OPERATIONS ON JAMES RIVER, VA.
May 4–10, 1864.
When General Grant assumed command of the armies of the United States, the headquarters of General Butler was at Fortress Monroe, from whence he exercised jurisdiction over the Department of Southern Virginia and North Carolina. The part assigned him in the coming campaign was an important one, and is thus fully described in the report of the Lieutenant-General:
“My first object being to break the military power of the rebellion and capture the enemy’s important strongholds, made me desirous that General Butler should succeed in his movement against Richmond, as that would tend more than anything else, unless it were the capture of Lee’s army, to accomplish this desired result in the east. If he failed, it was my determination, by hard fighting, either to compel Lee to retreat, or so to cripple him that he could not detach a large force to go north and still retain enough for the defence of Richmond. It was well understood, by both Generals Butler and Meade, before starting on the campaign, that it was my intention to put both their armies south of the James river, in case of failure to destroy Lee without it.
“Before giving General Butler his instructions, I visited him at Fort Monroe, and in conversation pointed out the apparent importance of getting possession of Petersburg and destroying railroad communications as far south as possible. Believing, however, in the practicability of capturing Richmond unless it was reinforced, I made that the objective point of his operations. As the army of the Potomac was to move simultaneously with him, Lee could not detach from his army with safety, and the enemy did not have troops elsewhere to bring to the defence of the city in time to meet a rapid movement from the north of James river.”
Under date of April 2d, General Grant gave written instructions to General Butler, in which were more specially detailed his plans for the opening of the campaign:
“General: In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have cooperative action of all the armies in the field, as far as this object can be accomplished.
“It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large ones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding on to the territory already taken from the enemy. But, generally speaking, concentration can be practically effected by armies moving to the interior of the enemy’s country from the territory they have to guard. By such movements they interpose themselves between the enemy and the country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary to guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a part of the enemy’s force, if no greater object is gained. Lee’s army and Richmond being the greater objects towards which our attention must be directed in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the force we can against them. The necessity of covering Washington with the army of the Potomac, and of covering your department with your army, makes it impossible to unite these forces at the beginning of a movement. I propose, therefore, what comes nearest this of anything that seems practicable. The army of the Potomac will act from its present base, Lee’s army being the objective point. You will collect all the forces from your command that can be spared from garrison duty, I should say not less than twenty thousand effective men to operate on the south side of James river, Richmond being your objective point. To the force you already have will be added about ten thousand men from South Carolina, under Major-General Gillmore, who will command them in person. Major-General W. F. Smith is ordered to report to you, to command the troops sent into the field from your own department.
“General Gillmore will be ordered to report to you at Fortress Monroe, with all the troops on transports, by the 18th instant, or as soon thereafter as practicable. Should you not receive notice by that time to move, you will make such disposition of them and your other forces as you may deem best calculated to deceive the enemy as to the real move to be made.
“When you are notified to move, take City Point with as much force as possible. Fortify, or rather entrench, at once, and concentrate all your troops for the field there as rapidly as you can. From City Point directions cannot be given at this time for your further movements.
“The fact that has already been stated—that is, that Richmond is to be your objective point, and that there is to be cooperation between your forces and the army of the Potomac—must be your guide. This indicates the necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the James river as you advance. Then, should the enemy be forced into his intrenchments in Richmond, the army of the Potomac would follow, and by means of transports the two armies would become a unit.
“All the minor details of your advance are left entirely at your discretion. If, however, you think it practicable to use your cavalry south of you so as to cut the railroad about Hicks’ Ford about the time of the general advance, it would be of immense advantage.
“You will please forward for my information at the earliest practicable day, all orders, details, and instructions you may give for the execution of this order.
“Major-General B. F. Butler.”
On the 19th of the same month General Butler was informed that he was expected to move from Fort Monroe on the same day that General Meade moved from Culpepper. The exact time of course could not at that time be designated; but, says General Grant: “It was my intention to fight Lee between Culpepper and Richmond if he would stand. Should he, however, fall back into Richmond, I would follow up and make a junction with his (General Butler’s) army on the James river; that, could I be certain he would be able to invest Richmond on the south side so as to have his left resting on the James, above the city, I would form the junction there; that circumstances might make this course advisable any how; that he should use every exertion to secure a footing as far up the south side of the river as he could, and as soon as possible after the receipt of orders to move; that if he could not carry the city, he should at least detain as large a force as possible.”
The military force under General Butler comprised the Eighteenth corps under General W. F. Smith, and the Tenth corps, under General Q. A. Gillmore. In order to mislead the enemy, these forces, on the 2d of May, were massed at Yorktown and Gloucester as if designed for a movement up the York river. At the same time a brigade under Colonel S. F. Alford, Third New York, landed at West Point, up the York river, and commenced building the wharves, &c. On the 4th of May orders to move were issued, and the troops embarked on board the transports. After dark on the 4th the vessels began to move down the York river, and up the James river, preceded by three army gunboats under command of Brigadier-General Graham; by the double-enders Eutaw, Mackinaw, and Osceola; four monitors, the Tecumseh, Canonicus, Saugus, Onondaga, and the iron-clad Atlanta, and by the smaller gunboats, Commodore Morris, Hunchback, Commodore Jones, Dawn, Delaware, Putnam, and Sheshonee.
General Butler thus describes the result of his first movement, in a dispatch to General Grant, from City Point:
“We have seized Wilson’s Wharf Landing. A brigade of Wild’s colored troops are there. At Fort Powhatan Landing two regiments of the same brigade have landed. At City Point, Hink’s division, with the remaining troops and battery, have landed. The remainder of both the Eighteenth and Tenth Army Corps are being landed at Bermuda Hundred, above the Appomattox.
“No opposition experienced thus far. The movement was apparently a complete surprise. Both army corps left Yorktown during last night. The monitors are all over the bar at Harrison’s Landing and above City Point. The operations of the fleet have been conducted to-day with energy and success. Generals Smith and Gillmore are pushing the landing of the men. General Graham with the army gunboats, led the advance during the night, capturing the signal stations of the rebels.”
Simultaneous with the departure of the transports, in order to embarrass the enemy, a party of nineteen hundred cavalry, led by Colonel West, started from Williamsburgh, to proceed up the Peninsula by land—supported by infantry—who drove the rebels before them, whenever encountered. At the same time, also, another expedition, consisting of the Eleventh Pennsylvania cavalry, Third New York cavalry, and First Delaware cavalry, and led by General Kautz, started up the James river. The design of this three-fold movement was to cut railroad communications between Richmond and Petersburg, and between Petersburg and Weldon, and thus to prevent reinforcements and supplies from coming to Lee’s army. In this they were partially successful. Within twenty hours after the transports sailed, the National forces were at City Point, with not a rebel behind them. Colonel West was completely successful in his Peninsula advance. On the 5th he dashed across the Chickahominy, and attacked the camp of the Fourth Virginia cavalry, in which thirty of the enemy were killed and wounded and thirty-five horses captured.
General Kautz’s party, proceeding up the south bank of the James, as if to cover the movement of the transports, wheeled off at Surrey Court-House, on the road for Sussex Court-House. Thence they proceeded to Hicksford, forty-five miles below Petersburg, where they cut the Petersburg road by destroying the bridge over the Meherrin river.
Colonel Spear, with a detachment of Kautz’s cavalry, pushed on to Jarrett’s Station, by the county road, where he destroyed the depot and a quantity of grain and supplies, after having put to flight a body of the enemy who opposed him.
Meantime General Kautz proceeded to Nottaway river, with the main body of his command, where he encountered fifteen hundred of the enemy entrenched in a square redoubt. After a spirited contest the rebels were hemmed up in the fort by a portion of the Federal force, while the remainder proceeded to destroy the public stores and burn the bridge. After advancing to Sussex Court House, they encamped until Monday following, the 8th, when they went on to Littleton, and taking the Petersburg plank-road, they marched within seven miles of that place. Reaching the Norfolk and Petersburg railroad, they burnt several bridges and destroyed the telegraph and railroad, advancing thirteen miles on that road. The next morning they returned to City Point. About three hundred prisoners were captured on this expedition.
On the 7th of May five brigades, under General Brooks, advanced toward the Petersburg and Richmond railroad, where they encountered a large force of the enemy, and engaged them at intervals for six hours. The railroad bridge across one of the tributaries of the Appomattox, seven miles from Petersburg, was destroyed, when the troops were withdrawn to their former position.
On the 9th there was a general advance of General Butler’s troops in the same direction. The enemy were discovered near Bakeman’s Creek, where severe skirmishing ensued, the brunt of which was borne by General Heckman’s brigade. A furious charge of the rebels was met and bravely repelled by the 27th Massachusetts. The rebel rifle-pits were finally carried by a simultaneous charge of the brigade; but the Federal[ were checked by a strong earthwork near Swift creek, that commanded the forks of the road. General Terry with the right of the Union forces, destroyed the railroad track about Chester Court House Junction, when the troops were withdrawn. The Federal loss was about four hundred and fifty in killed and wounded, principally in Heckman’s brigade. Many rebel prisoners were taken, chiefly from South Carolina regiments. They were a portion of Beauregard’s troops, who had just arrived in Virginia.