Social Origins and Primal Law

CHAPTER VII

TRACES OF PERIOD OF TRANSITION—AVOIDANCES

With a custom so deeply ingrained as incest would be in the nature of man's ancestor, still doubtless vastly animal, we may indeed surmise that the process of its decay was long and tedious. The temptation, as we have said, to such easy procuration of a mate in comparison with the danger and comparatively scanty results of capture, was very great, whilst the continual propinquity of father and daughter would tend to constant recrudescence, especially in default of any trace of law against it. There must, then, evidently have been a transition era of vast durance, between the type of the isolated consanguine group whose only resource in matrimony was exogamic hostile capture, as the outcome of the incestuous lust of its solitary male head, and the all-embracing tribe composed of an aggregation of several groups, and possessing thus ipso facto all the necessary elements of an endogamic connubium quite incompatible with such incest. In such a tribe, a group of women in many cases formed the pivotal centre, and capture was often found only as a form in survival. Is it possible to retrace the main features of an epoch of such evident importance in social evolution? In view of the fact that, in the past course of our argument, such law as would seemingly have been necessarily evolved in regulation of each step in primitive progress has been found identical in form with some actual savage custom, may not a deeper investigation of savage custom disclose further co-ordination, and prove equally fertile in interpretation of the past? Whilst, again, many obscure observances in actual lower life, in consonance with such archaic genesis, may take a rational form, though the origin seems apparently lost for ever.

Such research will, I think, clearly show that many social features in modern savage habit afford internal evidence that, as a fact, they could only have arisen in such a transition era. They also bear marks of a very lengthened evolutionary process, and thus confirm the natural idea of a halt of portentous length at the threshold of the present haven of comparative social rest. We shall doubtless find that the door left ajar by the entrance of the outside suitor was not to yield further with ease to the pressure of new needs, half-hearted as men would be, from the conservative force of old ideas, of incest and entire masculine dominance.

There is, for instance, one curious trait in actual savage custom which evidently dates from a very early stage of this epoch. It is that of the strange forms of 'stealthy' intercourse, being the indispensable preliminary symbols of the legality of an after marriage between the resident female of a group and an outside male. These forms are well known to anthropologists as occurring among many lower peoples. Here we find that the visits of the male suitor are supposed to be distinctly clandestine, taking place only by night, although in reality the fact is perfectly in the cognisance of the whole group. Now such fugitive and secret meetings are exactly what would have taken place when a group had arrived at a stage in which, although filial incest was decaying as a custom, there were still recognised certain marital rights over his daughter by the living father; when, in fact, tolerance of the presence of the outsider was yet in a tentative stage—and he was still regarded with suspicion, if not disfavour.[1]

In consonance with the view we have advanced of the circumstances attending the entry of an immigrant suitor, it has seemed to ensue that his position would have been quite dependent, and himself considered as a foreign element. That such was actually the case seems again proved by another trait in modern custom, whose genesis, however, was of very much later date, and when speech had made some progress. In our own day clandestine intercourse, as above described, may continue to pregnancy. On the birth of the child alone does the father become recognised as part of the group. But even so his nomenclatory power as regards his offspring is absolutely nil. Far from giving a name to the child, his own is taken from his offspring. Till now, in fact, he has been nameless; in future he will be known as the father of so-and-so, of Telemachus, in the case of Odysseus. To this point we will, however, have to return when we arrive at the question of the evolution of personal descent from that of descent recognised by locality, which we consider to have been the most primitive form. [Mr. Atkinson probably means descent from a local group, say Crow, not descent denoted by a place name, as 'de Rutherford.']

There is another trait in actual custom which also could only have acquired its most remarkable features in this era of change, and that is hostile capture itself, in its legacy of those 'forms' of capture which we find connected with more peaceful connubium all over the world. Such 'forms' have rightly been considered as mere survivals, and thus in agreement with our own theory capture is generally accepted as the earliest form of outside marriage.[2] But in some minds the brutality necessarily attending real capture, and its occurrence solely among very low races with whom any idea of sexual restraint is expected to be quite unfamiliar, has simply connected the process with the general lawlessness which, amongst such peoples, is supposed to characterise the relations between the sexes. Its occurrence in form of survival among higher races has been considered a meaningless ceremony, and its evident symbolism in legality dismissed as incredible. Students are, however, aware how much in error is the idea of utter lawlessness in connection with the marriage relationships of any savage race. On the contrary, as is well known, the list of prohibited kindred is not only much wider than our own, but no stage in the marital arrangements is without irksome and minute legislative restraints, strictly limiting and defining the rights of each individual, male and female.

To other minds the fact that a 'hostile capture,' presenting as its most characteristic feature an utter violence, should ever have been constituted into a symbol of legality in marriage, has given rise to much perplexity. Mr. McLennan in fact remarks—'It is impossible to believe that the mere lawlessness of savages should be consecrated into a legal symbol'—an assertion which we may accept, however little we are prepared to accept his general views on early society. It is evident that the whole difficulty has arisen from the apparent complete incompatibility of a seeming method in violence with a virtual act in law. The hypothesis we have presented of the 'primal law,' and its exogamous sequel, would seem however to throw a new light on the matter. All unions within the group being by the action of primal law, as we have shown, considered incestuous and illicit, marriage could only take place with an outside mate. The presence of a captured female within the camp would thus, as we see, actually constitute in itself a proof, and the only one possible at the epoch, of the legal consummation of marriage as ordained by the primal law. It is thus easy to see how a form of capture should be retained as a symbol of legality in later connubium. Its continued vitality results from the intense conservatism of lower peoples, and from the fact of the halo of prowess that surrounds it.

Its evolution as a symbol only arose, however, when, during the transition era, by the conjunction of groups into a tribe, friendly unions were possible. It would not have occurred with the earliest forms of horde, for these were isolated and hostile, and real capture itself was the sole form of marriage; nor would it have occurred with that later type, in which, with matriarchal descent, the relative positions of males and females were reversed, as far at least as suit in union is concerned.[3] It took its rise with that other great type of group characterised by patriarchal descent, which in all the after history of the world (for, as we shall see, their evolution was coincident and had for cause the same factor) was to dispute supremacy with that which accepted uterine descent. Here, as in the original type, the male continued to preserve his predominance and continued its traditions of capture.[4]

There remain other actual traits whose connection with this era is equally evident. For instance, avoidance between father-in-law and son-in-law could not have had its genesis in the very earliest type of assembly. Whilst parental incest ruled as the custom, each group must have been isolated from and hostile to every other. These two could never have been in habitual presence one of the other. But, again, the habit could not have arisen in the later form, as represented by a tribal horde with uterine descent, as primitively composed of only two intermarrying groups, each of which formed a clan distinguished by a different totem emblem.[5] The relative clan-relationship of each member of the horde would, by the aid of this distinctive totem, be distinctly defined, and, with female descent, the father-in-law and son-in-law would find themselves members of the same clan [phratry]. As thus being both males and of the same 'phratry,' there could not possibly be avoidance or enmity, real or simulated, between them.[6] By all the sacred ties of blood [phratry] they were conjoined in offence and in defence. Further, where descent is uterine we find that the disposal of a daughter is in the hands of the mother or maternal uncle alone—the father has no voice whatever in the question, nor any part in her value as an object of barter or sale. Thus he is perfectly disinterested in the matter of his children. So far from being in disunion with his son-in-law, his sympathies, in case of a tribal quarrel, would be certainly with him. But the younger man, in internal quarrels, might be found fighting to the death with his own real father, not (as I have seen it stated in mention of just such an incident)[7] because he has become part of his wife's clan,[8] which could never be, but because, with descent through the female, his father would be a member of the different group and of other blood to himself, and to his father-in-law also.

The genesis of this particular avoidance (father-in-law and son-in-law) took place during that stage of the transition era, when, incest still lingering, the immigrant suitor was so far acknowledged that his entry into a group was not always delayed till the death of his proposed father-in-law. As they were thus possible rivals there was a chance of friction, only to be averted by the law in question. Avoidance would arise at the same time between mother-in-law and son-in-law, but this time as a measure of protection for the marital rights of the husband of the former.[9] It could not have arisen in the early Cyclopean era. The son-in-law as such, could evidently not have had existence when the mother's daughter was the father's wife, nor, later, when, with the general recognition of the classifactory system, there arose a strict interdiction of sexual union between members of different generations. There would in such circumstances be no further risk of danger from the jealousy of a father as regards his wife, and the husband of his daughter. It had its origin in the fact that when the outside suitor had originally been granted entry, it would only have been after the death of the patriarch sire, and as a mate for his widowed females. But as these would include both mother and daughter, there would thereby be created a precedent, so to speak, which required regulation, when later, with the decay of incest, the living father remained in presence. In fact, avoidance between mothers-in-law and sons-in-law defined fathers-in-law's rights.

We may here again note another step in advance to purely human attributes in the fresh distinction between female and female, which has now again arisen as between a mother and her daughter as regards the immigrant suitor. But whereas with these, as indeed with most of the cases of avoidance we have studied, sexual jealousy has been the primary cause, we may now trace the action of quite another factor, which would certainly tend to a conservation of the habit, and in a manner intensify it. This would be association of idea with hostile capture.

As regards the father-in-law, however, the custom, as far as capture is concerned, would not occur with female descent, for the reasons we have already given of clan kinship in such a case. It might, however, be found as a factor to a certain extent with male kinship, for here it is the father-in-law who is of the same clan as his daughter, and thus interested in her negotiable value. Thus it is possible to imagine enmity between him and her possible captor, who is also of a different clan from himself. As regards avoidance of mother-in-law it has again, perhaps, been accentuated by forcible capture. The effect, however, in relation to descent would be exactly the reverse of that with the father. With early male descent in the primitive tribe as composed of only two clan groups [phratries], it is she who would be of the same stock as her daughter's husband, and the habit would not arise, the captor is, in fact, a member of the tribe from which she herself has been stolen; although later, when more than two clans were conjoined,[10] it might happen that her son-in-law belonged to another, and here there might arise feelings of animosity. With uterine descent the case is certainly altered. As a mother, and as member of a clan different from that of the male suitor, the figure of the son-in-law might be dreaded as a possible captor of her daughter and other young female members. But here again a difficulty arises, for when the capture becomes an accomplished fact, the mother-in-law and son-in-law would probably not meet again, at least in primitive times: he belonging to the group having patriarchal descent, with capture as the rule; she, to the matriarchal, where the female is normally immobile, between which two forms of group no friendly intercourse could occur. The fact of avoidance in any form presumes contiguity or the habitual presence of the individuals concerned, and this in such a case could not arise. So as in Tylor's figures we find that in W to H, as the latter is completely cut off from his family, there is not one single case of avoidance between the wife and the husband's relatives. It is evident that the same rarity of contiguity must have arisen also with the father in male descent; there is here certainly cause of disagreement in the rape, but if the parties see each other no more there would be no necessity of evolution of avoidance to mark the fact. Indeed, I cannot help thinking that the importance of association with hostile capture has been much exaggerated as a factor in the evolution of Avoidance. The question of 'residence' and 'descent' has not been held sufficiently in account by those who insist on the capture as the sole cause of avoidance. Despite the eminence of the authors favouring this view, I would venture to submit that the balance of proof would much favour sexual jealousy, which we have heretofore found the sole motive power in all changes.

Those who would uphold anger roused by capture as the cause of avoidance with the wife's relatives, for instance, must be prepared to show that it would be strongest with the one who was most deeply interested in the wife, one whose voice in her destiny was of greater power than her own mother's, and that was her maternal uncle, the head of her clan. Now I have failed as yet to find a single trace of such a case as avoidance between the latter and his sister's daughter's husband.

Again, jealousy, or a desire for regulations in matters of sexual union, will explain certain details in the accounts we have received of individual cases which seem otherwise obscure or irrelevant. These have been overlooked, as they are minute, but from my point of view are full of significance when closely examined. Mr. Lubbock says,[11] quoting Franklin as to American Indians: 'It is extremely improper for a mother-in-law to speak or even look at him, i.e. her son-in-law.' Quoting Baegert: 'The son-in-law was not allowed for some time to look into the face of his mother-in-law.' Further, 'among the Mongols a woman must not speak to her father-in-law, nor sit down in his presence. Among the Ostiaks, Une fille mariée évite autant qu'il lui est possible la présence du père de son mari tant qu'elle n'a pas d'enfant, et le mari pendant ce temps n'ose pas paraître devant la mère de sa femme' (Pallas). In China the father-in-law after the wedding-day never sees the face of his daughter-in-law again, he never visits her, and if they chance to meet he hides himself. Among the Kaffirs a married woman is required to hlonipa[12] her father-in-law, and all her husband's male relations in the ascending line, i.e. to be cut off from all intercourse with them.

Again, in Australia, it is compulsory on the mothers-in-law to avoid the sight of their sons-in-law, by-making the former take a very circuitous route on all occasions, to avoid being seen, and they hide the face or figure with the rug which the female carries with her. So strict is the rule, that if married men are jealous of any one, they sometimes promise to give him a daughter in marriage. This places the married man's wife, according to custom, in the position of mother-in-law, and renders any communication between her and her future son-in-law a capital crime.[13] Also among the Sioux or Dacotas, Mr. Philander Prescott remarks on the fear of uttering certain names. The father and mother-in-law must not call their son-in-law by name, and vice versa, and there are other relationships to which the prohibition applies. He has known an infringement of this rule punished by cutting the offender's clothes off his back and throwing them away. Harmon says 'that among the Indians east of the Rocky Mountains it is indecent for the father or mother-in-law to look at or speak to the son or daughter-in-law.' Among the Yakuts, Adolf Erman noticed a more peculiar custom. As in other northern regions the custom of wearing but little clothing in the hot stifling interior of the huts is common there, and the women often go about their domestic work stripped to the waist, nor do they object to this disarray in the presence of strangers; but there are two persons before whom a Yakut woman must not appear in this guise, her father-in-law and her husband's elder brother. Again, quoting J. G. Wood, he says the native term for these customs of avoidance is, 'being ashamed of the mother-in-law.' The Basuto custom forbids a wife to look in the face of her father-in-law till the birth of her first child—and among the Banyai a man must sit with his knees bent in presence of his mother-in-law, and must not put out his feet towards her.

Now an important circumstance to be remarked in nearly all cases of Avoidance is, that it principally exists between people of different sexes,—thus an a priori inference may be drawn that the primary cause lay in some relation to the sexual question. It is significant that a woman's avoidance of her husband's relations is with those in the ascending line, i.e. with his seniors. Against his juniors he can defend himself, against his seniors he needs the protection of law. In the cases we have cited, it is significant that, besides the father-in-law, hlonipaed among the Kaffirs, the woman must hlonipa all her husband's male relations in the ascending line. Among the Yakuts she must not appear unclothed before her husband's elder brother.

Among the Veddahs of Ceylon a father will not see his daughter, nor a mother her son, after they have come to years of maturity.[14]

If we examine the words italicised in the quotations above, they seem to convey more nearly an idea of impropriety in any approach to intimacy than that of 'cutting' from enmity, as Dr. Tylor has suggested. Indeed, we observe here just the same horror that a too familiar attitude between forbidden kindred, as uncle and niece, would excite amongst ourselves, arising from the same idea of repugnance.

We see that various observers use the terms 'improper' (Franklin), 'the fear of' (P. Prescott), 'indecent' (Harmon), 'cut off from all intercourse with them,' and no doubt they have[15] each expressed the impression made on themselves in observation. We note again that the only case where the native term in designation of the custom is given that it means 'being ashamed.' The limit in time for the avoidance is again significant. 'For some time,' Baegart says; 'tant qu'elle n'a pas d'enfant' (Pallas). 'Till the birth of the first child.' These limitations in time would not exist if enmity because of capture was the cause, whereas we can quite understand them if, the circumstances now proving the consummation of marriage, jealousy might then be supposed to cease. The reserve as to a too familiar attitude that this idea of indecency would imply, is shown where a Mongol daughter-in-law 'cannot sit down in the presence of the father-in-law,' and where the Banyai man 'must not put out his feet towards his mother-in-law, but sit with his knees bent in her presence.' In China it is the father-in-law who hides himself, and this surely would hardly be the act of a captor, nor can we imagine a man having his clothes cut off his back simply because he had not 'cut' some one sufficiently.

However, in connection with our argument we have Adolf Erman's account of the custom among the Yakuts, and where we find the husbands elder brother joined with the father-in-law in an avoidance, there a distinct feeling of impropriety in connection with these relations in law of the wife is indicated. The diffidence cited is exactly what would occur if union was undesirable and yet not impossible, between the persons in avoidance, and hence temptation was to be avoided. It is very important to note that no idea of enmity from capture can be associated with the husbands elder brother. Again, the custom of avoidance with an elder brother, where its connection with jealousy is evident, is very widespread, and very strict in observance; as we have already noted, it occurs in Orissa and among the Kyonthas in India, whilst I have also observed it in practice in New Caledonia, where it is most undoubtedly a means to an end, to protect the younger brother's marital rights. As to the significance of the fact mentioned in the case of the natives of Australia, where, as regards their wives, they are jealous of a man— and give him a daughter to place him in avoidance with her mother, comment is unnecessary.

These facts seem to me to be conclusive; but the question of the exact origin of avoidance is so important to my general argument, that I am glad to be able to find what I fancy is added proof from another source. If this furnishes the requisite evidence that sexual jealousy was the real factor, and not hostile capture, our hypothesis of the primal law acquires valuable inferential evidence in its favour. Such added proof we hope to be able to show in Dr. Tylor's figures.[16]

These figures, which are extracted from Dr. Tylor's work, would seem to be eloquent against hostile capture being the sole cause of Avoidance. They are derived from a comparison of Avoidance as occurring, (a) quite independent of residence, and (b) as actually resulting where coincidence of Avoidance and residence is found.

Now as regards the question of jealousy as cause of Avoidance, residence and propinquity will evidently have a powerful effect.

(A) As we have seen, any Avoidance under these circumstances would be remarkable without a prior stage in quite other conditions than those found generally with H to W residence. We note that whereas we might expect under even the above conditions to find only 9, there are 14. Here sexual jealousy has been an important cause.

The Avoidance of the Mother-in-law (for, of course, there was none here with father-in-law, who was a nonentity in such a family circle, and of the same clan as the son-in-law) arose as a matter of protection for the marital rights of the daughter as against her mother, both inhabiting the same large house common to matriarchal descent.

(B) Here, again, we expect to find 3, and see there are actually none, from which it would seem to result that W capture had nothing whatever to do with the origin of A, H to W, for, admitting the almost entire separation of the W from H family, which would make the case rarer, a tradition of capture would exist which would have effect when they were later grouped together. Whereas the non-Avoidance is explained by lack of jealousy, from absence of male relations of H.

(C) Here it is again quite impossible to accept any idea of W capture as the motive cause. Avoidance arose between W and father-in-law to protect rights of son-in-law and mother-in-law. It was evolved, as we have seen, as a measure of protection for that generation of males who were the actual captors, each generation by the classificatory system having individual rights. That the necessity for such legislation was urgent we see in the proportion of the figures 5 to 8.

Here, again, the fallacy of capture as primal cause of Avoidance is clearly evident. If this was the case, we might expect it to be almost universal, whereas in reality, instead of the 18 cases which the average should give us, we find only 9. It really had its origin in the reason we have already given, of sexual jealousy as a primary cause, and was later augmented as serving to impress on many the classificatory distinction between M and D, who otherwise, as far as totems went, were eligible to the same person. Where both father-in-law and mother-in-law are in avoidance, we may surmise a change in descent from the F to the M in the tribe, the converse change of M to F of course never occurring. The question of change of descent will explain problems in the nomenclature of Morgan's tables as regards nephews and sons, which have been overlooked.[17]

NOTE TO CHAPTER VII

3. Mr. Tylor's theory (Journal Anthrop. Institute, xviii. 247), is that of 'cutting' 'an outsider,' not one of the family, not recognised till his first child is born. For various reasons, Mr. Crawley rejects this explanation, rightly, I venture to think. Mr. Crawley holds that the mother-in-law avoidance 'seems to be causally connected with a man's avoidance of his own wife,' which he regards as only one aspect of the tabu between the two sexes, superstitiously regarded as dangerous to each other. But, like Mr. Atkinson, I much doubt whether the 'avoidance,' as far as it goes, of husband and wife is, in the main, the result of this superstition, though it plays its part on special occasions, as before the women sow the crops, and before the men go forth to war. Mr. Crawley's suggestion that, as husband and wife are perpetually breaking the alleged sexual tabu, the mother-in-law becomes 'a substitute to receive the onus of tabu,' 'a good instance of savage make-believe' does not carry conviction. Mr. Atkinson's theory seems 'as good as a better' (Mystic Rose, pp. 400-414).—A. L.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CLASSIFICATORY SYSTEM

In the gradual evolution of the group into the tribe during the long period of transition, the modifications in the internal organisation, which took place as the necessary result in the march in progress, should have left traces which we may also be able to follow in living custom. The immigration of the outside suitor, in its synchronism with the decay of paternal incest, must have entailed continual complications demanding regulation, and the resolution of each problem would lead to an almost mechanical step in advance. When by force of circumstances of environment or others such a step became retrograde, then we may expect an aberrant form whose very anomalism should lead to a facile recognition, and prove equally fertile in interpretation. Indeed, a curious vestige of the effect in action of the habit of incest, when brought into inevitable contact with progressive social evolution, is to be discerned in the nomenclature of that earliest phase of the classificatory system which Mr. L. H. Morgan has called the Malayan. From the general prevalence among lower races of a division into classes by generations of the members of group, and the deduction we see drawn in Ancient Society from the Hawaiian terms of relationship therein detailed, as to a previous state of general promiscuity, it will be desirable thoroughly to examine the whole question of the so-called classificatory system. It is doubly imperative in view of our own hypothesis, which, as regards the primary origin of society, may be said to be exactly the reverse of that of Mr. Morgan, in as far as the sexual inter-relations of brother and sister are concerned.

We have tried to portray the imperative evolution of a primal law as the sole possible condition of the first steps in social progress, a law which had so specially in view the bar to sexual intercourse between a brother and sister that it might, if a name for it were needed, be called the anadelphogamous law. [Mr. Atkinson wrote 'asororogamic,' which is really too impossible a word for even science to employ.] Mr. Morgan, on the contrary, says,[1] 'The primitive or consanguine family was founded upon the inter-marriage of brothers and sisters own and collateral in a group.' He adds,[2] 'The Malayan system defines the relationship that would exist in a consanguine family, and it demands the existence of such a family to account for its own existence.' And again,[3] 'It is impossible to explain the system as a natural growth, upon any other hypothesis than the one named, since this form of marriage alone can furnish a key to its interpretation.' He bases his argument on the fact that[4] 'under the Malayan system all consanguines, near and remote, fall within some one of the following relationships, viz. parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, brother and sister—no other blood relationships are recognised,' and says, speaking of promiscuity, that[5] 'a man calls his brother's son, his son, because his brother's wife is his wife as well as his brother's, and his sister's son is also his son because his sister is his wife.'

Now that a brother's son should be called a son is quite simple, as being a natural effect of the group marriage of brothers, the prevalence of which as a habit, and its effects, MM. Lorimer and Fison so well show among the Australians.[6] But that a sister's son should also be termed, by her brother, a 'son' is certainly a very different thing indeed, despite Mr. McLennan's and other arguments to the contrary. In this verbal detail lies the whole crux of the matter as regards Mr. Morgan. That it should have given rise to such diversity of opinion and suggested his theory of brother and sister marriage need hardly be matter of surprise. For it is at once, evident that a group holding such nomenclature ignored cousinship, even if it existed. To all later seeming my sister's son must be nephew to ego quite necessarily. That at any stage he should be unrecognised as such seems the more astonishing, as even in the very early times when totems first arose, and arose probably and precisely to distinguish cousins as such,[7] each cousin is of a different totem to the other, and thus not only eligible in marriage with another cousin, but in many lower races the born spouse each of the other. The whole question thus resolves itself into the exact value of the term we find used in the Hawaiian designation of the sister's son by her brother. Now it is important to note that two causes might have for effect the form of nomenclature in which a brother and sister each call the child a son, and thus ignore a possible cousinship. One cause is that some factor in self-interest or otherwise allowed such relationship to remain unrecognised, although existent, and another is that, as cousinship did not exist at all, there could be no recognition, or, as Mr. Morgan puts it, 'his sister's son is also his son because his sister is his wife.' To determine which is correct certainly seems difficult, and the whole thing has evidently been considered a most stubborn fact for the opponents of promiscuity.

That Mr. Morgan should have seized it in support of his theory, and that the theory should be so largely accepted, is not astonishing. Happily the great value of his ensuing argument as regards tribal development is in no way impaired if it can be shown, as we hope to do, that there is no necessity for an hypothesis of promiscuity to explain the terms in the Malayan table, which apparent need seems primarily to have led Mr. Morgan to evolve the idea of his primitive group. In fact, it becomes evident that, if we can furnish a clue as to how a sister's son came also to be a brother's son, without having recourse to the theory of an incestuous union of brothers and sisters, we at least discount the need of Mr. Morgan's 'consanguine family,' in which such incest is supposed to be a most characteristic and essential feature. We hope to prove that the terms which misled him are more apparent than real as proofs of any real affinity in blood, and that the original conception in causal connection was something quite apart.

Sir John Lubbock (Lord Avebury) has observed that the lower the milieu of a social status the less we see of the individual and the more of the group. In the case before us the individual as such does not exist at all, and there is only question of the group in its relation to its component classes. To confound one with the other led to Mr. Morgan's error.

There was much, in fact, in Mr. McLennan's shrewd remark in criticism of Mr. Morgan's theory that he did not seek the origin of the system of nomenclature in the origin of the classification of the connected persons, and that he courted failure in attempting to solve the problem by explaining the relationships comprised in the system in detail.'[8] But it seems to me that Mr. McLennan fell into the same error when he contented himself with the misleading analogies which a comparison with the Nair family system presented. These, however striking, are, as we shall find, simply the result of the fact that class or communal marriage was the common trait of the polyandrous and the Cyclopean family, nor can I see that Mr. McLennan followed his own excellent advice as regards the possible identity in origin of nomenclature and classification; if he had so done, his acute mind could not have failed in a resolution of the whole problem, whereas his final resume of the argument is in terms which I profess to be quite unable to grasp.

Before entering into the matter ourselves, we must keep in mind our affirmation as to the axiom which must, in my opinion, guide us in all research into the hidden causes of early social evolution. All innovations, as we have said, in the regulation of society, all novel legislative procedure so to speak, will be found to have relation to the sexual feelings in jealousy. This already is the genesis of the primal law, and, in each case of avoidance, we have found jealousy the leading factor. It is the same in the case before us. Bearing this in mind, let us then follow Mr. McLennan's advice as to seeking the origin of the classification of connected persons. Now what would be the family economy of the primitive group, and who are its component individuals, whose interests, in sexual matters, are likely to clash, and whose mutual relationship in this respect demanded distinction in furtherance of regulation of their respective rights?

The original primitive type of family, which we have called 'the Cyclopean,' has disappeared, giving place to a higher form, which, by the inclusion of male offspring, has permitted the existence of several generations in presence. The component individuals, speaking of one sex only, would be old males, males, and young males representing three generations. It is the interests of these generations, which, in sexual matters and in choice of food, &c. would be likely to clash, for we may be sure that the seniors, as with actual savages, would desire the lion's share. Distinction then being necessary, it would naturally, as with individuals, be based on relativity of age, seniority within certain limits confering priority. Thus gradually each generation, as indeed with actual lower races, would, qua generation, come to be a distinctly defined class with certain separate rights and obligations. In this simple necessity of a classification of the connected persons, we see the origin of the classificatory system itself, as an institution. Divers interests, as between seniors and juniors, demanded strict demarcation, and the limits of a generation furnished the required lines to mark them.

The very natural distinction by relativity of age was simply, as with individuals, utilised as the requisite machinery in regulation of mutual rights of the individual himself. His rights are a matter of concern simply within his generation, in which the relation is purely paternal and communal, with the sole reservation of rights conferred by seniority.

Even when later denominative expression was given to the idea of a generation, terms almost identical of male, old male, and young male are used, as there is no desire to convey any idea of personal kinship, and there is merely in view reference to relativity of age of a class in relation to the group. Later, as Mr. McLennan says (p. 277): 'Whatever class names primitively signified, Kiki would come to mean child, Kina parent, Moopuna grandchild, Kapuna grandparent, but originally no such idea of kinship was in view.' The classificatory system evolved itself simply as the result of a desire to define certain rights, and the division by generations was the most natural and feasible for the purpose. But the very simplicity and paucity of the original terms show that it was applied to any simple group form. In fact, we are here dealing with that primitive form which bound people together, by the mere tie of residence and locality, and was purely exogamous in habit. Now when we consider that this fixed relativity of age by generation was originally evolved in view of the relations within such a family, we can imagine that complications might arise from such arbitrary definitions, when, later, this family expanded into the numerically large tribe composed of two intermarrying totem clan groups [phratries].

Primitively, doubtless, as between the classes, the genetic idea as regards sexual matters was (as still with savages in questions of food) to favour the seniors and defend their rights in defining each one's status. But actually, with the decay of incest, it would become what it is as among lower races, where nothing is more remarkable than the strict interdict upon any union between members of different generations.[9]

It is evident that hence complications might arise perplexing to the savage mind. For instance, we may expect to find cases where the niece is an adult, whilst the aunt is still an infant, and yet marriage between the former and the son of the latter is obligatory, as they are cousins of the same generation. Here, probably, we have a clue to one of the most bizarre facts in anthropology, where the universal rule as to sexual connection between generations seems to be wantonly disobeyed, although in reality the reverse may be seen to be the case on examination. It is recorded of the Keddies of Southern India that a very singular custom exists among them, a young woman of sixteen or twenty years of age may be married to a boy of five or six years. She, however, lives with some other adult male (perhaps a maternal uncle or cousin), but is also allowed to form a connection with the father's relatives, occasionally it may be the boy's father himself, i.e. the woman's father-in-law! Should there be children from these liaisons, they are fathered on the boy husband. When the boy grows, the wife is either old or past child-bearing, when he in turn takes some other boy's wife in a manner precisely similar to that in his own case and procreates children for the boy husband.

By the classificatory system, as each in fact is a member of the same generation, they are born husbands and wives. The enforced virginity of the wife, implied under such conditions, entailed a celibacy incompatible with all lower ideas. It is easy to imagine the compromise between his conscience and his desires which a savage would make in such a case when favoured (or forced) by circumstances of environment, for it is unknown elsewhere. The infant nephew goes through the ceremony of marriage, which, by a fiction, being thus legally consummated, the wife is left free to follow her desires. These, however, are by no means allowed to run riot. They are regulated in a fashion of which, although the peculiarity is noted by the authors of the extract, the full significance can only be appreciated in connection with our hypothesis. She formed indeed connections outside of her husband, but solely with those of the legally eligible totem. As I believe the Keddies have male descent, these would be sons of the father's sister, or sons of the mother's brother, or again with the latter himself, who was her father-in-law, whereas union with the sons of the father's brothers, or of the mother's sisters, as being of the same totem, would not take place—and this we find to be the actual fact, as evidence proves.

But still other complications will be found to arise as the effect of the original concept of the classificatory system when brought face to face with new and advanced social order, which will have closer relation to our present argument. The distinctive feature in the economy of the primitive group in its relation to all other groups was mutual hostility. The instinctive distrust of strangers would be accentuated by the habitual hostile capture of females, for such groups, except in the case of the incest between father and daughter, were yet purely exogamous. But such mutual hostility implies isolation of each community. Thus all law evolved, as we have said, would be purely with a view to regulation of the internal economy of a single consanguine group alone. Now in such a group, the division into generations of old male, male, and young male implied (although not as yet understood as between generations) the relationship of parents and children. Each generation is either child or parent to the other. As marriage is communal,[10] all the fathers in one generation are fathers to all the children in the next indiscriminately, and conversely these children recognise as fathers all the males of the senior generation. It follows that the relationship of all the members of a generation is purely fraternal, all are brothers and sisters to each other, and in this consanguine family they were really either actually so, or at least half brothers and half sisters.

Between these the primal law of celibacy between brother and sister as such embraced the whole generation. Now as long as the family was thus simply constituted, no friction would arise. The brothers, in common, captured and married in common some outside female,[11] and their children constituted solely the next generation. The sisters were either stolen or emigrated to other groups; but we have seen that a moment would come when this process ceased to be universal. The sister came to remain in her own group, and she was joined by some outside suitor; with the advent of their children, who are cousins to the others, would arise dire perplexities, in view of the old law.

We may now begin to see more distinctly, in the fact of the presence of the cousins, the resolution of the problem as to how a sister's son came to be also a brother's, and we will find that Mr. Morgan was not the first to be baffled by the problem. It was too intricate for primitive man at any rate. When first presented to him, we may surmise that he, in fact, refused to recognise it as a problem at all. Since the beginning of things in the group, as constituted by all tradition, the children of one generation were children of another simply, and nothing more. That as a result of the presence of the outside male, some intricate process of scission had occurred, and things were not as they seemed, was an idea far too abstract to be readily seized. All in a generation had been ever, to early man, brother and sister, and brother and sister they should continue.

We have seen in a past chapter that it was actually to the interest of senior male group-members, while incest reigned, that this condition of things should endure. It put at their sole disposal the daughters of their brothers-in-law, and in the primal law placed a ban on sexual intercourse between all the younger male and female members, as constituting them brothers and sisters. As a factor in this case, however, the effect of incest was more or less temporary. The real agent in the tardy or non-recognition of the cousinship thus created, was the conservative force of old habit and tradition. We must remember that, in so early a group, personal descent as such was in no way recognised. Mere local contiguity alone constituted the sense of relationship, exogamy for instance took the form of local exogamy, for as all within a locality were (locally) relations, so all outside were, as strangers, free in marriage. While then so strong a sense of the value of contiguity continued, and was in practice, the evolution of an idea of non-relationship of two individuals with a common habitat would be too complex. Again, a recognition in fact implies a vast modification of the whole organisation of the group, which thus contains in cousins the elements of marriage within itself. But this is the latest and highest type of group and constitutes the tribe. We can understand that such a step was not taken at once by early man. Even when recognised we know that definition lags behind the event.

Thus in such a case as cited, and at the stage we are studying, if we find two cousins in presence, who are yet unrecognised as cousins, then, if nomenclature has taken place, we should find exactly the terms employed in the Malayan table which misled Mr. Morgan. A sister's son would be termed the brother's son, simply because the individual was as yet ignored, although existent, as a cousin, as members of the same generation they were brother and sister. Classes by generations alone were recognised.

Now as regards the validity of our assumption that relativity in age served as a means to determine privilege as to wedlock, proof can be furnished by certain nomenclatory features, as between members of a class or generation, to be found in the Malayan table in Ancient Society and elsewhere. This will afford, incidentally, strong negative proof of our theory as to non-union between brother and sister. It will also incidentally furnish the strongest negative evidence that, so far from brother and sister living in incest, as Morgan holds, brother and sister were regarded as quite apart in the sense of any sexual relation between them. It will be seen that there is a profound distinction made in address between inter-marriageable people and those between whom celibacy is enjoined.

Both Mr. Morgan and Mr. McLennan have drawn attention to the peculiarities in the terms of address as between 'brothers' and as between 'sisters.' It is curious that the full significance of the phenomena therein presented escaped two such keen intellects. We find here that terms of address as between persons of the same sex and of the same generation, and ergo brothers or sisters, present the very remarkable features that

(1) 'The age of the person spoken to compared with that of the speaker plays a very important part in the matter of denomination.'

(2) 'Such names refer not to the absolute age of the person addressed.'

(3) 'The relationships of brother and sister are conceived in the twofold form of elder and younger, and not in the abstract, and there are special terms for each among the Seneca Iroquois.'

(4) 'There is no name for brother and sister (Malayan system). On the other hand, there are a variety of names for use in salutations between "brother" and "sister" according to the age and sex of the person speaking in relation to the age and sex of the person addressed.'

(5) Among the Eskimo the form of the terms of relationship appears to depend, in some cases, more on the sex of the speaker than on that of the person to whom the term refers.

(6) In Eastern Central Africa, if a man has a brother and a sister, he is called one thing by the brother, but quite a different thing by the sister.

We will now illustrate the idea more completely by an extract of terms from the table of Hawaiian relationships in Ancient Society. An older or a younger brother is to a sister simply addressed or mentioned by the general term Kaiku nana, but to her, in address or mention of an older or a younger sister, they are respectively Kaik a'ana and Kaika-i-na. Again, an older or a younger sister is to a brother collectively Kaikuwaheena, but to him an elder or a younger brother is respectively Kaiknana and Kaikaina.

Now in view of our argument as regards the origin of these diversities in some sexual feelings, it is a most significant feature in these details of the terms of address that the expression of the relativity of age between the speakers is confined solely to the intercourse between members of the same sex. That a brother is the senior or the junior of Ego is carefully noted, but a sister is simply and vaguely a sister. Why? simply because whereas, by virtue of the primal law, no possible question whatever of mutual interest in sexual matters could possibly arise between a brother and a sister, on the other hand friction might hourly occur between brothers or between sisters. In fact, if our theory is correct, then, as questions of sexual privilege or precedence could cause jealousy between members of the same sex, distinctions would be necessary by definition of seniority when address took place between these, and in these cases alone, and this indeed we find to be the fact. As conclusive evidence we would cite the further important fact that these very same distinctions of senior and junior are used, inter se, between all those of the same totem [phratry] as now existing, but are never employed for their tribal cousins of the other totem [phratry]. And the reason is the same. The latter naturally do not marry (in groups formed of only two classes) [phratries] into the same totem [phratry] as the former, and thus there is no cause for jealousy or necessity of definition, whereas individuals of the same totem [phratry] are ipso facto group [potential] husbands of the same group [potential] wives, or are at least eligible in marriage with the same totem groups [phratries], and hence necessity for the exact definition by age of each one's rights.

Thus, as with other laws or institutions we have traced, we find a desire for distinction as regards rights in sexual union to be the genetic cause of the classificatory system both as regards the generation and its component members.

In all periods of transition which a process in change in progress implies, we expect to find cases where the conservative force of tradition from the past has delayed recognition of the too novel present, and we discover that circumstances have moved too rapidly for the intelligence of the times. If we keep this fact in view, we have thus seemed to find a natural explanation of the knotty point which was the cause of dispute between Mr. Morgan and Mr. McLennan,[12] and we may thus venture to say that each was both wrong and right in his views of the classificatory system in general. Each has mistaken a part for a whole, and they were ignorant that they were upholding two sides of the same question. Mr. Morgan was in error in assuming the system's too intimate connection with a determination of affinities in blood, in relation to which primarily, as we hope to have shown, it had really neither purpose nor aim, as also in his too hasty assumption of a consanguine family founded on brother and sister incest, based on a mere conjectural solution of a verbal detail, an assumption which he himself acknowledges had no other foundation.