MESSAGE COMMUNICATED TO THE TWO HOUSES OF CONGRESS, FEBRUARY 19, 1906
To the Senate and House of Representatives:
I submit herewith the letter of the Secretary of War transmitting the report of the Board of Consulting Engineers on the Panama Canal, and the report of the Isthmian Canal Commission thereon, together with a letter written to the Chairman of the Isthmian Canal Commission by Chief Engineer Stevens. Both the Board of Consulting Engineers and the Canal Commission divide in their report. The majority of the Board of Consulting Engineers, eight in number, including the five foreign engineers, favor a sea-level canal; and one member of the Canal Commission, Admiral Endicott, takes the same view. Five of the eight American members of the Board of Consulting Engineers and five members of the Isthmian Canal Commission favor the lock canal, and so does Chief Engineer Stevens. The Secretary of War recommends a lock canal pursuant to the recommendation of the minority of the Board of Consulting Engineers and of the majority of the Canal Commission. After careful study of the papers submitted and full and exhaustive consideration of the whole subject, I concur in this recommendation.
It will be noticed that the American engineers on the consulting board and on the commission by a more than two to one majority favor the lock canal, whereas the foreign engineers are a unit against it. I think this is partly to be explained by the fact that the great traffic canal of the Old World is the Suez Canal, a sea-level canal, whereas the great traffic canal of the New World is the Sault Ste. Marie Canal, a lock canal. Although the latter, the Soo, is closed to navigation during the winter months, it carries annually three times the traffic of the Suez Canal. In my judgment the very able argument of the majority of the Board of Consulting Engineers is vitiated by their failure to pay proper heed to the lessons taught by the construction and operation of the Soo Canal. It must be borne in mind, as the Commission points out, that there is no question of building what has been picturesquely termed “the Straits of Panama”; that is, a waterway through which the largest vessels could go with safety at uninterrupted high speed. Both the sea-level canal and the proposed lock canal would be too narrow and shallow to be called with any truthfulness a strait, or to have any of the properties of a wide, deep water strip. Both of them would be canals, pure and simple. Each type has certain disadvantages and certain advantages. But in my judgment the disadvantages are fewer and the advantages very much greater in the case of a lock canal substantially as proposed in the papers forwarded herewith; and I call especial attention to the fact that the Chief Engineer, who will be mainly responsible for the success of this mighty engineering feat, and who has therefore a peculiar personal interest in judging aright, is emphatically and earnestly in favor of the lock-canal project and against the sea-level project.
A careful study of the reports seems to establish a strong probability that the following are the facts: The sea-level canal would be slightly less exposed to damage in the event of war; the running expenses, apart from the heavy cost of interest on the amount employed to build it, would be less; and for small ships the time of transit would probably be less. On the other hand, the lock canal at a level of eighty feet or thereabout would not cost much more than half as much to build and could be built in about half the time, while there would be very much less risk connected with building it, and for large ships the transit would be quicker; while, taking into account the interest on the amount saved in building, the actual cost of maintenance would be less. After being built it would be easier to enlarge the lock canal than the sea-level canal. Moreover, what has been actually demonstrated in making and operating the great lock canal, the Soo, a more important artery of traffic than the great sea-level canal, the Suez, goes to support the opinion of the minority of the Consulting Board of Engineers and of the majority of the Isthmian Canal Commission as to the superior safety, feasibility, and desirability of building a lock canal at Panama.
The law now on our statute books seems to contemplate a lock canal. In my judgment a lock canal as herein recommended is advisable. If the Congress directs that a sea-level canal be constructed its direction will of course be carried out. Otherwise the canal will be built on substantially the plan for a lock canal outlined in the accompanying papers, such changes being made of course as may be found actually necessary; including possibly the change recommended by the Secretary of War as to the site of the dam on the Pacific side.