M’CLELLAN’S ARMY ON THE POTOMAC.
October 1–26, 1862.
At this juncture in military affairs, the cautious policy of General McClellan once more came into conflict with that of the United States Government, at Washington. It was McClellan’s desire to reorganize the army, which had suffered much under the command of General Pope, and which had just passed through two severe battles. Maryland Heights and Harper’s Ferry had been occupied and fortified, and, as the Potomac was low, and easily fordable by rebel raiders, McClellan designed to stretch his forces along that river, from near Washington, to Cumberland, a distance of about one hundred and fifty miles, to prevent further incursions, and to make occasional sallies for reconnaissance or offensive operations, while the work of reorganization should be in progress. General Halleck, on the other hand, representing the President and the War Department, denied the necessity for any delay and urged an immediate onset.
No onward movement was made until the 26th of October. In the meanwhile, President Lincoln, visiting the Army of McClellan on the first of the month, had discussed the whole campaign with that officer, and had personally inspected the battle-field of Antietam; then, returning to Washington, he had, through General Halleck, issued an order to General McClellan, directing him to cross the Potomac and attack General Lee. It was in pursuance of this order that the advance was commenced on the 26th—the intermediate days having been spent in the work of reorganization. But this work had not been accomplished without difficulty. On the 10th of October, the rebel General Stuart crossed the Potomac, at McCoy’s Ferry, leading a force of two thousand cavalry and a battery of horse artillery, and made a raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania. Means were immediately taken to cut off and capture those forces. All the fords of the river were ordered to be guarded, and Generals Pleasanton and Stoneman started in pursuit. General Stuart, by his raid of the 13th of June, into the rear of the Union armies between the Pamunkey and the Chickahominy, had acquired great credit for boldness and celerity of movement. Hence the desire to capture him was all the more eager, on the part of the National troops. But the failure of a subordinate officer of General Stoneman’s to seasonably occupy White’s Ford, a point about three miles below the mouth of the Monocacy, unfortunately left open a chance of retreat, through which, on the 12th of October Stuart succeeded in making his escape, after a conflict with the Union forces, which lasted upwards of four hours. The fight took place near the mouth of the river Monocacy, and, on the Union side, was conducted by General Pleasanton. The losses were slight, upon both sides.
The plan of General McClellan’s new campaign, commencing on the 26th of October, may best be stated in his own language:
“The plan of campaign I adopted during this advantage was to move the army, well in hand, parallel to the Blue Ridge, taking Warrenton as the point of direction for the main army; seizing each pass on the Blue Ridge by detachments, as we approached it, and guarding them after we had passed as long as they would enable the enemy to trouble our communications with the Potomac. It was expected that we would unite with the Eleventh corps and Sickles’s division near Thoroughfare Gap. We depended upon Harper’s Ferry and Berlin for supplies until the Manassas Gap Railway was reached; when that occurred, the passes in the rear were to be abandoned, and the army massed ready for action or movement in any direction.
“It was my intention if upon reaching Ashby’s or any other pass, I found that the enemy were in force between it and the Potomac in the valley of the Shenandoah, to move into the valley and endeavor to gain their rear.
“I hardly hoped to accomplish this, but did expect that by striking in between Culpeper Court-House and Little Washington I could either separate their army and beat them in detail, or else force them to concentrate as far back as Gordonsville, and thus place the army of the Potomac in position either to adopt the Fredericksburgh line of advance upon Richmond, or to be removed to the Peninsula, if, as I apprehended, it were found impossible to supply it by the Orange and Alexandria Railroad beyond Culpeper.”
On the night of November 7th, General McClellan received an order from Washington, relieving him from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and appointing General Burnside to be his successor. This change was immediately consummated. The army, at this time, was in fine condition and spirits, and was strongly posted near Warrenton, its right wing being across the Rappahannock, and its left resting on Manassas Junction, the front extending along the line of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. The rebels, under Longstreet, were massed near Culpeper, and it was apparent that a great battle could not long be deferred. Such was the posture of affairs, when General Burnside assumed command of the Army of the Potomac.
The impressive and affecting words of General McClellan, in reference to this passage in our national history, ought here to find a place. They render a merited tribute to the noble army of patriots, which he had led through so many perils.
“I am devoutly grateful to God that my last campaign with this brave army was crowned with a victory which saved the nation from the greatest peril it had then undergone. I have not accomplished my purpose if, by this report, the army of the Potomac is not placed high on the roll of the historic armies of the world. Its deeds ennoble the nation to which it belongs. Always ready for battle, always firm, steadfast and trustworthy, I never called on it in vain; nor will the nation ever have cause to attribute its want of success, under myself, or under other commanders, to any failure of patriotism or bravery in that noble body of American soldiers.
“No man can justly charge upon any portion of that army, from the Commanding General to the private, any lack of devotion to the service of the United States’ Government, and to the cause of the Constitution and the Union. They have proved their fealty in much sorrow, suffering, danger, and through the very shadow of death. Their comrades dead on all the fields where we fought, have scarcely more claim to the honor of a nation’s reverence than their survivors to the justice of a nation’s gratitude.”
The situation of the respective forces was then as follows: The Federal army, reinforced by the divisions of Generals Sigel and Sickles, who had advanced from Washington, occupied all the region east of the Blue Ridge, with the right resting on Harper’s Ferry, and the left extending nearly to Paris, on the road from Aldie to Winchester. The centre was at Snickersville; with Snicker’s Gap in its possession. The Confederate line was on the south side of the Blue Ridge, with the Shenandoah river immediately in its front, extending from Front Royal down to Charlestown, with the great body of their troops massed between Berryville and Winchester. On November 4th Ashby’s Gap was occupied without opposition by the Federal troops. The cavalry corps, under Colonel Pleasanton, pushed on from Piedmont, and occupied Marguette, holding the approaches to Manassas and Chester Gap, on the left side of the Blue Ridge. The condition and spirit of the army at this time were unequalled by that of any force before organized. On the 6th General McClellan’s headquarters were at Rectortown near Front Royal. The army was steadily advancing and the Confederate force falling back, with some skirmishing. Warrenton was occupied by the Federal troops on the same day. On the 7th a severe snow storm commenced, and continued throughout the day. On the 8th the bridge at Rappahannock Station was taken and held by General Bayard.
The next day was devoted by General McClellan to the transfer of his command to General Burnside. The most cordial feelings existed between the two officers, the latter of whom accepted a promotion which he had before twice declined, only upon the peremptory order of the War Department. On Sunday evening his officers assembled at his tent, for a final parting of commander and officers. It was such a scene of deep feeling as could occur only where officers reposed the highest confidence in their commander, who had led them successfully through some of the most fearful battles of modern wars. Monday was occupied in passing among the various camps, reviewing the troops, and taking a final leave of both officers and men. A spectator of these scenes has summed them up in these words:
“As General McClellan, mounted upon a fine horse, attended by a retinue of fine-looking military men, riding rapidly through the ranks, gracefully recognized and bid a farewell to the army, the cries and demonstrations of the men were beyond bounds—wild, impassioned, and unrestrained. Disregarding all military forms they rushed from their ranks and thronged around him with the bitterest complaints against those who had removed from command their beloved leader.”
On the next day, the 10th, he withdrew, taking the railroad cars at Warrenton. On reaching Warrenton Junction a salute was fired. The troops, which had been drawn up in line, afterward broke ranks, when the soldiers crowded around him and many eagerly called for a few parting words. He said in response, while on the platform of the railroad depot, “I wish you to stand by General Burnside as you have stood by me, and all will be well. Good-bye.” To this there was a spontaneous and enthusiastic response.
The troops were also drawn up in line at Bristow’s Station and Manassas Junction, where salutes were fired and he was complimented with enthusiastic cheers. On reaching Washington he proceeded immediately to the depot, and passed on to Philadelphia and Trenton, where he arrived early on the 12th.
What was now the military aspect? The movement of General McClellan’s army, after crossing the Potomac, was towards Gordonsville. This made a movement on the part of the Confederate general Lee necessary in order to prevent the Federal army from getting between him and Richmond. For this purpose he attempted to move from Winchester through the gaps of the Blue Ridge to Culpeper. The larger part of his force had passed through, when the gaps were taken and held by General McClellan. At the same time General Sigel had advanced from Washington, and lay near the Blue Ridge, covering at once Washington, observing the gaps to the Rappahannock, and protecting the railroad communication to that river. The bridge at Rappahannock Station had already been seized by the cavalry, under General Bayard. The available force of General McClellan was about one hundred and twenty thousand men; that of General Lee consisted of about sixty thousand able men at Culpepper and Gordonsville, and thirty thousand in the Shenandoah Valley, near Strasburg. The distance from Warrenton to Gordonsville is about fifty miles, and from Warrenton to the Rapidan, thirty-five miles; from Strasburg to Gordonsville, by Staunton and Charlottesville, one hundred and thirty-five miles; and by the only other practicable route, one northwest of Gordonsville, and perpendicular to General McClellan’s line of advance, about one hundred miles. In his position it was necessary for General Lee to defend the line of the Rapidan, or endeavor to effect a junction with the force in the Shenandoah Valley, under General Jackson, or fall back upon Richmond, in a country without a line of defence, with General McClellan close upon him, leaving General Jackson to shift for himself. The defence of the Rapidan was impracticable from the course of the river from the Alexandria railroad to the Blue Ridge. The efforts to join General Jackson would have uncovered Richmond, and the attempt to fall back on Richmond would have at least hazarded the demoralization of his army, and enabled General McClellan to turn the defensible parts of the Rappahannock, and the line of the North Anna. The appointment of General Burnside was followed by the organization of a portion of the army into divisions, and a movement to concentrate it at Fredericksburg.