WeRead Powered by ReaderPub
Six metaphysical meditations / cover

Six metaphysical meditations /

Chapter 17: ANSWER.
Open in WeRead

Explore more books like this:

About This Book

A sequence of six reflections subjects customary opinions to radical, systematic doubt to discover indubitable truths. The thinker discards sensory and speculative certainties via skeptical scenarios, arriving at a foundational assertion of self-awareness as a thinking substance. From clear and distinct perceptions the argument moves to proofs for a benevolent deity as guarantor of truth, and to arguments distinguishing immaterial mind from extended body, illustrated by analytic examples such as the wax experiment and the hypothesis of a deceiving intellect. The work progresses from methodological skepticism to metaphysical claims about knowledge, God, and the real distinction between mind and body.

OBJECT. III.

* Which of them is it, that is distinct from my thought? which of them is it that can be separated from me?

Some perhaps will answer this Question thus, I my self, who think am distinct from my thought, and my thought is different from me (tho’ not seperated) as dancing is distinguished from the Dancer (as before is noted.) But if Des-Cartes will prove, that he who understands is the same with his understanding, we shall fall into the Scholastick expressions, the understanding understands, the sight sees, the Will wills, and then by an exact analogy, the Walking (or at least the Faculty of walking) shall walk. All which are obscure, improper, and unworthy that perspicuity which is usual with the noble Des-Cartes.

ANSWER.

I do not deny, that I who think am distinct from my thought, as a thing is distinguish’d from its modus or manner; But when I ask, which of them is it that is distinct from my thought? this I understand of those various modes of thought there mention’d, and not of substance; and when I subjoyn, which of them is it that can be separated from me? I only signifie that all those modes or manners of thinking reside in me, neither do I herein perceive what occasion of doubt or obscurity can be imagined.