Such anomalous results are not confined to this country; they are but examples of that inversion of national opinion which marks at all stages the history of elections based on the majority system. Speaking of the United States, Professor Commons says that "as a result of the district system the national House of Representatives is scarcely a representative body. In the fifty-first Congress, which enacted the McKinley Tariff Law, the majority of the representatives were elected by a minority of the voters." In the fifty-third Congress, elected in 1892, the Democrats, with 47.2 per cent, of the vote, obtained 59.8 per cent, of the representatives.
The stupendous Republican victory of 1894 was equally unjustified; the Republican majority of 134 should have been a minority of 7, as against all other parties.[8] Similarly in New South Wales the supporters of Mr. Reid's government, who secured a majority of the seats at the election of 1898, were in a minority of 15,000. The figures of the New York Aldermanic election of 1906 show an equally striking contrast between the actual results of the election and the probable results under a proportional system:—
A "game of dice."
Parties. Seats Seats in
Obtained. proportion
to Votes.
Republican 41 18
Democrat 26 27
Municipal Ownership
Candidates 6 25
Socialist — 2
It is unnecessary to proceed with the recital of the anomalous results of existing electoral methods. It has been abundantly shown that a General Election often issues in a gross exaggeration of prevailing opinion; that such exaggeration may at one time involve a complete suppression of the minority, whilst at another time a majority may fail to obtain its fair share of representation. M. Poincaré may well liken an election to a game of dice (he speaks of les coups de dé du système majoritaire,) for no one who has followed the course of elections could have failed to have observed how largely the final results have depended upon chance. This, indeed, was the most striking characteristic of the General Elections of 1910. In the January election there were 144 constituencies in which the successful member was returned by a majority of less than 500. Of these constituencies 69 seats were held by the Ministerialists and 75 by the Unionists. The majorities were in some cases as low as 8, 10, and 14. The aggregate of the majorities in the Ministerialist constituencies amounted to 16,931, and had some 8500 Liberals in these constituencies changed sides, the Ministerialist majority of 124 might have been annihilated. On the other hand, the Unionists held 75 seats by an aggregate majority of 17,389, and had fortune favoured the Ministeralists in these constituencies their majority would have been no less than 274. Such is the stability of the foundation on which the House of Commons rests; such the method to which we trust when it is necessary to consult the nation on grave national issues.
The importance of boundaries.
All these anomalies can be traced to the same cause—that with a single-member system the whole of the representation of a constituency must necessarily be to the majority of the electors, whether that majority be large or small. It directly follows that the results of elections often depend not so much upon the actual strength of political parties, as upon the manner in which that strength is distributed over the country. If that strength is evenly distributed, then the minority may be crushed in every constituency; if unevenly distributed any result is possible. In the latter case the result may be considerably influenced by the manner in which the constituencies are arranged. A slight change in the line of the boundaries of a constituency might easily make a difference of 50 votes, whilst "to carry the dividing line from North to South, instead of from East to West, would, in many localities, completely alter the character of the representation." [9] An example will make this statement clear. Take a town with 13,000 Liberal and 12,000 Conservative electors and divide it into five districts of 5000 electors each. If there is a section of the town in which the Liberals largely preponderate—and it often happens that the strength of one or other of the parties is concentrated in a particular area—the net result of the election in five districts will depend upon the way in which the boundary lines are drawn. The possible results of two different distributions may be shown in an extreme form thus:—
Constituency Libs. Cons. 1st. 4,000 1,000 Lib. victory. 2nd. 2,400 2,600 Cons. " 3rd. 2,300 2,700 " " 4th. 2,200 2,800 " " 5th. 2,100 2,900 " " ——— ——— 13,000 12,000
Constituency Libs. Cons. 1st. 2,600 2,400 Lib. victory. 2st. 2,600 2,400 Lib. " 3st. 2,600 2,400 Lib. " 4th. 2,600 2,400 Lib. " 5th. 2,600 2,400 Lib. " ——— ——— 13,000 12,000
The gerrymander.
With one set of boundaries the area in which the Liberals largely preponderate might be enclosed in one constituency. The Liberals might obtain a majority of 3000 in this constituency but lose the other four seats. If, however, the boundary lines were so arranged that each constituency included a portion of this excessively Liberal area, the Liberals might obtain the whole of the five seats. In both cases the result of the election would fail to give a true presentation of the real opinions of the town. The influence of boundaries in determining the results of an election has been clearly realized in the United States for more than a century. Professor Commons states that whenever the periodical rearrangement of constituencies takes place the boundaries are "gerrymandered." "Every apportionment Act," says he, "that has been passed in this or any other country has involved inequality; and it would be absurd to ask a political party to pass such an Act, and give the advantage of the inequality to the opposite party. Consequently, every apportionment Act involves more or less of the gerrymander. The gerrymander is simply such a thoughtful construction of districts as will economize the votes of the party in power by giving it small majorities in a large number of districts, and coop up the opposing party with overwhelming majorities in a small number of districts…. Many of the worst gerrymanders have been so well designed that they come close within all constitutional requirements." [10] Although the National Congress has stated that the district for congressional elections must be a compact and contiguous territory, the law is everywhere disregarded.
The word "gerrymander" has found its way into English journalism. It was used by Liberals in their criticism of Mr. Balfour's abortive redistribution scheme of 1905, and has been equally used by Unionists in 1909 in their criticism of Mr. Harcourt's London Elections Bill. On neither occasion was the word used in its original meaning, and, although its history is to be found in most works on electoral methods, the story may, perhaps, be repeated with advantage:—
"The term Gerrymander dates from the year 1811, when Elbridge Gerry was Governor of Massachusetts, and the Democratic, or, as it was then termed, the Republican party, obtained a temporary ascendency in the State. In order to secure themselves in the possession of the Government, the party in power passed the famous law of 11 February 1812, providing for a new division of the State into senatorial districts, so contrived that in as many districts as possible the Federalists should be outnumbered by their opponents. To effect this all natural and customary lines were disregarded, and some parts of the State, particularly the counties of Worcester and Essex, presented similar examples of political geography. It is said that Gilbert Stuart, seeing in the office of the Columbian Centinel an outline of the Essex outer district, nearly encircling the rest of the country, added with his pencil a beak to Salisbury, and claws to Salem and Marblehead, exclaiming, 'There, that will do for a salamander!' 'Salamander!' said Mr. Russell, the editor: 'I call it a Gerrymander!' The mot obtained vogue, and a rude cut of the figure published in the Centinel and in the Salem Gazette, with the natural history of the monster duly set forth, served to fix the word in the political vocabulary of the country. So efficient was the law that at the elections of 1812, 50,164 Democratic voters elected twenty-nine senators against eleven elected by 51,766 Federalists; and Essex county, which, when voting as a single district had sent five Federalists to the Senate, was now represented in that body by three Democrats and two Federalists." [11]
Mr. Balfour's scheme did not involve a political rearrangement of boundaries, and the word "gerrymandering" was thus incorrectly employed in relation to it, but so long as we retain a system of single-member constituencies a Redistribution Bill will always invite suspicion because of the possibilities of influencing the arrangement of constituencies which such a measure affords. Instructions are usually given to boundary commissioners to attach due consideration "to community or diversity of interests, means of communication, physical features, existing electoral boundaries, sparsity or density of population;" [12] but although such instructions are at once reasonable and just, they would not prevent, and indeed might be used to facilitate, a gerrymander in the American sense of the term were such a proceeding determined upon. It is quite conceivable that a mining district in which one party had a very large majority might be surrounded by an area in which the political conditions were more balanced, but in which the opposite party had a small majority. If that mining area was, in accordance with the wording of these instructions, treated as one constituency because of its community of interests and the surrounding area divided into three or more districts, the minority would in all probability obtain a majority of seats.
The modern gerrymander
The new constituencies required by the South Africa Act of 1909 have been arranged with the utmost care,[13] but had the delegates to the South African National Convention adhered to their original proposal to abandon single-member constituencies, they would have secured for South Africa, among other invaluable benefits, complete security from the gerrymander, any possibility of which begets suspicion and reacts in a disastrous way upon political warfare. The gerrymander is nothing more or less than a fraudulent practice. But the United States is not the only country in which such practices take place. Their counter-part in Canada was described by Sir John Macdonald as "hiving the grits," and even in England, without any change of boundaries, practices have arisen within the last few years which have had their birth in the same motives that produced the American gerrymander. In boroughs which are divided into more than one constituency there is a considerable number of voters who have qualifications in more than one division. A man may vote in any division in which he has a qualification, but in not more than one. He may make his choice. In Edinburgh for many years, on both sides of politics, there has been a constant transfer of voters from one register to another in the hopes of strengthening the party's position in one or other division. It was even alleged that the precise moment of a vacancy in West Edinburgh (May 1909) was determined by the desire to ascertain the strength of the Unionist party in that division, to discover how many Unionist votes should be transferred for the purpose of improving Unionist prospects or of defeating the designs of their opponents. This allegation may be wholly unfounded, but the single-member system encourages such a proceeding, and the statement at least indicates how the voting power of a division may be manipulated. The mere possibility of such an action arouses the suspicion that it has taken place. Similar practices have, it is stated, been pursued in Bristol. Votes have been transferred from one division, where one of the parties was in a hopeless minority, for the purpose of strengthening its position in other divisions. An examination of the figures of the election in Birmingham in 1906 shows that in one division, Birmingham East, the Unionists narrowly escaped defeat. They won by a majority of 585 only. In the other divisions the Unionists won by very large majorities. Must not the possibility of transferring surplus votes in strong constituencies to strengthen the position in weak constituencies prove an irresistible temptation to the agents responsible for the success of the party? They are entitled to make use of all the advantages at their disposal. In this way a new and more subtle form of the "gerrymander" has arisen in England, and if we are to redeem English political warfare from proceedings which approximate very closely to sharp practices, we must so amend our electoral system as to give due weight to the votes not only of the majority but of the minority as well.
The Block Vote
The analysis of the results of majority systems would not be complete without some reference to the use of the "block" vote in the London County Council, the London Borough Council, and other elections. In the London County Council elections each constituency returns two members, and each elector can give one vote to each of two candidates. The Metropolitan boroughs are divided into wards returning from three to nine members, each elector giving one vote apiece to candidates up to the number to be returned. [14] Both in the London County and London Borough elections the majority, as in a single-member constituency, can obtain the whole of the representation. All the defects which arise from parliamentary elections again appear, and often in a more accentuated form. The figures of the two London County elections, 1904, 1907, disclose a catastrophic change in representation similar to that which characterized the General Election of 1906:—
LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL ELECTION, 1904
Seats in
Parties. Votes. Seats proportion
Obtained. to Votes.
Progressive and Labour 357,557 83 64
Moderate 287,079 34 52
Independent 12,940 1 2
Progressive majority over
Moderates 70,478 49 12
LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL ELECTION, 1907
Seats in
Parties. Votes. Seats proportion
Obtained. to Votes.
Moderate 526,700 79 67
Progressive and Labour 395,749 38 50
Independent 6,189 1 1
Moderate majority over
Progressive and Labour 130,951 41 17
The London County Council elections.
A swing of the pendulum which, measured in votes, would have transferred a majority of twelve into a minority of seventeen, had the effect of changing a majority of 49 into a minority of 41. This alternate exaggeration of the prevailing tendencies in municipal politics gives rise to a false impression of the real opinions of the elector. The citizens of London are not so unstable as the composition of their Council, but it is the more violent displacement which forms the basis of comment in the press and of municipal action. These elections, too, like the Parliamentary elections, showed with what ease the minority throughout large areas may be deprived of representation. Six adjoining suburban boroughs—Brixton, Norwood, Dulwich, Lewisham, Greenwich, Woolwich—were, before the election of 1907, represented by twelve Progressives. At that election they returned twelve Moderates; indeed on that occasion the outer western and southern boroughs, in one continuous line from Hampstead to Fulham, from Wandsworth to Woolwich, returned Moderates and Moderates only.
The election of aldermen of the L.C.C.
The London County Council elections of 1910 gave the Municipal Reform party a majority of two councillors over the Progressive and Labour parties. The transfer of a single vote in Central Finsbury would have been sufficient to have produced an exact balance. It was the duty of the new Council to elect the aldermen, the block vote being used. The majority of two was sufficient to enable the Municipal Reformers to carry the election of every one of the ten candidates nominated by them, thus depriving the minority of any voice in the election of aldermen. The object for which aldermen were instituted was entirely set at naught, and this the method of election alone made possible. The privilege of selecting aldermen was used by the party in power, not for the purpose of strengthening the Council by the addition of representative men, but for the purpose of strengthening the party position.[15] The privilege has been abused in a similar way by the English provincial boroughs. In these boroughs, prior to the Election of Aldermen Act, 1910, aldermen as well as councillors took part in the election of aldermen. In some cases a party having once obtained a predominant position has, by making full use of its power to elect aldermen in sympathy with itself, succeeded in perpetuating its predominance, although defeated at the polls. The minority of the councillors, with the assistance of the non-retiring aldermen, has not only elected further aldermen from members of the same party, but has controlled the policy of the Council. The Act referred to merely prevents aldermen in municipal councils from voting in the election of other aldermen, but does not go to the root of the evil. An alteration in the method of election is required.
[Sidenote 1: The election of Representative Peers of Scotland.]
A further example of the use of the block vote may be taken from the election of Scottish Representative Peers. At the commencement of each Parliament the Scottish Peers meet in Holyrood Palace for the purpose of electing sixteen of their number to represent the peerage of Scotland in the Parliament of the United Kingdom. The Unionist Peers are in a majority, and the block vote enables them to choose sixteen Unionist Peers. At the election of January 1910 Lord Torphichen, a Unionist Peer, who had voted against his party on the Finance Bill of the previous year, failed to secure re-election. Lord Torphichen was elected in the following December, but the incident shows how complete is the power conferred upon the majority by this method of election; not only political opponents but dissenting members of the same party can be excluded from representation.
The Australian Senate.
The block vote is used also in the election of members of the Australian Senate. Each State elects six senators, half of whom retire every three years. Each State is polled as a separate constituency, and each elector has three votes. At the election of 1910 the Labour Party polled the highest number of votes in each of the States, and thus succeeded in returning eighteen senators, all other parties obtaining none. The figures here given for the elections in Victoria and New South Wales show that in Victoria the successful candidates were not even supported by a majority of electors, and that in both States the excess of the successful over their leading opponents was so small that a slight turn over would have completely altered the result of the elections:—
ELECTION of AUSTRALIAN SENATORS, 1910
Victoria.
Successful. Unsuccessful.
Findley (Lab.)….217,673 Best (Fusionist) ……. 213,976
Barker (Lab.)…..216,199 Trenwith (Fusionist)…. 211,058
Blakey (Lab.)…..215,117 M'Cay (Fusionist) …… 195,477
Goldstein (Independent) 53,583
Ronald (Independent) … 18,380
648,889 692,474
New South Wales.
Successful. Unsuccessful.
A.M'Dougall(Lab.) …, 249,212 J.P. Gray (Fusionist)… 220,569
A. Gardiner (Lab.) … 247,047 E. Pulsford (Fusionist). 214,889
A. Rae (Lab.)……….239,307 J. C. Neild (Fusionist). 212,150
J. Norton (Independ.)… 50,893
R. Mackenzie (Independ.) 13,608
J.O. Maroney (Independ.) 9,660
T. Hoare (Independ.)…. 8,432
735,566 730,201
London Borough Councils
The London Borough Council elections yield results equally unsatisfactory. The Report of the Select Committee of the House of Lords which, in 1907, examined the Municipal Representation Bill introduced by Lord Courtney of Penwith, sums up these results in the following paragraphs:—
"If the different wards are similar in character, the majority, even if little more than one-half, may secure all the seats. For instance, in one borough the Progressives, with 19,430 votes, obtained all the 30 seats, and the Municipal Reformers, though they polled 11,416 votes, did not obtain even one; while, on the contrary, in four other boroughs the Progressives did not secure any representation. "On the other hand, the system does not in all cases secure power to the majority. If the wards are dissimilar and the majority too much condensed in certain districts, the minority may secure a majority of seats, as in the case of one borough where 46,000 votes secured 30 seats, while 54,000 votes only obtained 24.
"The system leads to violent fluctuations. If the two great parties are nearly evenly divided, it is obvious that a comparatively small change may create a revolution in the representation. In Lewisham, at the 1903 election, the Progressives had 34 seats and the Moderates only 6; in 1905, on the other hand, the Municipal Reformers obtained all the 42 seats, and the Progressives failed to secure even one."[16]
One example will suffice to illustrate the findings of this Committee.
Here are the results of two wards in the Borough of Battersea:—
BATTERSEA BOROUGH COUNCIL ELECTION, 1906
Ward Votes Obtained.
Municipal Reform Progressive
Candidates. Candidates.
Shaftesbury 786 905 }
(six seats) 777 902 }
769 899 }all
753 895 }successful.
753 891 }
741 852 }
——- ——-
Totals 4,579 5,344
St. John's 747 } 217
(three seats) 691 }all 197
686 }successful. 191
——- ——-
Totals 2,124 605
Totals for both wards 6,703 5,949
These tables disclose some curious anomalies. Each elector in the Shaftesbury ward has six votes—the ward being entitled to six Councillors—whereas each elector in the St. John's ward, which is only entitled to three Councillors, has but three votes. The additional representation is allotted to the Shaftesbury ward because of its larger electorate, but the only electors to reap any advantage from this fact are the Progressives. The presence in the ward of a large number of citizens who are Municipal Reformers has merely had the effect of increasing the amount of representation obtained by their opponents. Further, the number of Municipal Reformers in the Shaftesbury ward exceeded the number of Municipal Reformers in the St. John's ward; in the former they obtained no representation, in the latter they obtained three seats. The two wards taken together showed a net majority in votes of 754 for the Municipal Reformers who, however, only secured three seats out of nine. Taking the Borough as a whole the Municipal Reformers obtained 24 representatives with 53,910 votes, whereas the Progressives obtained 30 representatives with 46,274 votes.
Provincial Municipal Councils.
Nor are the results of the Provincial Borough elections more satisfactory. These boroughs are usually divided into wards returning three or six members each. One-third of the councillors retire each year, and each ward is called upon to elect one or two councillors, as the case may be. The figures for the Municipal elections held in November 1908, at Manchester, Bradford, and Leeds disclose a similar discrepancy between the votes polled and the seats obtained. [See table below.]
BOROUGH COUNCIL ELECTIONS, 1908
Parties Votes Seats Seats in
Polled. Obtained. proportion
to Votes.
Manchester.
Conservative 25,724 14 10
Independent 11,107 3 4
Liberal 14,474 7 6
Labour and Socialist 15,963 2 6
Bradford.
Conservative 12,809 10 6
Liberal 12,106 6 5
Socialist-Labour 11,388 0 5
Independent 1,709 1 1
Leeds.
Conservative 18,145 8 5
Liberal 19,507 3 5
Socialist-Labour 9,615 1 2
Independent 3,046 1 1
Summary.
The examples given in this chapter may be briefly summarised. The same defects are disclosed in Parliamentary, County Council and Municipal (both metropolitan and provincial) elections. These defects may be classified under three heads: (1) often a gross exaggeration of the strength of the victorious party; (2) sometimes a complete disfranchisement of the minority; and (3) at other times a failure of a majority of citizens to obtain their due share of representation. In addition, running through all the results, there is an element of instability due to the fact that a slight change in public opinion may produce an altogether disproportionate effect, the violence of the swing of the pendulum arising more from the electoral method than from the fickleness of the electorate. These defects all spring from the same root cause—that the representation of any constituency is awarded to the majority of the electors in that constituency irrespective of the size of the majority; that the votes of the minority count for nothing. The result of a General Election is thus often dependent not upon the relative strengths of political forces, but upon the chance way in which those forces are distributed, and in a considerable measure may be influenced by the way in which the boundaries of constituencies are drawn. Such a system invites and encourages gerrymandering, both in its original and modern forms, but this detestable practice can be made of no avail and the results of elections rendered trustworthy if we so reform present methods as to give due weight to the strength of each political party irrespective of the way in which that strength may be distributed.
[Footnote 1: Reply to Deputation, House of Commons, 10 November 1908.]
[Footnote 2: Mr. Corbett's analyses were accepted by the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems as "representing the truth as nearly as circumstances will permit."—Report, p. 31.]
[Footnote 3: There is a marked difference between the electoral conditions of Great Britain and Ireland, but as the Government of the day depends for support upon a majority of the representatives of all parts of the kingdom, the figures here given are those for the United Kingdom.]
[Footnote 4: Mr. Gladstone, in introducing the Redistribution of Seats Bill, 1 December 1884, said: "The recommendations of this system (one-member districts) I think are these—that it is very economical, it is very simple, and it goes a very long way towards that which many gentlemen have much at heart, viz., what is roughly termed representation of minorities."—Hansard, 3rd series, vol. 294, p. 379.]
[Footnote 5: Other examples are given in Appendix V. The representation of minorities varies very considerably in amount, and, as shown in the Appendix, depends not upon their size but upon the way in which they are distributed over the electoral area.]
[Footnote 6: The basis of calculation, as explained by Mr. Rooke Corbett, is as follows: "It seems to me reasonable to suppose that those changes of public opinion which affected the contested constituencies affected the uncontested constituencies also, and therefore, in estimating the number of voters in an uncontested constituency, I have assumed that the strength of each party varied from one election to another in the same ratio as in the contested constituencies in the same county."—P. R. Pamphlet, No. 14. Recent Electoral Statistics, p. 5.]
[Footnote 7: These figures are taken from an article by Robert B.
Hayward in The Nineteenth Century, February 1884, p. 295.]
[Footnote 8: Proportional Representation, by Professor Commons, p. 52 et seq. For further examples in the United States the reader should consult Chapter III. of Professor Commons' book.]
[Footnote 9: Preferential Voting, by the Right Hon. J. Parker Smith. p. 8.]
[Footnote 10: Proportional Representation, p. 50.]
[Footnote 11: The Machinery of Politics, W. R. Warn, 1872.]
[Footnote 12: Such instructions are contained in Clause 40 of the South
African Act, signed by the South African National Convention at
Bloemfontein, 11 May 1909.]
[Footnote 13: See Report of Delimitation Commission.]
[Footnote 14: This electoral method is known by various names. In Australia it is called the block vote, in the United States the general ticket, on the Continent the scrutin de liste.]
[Footnote 15: The action was defended on the ground that the Municipal
Reform party had obtained a majority of 39,653 votes at the polls.]
[Footnote 16: Report on Municipal Representation Bill (H.L.), 1907 (132), p. vi.]
CHAPTER III
THE INDIRECT RESULTS OF MAJORITY SYSTEMS
"Nous attachons un intêrét vital, presque aussi grand, à la forme dans laquello on consulte la nation qu'au principe lui-mème du suffrage universel."—GAMBETTA
False impressions of public opinion.
The first and immediate consequence arising from present electoral methods is the growth of false impressions of the true tendencies of public opinion, impressions that are still further distorted by the exaggerations of the press. The winning of a seat is always a "brilliant victory," and a "crushing defeat" for the other side. The German General Election of 1907 affords an excellent illustration of these false impressions. The Social Democrats lost nearly 50 per cent. of their previous representation, and an outburst of delight arose in certain journals over their "crushing defeat." But the Socialists' poll showed an increase of a quarter of a million, and although their total poll had not increased in quite the same proportion as that of other parties, the figures showed that the Social Democrats were still by far the largest party in Germany. The number of seats won were no true index to the movements in political forces. Not only the press, however, but some of the most careful writers on modern tendencies in politics are also misled by these false impressions. The General Election of 1895, in which there was a majority of 117,473 for the Unionists in a total of 4,841,769 votes, is a case in point. This election has often been chosen as marking the commencement of a period of strong reaction in political thought. Writers have been misled by the overwhelming majority in seats obtained by the Unionists at that election. They have entirely ignored the figures of the polls, and these, the only safe guide to the opinions of the electors, show that the reaction was far less strong than is usually supposed.
False impressions become the basis of legislative action.
False impressions of public opinion, however, lead to an indirect effect of much greater importance. The false impression becomes the basis of action, and an apparent triumph for reaction makes a "reactionary" policy much more easy of achievement. Similarly an apparent triumph for a "progressive" policy facilitates its adoption. For the House of Commons is still the most powerful factor in determining our political destinies, and hence these false results have a very material effect in the shaping of history. If the opinion of the people had been truly represented in the Parliaments elected in 1895 and 1900, is it not almost a certainty that the legislation of those two Parliaments would have been considerably modified? Or, to go further back to the election of 1886, the result of which was universally interpreted as a crushing defeat of Mr. Gladstone's proposals in favour of Home Rule, would not a true result on that occasion have influenced subsequent developments? Over-representation, which results in the temporary triumph of a party and of partisan measures, involves the nation in a serious loss, for the time and energy of a Parliament may be largely consumed in revising and correcting, if not in reversing the partisan legislation of its predecessor. Thus, a considerable portion of the time of the Parliament of 1906-1909 was spent in attempting to reverse the policies embodied in the Education and Licensing Acts of the preceding Parliament.
Loss of prestige by the House of Commons.
Apart, however, from speculation as to the effect of false electoral methods on the development of public affairs, the serious divergences between representation and polling strength, to which attention has been directed in the previous chapter, must tend to the weakening of the authority and prestige of the House of Commons. Should a Government, misled by the composition of the "representative" House, make use of its majority in that House for the passage of measures not really desired by the country, and should the House of Lords, reformed or not, guess rightly that the decisions of the Commons were contrary to the popular will, then inevitably the position of the House of Lords would be strengthened as compared with that of the Commons. "A House of Commons which does not represent," said a leading Liberal journal, "may stand for less in the country than the House of Lords, or the Crown, and its influence will infallibly decline in proportion. One has only to take up an old volume of Bagehot to confirm one's suspicions that the imperfections of electoral machinery, combined with the changes in the character of the electorate, are already threatening to undermine the real sources of the nation's power."[1] Sir Frederick Pollock has declared that our defective electoral system may "yield a House of Commons so unrepresentative in character as to cease to command the respect and obedience of citizens."[2]
Unstable representation.
False impressions of public opinion, unstable legislation based upon such false impressions, the weakening of the foundations on which the authority of the House of Commons rests, these are results which in themselves constitute a sufficiently serious condemnation of present methods. But those upheavals in representation, those violent swings of the pendulum which have often been so pronounced a feature of elections, give an instability to the composition of our supreme legislative chamber that must still further undermine its authority. Many, indeed, imagining that this dangerous instability is the reflection of an equally unstable electorate, begin to question whether a popular franchise is in any circumstances a satisfactory basis for government. The violence of the change in representation is attributed to the character of the electors instead of to the evil effects of a defective electoral method. On the other hand, the large majorities which accompany such changes are regarded by other politicians as blessings in disguise—as being essential to the formation of a strong Government. But a Government based on a false majority will, in the long-run, find that this exaggeration of its support in the country is a source of weakness rather than of strength. Like the image in Nebuchadnezzar's dream, the feet of such a Government are part of clay. For the extreme swing of the pendulum which brought the Government into power is usually followed by an equally violent swing in the opposite direction. When the high-water mark of success is attained at a General Election it becomes practically impossible for the party in power to gain additional seats at bye-elections, whilst an unbroken series of losses makes it difficult to prevent a feeling arising that the ministry has lost the confidence of the electors, although the actual change in public opinion may have been of the slightest. The prestige of the Government is gone, and prestige is as necessary to a Government as a majority. In brief, a large majority strengthens a Government only in so far as that majority corresponds to public opinion.
Weakened personnel.
Moreover, the extreme changes which take place at a General Election often result in a considerable weakening of the personnel of the House of Commons. In such a débâcle as that which took place in 1906, there was no process of selection by which the Unionists might have retained the services in Parliament of their ablest members. Although there were 33,907 Unionists in Manchester and Salford, Mr. Balfour, the leader of the party, experienced the mortification of being rejected by one of the divisions. This failure was paralleled by the defeat of Sir William Harcourt at Derby in 1895, whilst Mr. Gladstone, in contesting Greenwich in 1874, only succeeded in obtaining the second place, the first seat being won by a Conservative. A way is usually found by which party leaders return without delay to the House of Commons, but there are members of the highest distinction and capacity who, especially if these qualities are associated with a spirit of independence, find, it increasingly difficult to re-enter political life. Victory at the polls depends not so much upon the services which a statesman, however eminent, may have rendered to his country, as upon the ability of the party to maintain its majority in the particular constituency for which he stands. Indeed, in this matter a leader of opinion is placed at a disadvantage as compared with an ordinary member of the party; his very pre-eminence, his very activities bring him into conflict with certain sections of the electorate which, insignificant in themselves, may yet be sufficiently numerous to influence the result of an election. Statesmen, moreover, have often lost their seats merely because they have endeavoured to give electors of their very best. When Mr. John Morley (now Lord Morley of Blackburn), during the election of 1906, received a deputation of Socialists, he, with characteristic courage, explained very frankly the ground on which he could not support their principles.[3] A similar candour on his part in 1895 cost him his seat at Newcastle. Can we wonder then that there arise complaints that our statesmen are deficient both in courage and in ideas? Single-member constituencies are, as Gambetta pointed out more than twenty years ago, inimical to political thinking, and recent General Elections have afforded numerous examples in support of this statement. The courageous and forcible presentment of ideas has time after time been rewarded by exclusion from the House of Commons.
Degradation of party strife.
There is a further and equally serious charge that can be laid against the existing electoral system—it is in no small measure responsible for that increasing degradation in the methods of warfare which has characterised recent political and municipal contests. This debasement of elections cannot fail to contribute to that undermining of the authority of the House of Commons, upon which stress has already been laid. Indeed, there is abundant evidence to show that in conjunction with the imaginary instability of the electorate, the debasement of elections is weakening the faith of many in representative institutions. An efficient bureaucracy is now being advocated by a writer so distinguished as Mr. Graham Wallas, as the best safeguard against the excesses of an unstable and ignorant democracy. There is no need to undervalue the importance of competent officials, but all experience has shown the equal necessity of an adequate check upon the bureaucracy, however efficient, and such check must be found in the strengthening of representative bodies. Mr. Graham Wallas declares that "the empirical art of politics consists largely in the creation of opinion by the deliberate exploitation of subconscious non-rational inferences,"[4] and cites in support of this statement the atrocious posters and mendacious appeals of an emotional kind addressed to the electors in recent contests. It does not appear from electoral statistics that so large a proportion of voters are influenced by such appeals as Mr. Wallas thinks; his conclusions, like those of others, are based upon the false impressions arising from false results. It is, however, sufficient for the purpose of the political organizer to know that a number of the electors will succumb to such influences. The votes of this small section of the electorate can turn the scale at an election, and so long as we adhere to a system under which the whole of the representation allotted to any given constituency is awarded to the party which can secure a bare majority of votes, we must expect to see a progressive degradation of electoral contests. The successful organizer of victory has already learnt that he must not be too squeamish in the methods by which the victory is obtained, and if "the exploitation of subconscious non-rational inferences" is necessary to this end he will undoubtedly exploit them to the best of his powers.
The final rally.
Mr. Wallas gives from his personal experience an admirable illustration of the way in which elections are often lost and won. His vivid description of the close of a poll in a County Council election in a very poor district is in itself an emphatic condemnation of our electoral system. "The voters," says he, "who came in were the results of the 'final rally' of the canvassers on both sides. They entered the room in rapid but irregular succession, as if they were jerked forward by a hurried and inefficient machine. About half of them were women with broken straw hats, pallid faces, and untidy hair. All were dazed and bewildered, having been snatched away in carriages or motors from the making of match-boxes, or button-holes, or cheap furniture, or from the public-house, or, since it was Saturday evening, from bed. Most of them seemed to be trying in the unfamiliar surroundings to be sure of the name for which, as they had been reminded at the door, they were to vote. A few were drunk, and one man, who was apparently a supporter of my own, clung to my neck while he tried to tell me of some vaguely tremendous fact which just eluded his power of speech. I was very anxious to win, and inclined to think that I had won, but my chief feeling was an intense conviction that this could not be accepted as even a decently satisfactory method of creating a Government for a city of five million inhabitants, and that nothing short of a conscious and resolute facing of the whole problem of the formation of political opinion would enable us to improve it." The political "boss" has no such qualms; victory may turn upon the votes recorded at this final rally, and every effort must be made to ensure that the party's poll exceeds that of the enemy. Mr. Wallas does not propose any remedy; he merely suggests that something must be done to abolish the more sordid details of English electioneering. Why not go to the root of the evil and amend the electoral system which places so great a premium upon the success of such practices? It is indeed evident that this cannot be accepted as "a decently satisfactory method of creating a Government." But we are not compelled to continue the use of such a method. What possible justification is there for making the representation of all the other electors of a constituency depend upon the result of a final rally?
Bribery and "nursing"
Evidence was tendered before the Worcester Election Commission[5] to the effect that there were 500 voters in the city who were amenable to the influence of a small bribe, and that the party which secured the votes of these electors won the election. Again, is there no alternative to an electoral system which makes the representation of a town depend upon the action of the least worthy of its citizens? Direct bribery has been rendered more difficult by the Corrupt Practices Act, but bribery in a much more subtle form—"nursing" the constituency—would appear to be on the increase. Mr. Ellis T. Powell, who has had a considerable electioneering experience, gives an admirable statement[6] of the expenses attending a successful candidature. "If the candidate's means," says he, "permit of a favourable response to these invitations (appeals for money), he is said to be engaged in 'nursing' the constituency in which the gifts are distributed. A great proportion of these appeals relate to funds which are for public, or quasi-public purposes, such as those of hospitals; and there is no suggestion that any direct political influence is exercised in consequence of donations or contributions made to these institutions. But what is certain is that a section of the electorate-diminishing, but still potent, section—is favourably influenced by the fact that Mr. A. has given £100 to the funds of the hospital, whereas Mr. B. has given £5, 5_s_., or nothing at all. Candidates and their agents are perfectly well aware of this, and are even known to delay the announcement of their contributions in order to ascertain their respective amounts, and so to guard themselves against giving less than others have done. Mr. A. is inclined to give £20, but waits to see if Mr. B. gives £25, in which case he will raise his intended £20 to £30. These tactics are adopted, not because either of the candidates desires to be lavish or ostentatious in his gifts, and still less from any vulgar desire for notoriety in itself. They are simply an element, almost vital under existing conditions, of a successful appeal to the electorate. They may be said to be of the psychological rather than the political order, introducing into the electoral arena forces which have no business to be there, and whose activity is wholly vicious; but forces which nevertheless no politician can ignore, unless he wishes to postpone his realisation of their exact potency until the declaration of the poll places it before his, own eyes in large and unmistakable characters…. The writer was once consulted by a gentleman who, from motives which were truly laudable, desired to represent a London constituency. The path was clear to his selection as a candidate; the only question was that of expense. The writer, after noting the number of electors, informed him of the maximum sum which he might expend at a contest, but at the same time warned him that unless he were prepared to spend from £1500 to £2000 a year from that time until the General Election (of which there was no immediate prospect) he might regard his ambition as a hopeless one. The constituency was one where money must be spent. The other candidate would spend it, and his opponent must do at least as much, while his chance at the poll would be increased if he did a little more. When his opponent gave 10s. to a local cricket club, he could give no less. If he gave a guinea it might make a difference in his poll. The advice was not given in regard to electoral conditions as they ought to be, but as they are. The writer gave it with regret, and felt that he was playing almost a cynical part when he uttered the words. Yet it was in complete accord with the necessities of the existing system." Some of the practices associated with constituency-nursing can perhaps be reached by further legislation, but, if so, bribery in all probability will only take a form still more subtle. Again, why not strike at the root cause which makes these practices so highly profitable? Why continue to make the representation of all electors depend upon the votes of those who are influenced by the attentions of a rich patron?
The organization of victory.
The cumulative effect of these demoralising elements in party warfare is shown in the separation of the work of the party organizer from that of the party leader—separation which is becoming more and more complete. The work of covering hoardings with posters of a repulsive type, the task of preparing election "literature," must be carried out by men of a different character from those who are responsible for the public direction of the party; and as party agents often obtain their appointments because of their previous success in winning elections, the mere force of competition is compelling agents, sometimes against their own wishes, to resort to these questionable practices. The success of the Municipal Reform campaign in the London County Council election of 1907 was followed by a demand from many Progressives that the tactics of their opponents should be copied, that gramophone should be answered by gramophone, poster by poster. It is, however, certain that the more victory depends upon the work of the party organizer the more must his power increase, and this fact explains the unique position of the political "boss" in the United States, where ordinary electoral methods have been carried to their logical conclusion.[7] The political "boss" has become all-powerful because he has made himself the indispensable factor in successful political organization. At the London County Council elections in 1907, the leaders of the Municipal Reform Party dissociated themselves from the more extreme accusations made against the administration of the Progressives, but the conduct of the elections was apparently outside their powers of control. It may never become possible in England for a political organization such as "Tammany Hall" to succeed in planting on the register of voters a large number of fraudulent names, nor is it necessary yet for the press to issue a notice such as that which appeared in the New York Evening Post: "There are a thousand 'colonizers' waiting to vote for the Tammany ticket. Vote early, so that no one can vote ahead of you in your name."[8] In New York the Citizens' Unions have at each election to spend several weeks in succession in thwarting attempts at this offence on a large scale, and though our more perfect organization of elections renders such frauds impossible, still if we are to arrest the Americanization of our electoral contests we must cease to allow the results of a "final rally," the votes of the least worthy citizens, assiduous "nursing," or suggestive posters to decide the representation of a constituency.
Party exclusiveness.
The preceding criticism of recent developments in electoral warfare must not be read as a condemnation of party organization as such. Party organization there must be, and unquestionably the success of a party is intimately bound up with the efficiency of its organization. But our defective electoral system confers upon party organization a weapon which is not an adjunct to efficiency in the true sense of the word, but a weapon which has been and can be made a serious menace to the political independence and sincerity both of electors and of Members of Parliament. During the memorable three-cornered fight in Greenwich in 1906, Lord Hugh Cecil made this statement: "The opposition to me is not to put a Tariff Reformer in, but to keep me out. … We are face to face with an innovation in English politics, and it is a question of how far it is desirable to introduce methods which may be handled with a view to creating a party mechanism so rigid, so powerful, and so capable of being directed by a particular mind towards a single object, that it may become a formidable engine for carrying out a dangerous proposal. We do not want a system of political assassination under which any one who is in the way may be put out of the way." To realize the dangerous weapon which our present system places in the hands of party organizations, it is not necessary to give complete assent to the statement of Lord Hugh Cecil as to the character of the opposition brought against him. The power undoubtedly exists. Prior to the election of January 1910, the secret organization known as "confederates" was reported to have marked down all Unionist candidates who would not accept a course of policy approved of by this body. The action was defended on the ground that it was essential to secure Tariff Reform immediately and at all costs, but it nevertheless constituted a serious attack upon the representative character of the House of Commons. By such methods that historic House will be deprived of its rightful place in the constitution of this country. Political power will no longer be centred in the House of Commons; it will be vested in organizations outside Parliament, which will only meet to carry out their bidding. At the General Election of 1906 the mere threat of a three-cornered fight was sufficient to induce many Free Trade Unionists to retire from the contest; the purging was completed at the election of January 1910, and it would seem that in the future only those politicians who can with alacrity adopt the newest fashions or change their party allegiance can hope to take a permanent part in the political life of their country. Many of those who were so eager for Tariff Reform at all costs—the "confederates" themselves—would probably have protested most vigorously had the same policy of excluding competent men from Parliament been adopted for the attainment of political objects of which they did not approve, and the comment of The Times on this exclusive policy reflects the opinion of those who value the representative character of the House of Commons more highly than an immediate party triumph:—
"Parliament ought to represent the opinion of the country as a whole, and each of the great parties ought to represent the diversities of opinion which incline to one side or the other of a dividing line which, however practically convenient, does not itself represent any hard and immutable frontier. Now the variety and elasticity of representation, which are the secret of the permanence of our institutions, are directly injured by any attempt to narrow the basis of a party. If such attempts were to succeed upon any considerable scale we should have a couple of machine-made parties confronting one another in Parliament, with no golden bridges between their irreconcilable programmes. There is some danger at the present day of an approximation to a state of things in every way to be deprecated, and it is surely not for the Unionist party to promote any movement tending in that direction."[9]
This process of excluding valuable elements from our representative chamber is equally at work within the Liberal party. At the General Election of 1906 Sir William Butler, a Liberal of very high attainments, was compelled to withdraw his candidature for East Leeds on the ground that he could not fully support the Education policy of the Government. Mr. Harold Cox, during the Parliament of 1906, criticised the work of the Liberal Government from the point of view of a Liberal of the Manchester school, and the Preston Liberal Council withdrew its support. Nor does the Labour Party escape the same charge. Originally each member was required to accept in writing the constitution of the party, and this condition was rigorously enforced. In January 1911 it was decided at the Party Conference held at Leicester to dispense with the written pledge, but it would appear that a cast-iron conformity to party decisions is still insisted upon. On 10 February 1911 the party moved an amendment to the Address in favour of the Right to Work Bill, a measure as to the practicability of which there is a difference of opinion within the party. Mr. Johnson, the member for Nuneaton, voted against the amendment, and commenting on the incident the Labour Leader said: "Is Mr. Johnson to be allowed to defy the Party's mandate? We invite the Labour stalwarts of Nuneaton to give their earnest consideration to this question. And there can be no doubt as to what the verdict will be."
Mechanical debates.
These repeated attempts to make members of a party conform in all respects to a specified pattern, this constant insistence that members must give up the right of criticism and support on all occasions the party to which they belong, must and does react on the composition of the House of Commons. The duty of a Member of Parliament will tend more and more to be restricted to registering his approval or disapproval of the decisions of the Government, and, as the central organization of each party is in close touch with the party whips, the free and independent electors will be more and more confined, in the election of their representatives, to a choice between the nominees of machine-made parties. Moreover, in a House of Commons so composed discussion necessarily loses its vitalizing character. The debates on Free Trade in the House of Commons in 1905 towards the close of Mr. Balfour's administration were very real and full of life, because argument could and did affect the votes of members, but if the process continues of excluding all elements save those of the machine-controlled, debates will become more and more formal. They will lose their value. As Lord Hugh Cecil has said[10]: "The present system unquestionably weakens the House of Commons by denuding it of moderate politicians not entirely in sympathy with either political party, and consequently rendering obsolete all the arts of persuasion and deliberation, and reducing parliamentary discussion to a struggle between obstruction on the one side and closure on the other. The disproportion, moreover, between the majority in the House and that in the country, which it is supposed to represent, deprives the decisions of the House of much of their moral authority. The rigid partisanship, and the essentially unrepresentative character of the House of Commons as now constituted, leave it only the credit which belongs to the instrument of a party, and deprive it of that higher authority which should be the portion of the representatives of the whole people. "Similarly Mr. Birrell, in speaking[11] of the debate on the Women's Franchise Bill (12 July 1910), stated that he rejoiced in the immunity on that occasion from the tyranny of Government programmes and the obligation to all to think alike. "To think in programmes," said he, "is Egyptian bondage, and works the sterilization of the political intellect." And the nation suffers.
The disfranchisement of minorities in bi-racial countries
The extreme partizan who believes that political action is possible only through a well-controlled organization may be affected but little by the preceding arguments, and is, moreover, nearly always inclined to postpone the consideration of any reform which might possibly deprive his party of the advantages which he imagines it may obtain at the next General Election. Yet cases have occurred when parties have sacrificed their own advantage to the higher interests of the nation as a whole, and national interests demand a change in electoral methods. For the disfranchisement of minorities often gives rise to serious difficulties. The elections which took place in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony,[12] after the grant of self-government in 1906, show how racial divisions are unduly emphasized by such disfranchisement. Only one—Barberton—of the twenty-six country constituencies of the Transvaal returned a member who did not owe allegiance to Het Volk, although the figures of the polls showed that the minority numbered more than 25 per cent, of the electors. In Pretoria the Progressives gained but one seat, and that as the chance result of a three-cornered contest. The disfranchisement of minorities heightened the natural difference which existed between Johannesburg and the rest of the Transvaal—a difference which would have been still more pronounced had not Het Volk succeeded in obtaining six and the Nationalists five out of the total of thirty-four seats allotted to Johannesburg and the Rand. The first elections in the Orange River Colony resulted in a similar exaggerated contrast between Bloemfontein and the rest of the country. Five seats were allotted to Bloemfontein, four of which were won by members of the Constitutional party, whilst the fifth was only lost to them by the extremely narrow majority of two. Before the election The Friend, the organ of the Orangia Unie, stated that "if Bloemfontein ventures to vote for the Constitutionalists it will be setting itself in opposition to the whole country, and will be manifesting a spirit of distrust of the country population for which it will have to suffer afterwards." On the morrow of the election the same paper declared that "the election results of Bloemfontein will be read with deep disappointment throughout the colony, where the feeling will be that the capital has now shown itself politically an alien city." But would Bloemfontein have "shown itself politically an alien city" if the electoral method had been such that the minorities, both in Bloemfontein and in the country districts, had been able to secure representation in proportion to their strength?
Had the Constitution of South Africa provided for the representation of minorities in the House of Assembly, as proposed in the original draft signed at Cape Town, the process of race unification, both in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony, would have been facilitated, and the conflicting interests of the constituent States and of town and country would not by their exaggerated expression in the United Parliament have impeded the consolidation and unification of South Africa. The problem presented by racial differences is not confined to South Africa. The United Kingdom itself presents a conspicuous example of a nation in which the process of unification is still far from complete, and the process has been retarded, and is at the present time being retarded, by the electoral method in force. Not only does Ireland still continue to chafe against the Union, but the racial divisions within Ireland itself are encouraged and fostered by the failure of our representative system to do justice to minorities. The South and West of Ireland is represented in the House of Commons by Nationalists, and Nationalists alone, and, ranged in opposition to them, the North-East is represented by a smaller but equally determined body of Unionists, while those forces in Ireland which would endeavour, and in the past have endeavoured, to bridge over the differences between the North and South are entirely unrepresented. Had the minorities in the North and South of Ireland been represented within the House, there would probably have still remained a notable contrast between the two areas, but that contrast would not have appeared in its present heightened form, and, in addition, with a true electoral system there would have come from Ireland representatives whose sole aim and purpose was to achieve its unification. The picture which Ireland would have presented within the House would have been of a different character to that presented to-day, and the perennial Irish problem would have been infinitely less difficult, because the forces which made for union would have had full play. Even the unification of England and Wales may, in some respects, be described as incomplete; but such differences as exist largely arise from the electoral system which sometimes deprives the minority in Wales of all representation in the House of Commons. When in 1906 the fortunes of the Welsh Conservatives reached their lowest ebb, the latter numbered 36 per cent. of the voters, whilst in former elections the minority sometimes exceeded 40 per cent. Had Welsh Conservatives, during the last two decades, been adequately represented in the House of Commons, would not our conception of Wales from the political point of view have been considerably modified, would not the process of political unification have been made more complete?
The non-representation of minorities in Belgium accentuated the racial religious and language differences between Flanders and Wallony. Flanders was represented by Catholics only; the French-speaking districts by Liberals and Socialists. With proportional representation members of all three parties are returned in both areas, and this result has brought in its train a great national advantage, the political consolidation of Belgium. Another example of the disintegrating effects of the disfranchisement of minorities is to be seen in the American Civil War. A committee of the United States Senate unanimously reported in 1869 that this war might have been averted had the minorities in the North and South been duly represented in Congress. In the words of the report the absence of minority representation "in the States of the South when rebellion was plotted, and when open steps were taken to break the Union was unfortunate, for it would have held the Union men of those States together and have given them voice in the electoral colleges…. Dispersed, unorganized, unrepresented, without due voice and power, they could interpose no effectual resistance to secession and to civil war."
Defective representation in municipal bodies.]
False impressions of public opinion, unstable legislation, the weakening of the House of Commons, both in authority and in personnel, the degradation of party warfare, the undue exaltation of party machinery, the heightening of racial differences and of sectional interests, these are the fruits of that rough and ready system of Parliamentary elections with which hitherto we have been content. The electoral methods in force both in County Council and in Municipal elections are based on the same false principle, and in these spheres of corporate activity results almost equally disastrous are produced. The London County Council elections of 1907 presented most of the features which characterized the Parliamentary elections of 1906. Such catastrophic changes in the personnel of the County Council as took place in 1907 involves serious consequences to London ratepayers. In this election two ex-chairmen of the Council, the vice-chairman and several chairmen of committees, lost their seats. These were men who had been chosen by their colleagues because of their special fitness for their positions, and this wholesale dismissal as a result of a temporary wave of public feeling may make it more difficult to secure as candidates those who are prepared to devote the necessary time to the study of London's problems, for it is generally admitted that the position of a London County Councillor is no sinecure. The effective discharge of his duties demands unremitting attention to details. The new Council was remarkable for the number of members who had yet to win their spurs in public work, and London was the poorer for the loss of those able administrators whom thousands of voters desired as their representatives. A true electoral system would not only secure the adequate representation of all parties, but the presence in the Council of the most competent exponents of different policies.
Wasteful municipal finance.
Not only does the electoral system involve undue changes in the personnel of the Council, but it leads to an extremely wasteful expenditure of public money. Whether the London County Council was or was not justified in establishing a steamboat service, nothing can be more wasteful than that one Council should establish such a service at great cost, and that its successor should immediately reverse that policy. The steady development of a works department by one Council and its abandonment by a succeeding Council similarly involves useless expenditure. A fully representative Council would not display such violent alterations of policy, and it is of the utmost importance that the objects on which it is decided to spend public moneys should be the deliberate and considered choice of a Council on which all interests are fairly represented.
No continuity in administration.]
The Metropolitan Borough Council elections tell a similar tale. The Lewisham Borough Council consisted in 1900 of 35 Moderates and 7 Progressives; in 1903 of 34 Progressives and 8 Moderates and Independents; in 1906 of 42 Moderates, no representatives of the Progressive or Labour parties being elected. In three successive elections there was a complete change in the composition of the Council. Lewisham's experience is typical of that of several other London boroughs. Many councillors of the widest experience in municipal affairs lose their seats at the same time, and there is in consequence no security of continuity in the administration of the business of the Metropolitan boroughs. Dr. Gilbert Slater, in giving evidence before a select committee of the House of Lords, said: "I found, of course, when I came on to the Council without any previous municipal experience except by observation, that I and other members equally inexperienced had to take great responsibilities upon ourselves. For instance, I was vice-chairman of the Finance Committee, and my Chairman also had had no previous municipal experience; the Finance Committee was felt to be one of the most important of the Committees of the Council, and the fact that its Chairman and Vice-chairman were two new members itself was a weakness."[13] Dr. Slater added that it took three years' hard work before a councillor could really master the affairs of a London borough, and that being so, is it surprising that it is becoming increasingly difficult to secure the services of competent men for the work of our local bodies? There undoubtedly are, on both aides, men of marked ability and of whole-hearted devotion to public affairs, but if our electoral system is such that, in the presence of an undiscriminating swing of the pendulum, their ability and devotion count for nothing, such men tend, albeit unwillingly, to withdraw from public life. The influence of the permanent official increases; the authority of the representative assembly declines.
The root of the evil.
In parliamentary, in county, and in borough council elections alike we trace the evils of defective electoral methods. These evils constitute a complete answer to Lord Morley's criticism of Mill, that the latter laid undue stress upon the efficiency of electoral machinery. Erected on a false basis, those democratic institutions, on which so many hopes have been built and on which our future still depends, are found full of shortcomings due not only to the imperfections of human nature but to the ill-working of a defective electoral system. The evils arising from the latter cause can at least be remedied, and in remedying them we may make it possible for the electors to put more intelligence and conscience into their votes. Since Mill was, as Lord Morley says, concerned with the important task of moulding and elevating popular character, he was rightly anxious that the electoral machinery should be such as to give due weight to those who desired to take an intelligent interest in the affairs of their country.
[Footnote 1: The Manchester Guardian, 12 February 1909.]
[Footnote 2: Annual Meeting, Proportional Representation Society, 9 May 1906.]
[Footnote 3: The Times, 8 January 1906.]
[Footnote 4: Human Nature in Politics, pp. 241 et seq.]
[Footnote 5: The Times, 22 August 1906.]
[Footnote 6: The Essentials of Self-Government, pp. 102 et seq.]
[Footnote 7: It is a matter for congratulation that in so many States there is now (1911) a movement of revolt against the domination of the "boss."]
[Footnote 8: The Manchester Guardian, 21 April 1908.]