OBJECT. II.
Against the Second Meditation: Of the Nature
of Mans Mind.
I am a Thinking Thing. ’Tis True; for because I think or have a Phantasme (whether I am awake or asleep) it follows that I am Thinking, for I Think and I am Thinking signifie the same Thing. Because I Think, it follows That I am, for whatever Thinks cannot be Nothing. But when he Adds, That is, a Mind, a Soul, an Understanding, Reason, I question his Argumentation; for it does not seem a Right Consequence to say, I am a Thinking Thing, therefore I am a Thought, neither, I am an Understanding Thing, therefore I am the Understanding. For in the same manner I may Conclude, I am a Walking Thing, therefore I am the Walking it self.
Wherefore D.Cartes Concludes that an Understanding Thing and Intellection (which is the Act of an Understanding Thing) are the same; or at least that an Understanding Thing and the Intellect (which is the Power of an Understanding Thing) are the same; And yet all Philosophers distinguish the subject from its Faculties and Acts, that is, from its Properties and Essence, for the Thing it self is one thing, and its Essence is an other. It may be therefore that a Thinking Thing is the Subject of a Mind, Reason, or Understanding, and therefor it may be a Corporeal Thing, the Contrary Whereof is here Assumed and not Proved; and yet this Inference is the Foundation of that Conclusion which D.Cartes would Establish.
In the same Meditation, on, * I know that I am, I ask, What I am Whom I Thus Know, Certainly the Knowledge of Me precisely so taken depends not on those Things of whose Existence I am yet Ignorant.
’Tis Certain the Knowledge of this Proposition I am, depends on this, I think as he hath rightly inform’d us; but from whence have we the knowledge of this Proposition, I think? certainly from hence only, that we cannot conceive any Act without its subject, as dancing without a Dancer, knowledge, without a Knower, thought without a thinker.
And from hence it seems to follow, that a thinking Thing is a Corporeal Thing; for the Subjects of all Acts are understood only in a Corporeal way, or after the manner of matter, as he himself shews hereafter by the example of a piece of Wax, which changing its colour, consistence, shape, and other Acts is yet known to continue the same thing, that is, the same matter subject to so many changes. But I cannot conclude from another thought that I now think; for tho a Man may think that he hath thought (which consists only in memory) yet ’tis altogether impossible for him to think that he now thinks, or to know, that he knows, for the question may be put infinitely, how do you know that you know, that you know, that you know? &c.
Wherefore seeing the Knowledge of this Proposition I am, depends on the knowledge of this I think, and the knowledge of this is from hence only, that we cannot separate thought from thinking matter, it seems rather to follow, that a thinking thing is material, than that ’tis immaterial.
ANSWER.
When I said, That is a Mind, a Soul, an Understanding, Reason, &c. I did not mean by these names the Faculties only, but the things indow’d with those Faculties; and so ’tis alwayes understood by the two first names (mind and soul) and very often so understood by the two last Names (understanding and Reason) and this I have explain’d so often, and in so many places of these Meditations, that there is not the least occasion of questioning my meaning.
Neither is there any parity between Walking and Thought, for walking is used only for the Act it self, but thought is sometimes used for the Act, sometimes for the Faculty, and sometimes for the thing it self, wherein the Faculty resides.
Neither do I say, that the understanding thing and intellection are the same, or that the understanding thing and the intellect are the same, if the intellect be taken for the Faculty, but only when ’tis taken for the thing it self that understands. Yet I willingly confess, that I have (as much as in me lay) made use of abstracted words to signifie that thing or substance, which I would have devested of all those things that belong not to it. Whereas contrarily this Philosopher uses the most concrete Words to signifie this thinking thing, such as subject, matter, Body, &c. that he may not suffer it to be separated from Body.
Neither am I concern’d that His manner of joyning many things together may seem to some fitter for the discovery of Truth, than mine, wherein I separate as much as possibly each particular. But let us omit words and speak of things.
It may be (sayes he) that a Thinking thing is a corporeal thing, the contrary whereof is here assumed and not proved. But herein he is mistaken, for I never assumed the contrary, neither have I used it as a Foundation, for the rest of my Superstructure, but left it wholly undetermin’d till the sixth Meditation, and in that ’tis proved.
Then he tells us rightly, that we cannot conceive any Act without its subject, as thought without a thinking thing, for what thinks cannot be nothing; but then he subjoyns without any Reason, and against the usual manner of speaking, and contrary to all Logick, that hence it seem to follow, that a thinking thing is a corporeal Being. Truly the subjects of all Acts are understood under the notion of substance, or if you please under the notion of matter (that is to say of metaphysical matter) but not therefore under the notion of Bodies.
But Logicians and Commonly all Men are used to say, that there are some Spiritual, some Corporeal substances. And by the Instance of Wax I only proved that Colour, Consistence, Shape, &c. appertain not to the Ratio Formalis of the Wax; For in that Place I treated neither of the Ratio Formalis of the Mind, neither of Body.
Neither is it pertinent to the business, that the Philosopher asserts, That one Thought cannot be the subject of an other thought, for Who besides Himself ever Imagin’d This? But that I may explain the matter in a few words, ’Tis certain that Thought cannot be without a Thinking Thing, neither any Act or any Accident without a substance wherein it resides. But seeing that we know not a substance immediately by it self, but by this alone, that ’tis the subject of several Acts, it is very consonant to the commands of Reason and Custome, that we should call by different names those substances, which we perceive are the subjects of very different Acts or Accidents, and that afterwards we should examine, whether those different names signifie different or one and the same thing. Now there are some Acts which we call corporeal, as magnitude, figure, motion, and what ever else cannot be thought on without local extension, and the substance wherein these reside we call Body; neither can it be imagin’d that ’tis one substance which is the subject of Figure, and another substance which is the subject of local motion, &c. Because all these Acts agree under one common notion of Extension. Besides there are other Acts, which we call cogitative or thinking, as understanding, will, imagination, sense, &c. All which agree under the common notion of thought, perception, or Conscience; And the substance wherein they are, we say, is a thinking thing, or mind, or call it by whatever other name we please, so we do not confound it with corporeal substance, because cogitative Acts have no affinity with corporeal Acts, and thought, which is the common Ratio of those is wholly different from Extension, which is the common Ratio of These. But after we have formed two distinct conceptions of these two substances, from what is said in the sixth Meditation, ’tis easie to know, whether they be one and the same or different.