GENERAL BURNSIDE TAKES COMMAND OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
November 10, 1862.
On the 12th of November General Burnside issued the following address to the army:
In accordance with General Orders, No. 182, issued by the President of the United States, I hereby assume command of the Army of the Potomac. Patriotism, and the exercise of every energy in the direction of this army, aided by the full and hearty cooperation of its officers and men, will, I hope, under the blessing of God, insure its success.
Having been a sharer of the privations, and a witness of the bravery of the old Army of the Potomac in the Maryland campaign, and fully identified with them in their feelings of respect and esteem for General McClellan, entertained through a long and most friendly association with him, I feel that it is not as a stranger I assume command.
To the Ninth army corps, so long and intimately associated with me, I need say nothing. Our histories are identical. With diffidence for myself, but with a proud confidence in the unswerving loyalty and determination of the gallant army now intrusted to my care, I accept its control, with the steadfast assurance that the just cause must prevail.
This was a position that was by no means coveted by General Burnside. He well knew the difficulties and responsibilities of the office, and expressed his misgivings of his ability to perform its duties. But he was a brave and gallant soldier, and had already won the confidence of the Government, and the admiration of his companions in-arms. It was only after mature deliberation, and the consultation and advice of the principal corps commanders that he consented to take upon himself the chief command. In this determination he recognized the soldier’s duty of obedience as a paramount consideration.
On the 12th the general-in-chief, (Halleck) and General Meigs proceeded from Washington to the headquarters to confer with General Burnside. On the same day the advance of the army was across the Rappahannock and fifteen miles south of Warrenton. On the 14th General Burnside issued the following order reorganizing a portion of army:
First. The organization of a part of this array in three grand divisions is hereby announced. These grand divisions will be formed and commanded as follows:
The Second and Ninth Corps will form the right grand division, and will be commanded by Major-General E. V. Sumner.
The First and Sixth Corps will form the left grand division, and will be commanded by Major-General W. B. Franklin.
The Third and Fifth Corps will form the centre grand division, and will be commanded by Major-General Joseph Hooker.
The Eleventh Corps, with such others as may hereby be assigned to it, will constitute a reserve force, under the command of Major-General F. Sigel.
Assignments of cavalry and further details will be announced in future orders.
Meanwhile the mass of General Lee’s forces retired to Gordonsville. On the 16th the forces of General Burnside began to move for Fredericksburg, as had been previously determined in consultation on the 12th between Generals Halleck and Burnside. On the 15th the evacuation of Warrenton and the adjacent places was commenced, and by the morning of the 18th it was entirely completed. The advance was led by General Sumner. At the same time supplies were sent to Acquia Creek, and the repairs of the railroad track to Fredericksburg commenced, and the army concentrated at Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg.
The march to Richmond was to be made by the route from Fredericksburg. This city is on the south bank of the Rappahannock, and sixty-five miles distant from Richmond. It is connected with the latter place by a railroad, of which there is a double line nearly to Hanover Junction, twenty-three miles from Richmond. The railroad crosses the Matapony river at Milford, thirty-seven miles from Fredericksburg, and the Pamunkey, twenty-five miles from Richmond, besides a number of smaller streams. Between Falmouth, where the Federal army concentrated, and Richmond, there are two main and two minor lines of defence. The first that of the Rappahannock river. Above Falmouth its abrupt banks, which are lined with high hills, difficult of access, and its narrow fords and rocky bottom render a rapid crossing for a large force almost impossible. Below, the valley of the river expands, spreading often into spacious plains, while the winding course of the stream forms numerous necks of land, easily commanded from the north side, and giving secure crossing places, and ample ground for the formation of troops. At Fredericksburg the north commands the south bank, and much of the distance, which is a mile and a half, to the frowning hills or table land beyond. But these heights equally command this intermediate plain, and are unassailable in front except by infantry. Next in the rear, and twelve miles distant, is the line of the Po river and Stannard’s Marsh, which is hardly available except to hold a pursuing foe in check. The North Anna is about forty miles from the Rappahannock, and affords another principal line of defence. It is a deep and rapid stream, with a narrow valley. The table-land on its north bank is about one hundred feet above the bed of the river, and about one hundred and fifty feet on the south bank. The extension of its line after it turns to join the South Anna, and becomes the Pamunkey, presents scarcely less obstacles than the river itself, so well is the ground guarded by swamps and flanked by streams. The last and a minor line of defence is the South Anna river, with the southern commanded by the northern bank, and too near the North Anna for a second formation by a force that has been badly defeated. Numerous small streams parallel to the line of advance present suitable points for resistance, and protect foes attacking the line communication, while the bridges over them are weak points necessary to be securely guarded.
By the 20th a considerable force had reached Falmouth. General Sumner on the next day sent a summons to surrender, which elicited a correspondence from Mayor Slaughter, showing that the town was at the mercy of the combatants, and beyond the control of the city authorities.
As General Burnside’s army concentrated on the north bank, General Lee’s forces concentrated on the heights in the rear of Fredericksburg. Had the pontoon bridges been at hand when the advance reached Falmouth, the line of the Rappahannock would have been taken without opposition. Then, with proper supplies and bridges, thirty of the sixty miles to Richmond would have been placed within the reach of General Burnside, and perhaps a lodgment have been effected on the banks of the North Anna. Nearly thirty days elapsed before the pontoons arrived and the bridges were completed.
It was the design of General Burnside that the pontoons should leave Alexandria on November 11, and arrive at Falmouth at the same time with the advance of his army. The right grand division reached Falmouth on November 17. The pontoons left Alexandria on November 19, and arrived at Fredericksburgh after the movements of General Burnside had not only become known, but after General Lee had advanced his forces from Gordonsville to the heights in the rear of Fredericksburg, and had fortified them. They were not used until the night of December 10, owing to material changes in the plan of the commander-in-chief, necessitated by new movements of the enemy.
During the night of the 10th of December, therefore, the pontoons were conveyed to the river, and the artillery to the number of one hundred and forty-three pieces was placed in position opposite the city. Between four and five o’clock on the morning of the 11th, the work of building four bridges was commenced. One was to be made at the point where the railroad bridge formerly crossed, and two others opposite the city but nearer Falmouth, and the fourth nearly two miles below for the crossing of the left wing under General Franklin. A dull haze so obscured the movement, that it was not discovered for some time by the Confederate pickets. The bridges were thus partly constructed, when a brisk and deadly fire of musketry from along the banks of the river and windows of the houses was opened, which compelled the workmen to stop. They fled to the cover of the surrounding hills where they formed again, and about six o’clock the work was recommenced. The Confederates had now become aroused to a sense of what was going forward, and with reinforcements of sharpshooters swarmed the opposite bank and houses. The pontonniers, nothing daunted by the hot fire poured upon them, went bravely to work. A storm of bullets covered them. The planks and boats were riddled by every volley. Once more they were compelled to withdraw, and again fell back to the cover of the ridge of hills running parallel with the river. Orders were now given to the artillery to open fire on the city. The Federal batteries commenced an almost simultaneous bombardment, directing their fire chiefly at the houses in which the sharpshooters had concealed themselves. At the first fire they became untenable, and the riflemen retreated to the rear of the town, and took shelter behind the buildings unharmed. The fire of the artillery, which commenced at seven o’clock, was continued incessantly until one o’clock. The fog somewhat obscured its results, but bodies of the Confederates with great stubbornness still kept within the city. The Confederate batteries on the heights in the rear continued silent. Not a gun was fired. About ten o’clock, the workmen were again formed for a third attempt to build the bridges. Volunteers joined them from the Eighth Connecticut. Some planks were seized and carried out to the end of a string of boats and placed in position, when a galling fire from sharpshooters in rifle pits near the edge of the water again interrupted them, and they were recalled. Meantime the bombardment was continued, and several houses in the city had taken fire. In the afternoon, several pontoon boats, loaded with volunteers from the Seventh Michigan and Nineteenth Massachusetts, were sent over. They chased the Confederate sharpshooters from their hiding places, and the bridges were finished without further interruption. On the other side a scene of destruction presented itself. The walls of houses were breached, roofs had fallen in, and the interiors were destroyed.
No sooner were the bridges completed than the troops began to cross, and before dusk General Sumner’s grand division had gone over, and a section of General Hooker’s. All had rations for three days, and blankets for a bivouac. The grand division of General Franklin, consisting of the corps of General Reynolds and Smith, crossed over at the lower bridge, which was built earlier in the day, without interruption, as there was a plain before it which the artillery could have easily swept. The troops commenced crossing again early on the morning of the 12th without molestation. Some sharp resistance had been made by the Confederate soldiers to those who crossed on the previous day, but those were driven out of the city, or killed. During the afternoon fire was opened upon the city by the Confederate batteries on the nearest heights, which was replied to by the Federal batteries, and soon ceased. The occupation of Fredericksburg had now been successfully made. No greater opposition had been presented by the forces of General Lee than was sufficient to tempt the Federal troops to press forward with greater ardor.
The next movement was to drive the Confederate forces from their positions on the heights. These positions consisted of two lines of batteries, one a mile in rear of the other, and both overlooking the city. They extended, in the form of a semicircle, from Port Royal to a point about six miles above Fredericksburg. Their right wing, under General Jackson, extended from Port Royal to Guinney’s Station on the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad; the centre, under General Longstreet, extended to the telegraph road; the left, under General Stuart, was west of Massaponax creek. A reserve corps was commanded by General A. P. Hill. This was the force which had fought at Richmond and in Maryland.
Friday night and Saturday morning, the 13th, were spent by General Burnside in making a proper disposition of his forces. The left was occupied by General Franklin with his grand division, the centre by General Hooker, and the right by General Sumner.
The right of General Franklin rested on the outskirts of the city, his centre was advanced about a mile from the river, and his left was on the Rappahannock, about three miles below. The action commenced on the extreme left by an annoying fire from a rebel battery, which the Ninth New York was ordered to charge and capture. In this attempt they were repulsed. A brigade was brought to their aid by General Tyler, and another attempt made, but the fire was so deadly that it failed of success. The battle now became more general, and another attempt was made to capture the battery. No advantage was gained at this time, but a severe loss was suffered. The conflict now extended along the whole line of the left, and a desperate effort was made to drive the Confederates across the Massaponax creek by turning their position. The ground was contested most obstinately, but the Confederates gradually fell back, occasionally making a most desperate stand, until night, when General Franklin had succeeded in gaining nearly a mile, and his troops occupied the field. The right of General Franklin’s division, under General Reynolds, encountered the fire of the Confederate artillery on the heights, and although the conflict was most deadly, no advantage was gained.
On the right, under command of General Sumner, the action commenced about ten o’clock and was furious during the rest of the day. The Confederate forces occupied the woods and hills in the rear of the city, from which it soon became evident they could not be driven except at the point of the bayonet. The charge was ordered to be made by the division of General French supported by that of General Howard. Steadily the troops moved across the plain, until they were within a dozen yards of the ridge, when they were suddenly met by a galling fire from the Confederate infantry posted behind a stone wall. For a few minutes the head of the column exhibited some confusion; but quickly forming into line it retired back to a ravine within musket shot of the rebels. Here they were reinforced by fresh troops who fearlessly advanced to their aid under a most destructive fire of artillery. The line of assault was now formed again, and with bayonets fixed and a double quick step, they rushed forward to seize the Confederate artillery. From the first step they encountered a terrific fire of infantry and artillery. No veterans could face that shock. They were thrown into confusion and brought to a sudden halt. At this juncture the centre quivered, faltered, and fled in disorder, but was afterwards rallied and brought back. Three times was the attack thus made to dislodge those batteries. But each time it was in vain. The ranks of the storming party, shrunk to small limits, retired. The entire force of his artillery was now brought by General Sumner to bear upon the enemy, and thus the contest was kept up until dark. At night the Confederate force occupied their original position, and the wounded and the dead remained where they had fallen. Every attempt to remove them by the Federal troops was defeated by the rebel infantry.
In the centre under the command of General Hooker, skirmishing commenced early in the morning; and during the forenoon, while the fog prevailed, a terrific contest, chiefly with artillery, was kept up on both sides. The Confederate position appeared to be invulnerable to artillery, and about noon preparations were made for storming it. The troops marched steadily up within musket shot of the batteries, and were there met by such a destructive fire of artillery and rifles as drove them back with a heavy loss. Reinforcements were obtained, and the attempt to take the batteries was repeated in the afternoon, but without success. The contest continued with great fierceness until night. About half past five the firing of the musketry ceased, but that of the artillery continued until long after dark.
On the next day, Sunday the 14th, both armies remained comparatively quiet. Some skirmishing and artillery fire took place for a short time.
On Monday, both armies continued in the same position. The Confederates had strengthened some of their works. During the ensuing night, the army evacuated Fredericksburg and retired across the river to its former position. The artillery crossed first, followed by the infantry, the last of whom left about daylight. The pontoon bridges were then removed and all communication cut off. The movement was not perceived by the Confederates until it was too late to do any injury to the retreating force. The following is the despatch of General Burnside announcing this movement:
Major-General Halleck: The army was withdrawn to this side of the river because I felt the position in front could not be carried, and it was a military necessity either to attack or retire. A repulse would have been disastrous to us. The army was withdrawn at night, without the knowledge of the enemy, and without loss either of property or men.
The Federal loss was as follows: General Sumner’s division on the right, killed, four hundred and seventy-three; wounded, four thousand and ninety; missing, seven hundred and forty-eight. Total, five thousand three hundred and eleven.
General Hooker’s division on the centre, killed, three hundred and twenty-six; wounded, two thousand four hundred and sixty-eight; missing, seven hundred and fifty-four. Total, three thousand five hundred and forty-eight.
General Franklin’s division on the left, killed, three hundred and thirty-nine; wounded, two thousand five hundred and forty-seven; missing, five hundred and seventy-six. Total, three thousand four hundred and sixty-two. Grand total, killed, one thousand one hundred and thirty-eight; wounded, nine thousand one hundred and five; missing, two thousand and seventy-eight. Total, twelve thousand three hundred and twenty-one.
The Confederate loss was comparatively small, having been sheltered by their works.
General Burnside in his report to the general-in-chief, thus explains his defeat:
“How near we came to the accomplishment of our object future reports will show. But for the fog, and the unexpected and unavoidable delay in building the bridges, which gave the enemy twenty-four hours to concentrate his forces in his strong position, we would almost certainly have succeeded, in which case the battle would have been, in my opinion, far more decisive than if we had crossed at the places first selected. As it was, we came very near success. Failing in the accomplishment of the main object, we remained in order of battle two days, long enough to decide that the enemy would not come out of his strongholds to fight me with his infantry, after which we recrossed to this side of the river unmolested, without the loss of men or property.
“As the day broke our long lines of troops were seen marching to their different positions as if going on parade—not the least demoralization or disorganization existed.
“To the brave officers and soldiers who accomplished the feat of thus recrossing in the face of the enemy, I owe everything. For the failure in the attack, I am responsible, as the extreme gallantry, courage, and endurance shown by them were never exceeded, and would have carried the points had it been possible.
“To the families and friends of the dead I can only offer my heartfelt sympathies, but for the wounded I can offer my earnest prayer for their comfort and final recovery.
“The fact that I decided to move from Warrenton on this line rather against the opinion of the President, Secretary of War, and yourself, and that you have left the whole movement in my hands, without giving me orders, makes me the more responsible.”
Thus closed the third campaign against Richmond. No further hostile demonstrations were made by either army during the year.