In my despatches from the south I repeatedly expressed the opinion that the people were not yet in a frame of mind to legislate calmly and understandingly upon the subject of free negro labor. And this I reported to be the opinion of some of our most prominent military commanders and other observing men. It is, indeed, difficult to imagine circumstances more unfavorable for the development of a calm and unprejudiced public opinion than those under which the southern people are at present laboring. The war has not only defeated their political aspirations, but it has broken up their whole social organization. When the rebellion was put down they found themselves not only conquered in a political and military sense, but economically ruined. The planters, who represented the wealth of the southern country, are partly laboring under the severest embarrassments, partly reduced to absolute poverty. Many who are stripped of all available means, and have nothing but their land, cross their arms in gloomy despondency, incapable of rising to a manly resolution. Others, who still possess means, are at a loss how to use them, as their old way of doing things is, by the abolition of slavery, rendered impracticable, at least where the military arm of the government has enforced emancipation. Others are still trying to go on in the old way, and that old way is in fact the only one they understand, and in which they have any confidence. Only a minority is trying to adopt the new order of things. A large number of the plantations, probably a considerable majority of the more valuable estates, is under heavy mortgages, and the owners know that, unless they retrieve their fortunes in a comparatively short space of time, their property will pass out of their hands. Almost all are, to some extent, embarrassed. The nervous anxiety which such a state of things produces extends also to those classes of society which, although not composed of planters, were always in close business connexion with the planting interest, and there was hardly a branch of commerce or industry in the south which was not directly or indirectly so connected. Besides, the southern soldiers, when returning from the war, did not, like the northern soldiers, find a prosperous community which merely waited for their arrival to give them remunerative employment. They found, many of them, their homesteads destroyed, their farms devastated, their families in distress; and those that were less unfortunate found, at all events, an impoverished and exhausted community which had but little to offer them. Thus a great many have been thrown upon the world to shift as best they can. They must do something honest or dishonest, and must do it soon, to make a living, and their prospects are, at present, not very bright. Thus that nervous anxiety to hastily repair broken fortunes, and to prevent still greater ruin and distress, embraces nearly all classes, and imprints upon all the movements of the social body a morbid character.
In which direction will these people be most apt to turn their eyes? Leaving the prejudice of race out of the question, from early youth they have been acquainted with but one system of labor, and with that one system they have been in the habit of identifying all their interests. They know of no way to help themselves but the one they are accustomed to. Another system of labor is presented to them, which, however, owing to circumstances which they do not appreciate, appears at first in an unpromising light. To try it they consider an experiment which they cannot afford to make while their wants are urgent. They have not reasoned calmly enough to convince themselves that the trial must be made. It is, indeed, not wonderful that, under such circumstances, they should study, not how to introduce and develop free labor, but how to avoid its introduction, and how to return as much and as quickly as possible to something like the old order of things. Nor is it wonderful that such studies should find an expression in their attempts at legislation. But the circumstance that this tendency is natural does not render it less dangerous and objectionable. The practical question presents itself: Is the immediate restoration of the late rebel States to absolute self-control so necessary that it must be done even at the risk of endangering one of the great results of the war, and of bringing on in those States insurrection or anarchy, or would it not be better to postpone that restoration until such dangers are passed? If, as long as the change from slavery to free labor is known to the southern people only by its destructive results, these people must be expected to throw obstacles in its way, would it not seem necessary that the movement of social "reconstruction" be kept in the right channel by the hand of the power which originated the change, until that change can have disclosed some of its beneficial effects?
It is certain that every success of free negro labor will augment the number of its friends, and disarm some of the prejudices and assumptions of its opponents. I am convinced one good harvest made by unadulterated free labor in the south would have a far better effect than all the oaths that have been taken, and all the ordinances that have as yet been passed by southern conventions. But how can such a result be attained? The facts enumerated in this report, as well as the news we receive from the south from day to day, must make it evident to every unbiased observer that unadulterated free labor cannot be had at present, unless the national government holds its protective and controlling hand over it. It appears, also, that the more efficient this protection of free labor against all disturbing and reactionary influences, the sooner may such a satisfactory result be looked for. One reason why the southern people are so slow in accommodating themselves to the new order of things is, that they confidently expect soon to be permitted to regulate matters according to their own notions. Every concession made to them by the government has been taken as an encouragement to persevere in this hope, and, unfortunately for them, this hope is nourished by influences from other parts of the country. Hence their anxiety to have their State governments restored at once, to have the troops withdrawn, and the Freedmen's Bureau abolished, although a good many discerning men know well that, in view of the lawless spirit still prevailing, it would be far better for them to have the general order of society firmly maintained by the federal power until things have arrived at a final settlement. Had, from the beginning, the conviction been forced upon them that the adulteration of the new order of things by the admixture of elements belonging to the system of slavery would under no circumstances be permitted, a much larger number would have launched their energies into the new channel, and, seeing that they could do "no better," faithfully co-operated with the government. It is hope which fixes them in their perverse notions. That hope nourished or fully gratified, they will persevere in the same direction. That hope destroyed, a great many will, by the force of necessity, at once accommodate themselves to the logic of the change. If, therefore, the national government firmly and unequivocally announces its policy not to give up the control of the free-labor reform until it is finally accomplished, the progress of that reform will undoubtedly be far more rapid and far less difficult than it will be if the attitude of the government is such as to permit contrary hopes to be indulged in.
The machinery by which the government has so far exercised its protection of the negro and of free labor in the south—the Freedmen's Bureau—is very unpopular in that part of the country, as every institution placed there as a barrier to reactionary aspirations would be. That abuses were committed with the management of freedmen's affairs; that some of the officers of the bureau were men of more enthusiasm than discretion, and in many cases went beyond their authority: all this is certainly true. But, while the southern people are always ready to expatiate upon the shortcomings of the Freedmen's Bureau, they are not so ready to recognize the services it has rendered. I feel warranted in saying that not half of the labor that has been done in the south this year, or will be done there next year, would have been or would be done but for the exertions of the Freedmen's Bureau. The confusion and disorder of the transition period would have been infinitely greater had not an agency interfered which possessed the confidence of the emancipated slaves; which could disabuse them of any extravagant notions and expectations and be trusted; which could administer to them good advice and be voluntarily obeyed. No other agency, except one placed there by the national government, could have wielded that moral power whose interposition was so necessary to prevent southern society from falling at once into the chaos of a general collision between its different elements. That the success achieved by the Freedmen's Bureau is as yet very incomplete cannot be disputed. A more perfect organization and a more carefully selected personnel may be desirable; but it is doubtful whether a more suitable machinery can be devised to secure to free labor in the south that protection against disturbing influences which the nature of the situation still imperatively demands.
IMMIGRATION.
A temporary continuation of national control in the southern States would also have a most beneficial effect as regards the immigration of northern people and Europeans into that country; and such immigration would, in its turn, contribute much to the solution of the labor problem. Nothing is more desirable for the south than the importation of new men and new ideas. One of the greatest drawbacks under which the southern people are laboring is, that for fifty years they have been in no sympathetic communion with the progressive ideas of the times. While professing to be in favor of free trade, they adopted and enforced a system of prohibition, as far as those ideas were concerned, which was in conflict with their cherished institution of slavery; and, as almost all the progressive ideas of our days were in conflict with slavery, the prohibition was sweeping. It had one peculiar effect, which we also notice with some Asiatic nations which follow a similar course. The southern people honestly maintained and believed, not only that as a people they were highly civilized, but that their civilization was the highest that could be attained, and ought to serve as a model to other nations the world over. The more enlightened individuals among them felt sometimes a vague impression of the barrenness of their mental life, and the barbarous peculiarities of their social organization; but very few ever dared to investigate and to expose the true cause of these evils. Thus the people were so wrapt up in self-admiration as to be inaccessible to the voice even of the best-intentioned criticism. Hence the delusion they indulged in as to the absolute superiority of their race—a delusion which, in spite of the severe test it has lately undergone, is not yet given up; and will, as every traveller in the south can testify from experience, sometimes express itself in singular manifestations. This spirit, which for so long a time has kept the southern people back while the world besides was moving, is even at this moment still standing as a serious obstacle in the way of progress.
Nothing can, therefore, be more desirable than that the contact between the southern people and the outside world should be as strong and intimate as possible; and in no better way can this end be subserved than by immigration in mass. Of the economical benefits which such immigration would confer upon the owners of the soil it is hardly necessary to speak.
Immigration wants encouragement. As far as this encouragement consists in the promise of material advantage, it is already given. There are large districts in the south in which an industrious and enterprising man, with some capital, and acting upon correct principles, cannot fail to accumulate large gains in a comparatively short time, as long as the prices of the staples do not fall below what they may reasonably be expected to be for some time to come. A northern man has, besides, the advantage of being served by the laboring population of that region with greater willingness.
But among the principal requisites for the success of the immigrant are personal security and a settled condition of things. Personal security is honestly promised by the thinking men of the south; but another question is, whether the promise and good intentions of the thinking men will be sufficient to restrain and control the populace, whose animosity against "Yankee interlopers" is only second to their hostile feeling against the negro. If the military forces of the government should be soon and completely withdrawn, I see reasons to fear that in many localities immigrants would enjoy the necessary security only when settling down together in numbers strong enough to provide for their own protection. On the whole, no better encouragement can be given to immigration, as far as individual security is concerned, than the assurance that the national government will be near to protect them until such protection is no longer needed.
The south needs capital. But capital is notoriously timid and averse to risk itself, not only where there actually is trouble, but where there is serious and continual danger of trouble. Capitalists will be apt to consider—and they are by no means wrong in doing so—that no safe investments can be made in the south as long as southern society is liable to be convulsed by anarchical disorders. No greater encouragement can, therefore, be given to capital to transfer itself to the south than the assurance that the government will continue to control the development of the new social system in the late rebel States until such dangers are averted by a final settlement of things upon a thorough free-labor basis.
How long the national government should continue that control depends upon contingencies. It ought to cease as soon as its objects are attained; and its objects will be attained sooner and with less difficulty if nobody is permitted to indulge in the delusion that it will cease before they are attained. This is one of the cases in which a determined policy can accomplish much, while a half-way policy is liable to spoil things already accomplished. The continuance of the national control in the south, although it may be for a short period only, will cause some inconvenience and expense; but if thereby destructive collisions and anarchical disorders can be prevented, justice secured to all men, and the return of peace and prosperity to all parts of this country hastened, it will be a paying investment. For the future of the republic, it is far less important that this business of reconstruction be done quickly than that it be well done. The matter well taken in hand, there is reason for hope that it will be well done, and quickly too. In days like these great changes are apt to operate themselves rapidly. At present the southern people assume that free negro labor will not work, and therefore they are not inclined to give it a fair trial. As soon as they find out that they must give it a fair trial, and that their whole future power and prosperity depend upon its success, they will also find out that it will work, at least far better than they have anticipated. Then their hostility to it will gradually disappear. This great result accomplished, posterity will not find fault with this administration for having delayed complete "reconstruction" one, two, or more years.
Although I am not called upon to discuss in this report the constitutional aspects of this question, I may be pardoned for one remark. The interference of the national government in the local concerns of the States lately in rebellion is argued against by many as inconsistent with the spirit of our federal institutions. Nothing is more foreign to my ways of thinking in political matters than a fondness for centralization or military government. Nobody can value the blessings of local self-government more highly than I do. But we are living under exceptional circumstances which require us, above all, to look at things from a practical point of view; and I believe it will prove far more dangerous for the integrity of local self-government if the national control in the south be discontinued—while by discontinuing it too soon, it may be rendered necessary again in the future—than if it be continued, when by continuing it but a limited time all such future necessity may be obviated. At present these acts of interference are but a part of that exceptional policy brought forth by the necessities into which the rebellion has plunged us. Although there will be some modifications in the relations between the States and the national government, yet these acts of direct interference in the details of State concerns will pass away with the exceptional circumstances which called them forth. But if the social revolution in the south be now abandoned in an unfinished state, and at some future period produce events provoking new and repeated acts of direct practical interference—and the contingency would by no means be unlikely to arise—such new and repeated acts would not pass over without most seriously affecting the political organism of the republic.
NEGRO SUFFRAGE.
It would seem that the interference of the national authority in the home concerns of the southern States would be rendered less necessary, and the whole problem of political and social reconstruction be much simplified, if, while the masses lately arrayed against the government are permitted to vote, the large majority of those who were always loyal, and are naturally anxious to see the free labor problem successfully solved, were not excluded from all influence upon legislation. In all questions concerning the Union, the national debt, and the future social organization of the south, the feelings of the colored man are naturally in sympathy with the views and aims of the national government. While the southern white fought against the Union, the negro did all he could to aid it; while the southern white sees in the national government his conqueror, the negro sees in it his protector; while the white owes to the national debt his defeat, the negro owes to it his deliverance; while the white considers himself robbed and ruined by the emancipation of the slaves, the negro finds in it the assurance of future prosperity and happiness. In all the important issues the negro would be led by natural impulse to forward the ends of the government, and by making his influence, as part of the voting body, tell upon the legislation of the States, render the interference of the national authority less necessary.
As the most difficult of the pending questions are intimately connected with the status of the negro in southern society, it is obvious that a correct solution can be more easily obtained if he has a voice in the matter. In the right to vote he would find the best permanent protection against oppressive class-legislation, as well as against individual persecution. The relations between the white and black races, even if improved by the gradual wearing off of the present animosities, are likely to remain long under the troubling influence of prejudice. It is a notorious fact that the rights of a man of some political power are far less exposed to violation than those of one who is, in matters of public interest, completely subject to the will of others. A voter is a man of influence; small as that influence may be in the single individual, it becomes larger when that individual belongs to a numerous class of voters who are ready to make common cause with him for the protection of his rights. Such an individual is an object of interest to the political parties that desire to have the benefit of his ballot. It is true, the bringing face to face at the ballot-box of the white and black races may here and there lead to an outbreak of feeling, and the first trials ought certainly to be made while the national power is still there to prevent or repress disturbances; but the practice once successfully inaugurated under the protection of that power, it would probably be more apt than anything else to obliterate old antagonisms, especially if the colored people—which is probable, as soon as their own rights are sufficiently secured—divide their votes between the different political parties.
The effect of the extension of the franchise to the colored people upon the development of free labor and upon the security of human rights in the south being the principal object in view, the objections raised on the ground of the ignorance of the freedmen become unimportant. Practical liberty is a good school, and, besides, if any qualification can be found, applicable to both races, which does not interfere with the attainment of the main object, such qualification would in that respect be unobjectionable. But it is idle to say that it will be time to speak of negro suffrage when the whole colored race will be educated, for the ballot may be necessary to him to secure his education. It is also idle to say that ignorance is the principal ground upon which southern men object to negro suffrage, for if it were, that numerous class of colored people in Louisiana who are as highly educated, as intelligent, and as wealthy as any corresponding class of whites, would have been enfranchised long ago.
It has been asserted that the negro would be but a voting machine in the hand of his employer. On this point opinions seem to differ. I have heard it said in the south that the freedmen are more likely to be influenced by their schoolmasters and preachers. But even if we suppose the employer to control to a certain extent the negro laborer's vote, two things are to be taken into consideration: 1. The class of employers, of landed proprietors, will in a few years be very different from what it was heretofore in consequence of the general breaking up, a great many of the old slaveholders will be obliged to give up their lands and new men will step into their places; and 2. The employer will hardly control the vote of the negro laborer so far as to make him vote against his own liberty. The beneficial effect of an extension of suffrage does not always depend upon the intelligence with which the newly admitted voters exercise their right, but sometimes upon the circumstances in which they are placed; and the circumstances in which the freedmen of the south are placed are such that, when they only vote for their own liberty and rights, they vote for the rights of free labor, for the success of an immediate important reform, for the prosperity of the country, and for the general interests of mankind. If, therefore, in order to control the colored vote, the employer, or whoever he may be, is first obliged to concede to the freedman the great point of his own rights as a man and a free laborer, the great social reform is completed, the most difficult problem is solved, and all other questions it will be comparatively easy to settle.
In discussing the matter of negro suffrage I deemed it my duty to confine myself strictly to the practical aspects of the subject. I have, therefore, not touched its moral merits nor discussed the question whether the national government is competent to enlarge the elective franchise in the States lately in rebellion by its own act; I deem it proper, however, to offer a few remarks on the assertion frequently put forth, that the franchise is likely to be extended to the colored man by the voluntary action of the southern whites themselves. My observation leads me to a contrary opinion. Aside from a very few enlightened men, I found but one class of people in favor of the enfranchisement of the blacks: it was the class of Unionists who found themselves politically ostracised and looked upon the enfranchisement of the loyal negroes as the salvation of the whole loyal element. But their numbers and influence are sadly insufficient to secure such a result. The masses are strongly opposed to colored suffrage; anybody that dares to advocate it is stigmatized as a dangerous fanatic; nor do I deem it probable that in the ordinary course of things prejudices will wear off to such an extent as to make it a popular measure. Outside of Louisiana only one gentleman who occupied a prominent political position in the south expressed to me an opinion favorable to it. He declared himself ready to vote for an amendment to the constitution of his State bestowing the right of suffrage upon all male citizens without distinction of color who could furnish evidence of their ability to read and write, without, however, disfranchising those who are now voters and are not able to fulfil that condition. This gentleman is now a member of one of the State conventions, but I presume he will not risk his political standing in the south by moving such an amendment in that body.
The only manner in which, in my opinion, the southern people can be induced to grant to the freedman some measure of self-protecting power in the form of suffrage, is to make it a condition precedent to "readmission."
DEPORTATION OF THE FREEDMEN.
I have to notice one pretended remedy for the disorders now agitating the south, which seems to have become the favorite plan of some prominent public men. It is that the whole colored population of the south should be transported to some place where they could live completely separated from the whites. It is hardly necessary to discuss, not only the question of right and justice, but the difficulties and expense necessarily attending the deportation of nearly four millions of people. But it may be asked, what would become of the industry of the south for many years, if the bulk of its laboring population were taken away? The south stands in need of an increase and not of a diminution of its laboring force to repair the losses and disasters of the last four years. Much is said of importing European laborers and northern men; this is the favorite idea of many planters who want such immigrants to work on their plantations. But they forget that European and northern men will not come to the south to serve as hired hands on the plantations, but to acquire property for themselves, and that even if the whole European immigration at the rate of 200,000 a year were turned into the south, leaving not a single man for the north and west, it would require between fifteen and twenty years to fill the vacuum caused by the deportation of the freedmen. Aside from this, the influx of northern men or Europeans will not diminish the demand for hired negro labor; it will, on the contrary, increase it. As Europeans and northern people come in, not only vast quantities of land will pass from the hands of their former owners into those of the immigrants, but a large area of new land will be brought under cultivation; and as the area of cultivation expands, hired labor, such as furnished by the colored people, will be demanded in large quantities. The deportation of the labor so demanded would, therefore, be a very serious injury to the economical interests of the south, and if an attempt were made, this effect would soon be felt.
It is, however, a question worthy of consideration whether it would not be wise to offer attractive inducements and facilities for the voluntary migration of freedmen to some suitable district on the line of the Pacific railroad. It would answer a double object: 1. It would aid in the construction of that road, and 2. If this migration be effected on a large scale it would cause a drain upon the laboring force of the south; it would make the people affected by that drain feel the value of the freedmen's labor, and show them the necessity of keeping that labor at home by treating the laborer well, and by offering him inducements as fair as can be offered elsewhere.
But whatever the efficiency of such expedients may be, the true problem remains, not how to remove the colored man from his present field of labor, but how to make him, where he is, a true freeman and an intelligent and useful citizen. The means are simple: protection by the government until his political and social status enables him to protect himself, offering to his legitimate ambition the stimulant of a perfectly fair chance in life, and granting to him the rights which in every just organization of society are coupled with corresponding duties.
CONCLUSION.
I may sum up all I have said in a few words. If nothing were necessary but to restore the machinery of government in the States lately in rebellion in point of form, the movements made to that end by the people of the south might be considered satisfactory. But if it is required that the southern people should also accommodate themselves to the results of the war in point of spirit, those movements fall far short of what must be insisted upon.
The loyalty of the masses and most of the leaders of the southern people, consists in submission to necessity. There is, except in individual instances, an entire absence of that national spirit which forms the basis of true loyalty and patriotism.
The emancipation of the slaves is submitted to only in so far as chattel slavery in the old form could not be kept up. But although the freedman is no longer considered the property of the individual master, he is considered the slave of society, and all independent State legislation will share the tendency to make him such. The ordinances abolishing slavery passed by the conventions under the pressure of circumstances, will not be looked upon as barring the establishment of a new form of servitude.
Practical attempts on the part of the southern people to deprive the negro of his rights as a freeman may result in bloody collisions, and will certainly plunge southern society into restless fluctuations and anarchical confusion. Such evils can be prevented only by continuing the control of the national government in the States lately in rebellion until free labor is fully developed and firmly established, and the advantages and blessings of the new order of things have disclosed themselves. This desirable result will be hastened by a firm declaration on the part of the government, that national control in the south will not cease until such results are secured. Only in this way can that security be established in the south which will render numerous immigration possible, and such immigration would materially aid a favorable development of things.
The solution of the problem would be very much facilitated by enabling all the loyal and free-labor elements in the south to exercise a healthy influence upon legislation. It will hardly be possible to secure the freedman against oppressive class legislation and private persecution, unless he be endowed with a certain measure of political power.
As to the future peace and harmony of the Union, it is of the highest importance that the people lately in rebellion be not permitted to build up another "peculiar institution" whose spirit is in conflict with the fundamental principles of our political system; for as long as they cherish interests peculiar to them in preference to those they have in common with the rest of the American people, their loyalty to the Union will always be uncertain.
I desire not to be understood as saying that there are no well-meaning men among those who were compromised in the rebellion. There are many, but neither their number nor their influence is strong enough to control the manifest tendency of the popular spirit. There are great reasons for hope that a determined policy on the part of the national government will produce innumerable and valuable conversions. This consideration counsels lenity as to persons, such as is demanded by the humane and enlightened spirit of our times, and vigor and firmness in the carrying out of principles, such as is demanded by the national sense of justice and the exigencies of our situation.
In submitting this report I desire to say that I have conscientiously endeavored to see things as they were, and to represent them as I saw them: I have been careful not to use stronger language than was warranted by the thoughts I intended to express. A comparison of the tenor of the annexed documents with that of my report, will convince you that I have studiously avoided overstatements. Certain legislative attempts at present made in the south, and especially in South Carolina, seem to be more than justifying the apprehensions I have expressed.
Conscious though I am of having used my best endeavors to draw, from what I saw and learned, correct general conclusions, yet I am far from placing too great a trust in my own judgment, when interests of such magnitude are at stake. I know that this report is incomplete, although as complete as an observation of a few months could enable me to make it. Additional facts might be elicited, calculated to throw new light upon the subject. Although I see no reason for believing that things have changed for the better since I left for the south, yet such may be the case. Admitting all these possibilities, I would entreat you to take no irretraceable step towards relieving the States lately in rebellion from all national control, until such favorable changes are clearly and unmistakably ascertained.
To that end, and by virtue of the permission you honored me with when sending me out to communicate to you freely and unreservedly my views as to measures of policy proper to be adopted, I would now respectfully suggest that you advise Congress to send one or more "investigating committees" into the southern States, to inquire for themselves into the actual condition of things, before final action is taken upon the readmission of such States to their representation in the legislative branch of the government, and the withdrawal of the national control from that section of the country.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CARL SCHURZ.
His Excellency ANDREW JOHNSON, President of the United States.
DOCUMENTS ACCOMPANYING THE REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL CARL SCHURZ.
No. 1.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
Hilton Head, S.C., July 27, 1865.
Dear Sir: I have received your letter of the 17th instant, from
Charleston, propounding to me three questions, as follows:
1st. Do you think that there are a number of bona fide loyal persons in this State large enough to warrant the early establishment of civil government?
2d. Do you think that the white population of South Carolina, if restored to the possession of political power in this State, would carry out the spirit of the emancipation proclamation, and go to work in a bona fide manner to organize free labor?
3d. What measures do you think necessary to insure such a result in this State?
The first of these questions I am forced to answer in the negative, provided that white persons only are referred to in the expression "bona fide loyal persons," and provided that "the early establishment of civil government" means the early withdrawal of the general control of affairs from the United States authorities.
To the second question, I answer that I do not think that the white inhabitants of South Carolina, if left to themselves, are yet prepared to carry out the spirit of the emancipation proclamation; neither do I think that they would organize free labor upon any plan that would be of advantage to both whites and blacks until the mutual distrust and prejudice now existing between the races are in a measure removed.
To the third question I answer, that, in order to secure the carrying out of the "spirit of the emancipation proclamation," and the organization of really free labor in good faith, it appears to me necessary that the military, or some other authority derived from the national government, should retain a supervisory control over the civil affairs in this State until the next season's crops are harvested and secured.
The reasons which have dictated my replies I shall notice quite briefly.
Loyalty in South Carolina—such loyalty as is secured by the taking of the amnesty oath and by the reception of Executive clemency—does not approach the standard of loyalty in the north. It is not the golden fruit of conviction, but the stern and unpromising result of necessity, arising from unsuccessful insurrection. The white population of the State accept the condition which has been imposed upon them, simply because there is no alternative.
They entered upon the war in the spring of 1861 and arrayed themselves on the side of treason with a unanimity of purpose and a malignity of feeling not equalled by that displayed in any other State.
The individual exceptions to this rule were too few in numbers and were possessed of too little power to be taken into account at all. Although the overt treason then inaugurated has been overcome by superior force, few will claim that it has been transformed into loyalty toward the national government. I am clearly of the opinion that it has not, and that time and experience will be necessary to effect such a change.
All intelligent whites admit that the "abolition of slavery" and the "impracticability of secession" are the plain and unmistakable verdicts of the war. Their convictions as yet go no further. Their preference for the "divine institution," and their intellectual belief in the right of a State to secede, are as much articles of faith in their creed at the present moment as they were on the day when the ordinance of secession was unanimously adopted. When the rebel armies ceased to exist, and there was no longer any force that could be invoked for waging war against the nation, the insurgents accepted that fact simply as proof of the impossibility of their establishing an independent government. This sentiment was almost immediately followed by a general desire to save as much property as possible from the general wreck. To this state of the public mind, which succeeded the surrender of the rebel armies with noteworthy rapidity, I am forced to attribute the prevailing willingness and desire of the people to "return" to their allegiance, and resume the avocations of peace.
I do not regard this condition of things as at all discouraging. It is, indeed, better than I expected to see or dared to hope for in so short a time. One good result of it is, that guerilla warfare, which was so very generally apprehended, has never been resorted to in this State. There was a sudden and general change from a state of war to a state of peace, and, with the exception of frequent individual conflicts, mostly between the whites and blacks, and often, it is true, resulting in loss of life, that peace has rarely been disturbed.
It is, however, a peace resulting from a cool and dispassionate appeal to reason, and not from any convictions of right or wrong; it has its origin in the head, and not in the heart. Impotency and policy gave it birth, and impotency, policy and hope keep it alive. It is not inspired by any higher motives than these, and higher motives could hardly be expected to follow immediately in the footsteps of armed insurrection. The hopes of the people are fixed, as a matter of course, upon the President. The whites hope and expect to recover the preponderating influence which they have lost by the war, and which has been temporarily replaced by the military authority throughout the State, and they receive with general satisfaction the appointment of Mr. Perry as provisional governor of the State, and regard it as a step toward their restoration to civil and political power. Even those men who have taken the lead during the war, not only in the heartiness and liberality of their support of the rebel cause, but also in the bitterness of their denunciation of the national government and the loyal people of the northern States, express themselves as entirely satisfied with the shape which events are taking.
The colored population, on the contrary, or that portion of it which moulds the feelings and directs the passions of the mass, look with growing suspicion upon this state of affairs, and entertain the most lively apprehensions with regard to their future welfare. They have no fears of being returned to slavery, having the most implicit faith in our assurance of its abolition for all time to come, but they think they see the power which has held the lash over them through many generations again being restored to their former masters, and they are impressed with a greater or less degree of alarm.
Thus the "irrepressible conflict," the antagonism of interest, thought, and sentiment between the races is perpetuated. The immediate resumption by the whites of the civil and political power of the State would have a tendency to augment this evil. At the present time all differences between the whites and blacks, but more especially those growing out of agreements for compensated labor, are promptly and willingly referred to the nearest military authority for adjustment; the whites well knowing that simple justice will be administered, and the blacks inspired by the belief that we are their friends. This plan works smoothly and satisfactorily. Many of the labor contracts upon the largest plantations have been made with special reference to the planting and harvesting of the next year's crops; others expire with the present year. The immediate restoration of the civil power by removing military restraint from those planters who are not entirely sincere in their allegiance, and have not made their pledges and especially their labor contracts in good faith, and by withdrawing from the blacks that source of protection to which alone they look for justice with any degree of confidence, would, by engendering new suspicions, and new prejudices between the races, work disadvantageously to both in a pecuniary sense, while the successful solution of the important question of free black labor would be embarrassed, deferred, and possibly defeated, inasmuch as it would be placed thereby in the hands of men who are avowedly suspicious of the negro, and have no confidence in his fitness for freedom, or his willingness to work; who regard the abolition of slavery as a great sectional calamity, and who, under the semblance and even the protection of the law, and without violating the letter of the emancipation proclamation, would have it in their power to impose burdens upon the negro race scarcely less irksome than those from which it has theoretically escaped. Indeed, the ordinary vagrancy and apprenticeship laws now in force in some of the New England States (slightly modified perhaps) could be so administered and enforced upon the blacks in South Carolina as to keep them in practical slavery. They could, while bearing the name of freeman, be legally subjected to all the oppressive features of serfdom, peonage, and feudalism combined, without possessing the right to claim, much less the power to exact, any of the prerogatives and amenities belonging to either of those systems of human bondage. All this could be done without violating the letter of the emancipation proclamation; no argument is necessary to prove that it would be a total submission of its spirit. Even upon the presumption that the whites, when again clothed with civil authority, would be influenced by a sincere desire to enforce the emancipation proclamation, and organize free labor upon a wise and just basis, it would seem injudicious to intrust them with unlimited power, which might be wielded to the injury of both races until the prejudices and animosities which generated the rebellion and gave it life and vigor have had time to subside. Few men have any clear conception of what the general good at the present time requires in the way of State legislation. A thousand vague theories are floating upon the public mind.
The evils which we would have to fear from an immediate re-establishment of civil government would be not only hasty and ignorant but excessive legislation. While there may be wide differences of opinion as to which is the greater of these two evils per se, I am free to express my belief that one or the other of them would be very likely to follow the immediate restoration of civil government, and that it would be not only injudicious in itself but productive of prospective harm, to whites as well as blacks, to place the former in a position where a community of feeling, the promptings of traditional teachings, and the instincts of self-interest and self-preservation, would so strongly tempt them to make a choice. I believe that a respectable majority of the most intelligent whites would cordially aid any policy calculated, in their opinion, to secure the greatest good of the greatest number, blacks included, but I do not regard them as yet in a condition to exercise an unbiassed judgment in this matter. Inasmuch as very few of them are yet ready to admit the practicability of ameliorating the condition of the black race to any considerable extent, they would not be likely at the present time to devise a wise system of free black labor. Neither would they be zealous and hopeful co-laborers in such a system if desired by others.
I have spoken of the contract system which has been inaugurated by the military authorities throughout the State as working smoothly and satisfactorily. This statement should, of course, be taken with some limitation. It was inaugurated as an expedient under the pressure of stringent necessity at a time when labor was in a greatly disorganized state, and there was manifest danger that the crops, already planted, would be lost for want of cultivation. Many of the negroes, but more especially the able-bodied ones and those possessing no strong family ties, had, under the novel impulses of freedom, left the plantation where they had been laboring through the planting season, and flocked to the nearest military post, becoming a useless and expensive burden upon our hands. Very many plantations, under extensive cultivation, were entirely abandoned. At places remote from military posts, and that had never been visited by our troops, this exodus did not take place so extensively or to a degree threatening a very general loss of crops. The negroes were retained partly through ignorance or uncertainty of their rights and partly through fear of their former masters and the severe discipline unlawfully enforced by them.
Under the assurance that they were free, that they would be protected in the enjoyment of their freedom and the fruits of their labor, but would not be supported in idleness by the government so long as labor could be procured, the flow of negroes into the towns and military posts was stopped, and most of them already accumulated there were induced to return to the plantations and resume work under contracts to be approved and enforced by the military authorities. Both planters and negroes very generally, and apparently quite willingly, fell into this plan as the best that could be improvised. Although there have been many instances of violation of contracts, (more frequently, I think, by the black than by the white,) and although the plan possesses many defects, and is not calculated to develop all the advantages and benefits of a wise free-labor system. I am not prepared to recommend any material modification of it, or anything to replace it, at least for several months to come.
For reasons already suggested I believe that the restoration of civil power that would take the control of this question out of the hands of the United States authorities (whether exercised through the military authorities or through the Freedmen's Bureau) would, instead of removing existing evils, be almost certain to augment them.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Q.A. GILLMORE, Major General.
General CARL SCHURZ, Charleston, S.C.
No. 4.
Charleston, South Carolina, July 25, 1865.
General: Since handing you my letter of yesterday I have read a speech reported to have been delivered in Greenville, South Carolina, on the 3d instant.
I have judged of Mr. Perry by reports of others, but as I now have an opportunity from his own lips of knowing his opinions, I must request that you will cross out that portion of my letter referring to him.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN P. HATCH, Brevet Major General, Commanding.
Major General CARL SCHURZ.
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DISTRICT OF CHARLESTON,
Charleston, South Carolina, July 24, 1865.
General: In answer to your question as to the disposition of the people being such as to justify their speedy return to the control of political power, I would say no.
Many portions of the State have not yet been visited by our troops, and in other parts not long enough occupied to encourage the formation of a new party, disposed to throw off the old party rulers, who, after thirty years preaching sedition, succeeded in carrying their point and forcing the people into rebellion.
Were elections to be held now, the old leaders already organized would carry everything by the force of their organization. I would say delay action, pardon only such as the governor can recommend, and let him only recommend such as he feels confident will support the views of the government. Men who supported nullification in thirty-two, and have upheld the doctrine of States' rights since, should not be pardoned; they cannot learn new ways. I have read with care the published proceedings of every public meeting held in this State, and have observed that not one single resolution has yet been passed in which the absolute freedom of the colored man was recognized, or the doctrine of the right of secession disavowed. Why is this? Because the old leaders have managed the meetings, and they cannot see that a new order of things exists. They still hope to obtain control of the State, and then to pass laws with reference to the colored people which shall virtually re-establish slavery; and although they look upon secession as at present hopeless, a future war may enable them to again raise the standard.
You ask what signs do they show of a disposition to educate the blacks for the new position they are to occupy? This is a question that has so far been but little discussed. No education, except as to their religious duties, was formerly allowed, and this only to make them contented in their position of servitude. Whilst thoroughly instructed in the injunction, "servants obey your masters," adultery was not only winked at, but, unfortunately, in too many cases practically recommended. A few gentlemen have said to me that they were willing to have the blacks taught to read and write, but little interest appears to be felt on the subject.
With reference to the benefit to be derived by the general government by delaying the formation for the present of a State government, I will be brief. It will discourage the old leaders who are anxious to seize immediately the reins of power. It will, by allowing time for discussion, give the people an opportunity to become acquainted with subjects they have heretofore trusted to their leaders. Wherever our troops go, discussion follows, and it would be best that the people should not commit themselves to a line of policy, they have not had time to examine and decide upon coolly. It will give the young men ambitious of rising opportunity for organizing on a new platform a party which, assisted by the government, can quiet forever the questions which have made the State of South Carolina a thorn in the side of the Union. These young men, many of whom have served in the army, take a practical view of their present condition that the old stay-at-homes cannot be brought to understand. Give them time and support and they will do the work required of them. Their long absence has made it necessary to become acquainted with the people; but they will be listened to as men who have honestly fought in a cause which has failed, and will be respected for as honestly coming out in support of the now only reasonable chance of a peaceful government for the future.
Where our troops have been the longest time stationed we have the most friends; and were the people thoroughly convinced that the government (until they have shown a disposition to unite heartily in its support) is determined not to give them a State government, the change would go on much more rapidly.
The selection of Governor Perry was most fortunate. I know of no other man in South Carolina who could have filled the position.
I remain, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JNO. P. HATCH, Brevet Major General Commanding.
General CARL SCHURZ.
No. 5.
Charleston, S.C., July 24, 1865.
General: In compliance with your verbal request, made at our interview this a.m., to express to you my opinions and impressions regarding the status of the people of South Carolina, and of such others of the insurrectionary States with whom I have come in contact, respecting a return to their allegiance to the federal government, and a willingness on their part to sustain and support the same in its efforts to restore and accomplish the actual union of the States, and also their probable adhesion to the several acts and proclamations which have been enacted and promulgated by the legislative and executive branches of the government, I beg to reply, that, as an officer of one of the departments, I have been enabled by constant intercourse with large numbers of this people to form an approximate estimate of the nature of their loyalty, and also to gain a knowledge of the prejudices which remain with them towards the forces, military and political, which have prevailed against them after the struggle of the last four years, and established the integrity and power of the republic.
Whatever may be said upon the abstract question of voluntary or forcible State secession, the defeat of the insurrectionary forces has been so perfect and complete, that the most defiant have already avowed their allegiance to the national government. The first experience of the insurgents is a complete submission, followed by a promise to abstain from all further acts of rebellion—in fact, the nucleus of their loyalty is necessity, while perhaps some with still a sentiment of loyalty in their hearts for the old flag turn back, like the prodigal, with tearful eyes, wasted means, and exhausted energies.
At the present time there can be but few loyal men in the State of South Carolina who, through evil and good report, have withstood the wiles of secession. South Carolina has been sown broadcast for the last thirty years with every conceivable form of literature which taught her children the divine right of State sovereignty, carrying with it all its accompanying evils. The sovereign State of South Carolina in her imperial majesty looked down upon the republic itself, and only through a grand condescension, remained to supervise and balance the power which, when not controlling, she had sworn to destroy. The works of Calhoun were the necessary companion of every man of culture and education. They were by no means confined to the libraries of the economist and politician. When the national troops pillaged the houses and deserted buildings of Charleston, the streets were strewn with the pamphlets, sermons and essays of politicians, clergymen, and belles-lettres scholars, all promulgating, according to the ability and tastes of their several authors, the rights of the sovereign State. No public occasion passed by which did not witness an assertion of these rights, and the gauntlet of defiance was ever upon the ground.
It is the loyalty of such a people that we have to consider. As a people the South Carolinians are brave and generous in certain directions. In their cities there is great culture, and many of the citizens are persons of refinement, education and taste. The educated classes are well versed in the history of our country, and many have an intimate knowledge of the varied story of political parties. But from the lowest to the highest classes of the white population there is an instinctive dread of the negro and an utter abhorrence of any doctrine which argues an ultimate improvement of his condition beyond that of the merest chattel laborer.
The first proposition made by the southerner on all occasions of discussion is, that the emancipation proclamation of the President was a grievous error from every point of view; that in the settlement of the various questions arising from the insurrection, the national government assumes a responsibility which belongs to the several States, and now that the supremacy of the general government is established, and the prospect of a resuscitation, rehabilitation, reconstruction, or simple assertion of the legislative and executive powers of the separate States, a lingering hope yet remains with many, that although African slavery is abolished, the States may yet so legislate as to place the negro in a state of actual peonage and submission to the will of the employer. Therefore, we have combined with a forced and tardy loyalty a lingering hope that such State legislation can be resorted to as will restore the former slave to, as nearly as possible, the condition of involuntary servitude. And the question naturally arises, how long must we wait for a higher and purer expression of fealty to the Union, and for a more intelligent and just appreciation of the question of free colored, labor which the results of the contest have forced upon us?
I am satisfied, that while no efforts must be spared to instil into the minds of the freedmen the necessity of patient labor and endeavor, and a practical knowledge of the responsibilities of their new condition, by a judicious system of education, the white southerner is really the most interesting pupil, and we must all feel a solicitude for his enlightenment.
The principles of liberty have been working for a number of years in our republic, and have secured various great political results. Latterly they have worked with wonderful and rapid effect, and it has ever been by aid of all the forces of education and enlightened commerce between man and man that the progress of true freedom has been hastened and made secure. When the southern planter sees it demonstrated beyond a doubt that the free labor of the black man, properly remunerated, conduces to his pecuniary interests, at that moment he will accept the situation, and not before, unless it is forced upon him; therefore, it is the white southerner that must be educated into a realization of his responsibility in the settlement of these questions, and by a systematic and judicious education of the freedman a citizen will gradually be developed; and the two classes, finding their interests mutual, will soon settle the now vexed question of suffrage. I am firmly of opinion that the government cannot afford to relax its hold upon these States until a loyal press, representing the views of the government, shall disseminate its sentiments broadcast all over this southern land; and when all the avenues and channels of communication shall have been opened, and the policy of the government shall be more easily ascertained and promulgated, and the States, or the citizens thereof in sufficient numbers, shall have avowed by word and act their acceptance of the new order of things, we may then safely consider the expediency of surrendering to each State legislature the duty of framing its necessary constitution and code, and all other adjuncts of civil government. If the form of our government were monarchical, we might be more sanguine of the success of any proposed measure of amnesty, because of the immediate power of the government to suppress summarily any disorder arising from too great leniency; but to delegate to the States themselves the quelling of the tumult which they have themselves raised, is, to say the least, a doubtful experiment. Many thinking Carolinians have said that they preferred that the government should first itself demonstrate the system of free labor, to such an extent that the planter would gladly avail himself of the system and carry it on to its completion.
The presence of a strong military force is still needed in the State of South Carolina to maintain order, and to see that the national laws are respected, as well as to enforce such municipal regulations as the occasion demands. For such service, officers of sound, practical sense should be chosen—men whose appreciation of strict justice both to employer and employee would compensate even for a lack of mere skilful military knowledge; men without the mean prejudices which are the bane of some who wear the insignia of the national service.
I believe that affairs in South Carolina are yet in a very crude state; that outrages are being practiced upon the negro which the military arm should prevent. Doubtless many stories are fabricated or exaggerated, but a calm and candid citizen of Charleston has said: "Is it wonderful that this should be so; that men whose slaves have come at their call, but now demur, hesitate, and perhaps refuse labor or demand certain wages therefor—that such men, smarting under their losses and defeats, should vent their spite upon a race slipping from their power and asserting their newly acquired rights? Is abuse not a natural result?" But time, enlightenment, and the strenuous efforts of the government can prevent much of this.
I am, therefore, convinced that the education of the white and black must go hand in hand together until the system of free labor is so absolutely demonstrated that the interest of the employer will be found in the intelligence, the well-being, and the comfort of the employed. I believe that the great sources of benevolence at the north should still flood this southern land with its bounty—that the national government should encourage each State to receive all the implements of labor, education and comfort which a generous people can bestow, not merely for the benefit of the black freedman, but for the disenthralled white who has grovelled in the darkness of a past age, and who has been, perhaps, the innocent oppressor of a people he may yet serve, and with them enter into the enjoyment of a more glorious freedom than either have ever conceived.
With sentiments of respect and esteem, I beg to remain, general, your obedient servant,
JOHN H. PILSBURY, Deputy Supervising and Assistant Special Agent Treasury Department.
Major General CARL SCHURZ, &c., &c., &c.
No. 6.
VIEWS EXPRESSED BY MAJOR GENERAL STEEDMAN IN CONVERSATION WITH CARL SCHURZ.
Augusta, Georgia, August 7, 1864.
I have been in command of this department only a month, and can, therefore, not pretend to have as perfect a knowledge of the condition of affairs, and the sentiments of the people of Georgia, as I may have after longer experience. But observations so far made lead me to the following conclusions:
The people of this State, with only a few individual exceptions, are submissive but not loyal.
If intrusted with political power at this time they will in all probability use it as much as possible to escape from the legitimate results of the war. Their political principles, as well as their views on the slavery question, are the same as before the war, and all that can be expected of them is that they will submit to actual necessities from which there is no escape.
The State is quiet, in so far as there is no organised guerilla warfare. Conflicts between whites and blacks are not unfrequent, and in many instances result in bloodshed.
As to the labor question, I believe that the planters of this region have absolutely no conception of what free labor is. I consider them entirely incapable of legislating understandingly upon the subject at the present time.
The organization of labor in this State, especially in the interior, has so far, in most cases, been left to the planters and freedmen themselves, the organization of the Freedmen's Bureau being as yet quite imperfect. A great many contracts have been made between planters and freedmen, some of which were approved by the military authorities and some were not.
General Wilde, the principal agent of the Freedmen's Bureau in this State, is, in my opinion, entirely unfit for the discharge of the duties incumbent upon him. He displays much vigor where it is not wanted, and shows but very little judgment where it is wanted. Until the Freedmen's Bureau will be sufficiently organized in this State I deem it necessary to temporarily intrust the provost marshals, now being stationed all over the State, one to every four counties, with the discharge of its functions, especially as concerns the making of contracts and the adjustment of difficulties between whites and blacks.
I deem it impracticable to refer such difficulties for adjustment to such civil courts as can at present be organized in this State. It would be like leaving each party to decide the case for itself, and would undoubtedly at once result in a free fight. It will be so until the people of this State have a more accurate idea of the rights of the freedmen. The military power is, in my opinion, the only tribunal which, under existing circumstances, can decide difficulties between whites and blacks to the satisfaction of both parties and can make its decisions respected.
As for the restoration of civil power in this State, I apprehend it cannot be done without leading to the necessity of frequent interference on the part of the military until the sentiments of the people of Georgia have undergone a very great change.
This memorandum was read to General Steedman by me and he authorized me to submit it in this form to the President.
C. SCHURZ.
No. 7.
HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF COLUMBUS,
Macon, Georgia, August 14, 1885.
General: There are no loyal people in Georgia, except the negroes; nor are there any considerable number who would under any circumstances offer armed resistance to the national authority. An officer, without arms or escort, could arrest any man in the State. But, while their submission is thus complete and universal, it is not a matter of choice, but a stern necessity which they deplore.
If allowed they will readily reorganize their State government and administer it upon correct principles, except in matters pertaining to their former slaves. On this subject they admit the abolition of the institution, and will so frame their constitution, hoping thereby to procure their recognition as a State government, when they will at once, by legislation, reduce the freedmen to a condition worse than slavery. Yet while they will not recognize the rights of their former slaves themselves, they will submit to its full recognition by the national government, which can do just as it pleases and no resistance will be offered. My own clear opinion is, it will have to do everything that may be necessary to secure real practical freedom to the former slaves.
The disturbances at present are chiefly due, I think, to the swarm of vagrants thrown upon society by the disbanding of the rebel armies and the emancipation of the slaves at a season of the year when it is difficult for those who seek to find employment.
After the 1st of January I apprehend no trouble, as the culture of the next crop will absorb all the labor of the country. In the interim a great deal of care and diligence will be required. Hence I recommend the importance of sending men of energy and business capacity to manage the affairs of the Freedmen's Bureau.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN T. CROXTON, Brigadier General United States.
General CARL SCHURZ.
No. 8.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,
New Orleans, June 20, 1865.
Sir: I have the honor to transmit for your consideration a copy of the correspondence between the governor of Louisiana and myself touching the relations between the State and the military authorities in this department.
The instructions upon this subject are, and probably designedly, indefinite. They indicate, however, the acceptance by the President of the constitution of the State, adopted in September, 1864, as the means of re-establishing civil government in the State and the recognition of the governor as his agent in accomplishing this work. The same principle gives validity to such of the State laws as are not in conflict with this constitution, or repealed by congressional legislation, or abrogated by the President's proclamation or orders issued during the rebellion.
This leaves many questions undetermined, except so far as they are settled by the law of nations and the laws of war, so far as my authority extends. I will turn over all such questions to the State government; and in cases that do not come within the legitimate authority of a military commander, will report them for such action as his excellency the President, or the War Department, may think proper to adopt.
I have had a very free conference with the governor upon this subject, and I believe that he concurs with me that the course I have indicated in the correspondence with him is not only the legal but the only course that will avoid the appeals to the local courts by interested or designing men, which are now dividing those who profess to be working for the same object—the re-establishment of civil authority throughout the State.
Then, in addition, many questions, in which the interests of the government are directly involved, or in which the relations of the general government to the States, as affected by the rebellion, are left unsettled by any adequate legislation. I do not think it will be wise to commit any of these questions, either directly or indirectly, to the jurisdiction of the State or other local courts, and will not so commit them unless instructed to do so.
It is very possible that in the varied and complicated questions that will come up there may be differences of opinion between the governor and myself, but there shall be no discord of action, and I will give to his efforts the fullest support in my power.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir,
E.R.S. CANBY, Major General Commanding.
The SECRETARY OF WAR, Washington, D.C.
Official copy:
R. DES ANGES, Major, A.A.G.