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Six metaphysical meditations / cover

Six metaphysical meditations /

Chapter 24: OBJECT. VII.
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About This Book

A sequence of six reflections subjects customary opinions to radical, systematic doubt to discover indubitable truths. The thinker discards sensory and speculative certainties via skeptical scenarios, arriving at a foundational assertion of self-awareness as a thinking substance. From clear and distinct perceptions the argument moves to proofs for a benevolent deity as guarantor of truth, and to arguments distinguishing immaterial mind from extended body, illustrated by analytic examples such as the wax experiment and the hypothesis of a deceiving intellect. The work progresses from methodological skepticism to metaphysical claims about knowledge, God, and the real distinction between mind and body.

OBJECT. VII.

* Now it remains for me to examine, how I have received this Idea of God, for I have neither received it by means of my senses, neither comes it to me without my forethought, as the Ideas of sensible things use to do, when those things work on the Organs of my sense, or at least seem so to work; Neither is this Idea framed by my self, for I can neither add to, nor detract from it. Wherefore I have only to conclude, that it is innate, even as the Idea of me my self is Natural to my self.

If there be no Idea of God, as it seems there is not (and here ’tis not proved that there is) this whole discourse falls to the ground. And as to the Idea of my self (if I respect the Body) it proceeds from Sight, but (if the Soul) there is no Idea of a Soul, but we collect by Ratiocination, that there is some inward thing in a Mans Body, that imparts to it Animal Motion, by which it perceives and moves, and this (whatever it be) without any Idea we call a Soul.

ANSWER.

If there be an Idea of God (as ’tis manifest that there is) this whole Objection falls to the ground; and then he subjoyns, That we have no Idea of the Soul, but collect it by Ratiocination, ’Tis the same as if he should say, that there is no Image thereof represented in the Phantasie, but yet, that there is such a Thing, as I call an Idea.