The allotment of seats.
When the candidates in each compact have thus been arranged in order (and the votes given in writing by independent voters have also been counted), the returning officer proceeds to the second stage of his duties—the determination of the position of candidates with reference to their competitors in other compacts; and it is on this position that the actual allotment of seats depends. For this purpose he primarily takes into account, not the "numbers of comparison" of individual candidates, but the total number of voters who have supported each compact; he credits this total to the candidate who has the highest "number of comparison" within the compact; credits the next candidate with one-half this total, the third candidate with one-third, and so on, finally arranging the whole of the candidates in order. Thus far this stage of the process is identical in substance with the Belgian method, though the appearance is different. For, obviously, if List (or compact) A, of which the candidates are G, H, I, in that order receives 12,000 votes, while List B, with candidates P, Q, R, receives 10,000, and List C, with candidates X, Y, Z, receives 8000, it is all one whether the returning officer applies the d'Hondt rule and assigns two seats to List A (thus seating G and H), two seats to List B (thus seating P and Q), and one seat to List C (thus seating X), or whether he tabulates the result of the polling thus:
G 12,000 \
P 10,000 |
X 8,000 > Elected.
H 12,000/2 i.e. 6,000 |
Q 10,000/2 i.e. 5,000 /
Y 8,000/2 i.e. 4,000 Not elected, and so on.
But at this point a characteristic feature of the Finnish system comes into play. Candidates' names may occur in more than one compact, and may be found in isolated schedules, or on the written papers of independent voters as well. Consequently their final order cannot be determined by this simple application of the Belgian method. The returning officer must[1] add to the number of votes credited to a candidate of any one compact such additional votes as he may have obtained either as a member of another compact or from independent voters. Thus, in the Nyland elections, Miss Sohlberg, whose name will be found at the head of Schedule 48 within the Swedish compact, obtained the eleventh place within that compact. The total number of voters supporting this compact was 44,544, and Miss Sohlberg was therefore credited with an eleventh of this total, or 4049 votes. But Miss Sohlberg's name also occurred in Schedules 62 and 63 in the "Free Christian" compact and Schedule 21 in the "Christian" compact, and as her share of the votes of these compacts she received 153 and 325 respectively. She also received four votes in writing. Thus her final total was 4049 + 153 + 325 + 4, or 4531 in all, and it was this number which determined her position on the poll.
Successful candidates in the Nyland election. This explanation will perhaps be more comprehensible if the actual result of the polling in the Nyland division, so far as the first 25 candidates are concerned, is given in a tabular form:—
Final Names of Party. Number of Additional Final Order Candidates. Votes resulting Votes. Total. of from Place of Poll. Candidates on Compact. 1 Schybergson Swedish 44,544 2.33 44,546.33 2 Häninan Social Dem. 40,951 6.5 40,957.5 3 Soderholm Swedish 22,272 0.33 22,272.33 4 Sillanpää Social Dem. 20,475.5 8.83 20,484.33 5 Käkikoski Old Finn 20,402 9.33 20,411.33 6 Oljemark Swedish 14,848 — 14,848 7 Sirén Social Dem. 16,650.33 2.33 16,652.66 8 Rosenquist (G.) Swedish 8,908.8 2,932.83[2] 11,841.63 9 Rosenquist (V.) Swedish 11,136 4.33 11,140.33 10 Helle Social Dem. 10,237.75 3 10,240.75 11 Palmén Old Finn 10,201 8.83 10,209.83 12 Pertillä (E.) Social Dem. 8,190.2 4.67 8,194.87 13 Ahlroos Swedish 7,424 1 7,425 14 Pertillä (V.) Social Dem. 6,725.17 1.5 6,726.67 15 Reima Old Finn 6,800.67 5.67 6,806.34 16 Erkko Young Finn 6,521 6.32 6,527.32 17 Ehrnrooth Swedish 6,363.43 75.83 6,439.26 18 Laine (M.) Social Dem. 5,850.14 4 5,854.14 19 Wasastjerna Swedish 5,568 — 5,568 20 Ingman Social Dem. 5,118.88 3.5 5,122.38 21 Laine (O.) Old Finn 5,100.5 — 5,100.5 22 von Alfthan Swedish 4,949.33 — 4,949.33 23 Johansson Social Dem. 4,550.11 1.33 4,551.44 (All the above were elected.) 24 Sohlberg Swedish 4,049.45 482.45[3] 4,531.9 25 Gustaffsson Swedish 4,454.4 4.5 4,458.9 &c. &c.
Equitable results.
It will to some extent be gathered from the foregoing table that the total number of the supporters of the various compacts or parties in the Nyland division and the number of seats won were as follows:
Seats Seats in
Parties. Votes. Actually Proportion
Won. to Votes.
Swedish 44,544 9 8.7
Social Democrat 40,951 9 8.0
Old Finn 20,402 4 4.0
Young Finn 6,521 1 1.3
"Christian" compact 2,932 - .6
"Free Christian" 458 - .1
Radical 168 - -
Isolated schedules 1,356 - .3
Total 117,332 23 23.0
The result is thus in reasonable correspondence with the demands of a strictly proportionate allotment of seats; this statement is also true of the results for the whole of Finland, as the following table will show:—
Seats Seats in
Parties. Votes. Actually Proportion
Won. to Votes.
Social Democrat 329,946 80 74.1
Old Finn. 243,573 59 54.7
Young Finn 121,604 26 27.3
Swedish 112,267 24 25.2
Agrarian 51,242 9 11.5
Christian Labourer 13,790 2 3.1
Minor groups 18,568 - 4.1
Total 890,990 200 200.0
An exactly mathematical distribution is, of course, not to be expected from this, any more than from any other method which does not adopt the system of treating a whole country as a single constituency. As to the mechanism of the system it only remains to add that the process of counting was found to be very lengthy. In the Nyland division, where the results were ascertained sooner than in any other case, the elections were held on 15 and 16 March, but the result was not announced until the 2 April. To people accustomed to the greater rapidity of ordinary electoral methods this will seem a serious drawback. Possibly improved arrangements may shorten this long interval between the elections and the announcement of the result.
It would obviously be premature to attempt to estimate the political effects of the Finnish system as compared with other systems of proportional representation.
Elector's freedom of choice.
The Finnish system has been in operation since 1907, and the whole political circumstances of Finland have undergone so many striking changes, and so many new factors are at work that to disentangle particular causes and effects is an impossibility. But plainly the Finnish machinery gives a greater freedom to the elector than the Belgian system. The Finnish system in fact encourages the electors to arrange the candidates of a party in the order preferred by the electors themselves, and not in the order dictated by the party managers. There is no "party ticket" for which the elector can vote blindfold. He must choose the schedule that he prefers; he can even rearrange that schedule, or, if he chooses, can make one of his own. No doubt the schedule itself is ready made for him, but it contains three names only, and is not the equivalent of the Belgian "list." On the other hand, the elector who chooses to vote for a schedule within a compact adds, whether he likes it or not, to the total votes of the compact, and so may help to return not the candidate of his choice, but the candidates preferred by the majority of the party with which he is in sympathy. An illustration of this fact may be taken from the Nyland poll. The old Finnish party were alive to the possibilities of the situation, and combined their lists with great skill so as to attract votes. They placed their favourite candidates in nearly every schedule, but not at the head of the schedule. At the head of the schedule they placed some man of local popularity, usually a peasant proprietor, whose name was not repeated in many, if any, other schedules. Thus the local favourite attracted votes to the schedule, but in the race for the highest numbers of comparison the candidates whose names appeared on few schedules were left behind those whose names appeared on many schedules even in the lower places.
A portion of the official ballot paper showing the compact put forward by the Swedish People's Party is printed on the opposite page. In one corner of the ballot paper was a blank schedule in the following form.
THE ELECTOR who does not approve of any of the preceding lists should write here the names of his candidates in the order in which he wishes them to be elected.
CANDIDATES
Name…………………………………………….
Profession or Occupation…………………………..
Address………………………………………….
Name…………………………………………….
Profession or Occupation…………………………..
Address………………………………………….
Name…………………………………………….
Profession or Occupation…………………………..
Address………………………………………….
FINLAND GENERAL ELECTION, 1907
Part of Ballot Paper—Nyland Division.
The Voters' Compact of the Swedish People's Party.
1
HELSINGFORS.
Experienced Members of the Diet:—
—Schybergson, E. K.
—Neovius, A. W.
—Soderholm, K. G.
33
EAST NYLAND-LOUISA.
Justice and Progress:—
—Rosenquist, G. G.
—Stromberg, J.
—Ehrnrooth, L.
34
MID-NYLAND-NIOKBY.
The Welfare of the Rural Population;—
—Topelius, G. L.
—Alfthau, K. von
—Rosenquist, B. T.
35
MID-NYLAND-ESBO.
The Welfare of the Rural Population:—
—Wasastjerna, O.
—Schybergson, E.
—Soderholin, K.
36
WEST NYLAND-KYRK-SLATT.
The Welfare ol the Rural Population:—
—Nordberg, G.
—Ehrnrooth, L.
—Oljemark, K. T.
37
WEST NYLANB-EKENAS.
The Welfare of the Rural Population. Law and Justice:—
—Oljemark, K. T.
—Schybergson, E.
—Soderholm, K.
38
BORGA.
Knowledge and Experience:—
—Runeberg, J. W.
—Bjorkenheim, G.
—Rosenquist, G. G.
39
HELSINGFORS.
Sound Development of the Community;—
—Westermarck, Helena.
—Rosenquist, B. T.
—Bjorkenheim, G.
40
HELSINGFORS.
Law and Justice:—
—Sorterholm, K.
—Alfthan, K. von
—Westermarck, Helena,
41
HELSINGFORS.
Legality and Progress:—
—Westermarck, Helena.
—Neovius, A.
—Ehrnrooth, L.
42
HELLSINGFORS.
Swedish Culture:—
—Rosenqnist, B. T.
—Gustafsson, F. prof.
—Soderholm, K.
43
HELSINGFORS.
Friends of Labour and of the People:—
—Alfthan, K. von
—Gustafsson, F. prof.
—Gronroos, F.
44
HELSINGFORS.
Experience and Practical Knowledge:—
—Runeberg, J. W.
—Schybergson, E.
—Neovius, A.
45
HELSINGFORS.
The Labourers' Welfare:—
—Ahlroos, F.
—Holmberg, W.
—Ehrnrooth, L.
46
HELSINGFORS.
Commerce and Industry:
—Heimburger, W. F.
—Bjorkenheim, G.
—Schybergson, E.
47
THE SKERRIES OF NYLAND:
Navigation and Fisheries:—
—Hjelt, Th.
—Renter, O.
—Alfthan, K.
48
THE PROVINCE OF NYLAND:
HELSINGFORS.
Temperance, Morality and Popular Education:—
—Sohlberg, H.
—Ahlroos, F.
—Rosenquist, G. G.
[Footnote 1: This right of addition is subject to a limit. The reinforcements must not raise a candidate's total above what he might obtain if the votes given to all compacts or lists, where his name occurs, were divided by the figure which indicates his order within the compact from which he derives his principal strength.]
[Footnote 2: This large reinforcement of votes came from the Christian compact, where this candidate's name appeared as well as in the Swedish compact.]
[Footnote 3: See reference to Miss Sohlberg in preceding paragraph.]
APPENDIX V
THE STATISTICS OF THE GENERAL ELECTIONS, 1885-1910
The following tables are taken, with permission, from a paper read on 12
December 1906, by Mr. J. Rooke Corbett, M.A., before the Manchester
Statistical Society, of which a second and revised edition was published
in April 1910 by the Proportional Representation Society.
In these tables the totals for England, Wales, and Monmouth, Scotland and Ireland are shown separately, and the figures for England have been further subdivided according to the ten divisions into which the kingdom is divided by the Registrar General for the purpose of his work.
These ten subdivisions are as follows:
Metropolitan—
London.
South East—
Surrey.
Kent.
Sussex.
Hampshire.
Berkshire.
South Midland—
Middlesex.
Hertfordshire.
Buckinghamshire.
Oxfordshire.
Northamptonshire.
Huntingdonshire.
Bedfordshire.
Cambridgeshire.
East—
Essex.
Suffolk.
Norfolk.
South-West—
Wiltshire.
Dorsetshire.
Devonshire.
Cornwall.
Somersetshire.
West Midland—
Gloucestershire.
Herefordshire.
Shropshire.
Staffordshire.
Worcestershire.
Warwickshire.
North Midland—
Leicestershire.
Rutlandshire.
Lincolnshire.
Nottinghamshire.
Derbyshire.
North-West—
Cheshire.
Lancashire.
Yorkshire—
West Riding.
East Riding (with York).
North Riding.
Northern Division—
Durham.
Northumberland.
Cumberland.
Westmorland.
The first three columns, A, B and C, show the number of members allotted to these several divisions, the number of registered electors, and the number of members to which each division would be entitled if the 670 members of which the House of Commons is composed were divided among the several divisions in proportion to their electorates.
In taking the electorate as the basis of a proportionate redistribution of seats it is not intended to prejudge the question whether population or electorate is the better standard. The electorate has been taken because the figures are available for the very year in which the election takes place, whereas the population is only enumerated once in ten years.
The columns D and E show in two groups the number of members elected for these divisions, Liberal, Labour, and Irish members being gathered together in one column, Conservatives alone occupying the other.
It is one of the disadvantages of our present system of representation that it makes it quite impossible to ascertain the relative strength of the several parties into which the voters are divided. In the great majority of contests there is a Liberal, Labour, or Irish Nationalist candidate on one side, and a Unionist candidate on the other, and there is practically no evidence as to how many of the supporters of either candidate belong to each of the parties concerned. Any estimate of the relative strength of the Liberal and Labour parties or of the Unionist Free Traders, and Tariff Reformers must be largely a matter of guesswork. All that is possible, therefore, is to divide the voters into two groups, as has been done in these tables.
The columns F and G show the total electorate of the constituencies held respectively by the two groups of members shown in columns D and E.
The figures in these two columns are of value in showing the probable result of a scheme of redistribution. The South-Eastern counties may be taken as an example. These are at present represented by 48 members. The Liberals held three constituencies in January 1910 containing an electorate of 31,221 (columns D and F); the Conservatives held 45 constituencies containing an electorate of 604,887 (columns E and G). If a redistribution of seats was made on the basis of equal electorates, the South-Eastern counties would be entitled to 55 members (column C). It may be assumed that in any rearrangement of constituencies the parties would retain their predominance in the areas which they now represent, and if so the result of a rearrangement of constituencies on the basis of equal electorates would be that in January 1910 the Conservatives would have obtained 52 seats and the Liberals 3 (column K). Similarly in the General Election of 1906 the Liberals in Wales and Monmouth held 34 seats, the Conservatives none. If the constituencies had been rearranged, the Liberals would have held 35 seats, the Conservatives none. The majorities throughout the United Kingdom which would be obtained under a scheme of equal electorates are shown in column K.
The columns H and I show the number of electors who voted for the candidates of the two groups; Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist voters in one group, Conservative voters in the other.
In computing the figures in these columns an allowance has been made for uncontested constituencies on the following basis. It has been supposed that the changes of public opinion which affect the contested constituencies affect uncontested constituencies also, and in estimating the number of voters in an uncontested constituency it has therefore been assumed that the strength of each party varies from one election to another in the same ratio as in the contested constituencies in the same county.
The three columns J, K and L show respectively the actual majorities obtained, the majorities which would have been obtained if the country had been divided into single-member constituencies of equal size, and the majorities under a system of proportional representation.
The figures in the last two columns have been calculated with reference to the totals in column C, which gives the number of members to which each division would be entitled on a proportional basis.
In order to ascertain the figures given in column K (i.e. the probable results with equal single-member constituencies) it has been assumed, as already explained, that the two groups would, after the redistribution of seats, be predominant in the same areas as before the rearrangement.
The representation of minorities.
The tables give abundant evidence of the anomalies associated with our electoral system. One of the most striking is the great difference in the amount of representation secured by minorities in different parts of the country. The amount of representation secured by a minority has not depended upon its size, but upon the way in which it has been distributed. The following table shows the amount of representation obtained by important minorities in the General Election of January 1910:—
THE REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES, ELECTION JAN. 1910
Size of Seats Total Seats
Area. Minority. Obtained. for Whole Area
Ireland . . . . . . . 145,437 21 103
Scotland . . . . . . . 265,770 11 72
S. East: Counties. . . 220,995 3 48
Wales and Monmouth . . 116,696 2 34
Northern Counties . . 75,897 9 32
The figures show that in Ireland a minority of 145,437 obtained twenty-one representatives, whilst a minority of 116,696 in Wales and Monmouth obtained only two. The good fortune which befel the minority in Ireland, not only in the elections of 1910 but in all the elections since the Redistribution Bill of 1885, has been due to the fact that this minority is concentrated in one corner of Ireland and can transform itself into local majorities. The larger minority in Scotland, owing to its distribution throughout the country, obtains much less representation; the minorities in the south-eastern counties of England and Wales are also distributed throughout these two areas and likewise suffer. The minority of 75,879 in the northern counties being less evenly diffused was more fortunate, and obtained nine representatives. The figures for the election of December 1910 disclose similar anomalies.
GENERAL ELECTION, 1885
Col A: Members
Col B: Registered Electors
Col C: Proportionate Number of Members
Col D: Members - Liberal, Labour and Irish
Col E: Members - Conservatives
Col F: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Liberal, Labour,
and Irish Nationalists
Col G: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Conservative
Col H: Voters - Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist
Col I: Voters - Conservative
Col J: Majority - Actual
Col K: Majority - With equal Single Member Constituencies
Col L: Majority - Under Proportional Representation.
A B C DE FG HI J K L
Prop Memb Electorate Voters Majority
Memb Elect Memb Act Eq PR
Metropolis 60 489,396 57 LLI 22 165,345 162,228
Con 38 324,051 188,067 16 19 3
England
South-East 48 406,955 47 LLI 4 34,883 144,659
Con 44 372,072 187,831 40 39 7
S.Midland 38 312,477 36 LLI 14 123,665 124,717
Con 24 188,811 129,544 10 8
East 29 257,022 29 LLI 18 173,521 107,710 7 11 1
Con 11 83,501 98,137
South-West 40 314,603 36 LLI 27 229,612 144,273 14 16 4
Con 13 84,991 117,442
W.Midland 58 544,415 63 LLI 45 427,549 248,825 32 36 8
Con 13 116,866 198,212
N.Midland 34 328,844 38 LLI 26 255,836 55,503 18 22 4
Con 8 73,008 120,933
North-West 70 654,751 76 LLI 24 231,123 263,670
Con 46 423,628 292,942 22 22 4
Yorkshire 52 536,553 62 LLI 36 398,426 248,078 20 30 8
Con 16 138,127 189,930 20 30 8
North 32 305,015 35 LLI 25 262,287 144,803 18 25 5
Con 7 42,728 96,708
ENGLAND 461 4,150,031 480 LLI 241 2,302,248 1,740,466 21 52 16
Con 220 1,847,783 1,619,746
Wales and
Monmouth 34 286,145 33 LLI 30 263,199 149,782 26 27 11
Con 4 22,946 79,006
Scotland 72 576,828 67 LLI 58 485,116 289,032 44 45 15
Con 14 91,712 181,706
Britain 567 5,013,004 580 LLI 329 3,050,563 2,179,230 91 124 42
Con 238 1,962,441 1,880,458
Ireland 103 777,954 90 LLI 85 624,760 404,892 67 54 44
Con 18 153,194 139,273
Total 670 5,790,958 670 LLI 414 3,675,323 2,584,122 158 178 86
Con 256 2,115,635 2,019,731
Majority 158 1,559,638 564,391
NOTE.—The figures in columns K and L are calculated with reference to the totals in column C. Thus the figure L 54 for Ireland in column K of the last section of the table indicates that under a system of equal single-member constituencies Ireland's 90 members would be Liberal etc. 72, Unionist 18, a Liberal majority of 54, and the corresponding figure L 44 in column L indicates that under proportional representation the 90 members which Ireland would return would be Liberal etc. 67, and Unionist 23. a Liberal majority of 44.
GENERAL ELECTION, 1886
Col A: Members
Col B: Registered Electors
Col C: Proportionate Number of Members
Col D: Members - Liberal, Labour and Irish
Col E: Members - Conservatives
Col F: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Liberal, Labour,
and Irish Nationalists
Col G: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Conservative
Col H: Voters - Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist
Col I: Voters - Conservative
Col J: Majority - Actual
Col K: Majority - With equal Single Member Constituencies
Col L: Majority - Under Proportional Representation.
A B C DE FG HI J K L
Prop Memb Electorate Voters Majority
Memb Elect Memb Act Eq PR
Metropolis 60 489,396 57 LLI 11 87,974 125,457
Con 49 401,422 185,072 38 37 11
England—
South-East 48 406,955 47 LLI 0 - 114,518
Con 48 406,955 184,221 48 47 11
S.Midland 38 312,477 36 LLI 9 73,292 94,213
Con 29 239,185 128,339 20 20 6
East 29 257,022 29 LLI 4 87,975 81,838
Con 25 219,047 102,732 21 21 3
South-West 40 314,603 36 LLI 7 63,063 96,753
Con 33 251,540 129,056 26 22 6
W.Midland 58 544,415 63 LLI 15 136,518 173,463
Con 43 407,897 218,753 28 32 8
N.Midland 34 328,844 38 LLI 14 147,138 125,078
Con 20 181,706 126,547 6 4
North-West 70 654,751 76 LLI 13 123,459 236,134
Con 57 531,292 282,187 44 48 6
Yorkshire 52 536,553 62 LLI 33 359,414 214,407 6
Con 19 177,139 180,728 14 22
North 32 305,015 35 LLI 23 247,275 123,901 5
Con 9 57,740 96,404 14 21
ENGLAND 461 4,150,031 480 LLI 129 1,276,108 1,385,762
Con 332 2,873,923 1,634,039 203 188 42
Wales and
Monmouth 34 286,145 33 LLI 27 240,752 123,186 20 23 7
Con 7 45,393 82,179
Scotland 72 576,828 67 LLI 43 339,726 218,561 14 11 5
Con 29 237,102 188,164
Subtotal 567 5,013,004 580 LLI 199 1,856,586 1,727,509
Con 368 3,156,418 1,904,382 169 154 30
Ireland 103 777,954 90 LLI 84 616,735 376,445
Con 19 161,219 144,755 65 52 38
Total 670 5,790,958 670 LLI 283 2,473,321 2,103,954 8
Con 387 3,317,637 2,049,137 104 102
Majority 104 844,316 54,817
GENERAL ELECTION, 1892
Table headings:
Col A: Members
Col B: Registered Electors
Col C: Proportionate Number of Members
Col D: Members - Liberal, Labour and Irish
Col E: Members - Conservatives
Col F: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Liberal, Labour,
and Irish Nationalists
Col G: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Conservative
Col H: Voters - Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist
Col I: Voters - Conservative
Col J: Majority - Actual
Col K: Majority - With equal Single Member Constituencies
Col L: Majority - Under Proportional Representation.
A B C DE FG HI J K L
Prop Memb Electorate Voters Majority
Memb Elect Memb Act Eq PR
Metropolis 60 552,024 60 LLI 23 186,572 183,967
Con 37 365,452 214,275 14 20 4
England:
South-East 48 463,073 50 LLI 4 38,534 147,136
Con 44 424,539 206,075 40 42 8
S.Midland 38 340,650 38 LLI 15 139,228 120,844
Con 23 210,422 147,347 8 8 4
East 29 276,491 30 LLI 13 134,632 108,866
Con 16 141,859 110,849 3
South-West 40 325,769 35 LLI 15 136,061 125,392
Con 25 189,708 136,449 10 5 1
W. Midland 58 577,397 63 LLI 16 143,567 204,453
Con 42 433,830 248,774 26 31 7
N. Midland 34 347,482 38 LLI 22 232,970 145,587 10 14 2
Con 12 114,512 130,380
North-West 70 707,392 77 LLI 26 284,970 282,139
Con 44 422,422 307,698 18 15 3
Yorkshire 52 571,864 62 LLI 35 418,414 244,099 18 28 6
Con 17 153,450 204,492
North 32 328,189 36 LLI 25 264,483 143,172 18 22 4
Con 7 63,706 115,626
ENGLAND 461 4,499,331 489 LLI 194 1,979,431 1,705,655
Con 267 2,519,900 1,821,985 73 57 15
Wales and
Monmouth 34 314,063 34 LLI 31 294,395 152,326 28 30 10
Con 3 19,668 86,576
Scotland 72 606,203 66 LLI 52 449,994 267,631 32 32 8
Con 20 156,209 214,448
Subtotal 567 5,419,497 589 LLI 277 2,723,820 2,125,612 5 3
Con 290 2,695,777 2,123,009 13
Ireland 103 746,781 81 LLI 80 561,938 345,548 57 41 31
Con 23 184,843 157,181
Total 670 6,168,388 670 LLI 357 3,285,758 2,471,164 44 46 34
Con 313 2,880,620 2,280,190
Majority 44 405,138 190,974
GENERAL ELECTION, 1895
Table headings:
Col A: Members
Col B: Registered Electors
Col C: Proportionate Number of Members
Col D: Members - Liberal, Labour and Irish
Col E: Members - Conservatives
Col F: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Liberal, Labour,
and Irish Nationalists
Col G: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Conservative
Col H: Voters - Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist
Col I: Voters - Conservative
Col J: Majority - Actual
Col K: Majority - With equal Single Member Constituencies
Col L: Majority - Under Proportional Representation.
A B C DE FG HI J K L
Prop Memb Electorate Voters Majority
Memb Elect Memb Act Eq PR
Metropolis 60 573,141 61 LLI 8 70,056 161,328
Con 52 503,085 242,999 44 47 13
England:
South-East 48 472,725 50 LLI 2 24,057 152,213
Con 46 448,668 217,096 44 44 8
S.Midland 38 358,501 38 LLI 3 30,569 116,143
Con 35 327,932 164,052 32 32 6
East 29 294,153 31 LLI 8 70,467 101,736
Con 21 223,686 122,999 13 15 3
South-West 40 330,670 35 LLI 10 76,141 124,852
Con 30 254,529 144,435 20 19 3
W.Midland 58 589,881 63 LLI 9 85,544 195,545
Con 49 504,337 259,382 40 45 9
N.Midland 34 351,792 37 LLI 16 186,167 143,142 1
Con 18 165,625 149,436 2 1
North-West 70 728,292 78 LLI 10 114,035 273,585
Con 60 614,257 332,101 50 54 8
Yorkshire 52 565,799 61 LLI 28 317,932 238,032 4 7 1
Con 24 247,867 225,871
North 32 339,289 36 LLI 20 222,202 145,085 8 12 2
Con 12 117,087 124,697
ENGLAND 461 4,604,243 490 LLI 114 1,197,170 1,652,261
Con 347 3,407,073 1,983,068 233 236 48
Wales and
Monmouth 34 320,532 34 LLI 25 241,750 148,552 16 18 6
Con 9 78,782 108,036
Scotland 72 636,106 68 LLI 39 335,143 243,425 6 4 2
Con 33 300,963 234,138
Subtotal 567 5,560,881 592 LLI 178 1,774,068 2,044,238
Con 389 3,786,818 2,325,242 211 214 40
Ireland 103 727,562 78 LLI 82 549,467 317,910 61 42 28
Con 21 178,095 154,379
Total 670 6,292,443 670 LLI 260 2,323,530 2,362,148
Con 410 3,964,913 2,479,621 150 172 12
Majority 150 1,641,383 117,473
GENERAL ELECTION, 1900
Table headings:
Col A: Members
Col B: Registered Electors
Col C: Proportionate Number of Members
Col D: Members - Liberal, Labour and Irish
Col E: Members - Conservatives
Col F: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Liberal, Labour,
and Irish Nationalists
Col G: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Conservative
Col H: Voters - Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist
Col I: Voters - Conservative
Col J: Majority - Actual
Col K: Majority - With equal Single Member Constituencies
Col L: Majority - Under Proportional Representation.
A B C DE FG HI J K L
Prop Memb Electorate Voters Majority
Memb Elect Memb Act Eq PR
Metropolis 60 601,925 60 LLI 8 73,718 150,047
Con 52 528,207 247,777 44 46 14
England:
South-East 48 512,408 51 LLI 3 23,362 140,277
Con 45 489,406 220,829 42 47 11
S. Midland 38 388,361 39 LLI 6 63,375 120,012
Con 32 324,986 164,148 26 27 7
East 29 319,997 32 LLI 9 80,447 101,785
Con 20 239,550 125,375 11 8 4
South-West 40 337,449 33 LLI 14 122,410 127,086
Con 26 215,039 142,269 12 9 1
W. Midland 58 630,931 63 LLI 10 96,089 200,113
Con 48 534,842 261,474 38 43 9
N. Midland 34 378,996 38 LLI 18 211,280 149,794 2 4 0
Con 16 167,716 153,294
North-West 70 794,142 79 LLI 14 176,183 281,634
Con 56 617,957 351,243 42 43 9
Yorkshire 52 612,892 61 LLI 26 326,841 239,045 5 1
Con 26 286,051 238,870
North 32 367,007 36 LLI 16 197,102 147,017 2 2
Con 16 169,905 135,459
ENGLAND 461 4,944,108 492 LLI 124 1,370,807 1,657,814
Con 337 3,573,301 2,040,508 213 212 52
Wales and
Monmouth 34 342,209 34 LLI 28 286,628 161,190 22 24 8
Con 6 55,581 103,396
Scotland 72 683,840 68 LLI 34 312,781 254,112
Con 34 371,059 258,836 4 6
Britain 567 5,970,187 594 LLI 186 1,970,216 2,073,116
Con 381 3,999,941 2,402,740 195 194 44
Ireland 103 765,258 76 LLI 82 598,469 318,203 61 44 28
Con 21 166,757 145,906
Total 670 6,735,415 670 LLI 268 2,568,685 2,391,319
Con 402 4,166,698 2,548,736 134 150 16
Majority 134 1,598,013 157,417
GENERAL ELECTION, 1906
Table headings:
Col A: Members
Col B: Registered Electors
Col C: Proportionate Number of Members
Col D: Members - Liberal, Labour and Irish
Col E: Members - Conservatives
Col F: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Liberal, Labour,
and Irish Nationalists
Col G: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Conservative
Col H: Voters - Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist
Col I: Voters - Conservative
Col J: Majority - Actual
Col K: Majority - With equal Single Member Constituencies
Col L: Majority - Under Proportional Representation.
A B C DE FG HI J K L
Prop Memb Electorate Voters Majority
Memb Elect Memb Act Eq PR
Metropolis 60 626,011 57 LLI 40 385,762 251,937
Con 20 240,249 225,725 20 13 3
England
South East 48 583,000 54 LLI 22 273,398 245,046
Con 26 309,602 241,097 4 4
S.Midlands 38 441,803 40 LLI 27 328,386 193,594 16 20 2
Con 11 113,417 172,159
East 29 368,662 34 LLI 25 333,564 170,039 21 28 4
Con 4 35,098 128,991
South-West 40 371,300 34 LLI 34 321,822 176,478 28 24 4
Con 6 49,478 144,342
W.Midland 58 679,903 63 LLI 35 402,148 288,832 12 11 1
Con 23 277,760 286,862
N.Midland 34 420,677 39 LLI 28 358,852 205,066 22 27 5
Con 6 61,825 151,924
North-West 70 869,792 80 LLI 55 680,843 420,969 40 46 12
Con 15 188,949 321,560
Yorkshire 52 667,863 62 LLI 41 556,233 340,865 30 42 14
Con 11 111,635 218,778
North 32 409,843 38 LLI 27 345,353 215,748 22 26 10
Con 5 64,490 123,003
England 461 5,438,859 501 LLI 334 3,986,356 2,508,574 207 233 53
Con 127 1,452,503 2,014,441
Wales and
Monmouth 34 387,585 35 LLI 34 387,585 217,462 34 35 13
Con 0 — 100,547
Scotland 72 750,401 70 LLI 60 629,360 367,942 48 48 16
Con 12 121,041 235,098
Britain 567 6,576,845 606 LLI 428 5,003,301 3,093,978 289 316 82
Con 139 1,573,544 2,350,086
Ireland 103 693,417 64 LLI 85 545,748 301,833 67 36 22
Con 18 147,669 144,708
TOTAL 670 7,270,262 670 LLI 513 5,549,049 3,395,811 356 352 104
Con 157 1,721,213 2,494,794
Majority 356 3,827,836 901,017
GENERAL ELECTION, JANUARY 1910
Table headings:
Col A: Members
Col B: Registered Electors
Col C: Proportionate Number of Members
Col D: Members - Liberal, Labour and Irish
Col E: Members - Conservatives
Col F: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Liberal, Labour,
and Irish Nationalists
Col G: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Conservative
Col H: Voters - Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist
Col I: Voters - Conservative
Col J: Majority - Actual
Col K: Majority - With equal Single Member Constituencies
Col L: Majority - Under Proportional Representation.
A B C DE FG HI J K L
Prop Memb Electorate Voters Majority
Memb Elect Memb Act Eq PR
Metropolis 60 658,795 57 LLI 26 246,838 254,154
Con 34 411,957 298,821 8 15 5
England:
South-East 48 636,108 55 LLI 3 31,221 220,995
Con 45 604,887 334,022 42 49 11
S. Midland 38 490,592 43 LLI 11 146,312 197,717
Con 27 344,280 235,776 16 17 3
East 29 400,062 35 LLI 15 236,234 173,465 1 7 1
Con 14 163,828 170,027
South-West 40 386,514 34 LLI 18 201,726 172,692 2
Con 22 184,788 175,010 4
W. Midland 58 713,761 62 LLI 17 227,430 284,629
Con 41 486,331 334,874 24 22 6
N. Midland 34 446,752 39 LLI 23 334,766 216,469 12 19 3
Con 11 111,986 181,209
North-West 70 928,640 81 LLI 47 636,497 449,324 24 35 7
Con 23 292,143 382,796
Yorkshire 52 701,856 61 LLI 89 564,418 365,185 26 37 11
Con 13 137,438 248,507
North 32 430,594 38 LLI 23 354,697 216,760 14 24 6
Con 9 75,897 150,471
ENGLAND 461 5,793,674 505 LLI 222 2,980.139 2,551,390 21 3
Con 239 2,813,535 2,521,513 17
Wales and
Monmouth 34 425,714 37 LLI 32 414,613 243,383 30 35 13
Con 2 11,101 116,696
Scotland 72 785,391 68 LLI 61 675,723 394,103 50 50 14
Con 11 109,668 265,770
Sub total 567 7,004,779 610 LLI 315 4,070,475 3,188,876 63 106 30
Con 252 3,188,876 2,903,979
Ireland 103 688,284 60 LLI 82 518,154 356,223 61 30 26
Con 21 170,130 145,437
Total 670 7,693,063 670 LLI 397 4,588,629 3,545,099 124 136 56
Con 270 3,104,434 3,049,416
Majority 124 1,484,195 495,683
GENERAL ELECTION, DECEMBER 1910
Table headings:
Col A: Members
Col B: Registered Electors
Col C: Proportionate Number of Members
Col D: Members - Liberal, Labour and Irish
Col E: Members - Conservatives
Col F: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Liberal, Labour,
and Irish Nationalists
Col G: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Conservative
Col H: Voters - Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist
Col I: Voters - Conservative
Col J: Majority - Actual
Col K: Majority - With equal Single Member Constituencies
Col L: Majority - Under Proportional Representation.
A B C DE FG HI J K L
Prop Memb Electorate Voters Majority
Memb Elect Memb Act Eq PR
Metropolis 60 658,795 57 LLI 29 279,492 223,151
Con 31 379,303 264,281 2 9 5
England—
South-East 48 636,108 55 LLI 5 58,248 209,434
Con 43 577,860 311,888 38 45 11
S. Midland 38 490,592 43 LLI 14 170,762 190,120
Con 24 319,830 219,876 10 13 3
East 29 400,062 35 LLI 16 256,750 164,849 3 9 1
Con 13 143,312 154,529
South-West 40 386,514 34 LLI 14 159,494 164,698
Con 26 227,020 168,992 12 6 0
W. Midland 58 713,761 62 LLI 19 246,842 268,125
Con 39 466,919 316,574 20 20 6
N. Midland 34 446,752 39 LLI 21 298,037 202,351 8 13 3
Con 13 148,715 173,545
North-West 70 928,640 81 LLI 39 524,682 400,508 8 11 1
Con 31 403,958 386,045
Yorkshire 52 701,856 61 LLI 40 570,544 321,622 28 39 9
Con 12 131,312 239,067
North 32 430,594 38 LLI 25 375,574 200,583 18 28 6
Con 7 55,020 142,388
ENGLAND 461 5,793,674 505 LLI 222 2,940,425 2,345,441 7
Con 239 2,853,249 2,377,185 17 5
Wales and
Monmouth 34 425,714 37 LLI 31 388,507 210,525 28 31 9
Con 3 37,207 121,013
Scotland 72 785,391 68 LLI 61 678,395 372,313 50 50 10
Con 11 106,996 277,183
Subtotal 567 7,004,779 610 LLI 314 4,007,327 2,928,279 61 88 14
Con 253 2,997,452 2,775,381
Ireland 103 688,284 60 LLI 84 536,675 350,029 65 34 24
Con 19 151,609 146,982
Total 670 7,693,063 670 LLI 398 4,544,002 3,278,308 126 122 38
Con 272 3,149,061 2,922,363
Majority 126 1,394,941 355,945
APPENDIX VI
PREFERENTIAL VOTING: THE TRANSFER OF SUPERFLUOUS VOTES
(A Memorandum by the Rt. Hon. J. Parker Smith)[1]
(1) The Element of Chance Involved: Its Magnitude
An objection, which occurs to every one who considers schemes of Preferential Voting, is that an element of chance is introduced into the result by the methods for the transfer of the superfluous votes of successful candidates. Supposing one part of the supporters of A, a successful candidate, have put down B as their second choice, and the remainder C, and that a certain number of A's votes are superfluous, and have to be transferred, how is it to be determined what number of AB votes, as they may be called, and what number of AC votes shall be transferred? If the question is settled by chance, as, by drawing the necessary number at random from A's heap, by declaring that voting papers shall be used in the order in which they were handed in at the polling booths, or by laying down any other set of arbitrary rules to determine the order in which they shall be counted, an element of uncertainty is introduced by which there seems to be serious danger that B and C will gain or lose unfairly.
Those who are accustomed to dealing with statistics will be prepared to find this danger less than might have been expected; but even they will be surprised to find of how small importance the arbitrary element is discovered, by actual calculation, to be.
The difficulty can be made clear by a numerical instance. Take the case of an election for several seats, where the necessary quota is 6000, and where a favourite candidate, whom we will call A, has received the first votes of 10,000 voters. Though all those voters have agreed in putting the same candidate first, they are divided as to who may wish to be returned next. Six thousand of them put B as their second choice, and the other 4000 C. If the 6000 votes which A requires are drawn wholly from the AB votes, the result of the transfer will be that C is credited with 4000 votes and B with none. This would be clearly unfair, for, in reality, B has received among A's voters much more support than C. To use up the 4000 AC votes and only 2000 AB votes, and to transfer 4000 votes to B and none to C would be equally unfair to C. The course which is exactly fair to both B and C is that the votes which are transferred should be divided between them in the same proportion as that in which the opinions of the whole number of A's supporters is divided. That is to say, strict justice will be done if every 1000 votes which are used or transferred are made up of 600 AB votes and 400 AC votes. Accordingly, A's quota of 6000 must be made up of 3600 AB votes and 2400 AC votes, and the 4000 papers left to be transferred will consequently consist of 2400 votes for B and 1600 votes for C.
This principle avoids all uncertainty, and is indisputably fair. It remains to consider how to carry it into effect. In most cases there would, in reality, be many more classes of votes than in the instance taken above. Even in such cases it is practicable, as will presently be shown, to divide the votes proportionately by an actual process of counting and separation. A certain amount of complication is, of course, introduced, but the extra labour involved does not seem impossible. The question whether this extra labour is necessary must be answered by examining the magnitude of the evil which it is sought to remedy.
If the votes are counted in a random order, it is clear there is a probability that the order in which they are drawn will correspond to the total numbers of each class in the ballot-box. It is reasonable to expect that when there are 10,000 ballot papers in an urn the composition of the first thousand drawn out will nearly be the same as that of any other thousand, or of the whole 10,000. The amount of this probability may be determined mathematically, and is very great.
This fact was clearly seen by Mr. Andrae, the statesman by whom the method of preferential voting was introduced into Denmark in 1855, and a mathematician of undisputed eminence. In answer to an objection of the kind now under discussion, he replied: "If this law of mine had already been in operation over the whole of Europe (including Turkey), for a period of 10,000 years, and if the elections in every part of Europe to which the law was applied were to take place, not every one, or three, or seven years, but every week in regular repetition, these elections throughout Europe, at the rate of a general European election per week, would still have to go on for more than a thousand times the period of years already stated; that is to say, for more than a thousand times ten thousand years, before the chances would be equal that the voting papers should come out of the urn in the order required to form the basis of this problem. Although, therefore, the supposed combination is, mathematically speaking, only an enormous improbability, yet, practically speaking, it is absolutely impossible."[2]
To state the matter more exactly, and as the result of an independent mathematical investigation, it appears that in the case we have stated, if 4000 voting papers were drawn out of A's heap at random, instead of the papers being carefully sorted and proportionately divided, the probability is that neither B nor C would gain or lose more than 11 votes. In other words, it is just even betting that the number of AB votes in the 4000 drawn would lie between 2411 and 2389 (inclusive), and consequently that the number of BC votes will lie between 1589 and 1611. The odds are more than 3 to 1 neither B nor C would gain or lose more than 20 votes, i.e. that the number of AB votes drawn will lie between 2420 and 2380; more than 10 to 1 that neither would gain or lose more than 30 votes; just 50 to 1 that neither would gain or lose more than 40 votes; and about 2000 to 1 that neither would gain or lose more than 60 votes. If the number of classes were larger or the number of votes to be drawn smaller, the effect would be much less. It will thus be seen that it is only in the case of very closely contested elections that the element of chance can affect the result. It will also be observed that the element of chance will not be of importance as between the different parties, but only as between different individual candidates of the same party, since in almost all cases the electors who are agreed upon the candidate they most desire will also put for their second choice candidates of the same party.
In closely contested elections it must, of course, be admitted that as a result of this method, chance might decide which of two candidates of the same party should be elected. But in closely contested elections in large constituencies so many elements of chance are always and necessarily involved, that the introduction of a fresh one does not, in reality, make the result more arbitrary. Putting aside all the slight influences which at the last moment decide a score or two of featherweight votes, and assuming that every voter is profoundly convinced of the truth of his opinions, there remains the question of boundaries. A slight change in the line of the boundaries of the constituency might easily make a difference of fifty votes—a larger difference than what we are concerned with. To carry the dividing lines from North to South instead of from East to West, would, in many localities, completely alter the character of the representation.
These are, in reality, matters of chance, and more arbitrary in their nature than the order in which voting papers are drawn from an urn.
(2) Method of Eliminating the Chance Element
If, however, special precautions are still thought necessary, the following method of counting the votes appears to reduce, as far as practicable, the element of chance involved in the transfer of superfluous votes:—
The whole set of voting papers of the constituency being mixed, the papers, not yet unfolded, are drawn out one by one. Each is stamped, as it is drawn, with a corresponding number, 1, 2, … in order. It is then unfolded, and sorted according to the names of the candidates marked first and second upon it. Suppose there are six candidates, A, B, C, X, Y, Z; the votes of any candidate, A, will be sorted into six heaps, viz., A votes (i.e. votes where A only is voted for), AB, AC, AX, AY, and AZ votes. If A is found to have received more votes than he requires, the order in which the votes will be counted to him will be as follows: Use first the A votes, then use up those heaps where the second name also is that of a candidate who has received more than the necessary minimum. If these heaps give A more than he requires, take the same proportion out of each of such heaps, taking out of each heap the last drawn votes first. If, however, these heaps are used up without giving A as many votes as he requires, take an equal proportion of the votes of each of the remaining heaps—taking out of each heap the last drawn votes first.
Example.—Take an election where 6000 is the necessary minimum, and suppose A has 8650 votes, composed as follows:
A 600
AB 2,700
AC 4,500
AX 50
AY 200
AZ 600
——-
8,650
Using first the 600 A votes, we are left with 5400 to make up out of the remaining heaps.
1. Suppose B and C have received the quota. The 5400 can be taken from their heaps exclusively, for in their two heaps are 7200 votes; the proportion to be taken from each heap is therefore 5400 out of 7200, which is three quarters. Thus we make up A's number thus:—
A votes 600
Three-quarters of 2,700 AB " 2,025
Three-quarters of 4,500 AC " 3,375
——-
6,000
And transfer the remainder (the AB and AC votes transferred being those stamped with the lowest numbers).
2. Suppose B and X have received the quota. Their two heaps amount to 2750 votes. Using these up, there remain 2650 votes to be made up out of the AC, AY, and AZ heaps. These three heaps together contain 5300 votes; and the proportion to be taken from each heap is 2650 out of 5300, or half. Thus A's number is made up as follows:—
A votes 600
AB " 2,700
AX " 50
Half of 4,500 AC " 2,250
Half of 200 AY " 100
Half of 600 AZ " 300
——-
6,000
And the remaining votes of each of the three last classes—being those stamped with the lowest numbers—will be transferred.
It will be observed that the element of chance is not wholly excluded, since the question, which papers out of the AC heap are transferred, is left to depend upon the order of drawing. To exclude chance wholly, these would have to be sorted into heaps according to the third name upon them, and an equal proportion taken from each heap. The figures in the first half of this paper are sufficient to show that such trouble would be wholly superfluous.
[Footnote 1: This Memorandum is published by permission of the Rt. Hon. J. Parker Smith. Although written in 1884, the arguments still apply. The method described in the second part of the paper has been adopted in the Municipal Representation Bill (see Appendix VII.), but the method of application differs in detail.]
[Footnote 2: Quoted by Mr. (afterwards Earl) Lytton in his Report on the Election of Representatives for the Rigsraad.—House of Commons papers, 1864, vol. 61, p. 24 of No. 7.]
APPENDIX VII
THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE
SCHEDULE TO MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION BILL, 1910
THE FIRST SCHEDULE[1]
RULES FOB THE TRANSFER OF VOTES AND FOR ASCERTAINING THE RESULT OF THE POLL
Arrangement of ballot papers.
1. After the ballot papers have been mixed, in accordance with the rules contained in the First Schedule to the Ballot Act, 1872, the returning officer shall draw out all ballot papers which he does not reject as invalid, and file in a separate parcel those on which the figure 1 is set opposite the name of the same candidate. The returning officer shall then count the number of papers in each parcel.
Ascertainment of quota.
2. The returning officer shall then add together the numbers of the papers in all the parcels and divide the total by a number exceeding by one the number of vacancies to be filled, and the result increased by one, disregarding any fractional remainder, shall be the number of votes sufficient to secure the return of a candidate, herein called the "quota."
Candidates with quota elected.
3. Any candidate whose parcel contains a number of papers equal to or greater than the quota shall be declared elected.
Transfer of surplus votes.] 4.—(1) If the number of candidates elected under the last rule shall not equal the number of vacancies, the returning officer shall as far as possible transfer from each elected candidate the votes (if any) in excess of the quota (herein called surplus votes) to the candidates indicated on the ballot papers as next in order of the voters' preference, excluding candidates already declared elected. The votes of the candidate having the largest number of votes shall first be dealt with, and the particular votes to be transferred shall be determined in accordance with the following regulations:—
(a) The returning officer shall arrange all the ballot papers in the parcel of the elected candidate on which votes capable of transfer are given by filing in a separate sub-parcel those on which a next preference is indicated for some one continuing candidate.
(b) The returning officer shall also make a separate sub-parcel of the ballot papers in the parcel on which the votes given are not capable of transfer.
(c) The returning officer shall count the ballot papers in each sub-parcel, and also the total of all the ballot papers containing votes capable of transfer.
(d) If the total number of votes capable of transfer is equal to or less than the surplus votes, the returning officer shall transfer all the votes capable of transfer.
(e) If the total number of votes capable of transfer is greater than the surplus votes, the returning officer shall transfer from each sub-parcel of votes capable of transfer the number of votes which bears the same proportion to the total of the sub-parcel as the number of surplus votes bears to the total of all the votes capable of transfer.
(f) The number of votes to be transferred from each sub-parcel under the preceding regulation shall be ascertained by multiplying the total of the sub-parcel by the number of surplus votes and dividing the result by the total number of votes capable of transfer. Fractional remainders shall be disregarded.
(g) The particular votes transferred from each sub-parcel shall be those last filed in the sub-parcel.
(2) The transfer of surplus votes shall be effected by making new sub-parcels of the ballot papers on which those votes are given, and adding those sub-parcels to the parcels (if any) of the candidates to whom the transfers are made, or, where any such candidate has as yet no parcel, a new parcel shall be formed for him from the papers transferred.
(3) All ballot papers in a parcel of an elected candidate not transferred under this rule shall be set aside as finally dealt with, and the votes given thereon shall thenceforth not be taken into account.
(4) If two or more parcels of elected candidates are equal in size, the returning officer shall decide which parcel he will first deal with under this rule.
(5) A transfer of votes under this rule shall not be made unless the surplus votes of the elected candidate, together with any other surplus votes not transferred, exceed the difference between the totals of the votes of the two continuing candidates lowest on the poll.
(6) This rule shall take effect subject to the provisions for filling the last vacancy herein-after contained, and if at any time it shall be possible to fill the last vacancy under those provisions, no further transfer under this rule shall be made.
Result of transfer.
5. After the transfer of the surplus votes of an elected candidate, any candidate who shall, as a result of the transfer, obtain the quota of votes, shall be declared elected.
Further transfer of surplus votes.
6.—(1) Unless and until the last vacancy shall have been filled under the provisions herein-after contained, if, after the transfers directed by Rule 4, there shall still remain a vacancy, and the votes of any elected candidate to whom a transfer has been made are in excess of the quota, the returning officer shall, as far as possible, take from the sub-parcel last transferred to that candidate a number of votes equal to the surplus.
(2) The particular votes to be taken shall be determined in accordance with the regulations given in Rule 4 hereof, in the same manner as if the votes included in the sub-parcel last transferred had been the only votes given to the candidate; the ballot papers so taken shall be added in separate sub-parcels to the parcels of the continuing candidates (if any) indicated thereon as next in order of the voters' preference, and the votes given thereon shall be transferred to those candidates accordingly. Where any such candidate has as yet no parcel, a new parcel shall be formed for him from the papers transferred.
(3) The remaining ballot papers in the parcel of the elected candidate (including the ballot papers taken from the parcel under Sub-Rule (1) on which the votes given are not capable of transfer) shall be set aside as finally dealt with, and the votes given thereon shall thenceforth not be taken into account.
(4) After any transfer of votes under this rule, any candidate who shall, as a result of the transfer, obtain the quota of votes shall be declared elected.
(5) The process directed by this rule shall be repeated until the last vacancy is filled, or until no candidate has any surplus votes, whichever shall first happen.
(6) If two or more parcels shall be equal in size, regard shall be had to the number of votes counted to each candidate under Rule 1, and the parcel of the candidate highest on that count shall first be dealt with, but if the numbers of votes on that count were equal, the returning officer shall decide which parcel he will first deal with under this rule.
(7) A transfer of votes under this rule shall not be made unless the surplus votes of the elected candidate, together with any other surplus votes not transferred, exceed the difference between the totals of the votes of the two continuing candidates lowest on the poll.