Mr. Dana—There is no evidence of that,—the evidence is, that after the adjournment he asked an explanation from Mr. Riley of the interview in the morning.
The Commissioner referring to his notes—says, he believes Mr. Dana is right.
Mr. Lunt. Now with whom is he associated? I hold in my hand an account of a meeting held in Faneuil Hall, on the 14th of October last.
Mr Dana.—For what purpose this narrative to be read here? It is an account from a hostile paper, of a political meeting, not made under oath; and it does not appear who wrote it, nor whether the person who wrote it was present at the meeting.
The Commissioner.—I shall not object to the gentleman's reading whatever he thinks proper. You have introduced in your argument a great many irrelevant matters, Mr. Dana, and Mr. Lunt may do the same.
Mr. Lunt.—This is the account,—Reads from the Boston Post of October 15, 1850.
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW MEETING.
"The call for a meeting of the opponents of the fugitive slave law, at Faneuil Hall, last night, collected a large audience, comprising a considerable number of colored people. There were about three hundred colored females in the galleries. The meeting was called to order by Francis Jackson, and organized as follows:—Charles Francis Adams, President; Samuel E. Sewall, Gershom B. Weston, Francis Jackson, and Timothy Gilbert, Vice Presidents; J. W. Stone, and J. W. Thornton, Secretaries.
"Upon taking the chair, Mr. Adams delivered a carefully prepared address, in which he maintained that the law was repugnant to the spirit of our institutions and the constitution, and fraught with as much danger to free colored people as to fugitives.
"He was followed by Frederick Douglass, who described the consternation the law had created among the colored people, free and fugitive, and said that he knew of hundreds of both classes who were fleeing to Canada. The free colored people were in fear of seizure by conspiring complainants, aided by perjured affidavits.
"Richard H. Dana, Jr., after expressing regret that the meeting was not made up of somewhat different material, of the leading men in all branches of business, and of men of property and reputed respectability, read a long letter from Josiah Quincy, senior, declaring against the law, but at the same time expressing his belief that there was no real ground for alarm, for, in his opinion, the enforcement of the law in Massachusetts would prove to be impracticable.
"At the request of the President, Mr. Dana also read a series of resolutions, author unknown, declaring that the moral sense of the individuals composing the meeting, revolted against the law; denouncing it as contradictory to the declaration of independence, and inconsistent with the purposes of the constitution, and in direct violation of its habeas corpus provision, and the right of the people to be secure from unreasonable seizure, &c.; that the meeting could not believe that any citizen of Boston and its vicinity could be so destitute of love of his country and of his race, or devoid of a sense of justice, as to take part in returning a fugitive; and that all present pledge themselves to endeavor to aid and cooperate with all colored people endangered by the law.
"Speeches were made by Wendell Phillips, James W. Briggs, of Ohio, Charles Remond, and the Rev. Mr. Colver. The resolutions were adopted, as a matter of course. The last one provided "for a committee of vigilance to secure the fugitives and colored inhabitants of Boston and vicinity from any invasion of their rights by persons acting under the law," and the committee was styled and made up as follows:—"
The last resolution provides for a committee, of which Charles G. Davis was one. Now I admit that Mr. Davis was in Syracuse, at the time. But he admits that he volunteered upon his return. Why didn't he publicly disclaim any assent to these proceedings? And if he did not, is he not to be presumed to have assented? I want the public to know whether Mr. Davis and those associated with him, abide by the doctrines avowed in Faneuil Hall.
The Statute provides that whoever has been engaged in aiding, abetting, or assisting, directly or indirectly, is criminal. I shall contend that the defendant is directly implicated. He is more or less implicated, in the opinions which have been promulgated, and from his conversations with Mr. Riley. What next? He comes and asks whether a certain man is a Southern man. Why? Is not a Southern man to go into a United States Court? Has it come to this?
Mr. Davis then says to Sawin, "this is a d—d nasty piece of business," in the presence of the prisoner. He knew that such an expression was calculated to have two effects; first, to discourage the officer,—and secondly, to encourage and excite the prisoner. This was an indirect aiding,—connecting it with the subsequent escape. He uses language of a very unusual and violent character afterwards.
For some unaccountable reason Mr. Davis remains here; for it is unaccounted for. Was he counsel?
I maintain he was not counsel. Mr. Riley did not know he was counsel when he asked Shadrach in Wright's presence if Davis was counsel. Riley didn't know it then. Shadrach appeared to be in doubt about it.
(It was suggested that there was no such evidence.)
What was he waiting for? What single thing did he do as counsel?
Mr. Lunt here reviewed the evidence of the transactions in the court room more minutely. Davis pushed the door and stuck his back against the post. One expression, "Take him out, boys," is the natural expression of a stranger. The other words testified to by others were, "take him out." He goes down, and does not interfere, according to his own statement. He shows no disposition to prevent a rescue.
The Commissioner inquires whether not interfering may not be indirectly aiding and abetting.
Mr. Lunt. I am not ready to take that ground at present.
The Commissioner. He is undoubtedly liable, as a magistrate, and subject to a fine of $300.
Mr. Lunt reviews the evidence of what took place in the entry, argues that Mr. Homer could not have seen the whole disturbance, says that as a professional man, he can't say it is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Davis uttered the words "take him out, boys," and does not think they would satisfy a jury, taken by themselves. But there was reasonable cause for binding him over. Mr. Prescott shakes my confidence in my preconceived opinions upon the subject, as to whether Davis went out or not. I did not think before that Davis went out. Mr. Prescott cannot be mistaken. Mr. Prescott's testimony is not met by the negative testimony of Mr. Riley, for it was impossible that Mr. Riley could have constantly watched the left hand or easterly door, while talking with others or disputing with Mr. Wright. If he did go out then, he had an opportunity to concert a signal with the colored men without.
Mr. Lunt argued to show the intenseness of Mr. Davis's interest and zeal in opposition to the law, that it was avowed by him under oath upon the stand; that showed his predisposition and excited state of mind upon the subject, and the greater liability of his being betrayed into an act of overt resistance to the law, if an opportunity occurred. This excited state of mind continued in the court room, as was proved by his addressing the officers in the abusive and sanguinary terms used by him. Up to the moment of leaving the court room, and when expostulated with by the officer, for saying he and others ought to have their throats cut, he admitted that he had said so, and that he said so again. Clark and Hutchins heard the cry—"Take him out boys;" and Byrnes, whose eye was fixed on Mr. Davis, was certain that they came from him.
The words were uttered. He was in that peculiar state of mind, which rendered such words the natural expression of his feelings, and they were in perfect accordance with the general purpose of resistance to the law publicly promulgated by his associates and co-laborers, who had been formed into an organized body in this city. He did not content himself with going out when Hutchins opened the door for him. He braced his back against the door-post, and pushed against the door to open it wider. Then came the cry—"Take him out, boys!" And Byrnes had sworn it came from Mr. Davis. Connected with Mr. Davis's leaving the room was another significant fact. Almost at the moment that he, quitting that part of the room where the fugitive was, started to go out, the fugitive rose, put on his coat, and appearing to be excited, walked forward, just as the first cry was raised.
Mr. Davis lingers on the stair-case, and goes to his office, not knowing or caring, he would have us suppose, what had been the issue. Upon this evidence, it seems to me a clear case for holding the party over for further examination and trial.
Wednesday, Feb. 26. Upon the opening of the Court the Commissioner delivered his decision.
He commenced by stating the offence under the statute with which the defendant is charged, and stated that he should confine himself principally to the question whether the defendant was aiding or abetting the person who had been arrested, and that the legal decisions upon the construction of the statute were merely for the purposes of this examination. The Commissioner then reviewed the evidence as to the expressions of the defendant in the court room, and stated that it had been proved that the defendant said the officers of the Court ought to have their throats cut. No notice was taken in the opinion of the evidence of Geo. W. Minns, Esq. The following extracts are made from the opinion of the Commissioner.
"The defendant has also volunteered the statement in this court, when called as a witness in the preceding examination, that he was glad the prisoner was free, and when further questioned, he left it unexplained whether that opinion also embraced the unlawful means that had been used."
"These facts have a legal bearing upon the animus, the wilful intent with which any act may have been done, by the defendant to aid in the rescue; and I should fail in the duty of a magistrate at this time, and under all the circumstances surrounding this examination, to permit to pass unrebuked any manifestation of a resistance to or contempt of legal process, especially when coming from intelligent citizens and men in official positions, whose countenance or encouragement may have involved, and may again involve, the excitable and less informed in an open violation of law. At the same time there is a plain distinction as to the penal consequences, between a moral and a legal aiding or abetting; and holding throughout these examinations, as I trust I may be enabled to do, an impartial as well as a firm hand, care shall be taken not to confound an indiscretion or a moral perversion, or any mere expression of opinion, however gross, with a wilful act constituting legal guilt. I fully recognise the doctrine suggested in the defence, of the largest liberty within law, and also the right of the people to make or amend constitutions and laws, by all constitutional means or reserved powers."
"But so far as the defendant is here proved to have done any act, there is no evidence which connects him criminally with a preconcerted plan of rescue; and I take pleasure in adding that the conduct of the defence by the learned counsel, and his testimony and disavowals, have greatly aided me in coming to that conclusion." * * *
"Of this preliminary point of the evidence I do not find an aiding or abetting within the provisions of the statute. But, in connection with what immediately followed in the passing of the defendant out at the door, the exclamation supposed by one witness to have come from him, his position and his hand upon the door, immediately followed by the rush of the rioters who surrounded it, and the absence of all evidence of attempt on the part of the defendant to prevent the rescue, it presented, on the part of the evidence for the prosecution, a strong case of probable cause, that made it the duty of the district attorney to bring the party to an examination. But in the view I take of a preliminary inquiry in this form, and especially where not only the evidence that would come before a grand jury, but the defence is gone into, testimony stronger than probable cause should appear, in order to hold the party to a trial." * * *
"Then is that proof found in the acts of the defendant as he passed out of the door, in themselves or in their connection with his preceding declarations and conduct?"
The Commissioner then reviewed the evidence of Mr. Byrnes, and come to the conclusion that taking it as it stands it does not satisfactorily prove that the defendant uttered the words ascribed to him. * * *
"The only other evidence refers to the manner the defendant went out of the door. Hutchins, who passed him out, says that the defendant turned his back to the wall, the outer corner of the casement, instead of going directly forward, and put his head on the outer door, and then it started and was forced open. This act, as it was exhibited to the Commissioner, by the witness, is not inconsistent with the explanation that it was the result of the rush and pressure without, and the force there applied to the door; and if the attack was unexpected by the defendant, his neglect to interpose resistance to the forcing of the door, or to aid the officers, which it was his duty to have done, and which, it has been urged by the district attorney for the prosecution, with much force in the argument, may have been caused from sudden surprise or agitation. And even if, as the previous and subsequent conduct of the defendant might lead to infer, was a wilful omission of duty, especially in a magistrate, yet, if unaccompanied by any act or expression, aiding in, or inciting to the rescue, and in the absence of a call from a proper officer for assistance, it is not the distinct offence charged in the complaint, or defined in the statute; and the party, if answerable, is so in another form and tribunal. It is further to be considered, as suggested by the counsel for the defence, that the decision in this hearing is not final, or in any legal form conclusive, and as the defendant has a permanent locality, leaves the inquiry open elsewhere, should this evidence or further proof require it. Upon the whole evidence, therefore, and applying the rule which should govern preliminary examinations, of not binding over a party accused, without testimony beyond that which might constitute legal probable cause for his arrest and examination, I shall order that the defendant be discharged."
The commissioner now addressed the defendant personally, and said—"Charles G. Davis, the court order you to be discharged, and go without day."
Act of Congress of 1850.
An Act to amend, and supplementary to the Act, entitled "An Act respecting Fugitives from Justice, and persons escaping from the service of their Masters," approved February 12, 1793.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the persons who have been, or may hereafter be, appointed commissioners, in virtue of any act of Congress, by the circuit courts of the United States and who, in consequence of such appointment, are authorized to exercise the powers that any justice of the peace or other magistrate of any of the United States may exercise in respect to offenders for any crime or offence against the United States by arresting, imprisoning, or bailing the same under and by virtue of the thirty-third section of the act of the twenty-fourth of September, seventeen hundred and eighty-nine, entitled, "An act to establish the judicial courts of the United States," shall be, and are hereby authorized and required to exercise and discharge all the powers and duties conferred by this act.
Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That the superior court of each organized territory of the United States shall have the same power to appoint commissioners to take acknowledgments of bail and affidavit, and to take depositions of witnesses in civil causes, which is now possessed by the circuit courts of the United States; and all commissioners who shall hereafter be appointed for such purposes by the superior court of any organized territory of the United States shall possess all the powers and exercise all the duties conferred by law upon the commissioners appointed by the circuit courts of the United States for similar purposes, and shall moreover exercise and discharge all the powers and duties conferred by this act.
Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That the circuit courts of the United States, and the superior courts of each organized territory of the United States, shall from time to time enlarge the number of commissioners, with a view to afford reasonable facilities to reclaim fugitives from labor, and to the prompt discharge of the duties imposed by this act.
Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That the commissioners above named shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the judges of the circuit and district courts of the United States, in their respective circuits and districts within the several States, and the judges of the superior courts of the Territories, severally and collectively, in term time and vacation; and shall grant certificates to such claimants, upon satisfactory proof being made, with authority to take and remove such fugitives from service or labor, under the restrictions herein contained, to the State or Territory from which such persons may have escaped or fled.
Sec. 5. And be it further enacted, That it shall be the duty of all marshals and deputy marshals to obey and execute all warrants and precepts issued under the provisions of this act, when to them directed; and should any marshal or deputy marshal refuse to receive such warrant or other process, when tendered, or to use all proper means diligently to execute the same, he shall, on conviction thereof, be fined in the sum of one thousand dollars to the use of such claimant, on the motion of such claimant, by the circuit or district court for the district of such marshal; and after arrest of such fugitive by such marshal or his deputy, or whilst at any time in his custody, under the provisions of this act, should such fugitive escape, whether with or without the assent of such marshal or his deputy, such marshal shall be liable, on his official bond, to be prosecuted for the benefit of such claimant, for the full value of the service or labor of said fugitive in the State, Territory, or district whence he escaped; and the better to enable the said commissioners, when thus appointed, to execute their duties faithfully and efficiently, in conformity with the requirements of the constitution of the United States and of this act, they are hereby authorized and empowered, within their counties respectively, to appoint in writing under their hands, any one or more suitable persons, from time to time, to execute all such warrants and other process as may be issued by them in the lawful performance of their respective duties; with an authority to such commissioners, or the persons to be appointed by them, to execute process as aforesaid, to summon and call to their aid the bystanders, or posse comitatus of the proper county, when necessary to insure a faithful observance of the clause of the constitution referred to, in conformity with the provisions of this act; and all good citizens are hereby commanded to aid and assist in the prompt and efficient execution of this law, whenever their services may be required, as aforesaid, for that purpose; and said warrants shall run and be executed by said officers anywhere in the State within which they are issued.
Sec. 6. And be it further enacted, That when a person held to service or labor in any State or Territory of the United States has heretofore or shall hereafter escape into another State or Territory of the United States, the person or persons to whom such service or labor may be due, or his, her, or their agent or attorney, duly authorized, by power of attorney, in writing, acknowledged and certified under the seal of some legal office or court of the State or Territory in which the same may be executed, may pursue and reclaim such fugitive person, either by procuring a warrant from some one of the courts, judges, or commissioners aforesaid, of the proper circuit, district or county, for the apprehension of such fugitive from service or labor, or by seizing and arresting such fugitive where the same can be done without process, and by taking and causing such person to be taken forthwith before such court, judge or commissioner, whose duty it shall be to hear and determine the case of such claimant in a summary manner; and upon satisfactory proof being made, by deposition or affidavit, in writing, to be taken and certified by such court, judge, or commissioner, or by other satisfactory testimony, duly taken and certified by some court, magistrate, justice of the peace, or other legal officer authorized to administer an oath and take depositions under the laws of the State or Territory from which such person owing service or labor may have escaped, with a certificate of such magistracy or other authority, as aforesaid, with the seal of the proper court or officer thereto attached, which seal shall be sufficient to establish the competency of the proof, and with proof also by affidavit, of the identity of the person whose service or labor is claimed to be due as aforesaid, that the person so arrested does in fact owe service or labor to the person or persons claiming him or her, in the State or Territory from which such fugitive may have escaped as aforesaid, and that said person escaped, to make out and deliver to such claimant, his or her agent or attorney, a certificate setting forth the substantial facts as to the service or labor due from such fugitive to the claimant, and of his or her escape from the State or Territory in which such service or labor was due to the State or Territory in which he or she was arrested, with authority to such claimant, or his or her agent or attorney, to use such reasonable force and restraint as may be necessary under the circumstances of the case, to take and remove such fugitive person back to the State or Territory from whence he or she may have escaped as aforesaid. In no trial or hearing under this act shall the testimony of such alleged fugitive be admitted in evidence; and the certificates in this and the first section mentioned shall be conclusive of the right of the person or persons in whose favor granted to remove such fugitive to the State or Territory from which he escaped, and shall prevent all molestation of said person or persons by any process issued by any court, judge, magistrate, or other person whomsoever.
Sec. 7. And be it further enacted, That any person who shall knowingly and willingly obstruct, hinder, or prevent such claimant, his agent or attorney, or any person or persons lawfully assisting him, her, or them, from arresting such fugitive from service or labor, either with or without process as aforesaid; or shall rescue, or attempt to rescue, such fugitive from service or labor, from the custody of such claimant, his or her agent or attorney, or other person or persons lawfully assisting as aforesaid, when so arrested, pursuant to the authority herein given and declared; or shall aid, abet, or assist such person, so owing service or labor as aforesaid, directly or indirectly, to escape from such claimant, his agent or attorney, or other person or persons, legally authorized as aforesaid; or shall harbor or conceal such fugitive, so as to prevent the discovery and arrest of such person, after notice or knowledge of the fact that such person was a fugitive from service or labor as aforesaid, shall, for either of said offences, be subject to a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars and imprisonment not exceeding six months, by indictment and conviction before the district court of the United States for the district in which such offence may have been committed, or before the proper court of criminal jurisdiction, if committed within any one of the organized Territories of the United States; and shall moreover forfeit and pay, by way of civil damages to the party injured by such illegal conduct, the sum of one thousand dollars for each fugitive so lost as aforesaid, to be recovered by action of debt in any of the district or territorial courts aforesaid, within whose jurisdiction the said offence may have been committed.
Sec. 8. And be it further enacted, That the marshals, their deputies, and the clerks of the said district and territorial courts, shall be paid for their services the like fees as may be allowed to them for similar services in other cases; and where such services are rendered exclusively in the arrest, custody, and delivery of the fugitive to the claimant, his or her agent or attorney, or where such supposed fugitive may be discharged out of custody for the want of sufficient proof as aforesaid, then such fees are to be paid in the whole by such claimant, his agent or attorney; and in all cases where the proceedings are before a commissioner, he shall be entitled to a fee of ten dollars in full for his services in each case, upon the delivery of the said certificate to the claimant, his or her agent or attorney; or a fee of five dollars in cases where the proof shall not, in the opinion of such commissioner, warrant such certificate and delivery, inclusive of all services incident to such arrest and examination, to be paid in either case by the claimant, his or her agent or attorney. The person or persons authorized to execute the process to be issued by such commissioners for the arrest and detention of fugitives from service or labor as aforesaid, shall also be entitled to a fee of five dollars each for each person he or they may arrest and take before any such commissioner as aforesaid at the instance and request of such claimant, with such other fees as may be deemed reasonable by such commissioner for such other additional services as may be necessarily performed by him or them: such as attending to the examination, keeping the fugitive in custody, and providing him with food and lodging during his detention, and until the final determination of such commissioner: and in general for performing such other duties as may be required by such claimant, his or her attorney or agent, or commissioner in the premises; such fees to be made up in conformity with the fees usually charged by the officers of the courts of justice within the proper district or county, as near as may be practicable, and paid by such claimants, their agents or attorneys, whether such supposed fugitive from service or labor be ordered to be delivered to such claimants by the final determination of such commissioners or not.
Sec. 9. And be it further enacted, That upon affidavit made by the claimant of such fugitive, his agent or attorney, after such certificate has been issued, that he has reason to apprehend that such fugitive will be rescued by force from his or their possession before he can be taken beyond the limits of the State in which the arrest is made, it shall be the duty of the officer making the arrest to retain such fugitive in his custody, and to remove him to the State whence he fled, and there to deliver him to said claimant, his agent or attorney. And to this end the officer aforesaid is hereby authorized and required to employ so many persons as he may deem necessary, to overcome such force, and to retain them in his service so long as circumstances may require; the said officer and his assistants, while so employed, to receive the same compensation, and to be allowed the same expenses as are now allowed by law for the transportation of criminals, to be certified by the judge of the district within which the arrest is made, and paid out of the treasury of the United States.
Sec. 10. And be it further enacted, That when any person held to service or labor in any State or Territory, or in the District of Columbia, shall escape therefrom, the party to whom such service or labor shall be due, his, her, or their agent or attorney, may apply to any court of record therein, or judge thereof in vacation, and make satisfactory proof to such court, or judge in vacation, of the escape aforesaid, and that the person escaping owed service or labor to such party. Whereupon the court shall cause a record to be made of the matters so proved, and also a general description of the person so escaping, with such convenient certainty as may be; and a transcript of such record authenticated by the attestation of the clerk, and of the seal of the said court, being produced in any other State, Territory, or District in which the person so escaping may be found, and being exhibited to any judge, commissioner, or other officer authorized by the law of the United States to cause persons escaping from service or labor to be delivered up, shall be held and taken to be full and conclusive evidence of the fact of escape, and that the service or labor of the person escaping is due to the party in such record mentioned. And upon the production by the said party of other and further evidence, if necessary, either oral or by affidavit, in addition to what is contained in the said record, of the identity of the person escaping, he or she shall be delivered up to the claimant. And the said court, commissioner, judge, or other person authorized by this act to grant certificates to claimants of fugitives, shall, upon the production of the record and other evidences aforesaid, grant to such claimant a certificate of his right to take any such person identified and proved to be owing service or labor as aforesaid, which certificate shall authorize such claimant to seize or arrest and transport such person to the State or Territory from which he escaped: Provided. That nothing herein contained shall be construed as requiring the production of a transcript of such record as evidence as aforesaid; but in its absence, the claim shall be heard and determined upon other satisfactory proofs competent in law.
Approved September 18th, 1850.