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Scepticism and animal faith

Chapter 28: INDEX
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About This Book

The author presents a restrained philosophical approach that accepts everyday convictions as the proper basis for belief, arguing that radical skepticism cannot be lived and that instinctive, practical trust — animal faith — underpins knowledge and action. He critiques metaphysical systems that conflate different orders of reality, distinguishes various realms of being, and defends a naturalistic materialism for inquiries into the physical world while reserving logic and aesthetics for immaterial matters. The work combines conceptual clarification, literary reflection, and a defense of common sense as a temperate method for philosophic thought.

INDEX

  • Analysis and synthesis, 117-119
  • Animation, not behaviour, 244-246;
    • an expression of mechanism, not a substitute, 246, 247;
    • conceived dramatically, 248, 249
  • Anthropomorphism excusable, 147, 148
  • Appearance, two senses of the word, 39, 43
  • Apperception, timeless, 24, 25, 28-30;
    • its physical ground, 282
  • Arabian Nights, 67, 160, 305
  • Aristotle, his metaphysics, vii;
    • identifies essence with intuition, 126-129;
    • on God, 130, 131;
    • on substance, 190;
    • on entelechies, 217
  • Arts, creative like the senses, 87, 102
  • Astronomy, good for moralists, 307
  • Behaviour, theme of scientific psychology, 243-246
  • Belief, not implied in intuition, 16;
    • enacted before it is asserted, 264
  • Berkeley, alluded to, 58;
    • his direct intuition, 68;
    • his nominalism, 97
  • Brahma, 18, 19, 51
  • British and German philosophy criticises perception, not memory, 13;
    • only literature, 254
  • Buddhism, 306
  • Causation, 210
  • Change, feeling of it not a change, 25;
    • known by faith only, 26;
    • may be illusion, 30;
    • fallacious disproofs of it, 31, 32
  • Common sense, roughly sound, v
  • Contingency of all existence, 134, 135
  • Contradiction an essence of discourse, 121, 137
  • Criticism, empirical and transcendental, 3, 4;
    • arises by conflict of dogmas, 8;
    • depends on literary psychology, 187;
    • should appeal to living beliefs, 305
  • Data, non-existentials, 45;
    • universals, 54;
    • their basis cerebral, 56
  • Dateless, defined, 270
  • Democritus, ix, 55
  • Demonstration, assumes discourse, 115-119
  • Descartes, 17;
    • doubts facts only, 289;
    • cogito ergo sum, 290-293
  • Dialectic, not true unless descriptive, 28;
    • involves belief in memory, 119, 120
  • Discourse, an event, 119;
    • involved in positing anything, 124;
    • distinguished late, 193
  • Dogma, how precipitated, 6
  • Empiricism admits substance, 199-201
  • Entelechy, 130, 217
  • Error distinguishes discourse from its objects, 123
  • Esse est percipi, 58
  • Essences adumbrated, 35, 38, 39, 48;
    • simile of the costumer’s shop, 70-72;
    • introduced, 73, 74;
    • defined further, 75-78;
    • necessary terms in knowledge, 80-82;
    • of any complexity, 116, 262;
    • infinitely comminuted, 129;
    • without inherent values, 130;
    • not limited to Platonic ideas, 225
  • Eternal, defined, 271
  • Eternity, 112
  • Euclid, 86, 121;
  • Events involve substance, 230-232
  • Everlasting, defined, 271
  • Evidence, two meanings, 43, 44, 99
  • Existence, the sense of it, 24, 25, 187, 188;
    • not a datum, 34-38;
    • presence to intuition neither sufficient for it nor necessary, 45-47;
    • its physical definition, 48;
    • odious to logic, 48, 206;
    • name for an object of faith, 42;
    • felt as pure Being posited, 273
  • Expectation, irrational as hunger, 36
  • Experience, use of the word, 138;
    • naturally conditioned, transcendentally primary, 23, 24;
    • conceived as a life, 57;
    • is discourse interrupted by shocks, 143;
    • belief in it imposed by instinct, not by experience itself, 144;
    • its primitive texture, 188, 189;
    • imagined experience hypostatised, 255, 256;
    • reduced to blank feeling or extended to dreams, 260
  • Explanation, 208
  • Fact, 228, 229;
    • never a datum, 91;
    • denied if regarded as a concept, 60
  • Faith prior to intuition, 107
  • Fichte, 62, 63, 184, 185
  • Future, an assumption, 36;
    • rash notion of it, 235
  • God assimilated to nature, 237;
    • to truth, 268;
    • to the spirit of a cosmos, 130, 131
  • Hamlet, 27, 58, 95
  • Heraclitus, ix, 29
  • History, dependent for its validity on physics, 13;
    • interfused with fiction, 160;
    • partly literary psychology, 253
  • Hume, his sharp intuition, 67, 68;
    • criticism by retrenchment, 293;
    • residual assumptions, 294;
    • analysis of conventions, 295;
    • sophistical result, 296, 297
  • Ideas not beliefs unless action is suggested, 16;
    • Platonic ideas, 222-224
  • Identification an act of faith, 117, 119
  • Identity felt under diverse appearances, 153
  • Illusion, three ways out of it, 72
  • Immortal, defined, 271
  • Indian philosophy, viii, 51-55, 67, 305, 306
  • Instantaneous, defined, 270
  • Intelligence expresses animal adjustments, 281
  • Intent, 100, 137, 166, 167
  • Interpretation obscures the datum, 67, 68
  • Introjection, 241
  • Intuition yields only appearance, 24;
    • denied by sceptics, 58;
    • an expression of animal wakefulness, 133;
    • does not think, 150;
    • may exist behind observable facts, 258;
    • divined by sympathy, 221, 250;
    • most communicable when most articulate, 251
  • Ionian physics, vii, viii
  • Kant, 4, 97;
    • his incoherence, 298;
    • his analysis of knowledge, 299, 300;
    • destructive results, 301
  • Karma, 54
  • Knowledge, impossible with nothing to know, 60;
    • is symbolical, 95, 96, 98, 101;
    • has a removed object, 154;
    • bridges the flux, 161;
    • its animal basis, 164, 172;
    • may recover essences given elsewhere, 168, 169;
    • not intuition, 170, 171;
    • the object identified by bodily attitude (illustration of the moon), 172-177;
    • though symbolical progressive, 177-179;
    • may be adequate to discourse elsewhere, 207;
    • when pictorially adequate it is still faith, 107
  • Life of reason, 109, 110
  • Literary psychology, 174;
    • possibly true, 259;
    • turned into metaphysics, 293, 294
  • Logic, partly creative, partly descriptive, vi;
    • not coercive over fact, ibid., 2, 3;
    • studies essence, not truth, 262
  • Memory, presence of the absent, 141;
    • is direct, 151;
    • posits animation, 242;
    • in a natural setting, 150, 158;
    • pictorial exactitude possible but worthless, 152, 153;
    • stationed in the present, which frames the past, 154, 155;
    • may be truer than experience, 156;
    • should be selective, 157;
    • criticised only by fancy, 160
  • Metaphysics confuses different realms of being, vii, 203, 208, 209, 218
  • Natural philosophy, vii;
    • present ferment in it, ix;
    • progresses in knowledge, 218;
    • has a poetic side, 234
  • Nature, the total object of perception, 197, 198;
    • connotations of the word, 234;
    • uniformity of nature an assumption, ibid.;
    • tested and embodied in art, 236, 239
  • Nirvana, 51
  • Object, use and misuse of the word, 202, 203
  • Order of genesis, of discovery, 109;
    • of evidence, 110
  • Pain, 65, 66, 280
  • Parmenides, 29, 55, 61
  • Past, an object of faith, 29;
    • may be illusory, 36, 37
  • Perception, not intuition but faith expressing a bodily response, 282, 283
  • Permanence given in experience, 193, 195
  • Phenomena, in Platonism, 224;
    • in modern philosophy, 225, 226
  • Plato, 69, 78, 85, 225, 226, 306
  • Platonic ideas, selected essences, 77;
    • hypostatised, 222-224
  • Positing, propriety of the term, 184
  • Primary and secondary qualities, 82-90
  • Protagoras, 306
  • Psyche, 19, 147, 156. Cf. Self
  • Psychologism, 256, 292
  • Psychology, scientific and literary, 252;
    • supports the non-existence of data, 63-66
  • Pythagoras, ix
  • Reality, meaning of the term, 33, 34;
    • eulogistic use of it, 51, 210
  • Reason, not a force, 186;
    • principle of sufficient reason, 289
  • Religious dogmas easily doubted, 11, 12
  • Scepticism, a conflict of dogmas, 8;
    • an accident in philosophy, 9;
    • rich in ideas, 67;
    • a trance state, 69;
    • would be the best philosophy if tenable, 100, 186;
    • deprecated in Christian times, 297
  • Sceptics in Greece, some sophists, 307;
    • some true philosophers, 308
  • Schopenhauer, 68
  • Self, evidence for its existence, 146;
    • may be denied, 148, 290;
    • is obscure, 149;
    • an almost perpetual object, 291
  • Sensations and ideas, ambiguous uses of the terms, 86-90, 188, 225
  • Shock, distinguishes experience from pure discourse, 139, 141;
    • prompts to belief in the self and in the object, 142
  • Socrates, his favourite essences, 78;
    • his utilitarianism in science, 307
  • Solipsism, untenable if personal, 13;
    • tenable if of the present moment, 15, 16
  • Sophists, 306
  • Soul, genesis of the notion, 216;
    • analysis of it, 218-221
  • Spinoza, right on chief issue, viii;
    • thinks ideas beliefs, 16;
    • defines the realm of essence, 129;
    • a philosopher in the better sense, 305
  • Spirit, non-existential for transcendentalists, 62;
    • at home in intuition, 125, 126;
    • implied in it, 147;
    • ready to be omniscient, 116;
    • timeless and supernatural in status, 161, 162;
    • distrusts substance but lives by it, 147;
    • is no datum, 272;
    • often more than intuition, 273, 274;
    • expresses animal life, 276-280;
    • is not a substance, 286-288
  • Spiritual substance, a contradiction, 217;
    • how suggested, ibid.
  • Substance, posited by intent expressing animal reaction, 106;
    • belief in it primordial, 185, 187;
    • prior to intuition, 188;
    • revealed on its dynamic side, not pictorially, 197;
    • not metaphysical, 201, 202;
    • the material in things, 203;
    • not duplicated by them, 204;
    • explains their genesis and distribution, 209;
    • connects appearances, 212
  • Surprise, not occasioned by contingency, 136;
    • incompatible with omniscience, 276
  • Timeless, defined, 270
  • Transcendentalism, properly a method only, 25;
    • its subject and object false, ibid.;
    • denies all existences, 59-63;
    • its ambiguity, 297, 298;
    • a part of literary psychology, 301;
    • its metaphysical form, 302;
    • must be abandoned in practice, 303;
    • its latent barbarism, 304
  • Truth, may be conveyed through symbols, 179-181;
    • mistaken for substance, 226-228;
    • possible in literary psychology, 259;
    • not proper to names or values, 263;
    • ignored by supposing things to change with the views of them, 264-266;
    • not an existence, not an opinion, not certitude, but the ultimate description of things in all their relations, 267, 268;
    • the subjective seat of opinions does not jeopardise it, 306;
    • may be loved for its own sake, 307
  • Unity of apperception, 25
  • Universals, data of intuition, 91, 93
  • Universe, not known as a whole, vi;
  • Vagueness, relative, 94, 95
  • Variation involves eternal essences, 113, 114
  • Vedanta, 61

THE END