The conquest of the Philippines by the United States, 1898-1925

During the war the President had already shown a shrewd instinct for trading, thus expressed in his own words: “While we are conducting war and until its conclusion we must keep all we get; when the war is over we must keep what we want”⁠[1]. Thus it was that when, after less than four months of fighting the Spanish government acting through the good offices of the French government finally decided to ask for peace, she was, to say the least, taken by surprise at the conditions imposed by the victorious President.

When the desire for a parley was first brought to the attention of McKinley he summoned his Cabinet for a protracted conference to discuss the terms of peace. Those relating to the Philippines naturally elicited the most attention. Secretary Bliss seeing great commercial opportunities in the Islands favored taking the entire group. So did Attorney General Griggs. Secretaries Gage and Long thought a naval base would be enough. As for the Secretary of State, Mr. Day, we quote Mr. McKinley’s own words. Commenting on the varying views of his Cabinet which ranged from the retention of the whole archipelago to one or two more important islands, McKinley jokingly added, “But Judge Day only wants a hitching post.”

So much for the administration’s early attitude regarding its benevolent and kindly intentions towards the Philippines⁠[2].

In response, therefore, to the Spanish Minister’s request for peace, a request in which that able representative of the Queen Regent assured the President and his administration that the Spanish treatment of Cuban insurrection had been adopted solely “to spare the great island from the dangers of premature independence,” Mr. McKinley submitted the following conditions for the suspension of hostilities:

First: the relinquishment by Spain of all claim to Cuba and immediate evacuation of the island.

Second: the cession to the United States of the islands of Porto Rico and the other islands then under the sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies, and also the cession of an island in the Ladrones to be selected by the United States.

Third: that the United States was to be entitled “to occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which should determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines”⁠[3].

Spain was not alone in her denunciation of these hard terms. The French ambassador, M. Cambon, through whom the interests of the Spanish government were being represented in Washington, tried in vain to secure a modification of these terms, particularly that regarding Porto Rico which “he characterized as evincing a spirit of conquest inconsistent with the declaration of disinterestedness with which the United States had commenced the war”⁠[4]. It should be remembered also that these terms were made two weeks before the final capture of Manila. At this early stage it is already evident that the President failed to recognize in any way the existing fact that there was a native uprising in the Islands and that a Philippine Republic had been proclaimed under it.

Five commissioners were appointed to negotiate the final treaty with Spain but it is significant to notice that three of them were avowed Imperialists⁠[5] and already known to be in favor of acquiring territories in the Far East. These three were the Hon. Cushman Davis, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Hon. William P. Frye, member of the same Committee, and the Hon. Whitelaw Reid, who had formerly held the post of envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States to France.

Under such auspicious beginnings it was an easy matter for the President to communicate with sufficient tact the secret instructions which were to guide the commissioners in Paris. These secret instructions were prepared with great detail and care and must be examined accordingly. In them, the President first expressed in high sounding language the altruistic purposes with which the war had been waged.

It is my earnest wish [he said] that the United States in making peace should follow the same high rule of conduct which guided it in making war.... The lustre and the moral strength attaching to a cause which can be properly rested upon the considerate judgment of the world should not under any illusion of the hour be dimmed by ulterior designs which might tempt us into excessive demands or even into adventurous departure on untried paths.

These were fine words, indeed, but, they were meant only for Cuba and not for the Philippines.

The Philippines [continued the President] stand upon a different basis. It is none the less true, however, that without any original thought of complete or even partial acquisition, the presence and success of our arms at Manila impose upon us obligations which we cannot disregard. The march of events rules and overrules human action ... we cannot be unmindful that without any desire or design on our part, the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation in whose growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization.

But that these were in fact but weasel words to smooth the instructions which were to follow now becomes evident. It bluntly appears in the next paragraph when the President continued thus, “Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the commercial opportunity to which American statesmanship cannot be indifferent.” And thus, by elaborate gradations finally came the President’s real demand expressed in these words, “The United States cannot accept less than the cession in full right and sovereignty of the island of Luzon”⁠[6].

With these secret instructions in hand the commissioners departed for Paris. There they were joined by other American observers fresh from their Philippine campaigns. Among them were Admiral Dewey, General Merritt, Major Bell and General Green who had come for the purpose of presenting their statement to aid the commissioners in their negotiations. The tenor of their reports was practically the same, holding that it would not be wise to return all of the Islands or even a part of them to Spain, that the cession of the archipelago would be a “good business proposition” and that the Filipinos would not offer much resistance to American rule. How totally without foundation the latter statement was became evident during the Filipino-American war. One of the opinions submitted which no doubt produced a marked effect on the later negotiations came from the Belgian consul in Manila, M. Andre. His statement was that:

The United States can assure a steady government in these islands and in their hands the country will increase in wealth, and will, in a short time, be able to return to the United States the money laid out⁠[7].

Thus it was that on October 26, before the subject of the Philippines was actually brought to the attention of the Peace Conference, the President cabled his commissioners to the effect that recent information had convinced him that the cession of Luzon alone was out of the question and therefore, influenced as he said “by the single consideration of duty and humanity,” he directed that, “the cession must be of the whole archipelago or none.” “The latter,” he continued, “is wholly inadmissible, and the former must therefore be required”⁠[8].

Now throughout these proceedings it is at once apparent that no thought, no consideration, not even a voice was given to the Filipino people. A representative of the Filipinos, Mr. Agoncillo, went to Paris and later to Washington to seek a hearing before the commission, but the doors of both council chambers were slammed in his face and the authorities in Washington would not receive him. He could obtain a hearing nowhere. The whole matter was a business proposition, and the commissioners treated it accordingly. The secrecy with which the President’s designs were guarded may be gathered from the fact that the “Papers relating to the Treaty with Spain,” which included also the private communications between the chief executive and his commissioners, were carefully concealed from the American public until January 31, 1901, that is, after the Presidential elections of 1900 had been successfully passed. Even then the papers only came to light after having been extracted from the jealous custody of the Executive by a Senate resolution demanding them. They were then published as Senate Document, 148, 56th Congress, Second Session.

It is one of the most significant features of this conquest, that at the time when the great issue was at stake neither the Filipinos who were most interested in the outcome nor the Americans who faced the parting of the ways were ever taken into the confidence of the Administration.

It is difficult to understand how the commissioners finally came to an agreement regarding the Philippines. They could, of course, have followed McKinley’s claim and demanded the islands by conquest. But such a position seemed unwarrantable to the commissioners who wired the President accordingly on November 3. Furthermore, the Spanish commissioners feared utter repudiation at home. To lose Cuba and her possessions in the West Indies, “the last memory of a glorious past,” was sorrowful enough, but to lose the Philippines as well was indeed pitiful. But the President stood firm in his demands for the entire archipelago, and so a friendly concession was made whereby the title to the Philippines was apparently bought, “the United States to pay Spain the sum of twenty million dollars within three months after the exchange of ratifications of the present treaty.” Considering that the Islands had a total land area almost equal to that of England, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, and a population of more than seven million it was not a bad bargain at all, and the President certained lived up to his reputation for shrewdness and ability to drive a good business bargain.

And in that manner was the President’s original intention fully accomplished. For in the words of one of his own appointed commissioners, Mr. Davis, it was of the utmost importance that the United States should have a “commanding commercial position” in the waters of the East, “in view of the astounding changes which the Chinese Empire has been subjected to and is destined to further undergo.”

I am interested that this country shall have its share of trade of that great empire [he said]. California, Washington and Oregon have scarcely more than two millions of people. I want to see the commercial development of that part of our country expand until there shall be twenty millions of people there; and I do honestly and sincerely believe, from all I have studied and thought on the subject, that the retention of the Philippine Islands, and their adjustment to our needs and destiny, is a necessary and indispensable step in the advancement to which I have so alluded.

The well-known historian, James Ford Rhodes, contributes much light to this chapter of American history. “It is true,” he wrote in 1922, “that McKinley was inconsistent in his public words.” For “in his message of December, 1897, he had said, ‘forcible annexation ... cannot be thought of; that by our code of morality would be criminal aggression!’” And yet “one cannot read the proceedings of the Peace Commission in Paris,” adds Mr. Rhodes, “and see in any other light than that our taking of the Philippines was ‘forcible annexation’”⁠[9].

The British press of that year, however, showed the incongruity even more effectively. A cartoon was presented entitled “Doctrine and Practice” representing Dame Europe in a garden haughtily saying to an intruder, “To whom do I owe the pleasure of this intrusion?” To which the person addressed replies,—“Ma’am, my name is Uncle Sam.” And this rejoinder follows, “Any relation to the late Colonel Monroe?”⁠[10].

It certainly would have seemed impossible after all that had passed and the help which the United States had asked and accepted from the Filipinos as their allies, that the future of the Islands should be determined without even inviting a suggestion from their people as to what should be the terms of peace. The United States had always insisted that governments rest on the consent of the governed; the President had taken pains to assure the world that “forcible annexation” was not to be thought of as it would be “criminal aggression”; it had even been insisted that “our priceless principles” could not change under “a tropical sun” and that it was with no thought of gain but solely for the good of the Filipinos and the sake of humanity that the American nation was fighting at all, and yet the Washington administration refused, not only to invite suggestion, but even to receive and listen to the envoy whom the Filipinos sent to express their views as to the future of the seven million people who had proved themselves most efficient allies and whose help the American commanders had been glad to invite and accept.

It is all a striking instance of the crimes which have been committed in the name of liberty.

But although the President and his commissioners were highly satisfied with the treaty, their work was far from accomplished. That document had to be ratified and for that purpose all the forces and arguments and all the enthusiasm which the President thought he had found in a tour of the middle west were now employed. The struggle for its ratification, therefore, soon got under way but this fact must be at once noticed,—that although the people were being urged to stand behind the treaty they did not and could not know what the treaty really meant.

And this unfortunate situation was so because to the political leaders of that time the provisions of the treaty meant one of several things. To the majority the cession of the Philippines if ratified meant that America was to be definitely launched upon a policy of colonial expansion. In the past the Federal government had acquired territory on the continent, but in such cases it had also meant eventual statehood by and with the consent of its inhabitants. But the Philippine issue widely differed from this. Not only had the Filipinos not been consulted in the matter, but the administration itself had made it clear that it was not prepared to favor the extension of American citizenship to the natives⁠[11].

Now, there were certain men in the Senate who wished to ratify the treaty and yet were opposed to a policy of colonization. Hence, they proposed to amend it or to pass a resolution clearly stating that the Philippines would ultimately, if not immediately, be given their independence. A number of such resolutions were therefore offered but they all failed to pass.

Another group of Senators, though not perhaps strictly opposed to some other more reasonable policy of expansion, nevertheless objected to the treaty as it then stood because it was an injustice to the Filipinos. This element could not understand why the Cubans should be treated differently from the Filipinos in the face of an official statement made by Admiral Dewey to the effect that “the Filipinos were better fitted for self-government than the Cubans were”⁠[12]. As Senator Mason ably put it,—

Tell me why we should adopt one plan for Cuba and another for the Philippines? Do you say ... “We promised we would not steal Cuba, but we did not promise not to steal the Philippines?” Do you say, with Shylock, “Is it so nominated in the bond?” ... Will you tell me please, how grand larceny and criminal aggression in Cuba become high Christian civilization in the Philippines?

This powerful group of practical anti-imperialists, headed by such men as Senator Hoar, Carl Schurz, and ex-President Harrison, stoutly maintained that the principles underlying the structure of the American republic were not compatible with the policy of holding colonies. They urged the argument that the United States could have no subjects under her suzerainty, because she herself was composed of free citizens. And, finally, they attacked the administration’s intention of governing a subject people without the latter’s consent.

A selfish element among the Senators also had to be contended with. This group was made up of those who feared that annexation of the Philippines would eventually mean the introduction of the Filipinos in some form or another into American life. The idea was apparently repugnant to them. Such an attitude was no doubt, however, a result of misinformation and downright prejudice against Asiatics in general. Senator McLaurin characterized the extent of this feeling when he said that he was against “the incorporation of a mongrel and semibarbarous population into our body politic,” which was “inferior to, but akin to the Negro in moral and intellectual qualities and capacity for self-government.”

So heavily laden was the atmosphere with these objections against ratification, that it became doubtful whether the administration would be vindicated. It remained for Senator Lodge with his fluent language and adroit reasoning, and Mr. Bryan’s mistaken policy to swing the senatorial sentiment in the other direction.

Senator Lodge’s presentation deserves first attention because of the open and high-handed manner in which he presented his case. Briefly, his attitude was that ratification did not necessarily mean annexation or colonization. The time to decide the latter, in his opinion, was after the treaty had been accepted. This was directly opposed to the prevailing view that to accept the treaty meant to enter upon an era of colonial expansion. But the Senator was not to be daunted. He took as his weapon, and he followed as his method of attack, the road which adroit diplomats and statesmen have constantly followed when arguments have failed them—the vanity of human nature.

Let the Senator’s own words testify to this:

When that treaty is ratified [he contended] we have full power and are absolutely free to do with those islands as we please, and the opposition to its ratification may be summed up in a single sentence—that the American people and the American Congress are not to be trusted with that power and with that freedom of action in regard to the inhabitants of those distant islands. Every one of the resolutions thus far offered on this subject is an expression of distrust in the future and in our dealings with other people. It is a well-meant effort to make us give bonds to Fate by means of a Congressional resolution.

The resolutions which the Senator meant were those declaring that the United States did not intend to make a permanent colony of the Philippines, and that ultimately or immediately the Filipinos would be granted self-government.

Could a more direct appeal to the vanity of the American people have been made?

Suppose we ratify the treaty [continued the Senator] the islands pass from the possession of Spain into our possession without committing us to any policy. I believe we can be trusted as a people to deal honestly and justly with the islands and their inhabitants thus given to our care⁠[13].

It is well to recall this language of the late Senator in view of the contention being made today that Congress cannot alienate the Philippines. If the spokesman of the administration of 1898 insisted that the ratification of the treaty would not commit the United States to any policy with regard to the Philippines, and that the Congress could later deal with the Islands in accordance with the wishes of the people, will Congress now repudiate the theory which then prevailed and which largely induced the Senate to ratify the treaty? Can the United States afford to give her enemies this new ground for distrust?

But let the Senator continue once more,—“It is for us to decide the destiny of the Philippines, not for Europe, and we can do it alone and without assistance.” On another occasion he made this most flowery statement,—

To the American people and their government I am ready to intrust my life, my liberty, my honor and, what is far dearer to me than anything personal to myself, the life and liberty of my children and my children’s children. If I am ready thus to trust my children to the government which the American public create and sustain, am I to shrink from intrusting to that same people the fate and fortune of the Philippine Islands?

Evidently it did not occur to the venerable senator that these Filipinos were not to have a voice in the government which he praised so eloquently and that, therefore, in the words of Daniel Webster,—

No matter how easy may be the yoke of a foreign power, no matter how lightly it sits upon the shoulders, if it is not imposed upon him by the voice of his own nation and of his own country, he cannot and he means not to be happy under its burden.

But the Senator’s point had been made. He had convinced many opponents of the treaty that refusal to ratify unless accompanied by a statement of America’s honest intentions meant a distrust of America’s honest abilities to give the Filipinos a square deal. These men thought that such a resolution would mean giving bonds to Spain and to Europe for America’s good conduct.

A further element also entered into the struggle which aided the administration in its fight. It was Mr. Bryan’s arrival in Washington urging the Democrats to ratify the treaty. Like Senator Lodge, Mr. Bryan contended that the treaty as it then stood did not commit the country to a policy of colonization. That policy was to be decided in the coming elections when the attitude towards the Filipino could be more plainly expressed⁠[14]. And so confident was the great commoner that the American public would oppose indefinite if not permanent annexation of the Islands that he was willing to risk the issue until 1900.

The ratification of the treaty [he said] instead of committing the United States to a colonial policy really clears the way for the recognition of the Philippine Republic.... Could the independence of the Filipinos be secured more easily by diplomacy from a foreign and hostile nation than it can through laws passed by Congress and voicing the sentiments of the American people? If independence is more desirable to our people than a colonial policy, who is there and what is there to prevent the recognition of Philippine independence? It is absurd to say that the United States can be transformed from a republic to an empire without consulting the voters⁠[15].

Mr. Bryan may or may not have been justified in taking this attitude, but he certainly failed to foresee the nature of the campaign which his opponents were to launch in order to vindicate the President’s Philippine policy.

While the discussions on the treaty were thus rapidly coming to a close the situation in the Philippines was constantly becoming menacing. American transports bearing thousands of soldiers were being massed in Manila. The insurgents who, it will be remembered, had surrounded the city were being gradually pushed further and further back. In many instances these advances by the Americans were also made in violation of the protocol with Spain which had declared that America was merely “to occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of the treaty.” Generally these orders compelling the Filipinos to make more and more humiliating withdrawals were accompanied with gratuitous threats to use force. What friendship had been left at the time of the occupation had given way to suspicion.

Perhaps no one more than Senator Bacon realized the danger which these relations meant.

While there is not a declaration of war [he said] while there is no avowal of hostile intent, with two such armies fronting each other with such diverse intents and resolves, it will take but a spark to ignite the magazine which may explode.... They (the Filipinos) are opposed to the occupation of their islands by the United States troops [warned the Senator] because of the apprehension that it is the purpose of the United States government to maintain a permanent dominion over those islands; and whenever, we shall by such resolutions as these, say solemnly to the world that such is not our purpose, there is no longer any danger or difficulty⁠[16].

That such was also the view taken by the Filipino leaders and observed by the American commander was also clear. “They begged,” said General Otis, “for some tangible concession from the United States government, one which they could present to the people and which might serve to allay excitement” ⁠[17].

Two days before the vote was taken, however, every attempt to declare America’s real purpose with regard to the Philippines had failed. On that fateful day the hostilities between the Americans and Filipinos against which Mr. Bacon had warned his countrymen finally broke out. The Administration immediately claimed that the insurgents had treacherously begun the hostilities, but even with this inducement to support the treaty, that document was finally ratified with but one vote to spare.

But it was not yet too late to hear the protest of the Filipinos even if it had been ignored for so long a time. The opponents of colonization immediately commenced their efforts to pass their resolutions plainly putting the benevolent attitude which the President and his supporters had been so vaguely hinting at. That of Mr. McEnery’s supplemented by Mr. Bacon’s amendment was, in particular, the most clear and reasonable of all. It read as follows:

Resolved, further, that the United States hereby disclaim any disposition or intention to exercise permanent sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said islands, and assert their determination, when a stable and independent government shall have been erected therein, entitled in the judgment of the government of the United States to recognition as such, to transfer to said government, upon terms which shall be reasonable and just, all rights secured under the cession by Spain, and to thereupon leave the government and control of the Islands to their people.

Surely, the issue could not have been more plainly put. If the United States really intended and could be trusted to deal honestly and fairly with the Filipinos, now was the time to announce her policy. This resolution still gave the United States a wide latitude of discretion as to when the Filipinos could have their cherished freedom. Even Senator Lodge should have had no apprehension in the matter. There were here no bonds to be given to Europe, no distrust in the good faith and judgment of the American people. The resolution merely sought to decide whether the Filipinos would at some distant time in the future eventually be granted that which had been given to Cuba. But this resolution also failed to pass and in its failure the true purpose of the Administration was made clear. The vote was a tie and the casting vote of the Vice-President was cast against it.