quarter. Now you must go, and take with you the old and feeble, feed and nurse them, and build for them in more quiet places proper habitations to shield them against the weather until the mad passions of men cool down, and allow the Union and peace once more to settle on your old homes at Atlanta.