| PAGE | ||
| Big guns more accurate at long range, because more regular | 94 | |
| Big guns need less accurate range-finding, because the danger space is greater | 95 | |
| Range-finding by bracket | 97 | |
| The crux of sea fighting, changes of course and speed produce an irregularly changing range | 98 | |
| In this sketch the black silhouette shows the position at the moment the torpedo is fired; the white silhouette the position the ship has reached when the torpedo meets it | 107 | |
| Plan of Sydney and Emden in action | 158 | |
| Plan of the action between the British battle-cruisers and the German armoured cruisers | 199 | |
| Plan of action between Kent and Nürnberg, and of that between Cornwall and Glasgow and Leipzig | 207 | |
| The action off Heligoland up to the intervention of Commodore Goodenough’s Light Cruiser Squadron | 235 | |
| The action off Heligoland. The course of the battle-cruisers | 239 | |
| The Dogger Bank Affair. Diagram to illustrate the character of the engagement up to the disablement of Lion | 249 | |
| The official plan of the Battle of Jutland. Note that the course of the Grand Fleet is not shown to be “astern” of the battle-cruisers, but parallel to their track | 295 | |
| Position of the opposing fleets at 3:30 P.M. | 298 | |
| The first phase; from Von Hipper’s coming into view, until his juncture with Admiral Scheer | 301 | |
| The second phase; Beatty engages the combined German Fleet, and draws it toward the Grand Fleet | 309 | |
| Sketch plan of the action from 6 P.M. when the Grand Fleet prepared to deploy, till 6:50 when Admiral Scheer delivered his first massed torpedo attack | 332 | |
| Jutland Diagrams. Third phase | at end of book | |
About This Book
The author presents a detailed study of British naval operations and doctrine during the First World War, pairing narrative accounts of individual actions—such as cruiser duels, raids, and fleet battles—with technical examinations of gunnery, fire control, torpedo employment, and ship-handling. Chapters trace campaign narratives, analyze strategic choices and distribution of forces, and assess tactical maneuvers and ethical questions arising from naval warfare. Diagrams and battle plans accompany critiques of prevailing sea fallacies and proposals for first principles and elements of sea force. The work concludes with discussions of combined operations against ports and seaborne logistical targets and reflections on the demands placed on seamen and command.