Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812. Volume 1

FOOTNOTES:

CHAPTER IVToC

FROM THE ORDERS IN COUNCIL TO WAR

1807-1812

When the treaty of December 31, 1806, was about to be signed, the British negotiators delivered to the Americans a paper, of the general character of which they had been forewarned, but which in precise terms then first came before them. Its origin was due to a pronouncement of the French Emperor, historically known as the Decree of Berlin, which was dated November 21, while the negotiations were in progress, but had become fully known only when they had reached a very advanced stage. The pretensions and policy set forth in the Decree were considered by the British Government to violate the rights of neutrals, with a specific and far-reaching purpose of thereby injuring Great Britain. It was claimed that acquiescence in such violations by the neutral, or submission to them, would be a concurrence in the hostile object of the enemy; in which case Great Britain might feel compelled to adopt measures retaliatory against France, through the same medium of neutral navigation. In such steps she might be fettered, should the present treaty take effect. In final ratification, therefore, the British Government would be guided by the action of the United States upon the Berlin Decree. Unless the Emperor abandoned his policy, or "the United States by its conduct or assurances will have given security to his Majesty that it will not submit to such innovations on the established system of maritime law, ... his Majesty will not consider himself bound by the present signature of his commissioners to ratify the treaty, or precluded from adopting such measures as may seem necessary for counteracting the designs of his enemy."[172] The American representatives transmitted this paper to Washington, with the simple observation that "we do not consider ourselves a party to it, or as having given it in any the slightest degree our sanction."[173]

The Berlin Decree was remarkable not only in scope and spirit, but in form. "It had excited in us apprehensions," wrote Madison to the United States minister in Paris, "which were repressed only by the inarticulate import of its articles, and the presumption that it would be executed in a sense not inconsistent with the respect due to the treaty between France and the United States." It bore, in fact, the impress of its author's mind, which, however replete with knowledge concerning conventional international law, defined in accordance with the momentary and often hasty impulses of his own will, and consequently often also with the obscurity attendant upon ill-digested ideas. The preamble recited various practices of Great Britain as subversive of international right; most of which were not so, but in accordance with long-standing usage and general prescription. The methods of blockade instituted by her were more exceptionable, and were given prominence, with evident reference to the Order of May 16, declaring the blockade of a long coast-line. It being evident, so ran the Emperor's reasoning, that the object of this abuse of blockade was to interrupt neutral commerce in favor of British, it followed that "whoever deals on the Continent in English merchandise favors that design, and becomes an accomplice." He therefore decreed, as a measure of just retaliation, "that the British Islands were thenceforward in a state of blockade; that all correspondence and commerce with them was prohibited; that trade in English merchandise was forbidden; and that all merchandise belonging to England, or" (even if neutral property) "proceeding from its manufactories and colonies, is lawful prize." No vessel coming directly from British dominions should be received in any port to which the Decree was applicable. The scope of its intended application was shown in the concluding command, that it should be communicated "to the Kings of Spain, of Naples, of Holland, of Etruria, and to our allies, whose subjects, like ours, are the victims of the injustice and barbarism of the English maritime laws."[174]

The phrasing of the edict was ambiguous, as Madison indicated. Notably, while neutral vessels having on board merchandise neutral in property, but British in origin, were to be seized when voluntarily entering a French port, it was not clear whether they were for the same reason to be arrested when found on the high seas; and there was equal failure to specify whether the proclaimed blockade authorized the capture of neutrals merely because bound to the British Isles, as was lawful if destined to a seaport effectively blockaded. Again, some of the proposed measures, such as refusal of admission to vessels or merchandise coming to French ports from British, were matters of purely local concern and municipal regulation; whereas the seizure of neutral property, because of English manufacture, was at least of doubtful right, if exercised within municipal limits, and certainly unlawful, if effected on the high seas. Whether such application was intended could not certainly be inferred from the text. The genius of the measure, as a whole, its inspiring motive and purpose, was revealed in the closing words of the preamble: "This decree shall be considered as the fundamental law of the Empire, until England has acknowledged that the rights of war are the same an land and on sea; that it [war] cannot be extended to any private property whatever; nor to persons who are not military; and until the right of blockade be restrained to fortified places, actually invested by competent forces." These words struck directly at measures of war resting upon long-standing usage, in which the strength of a maritime state such as Great Britain was vitally implicated.

The claim for private property possesses particular interest; for it involves a play upon words to the confusion of ideas, which from that time to this has vitiated the arguments upon which have been based a prominent feature of American policy. Private property at a standstill is one thing. It is the unproductive money in a stocking, hid in a closet. Property belonging to private individuals, but embarked in that process of transportation and exchange which we call commerce, is like money in circulation. It is the life-blood of national prosperity, upon which war depends; and as such is national in its employment, and only in ownership private. To stop such circulation is to sap national prosperity; and to sap prosperity, upon which war depends for its energy, is a measure as truly military as is killing the men whose arms maintain war in the field. Prohibition of commerce is enforced at will where an enemy's army holds a territory; if permitted, it is because it inures to the benefit of the conqueror, or at least from its restricted scope does not injure him. It will not be doubted that, should a prohibition on shore be disregarded, the offending property would be seized in punishment. The sea is the great scene of commerce. The property transported back and forth, circulating from state to state in exchanges, is one of the greatest factors in national wealth. The maritime nations have been, and are, the wealthy nations. To prohibit such commerce to an enemy is, and historically has been, a tremendous blow to his fighting power; never more conspicuously so than in the Napoleonic wars. But prohibition is a vain show, in war as it is in civil government, if not enforced by penalties; and the natural penalty against offending property is fine, extending even to confiscation in extreme cases. The seizure of enemy's merchant ships and goods, for violating the prohibition against their engaging in commerce, is what is commonly called the seizure of private property. Under the methods of the last two centuries, it has been in administration a process as regular, legally, as is libelling a ship for an action in damages; nor does it differ from it in principle. The point at issue really is not, "Is the property private?" but, "Is the method conducive to the purposes of war?" Property strictly private, on board ship, but not in process of commercial exchange, is for this reason never touched; and to do so is considered as disgraceful as a common theft.

Napoleon, as a ruler, was always poverty-stricken. For that reason he levied heavy contributions on conquered states, which it is needless to say were paid by private taxpayers; and for the same reason, by calling French ships and French goods "private property," he would compel for them the freedom of the sea, which the maritime preponderance of Great Britain denied them. He needed the revenue that commerce would bring in. So as to blockades. In denying the right to capture under a nominal blockade, unsupported by an effective force, he took the ground which the common-sense of nations had long before embodied in the common consent called international law. But he went farther. Blockade is very inconvenient to the blockaded, which was the rôle played by France. Along with the claim for "private property," he formulated the proposition that the right of blockade is restrained to fortified places; to which was afterwards added the corollary that the place must be invested by land as well as by sea. It is to be noticed that here also American policy showed a disposition to go astray, by denying the legitimacy of a purely commercial blockade; a tendency natural enough at that passing moment, when, as a weak nation, it was desired to restrict the rights of belligerents, but which in its results on the subsequent history of the country would have been ruinous. John Marshall, one of the greatest names in American jurisprudence, when Secretary of State in 1800, wrote to the minister in London:

In 1810, the then Secretary of State enclosed to the American minister in London the letter from which this extract is taken, among other proofs of the positions maintained by the United States on the subject of blockade. The particular claim cited was not directly indorsed; but as its mention was unnecessary to the matter immediately in hand, we may safely regard its retention as indicative of the ideal of the Secretary, and of the President, Mr. Madison. In consequence, we find the minister, William Pinkney, in his letter of January 14, 1811, adducing Marshall's view to the British Foreign Secretary:

The error into which both these eminent statesmen fell is military in character, and proceeds from the same source as the agitation in favor of exempting so-called private property from capture. Both spring from the failure to recognize a function of the sea, vital to the maintenance of war by states which depend upon maritime commerce. To forbid the free use of the seas to enemy's merchant ships and material of commerce, differs in no wise in principle from shutting his ports to neutral vessels, as well as to his own, by blockade. Both are aimed at the enemy's sources of supply, at his communications; and the penalty inflicted by the laws of war in both cases is the same,—forfeiture of the offending property. With clear recognition of this military principle involved, and of the importance of sustaining it by Great Britain, British high officials repeatedly declared that the Berlin Decree was to be regarded, not chiefly in its methods, but in its object, or principle, which was to deprive Great Britain of her principal weapon. This purpose stood avowed in the words, "this decree shall be considered the fundamental law of the Empire until England has acknowledged," etc. British statesmen correctly paraphrased this, "has renounced the established foundations, admitted by all civilized nations, of her maritime rights and interests, upon which depend the most valuable rights and interests of the nation."[178] The British authorities understood that, by relinquishing these rights, they would abandon in great measure the control of the sea, so far as useful to war. The United States have received their lesson in history. If the principle contended for by their representatives, Marshall and Pinkney, had been established as international law before 1861, there could have been no blockade of the Southern coast in the Civil War. The cotton of the Confederacy, innocent "private property," could have gone freely; the returns from it would have entered unimpeded; commerce, the source of national wealth, would have flourished in full vigor; supplies, except contraband, would have flowed unmolested; and all this at the price merely of killing some hundred thousands more men, with proportionate expenditure of money, in the effort to maintain the Union, which would probably have failed, to the immeasurable loss of both sections.

The British Government took some time to analyze the "inarticulate import" of the Berlin Decree. Hence, in the paper presented to Monroe and Pinkney, stress was laid upon the methods only, ignoring the object of compelling Great Britain to surrender her maritime rights. In the methods, however, instinct divined the true character of the plotted evil. There was to be formed, under military pressure, a vast political combination of states pledged to exclude British commerce from the markets of the Continent; a design which in execution received the name of the Continental System. The Decree being issued after the battle of Jena, upon the eve of the evident complete subjugation of Prussia, following that of Austria the year before, there was room to fear that the predominance of Napoleon on the Continent would compel in Europe universal compliance with these measures of exclusion. It so proved, in fact, in the course of 1807, leading to a commercial warfare of extraordinary rigor, the effects of which upon Europe have been discussed by the author in a previous work.[179] Its influence upon the United States is now to be considered; for it was a prominent factor in the causes of the War of 1812.

Although in a military sense weak to debility, and politically not welded as yet into a nation, strong in a common spirit and accepted traditions, the United States was already in two respects a force to be considered. She possessed an extensive shipping, second in tonnage only to that of the British Islands, to which it was a dangerous rival in maintaining the commercial intercourse of Europe; while her population and purchasing power were so increased as to constitute her a very valuable market, manufacturing for which was chiefly in the hands of Great Britain. It became, therefore, an object with Napoleon, in prosecution of the design of the Berlin Decree, to draw the United States into co-operation with the European continental system, by shutting her ports to Great Britain; while the latter, confronted by this double danger, sought to impose upon neutral navigation—almost wholly American—such curtailment as should punish the Emperor and his tributaries for their measures of exclusion, and also neutralize the effect of these by forcing the British Islands into the chain of communication by which Europe in general was supplied. To retaliate the Berlin Decree upon the enemy, and by the same means to nourish the trade of Great Britain, was the avowed twofold object. The shipping of the United States found itself between hammer and anvil, crushed by these opposing policies. Napoleon banned it from continental harbors, if coming from England or freighted with English goods; Great Britain forbade it going to a continental port, unless it had first touched at one of hers; and both inflicted penalties of confiscation, when able to lay hands on a vessel which had violated their respective commands.

The lack of precision in the terms of the Berlin Decree exposed it from the first to much latitude of interpretation; and the Emperor remaining absent from France for eight months after its promulgation, preoccupied with an arduous warfare in Eastern Europe, the construction of the edict by the authorities in Paris made little alteration in existing conditions. Nevertheless, the impulse to retaliate prevailed; and the British ministry with which Monroe and Pinkney had negotiated, though comparatively liberal in political complexion, would not wait for more precise knowledge. The occasion was seized with a precipitancy which lent color to Napoleon's assertion, that the leading aim was to favor their own trade by depressing that of others. This had already been acknowledged as the motive for interrupting American traffic in West India produce. Now again, one week only after stating to Monroe and Pinkney that they "could not believe that the enemy will ever seriously attempt to enforce such a system," and without waiting to ascertain whether neutral nations, the United States in particular, would, "contrary to all expectations, acquiesce in such usurpations,"[180] the Government on January 7, 1807, with no information as to the practical effect given to the Decree in operation, issued an Order in Council, which struck Americans directly and chiefly. Neutrals were forbidden to sail from one port to another, both of which were so far under the control of France or her allies that British vessels might not freely trade thereat. This was aimed immediately at trade along the coast of Europe, but it included, of course, the voyages from a hostile colony to a hostile European port already interdicted by British rulings, of which the new Order was simply an extension. It fell with particular severity on Americans, accustomed to go from port to port, not carrying on local coasting, but seeking markets for their outward cargoes, or making up a homeward lading. It is true that the Cabinet by which the Order was issued did not intend to forbid this particular procedure; but the wording naturally implied such prohibition, and was so construed by Madison,[181] who communicated his understanding to the British minister at Washington. Before this letter could reach London, the ministry changed, and the new Government refrained from correcting the misapprehension. For this it was taken to task in Parliament, by Lords Holland and Grenville.[182]

Monroe had once written to the British Foreign Secretary that "it cannot well be conceived how it should be lawful to carry on commerce from one port to another of the parent country, and not from its colonies to the mother country."[183] This well meant argument, in favor of opening the colonial trade, gave to the new step of the British Cabinet a somewhat gratuitous indorsement of logical consistency. A consciousness of this may have underlain the remarkable terms in which this grievous restriction was imparted to the United States Government, as evincing the singular indulgence of Great Britain. Her minister in Washington, in conveying the Order to the State Department, wrote: "His Majesty, with that forbearance and moderation which have at all times distinguished his conduct, has determined for the present to confine himself to exercising his decided naval superiority in such a manner only as is authorized by the acknowledged principles of the laws of nations, and has issued an Order for preventing all commerce from port to port of his enemies; comprehending in this Order not only the ports of France, but those of other nations, as, either in alliance with France, or subject to her dominion, have, by measures of active offence or by the exclusion of British ships, taken part in the present war."[184] These words characterized the measure as strictly retaliatory. They implied that the extra-legal action of the enemy would warrant extra-legal action by Great Britain, but asserted expressly that the present step was sanctioned by existing law,—"in such a manner only as is authorized by the acknowledged principles of the law of nations." The prohibition of coasting trade could be brought under the law of nations only by invoking the Rule of 1756, forbidding neutrals to undertake for a state at war employment denied to them in peace. Of this, coasting was a precise instance; but to call the Rule an acknowledged principle of the law of nations was an assumption peculiarly calculated to irritate Madison, who had expended reams in refutation. He penned two careful replies, logical, incisive, and showing the profound knowledge of the subject which distinguished him; but in a time of political convulsion he contended in vain against men who wore swords and thought their country's existence imperilled.

The United States authorities argued by text and precedent. To the end they persisted in shutting their eyes to the important fact, recognized intuitively by Great Britain, that the Berlin Decree was no isolated measure, to be discussed on its separate merits, but an incident in an unprecedented political combination, already sufficiently defined in tendency, which overturned the traditional system of Europe. It destroyed the checks inherent in the balance of power, concentrating the whole in the hands of Napoleon, to whom there remained on the Continent only one valid counterweight, the Emperor of Russia, whom he soon after contrived to lead into his scheme of policy. The balance of power was thus reduced to the opposing scales of Great Britain and France, and for five years so remained. The Continental System, embracing all the rest of Europe, was arrayed against Great Britain, and might well look to destroy her, if it could command the support of the United States. Founded upon armed power, it proposed by continuous exertion of the same means to undermine the bases of British prosperity, and so to subvert the British Empire. The enterprise was distinctly military, and could be met only by measures of a similar character, to which existing international law was unequal. The corner-stone was the military power of Napoleon, which, by nullifying the independence of the continental states, compelled them to adopt the methods of the Berlin Decree contrary to their will, and contrary to the wishes, the interests, and the bare well-being of their populations. "You will see," wrote an observant American representative abroad, "that Napoleon stalks at a gigantic stride among the pygmy monarchs of Europe, and bends them to his policy. It is even an equal chance if Russia, after all her blustering, does not accede to his demands without striking a blow."[185] To meet the danger Great Britain opposed a maritime dominion, equally exclusive, equally founded on force, and exercised in equally arbitrary fashion over the populations of the sea.

At the end of March, 1807, the British Cabinet with which Monroe and Pinkney had negotiated went out of office. Their successors came in prepared for extreme action in consequence of the Berlin Decree; but their hand was for the moment stayed, because its enforcement remained in abeyance, owing to the Emperor's continued absence in the field. Towards the claims of the United States their attitude was likely to be uncompromising; and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Canning, to whom fell the expression of the Government's views and purposes, possessed an adroitness in fastening upon minor weaknesses in a case, and postponing to such the consideration of the important point at issue, which, coupled with a peremptoriness of tone often bordering on insolence, effected nothing towards conciliating a people believed to be both unready and unwilling to fight. The American envoys, at their first interview, in April, met him with the proposition of their Government to reopen negotiations on the basis of the treaty of December 31. Learning from them that the treaty would not be ratified without a satisfactory arrangement concerning impressment, Canning asked what relations would then obtain between the two nations. The reply was that the United States Government wished them placed informally on the most friendly footing; that is, that an understanding should be reached as to practical action to be expected on either side, without concessions of principle.[186] As final instructions from Washington were yet to come, it was agreed that the matter should be postponed. When they arrived, on July 16, the envoys drew up a letter, submitting the various changes desired; but conveying also the fixed determination of the President "to decline any arrangement, formal or informal, which does not comprise a provision against impressments from American vessels on the high seas, and which would, notwithstanding, be a bar to legislative measures by Congress for controlling that species of aggression."[187]

This letter was dated July 24, but by the time it could be delivered news arrived which threw into the background all matters of negotiation and illustrated with what respect British naval officers regarded "the instructions, repeated and enforced, for the observance of the greatest caution in impressing British seamen."[188] It is probable, indeed, that the change of ministry, and the well-understood tone of the new-comers, had modified the influence of these restraining orders; and Canning evidently felt that such an inference was natural, for Monroe reported his noticeable desire "to satisfy me that no new orders had been issued by the present ministry to the commandant of the British squadron at Halifax," who was primarily responsible for the lamentable occurrence which here traversed the course of negotiation. It had been believed, and doubtless correctly, that some deserters from British ships of war had found their way into the naval service of the United States. In June, 1807, the American frigate "Chesapeake," bearing the broad pendant of Commodore James Barron, had been fitting for sea in Hampton Roads. At this time two French ships of war were lying off Annapolis, a hundred miles up Chesapeake Bay; and, to prevent their getting to sea, a small British squadron had been assembled at Lynnhaven Bay, just within Cape Henry, a dozen miles below the "Chesapeake's" anchorage. They were thus, as Jefferson said, enjoying the hospitality of the United States. On June 22 the American frigate got under way for sea, and as she stood down, one of the British, the "Leopard" of fifty guns, also made sail, going out ahead of her. Shortly after noon the "Chesapeake" passed the Capes. When about ten miles outside, a little after three o'clock, the "Leopard" approached, and hailed that she had a despatch for Commodore Barron. This was brought on board by a lieutenant, and proved to be a letter from the captain of the "Leopard," enclosing an order from Vice-Admiral Berkeley, in charge of the Halifax station, "requiring and directing the captains and commanders of his Majesty's vessels under my command, in case of meeting the American frigate, the 'Chesapeake,' at sea, without the limits of the United States, to show her captain this order, and to require to search his ship for deserters from certain British ships," specified by name. Upon Barron's refusal, the "Leopard" fired into the "Chesapeake," killed or wounded twenty-one men, and reduced her to submission. The order for search was then enforced. Four of the American crew, considered to be British deserters, were taken away. Of these, one was hanged; one died; and the other two, after prolonged disputation, were returned five years later to the deck of the "Chesapeake," in formal reparation.

Word of this transaction reached the British Government before it did Monroe, who was still sole American minister for all matters except the special mission. Canning at once wrote him a letter of regret, and spontaneously promised "prompt and effectual reparation," if upon receipt of full information British officers should prove culpable. Four days later, July 29, Monroe and Canning met in pursuance of a previous appointment, the object of which had been to discuss complaints against the conduct of British ships of war on the coast of the United States. The "Chesapeake" business naturally now overshadowed all others. Monroe maintained that, on principle, a ship of war could not be entered to search for deserters, or for any purpose, without violating the sovereignty of her nation. Canning was very guarded; no admission of principle could then be obtained from him; but he gave Monroe to understand that, in whatever light the action of the British officer should be viewed by his Government, the point whether the men seized were British subjects or American citizens would be of consideration, in the question of restoring them, now that they were in British hands. Monroe, in accordance with the position of his Government on the subject of impressment, replied that the determining consideration was not the nationality of the men, but of the ship, the flag of which had been insulted.

The conference ended with an understanding that Monroe would send in a note embodying his position and claims. This he did the same day;[189] but his statements were grounded upon newspaper accounts, as the British Government had not yet published Berkeley's official report. He would not await the positive information that must soon be given out, but applied strong language to acts not yet precisely ascertained; and he mingled with the "Chesapeake" affair other very real, but different and minor, subjects of complaint, seemingly with a view to cumulative effect. He thus made the mistake of encumbering with extraneous or needless details a subject which required separate, undivided, and lucid insistence; while Canning found an opportunity, particularly congenial to his temperament, to escape under a cloud of dignified words from the simple admission of wrong, and promise of reparation, which otherwise he would have had to face. He could assume a tone of haughty rebuke, where only that of apology should have been left open. His reply ran thus: