The conquest of the Philippines by the United States, 1898-1925

The last chapter took us to the day when the Senate of the United States, with one vote to spare, finally ratified the treaty. But seven weeks before that momentous occasion the President had already started on his career of usurpation which finally ended in war. On December 21, 1898, he issued a proclamation which he caused to be broadcasted in the Islands. At that time the United States had no title to a foot of land in the Philippines, and whether it would have depended on the ratification of the treaty which was bitterly opposed by many leaders of the Republican party. Until this treaty was ratified the protocol of August 13 remained in force which by its terms merely provided that the United States forces should occupy “the city, bay and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of the treaty.” None the less the President began his proclamation by saying that,

the destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila by the United States squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral Dewey followed by the reduction of the city and the surrender of the Spanish forces practically effected the conquest of the Philippine islands and the suspension of Spanish sovereignty therein. With the signature of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain by their respective plenipotentiaries at Paris on the 10th instant, and as a result of the victories of American arms, the future control, disposition, and government of the Philippine islands are ceded to the United States. In the fulfillment of the rights of sovereignty thus acquired and the responsible obligations thus assumed, the actual occupation and administration of the entire group of the Philippine Islands becomes immediately necessary, and the military government heretofore maintained by the United States in the city, harbor and bay of Manila is to be extended with all possible dispatch to the whole ceded territory.

He concluded by urging the military administration to win the confidence, respect and affection of the Filipinos,

by assuring them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of “benevolent assimilation” substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule.

The President’s language thus made it clear that he considered the conquest of the Philippine Islands as practically complete, that the United States now owned them and could deal with them as it would and that it did not offer them any voice in their government, much less the independence for which they had struggled so long and which they thought the United States had fought to give them.

The President also went on to say:

All persons who, either by active aid or by honest submission, cooperate with the Government of the United States to give effect to these beneficent purposes will receive the reward of its support and protection. All others will be brought within the lawful rule we have assumed, with firmness if need be, but without severity so far as possible.

Bearing in mind that this Proclamation was issued seven weeks before the treaty was ratified, what did the President assert by it? Simply this—in substance he told the Filipinos:

You are ours, the control of your public property and the revenues of your state are ours, the use and management of your public means of transportation and conveyance are controlled by our authority and while we mean to rule you with benevolence, nevertheless you must accept our sovereignty in order to receive our support and protection, for if you fail to do so the armed forces of the United States will compel you to submit.

The Filipinos realized this; it was not difficult for them to see what the United States really intended, notwithstanding the honeyed phrases of the proclamation. The American commander in Manila, General Otis, also realized it, and knowing the stern resolve of the people to assert their independence he took the liberty of censoring the proclamation by cutting out the words “sovereignty” and “immediate extension of authority.” Unfortunately the proclamation got out by mistake in its original form and served to increase the tension between the two armies.

In accordance with this proclamation, the American forces in Manila gradually extended their occupations beyond the city limits, forcing the Filipino army to retire farther and farther from its original lines. As long as the Filipino forces yielded gracefully to these illegal advances they certainly had a right to feel that no organized attack would be made upon them. But on February 4, two days before the treaty was ratified the American lines were again extended into the outlying territory.

That night an American sentry seeing a Filipino on the newly occupied sector challenged him. What transpired is best stated by this same American private.

I yelled, “Halt!” ... The man moved. I challenged him with another “Halt.” Then he immediately shouted, “Halto” to me. Well, I thought the best thing to do was to shoot him. He dropped. Then two Filipinos sprang out of the gateway about fifteen feet from us. I called “Halt” and Miller fired and dropped one. I saw that another was left. Well, I think I got my second Filipino that time. We retreated to where our six other fellows were and I said, “Line up, fellows, the niggers are in here all through these yards.” We then retreated to the pipe line and got behind the water workmain and stayed there all night. It was some minutes after our second shots before Filipinos began firing⁠[1].

General Otis described the outbreak in his official report in very much the same manner. He said:

An insurgent approaching the picket (of a Nebraska regiment) refused to halt or answer when challenged. The result was that our picket discharged his piece (killing the Filipino) when the insurgent troops near Santa Mesa opened fire on our troops there stationed.... During the night it was confined to an exchange of fire between opposing lines for a distance of two miles.... It is not believed that the chief insurgents wished to open hostilities at that time⁠[2].

It has never been even suggested that this exchange of fire caused any casualties⁠[3].

That the Filipino leaders did not desire an outbreak has also been substantiated from numerous reliable sources since then. Thus Charles B. Elliott, a defender of the American administration, writing as late as 1916 says:

The Filipinos at that particular hour were unprepared for attack or defense. The expected battle came when they were off their guard, most of the higher officers being absent in Malolos⁠[4]. [While] the American authorities in Manila, having taken a more positive stand ... let loose the dogs of war they had been holding ready⁠[5].

The next day General Aguinaldo sent a member of his staff under a flag of truce to interview General Otis and to tell him that the firing of the night before had been against his orders and that he wished to stop further hostilities. To bring this about he proposed to establish a neutral zone wide enough to keep the opposing armies apart. But to this request Otis replied that the fighting having begun must go on “to the grim end”⁠[6]. This refusal was followed by an attack on the Filipino forces which lasted all day and resulted in killing some three thousand natives.

These incidents reviewed by a Senate Committee of which Mr. Lodge was the chairman make other facts stand clear. General MacArthur was questioned as follows:

Senator Patterson: The question is whether the Filipino troops made any attempt to advance upon American troops that night (Feb. 4) or that morning (Feb. 5). You have no knowledge of anything of that kind?

Gen. MacArthur: I have no knowledge of that kind and I presume it was not so because—

Sen. Patterson: The result of that advance was the killing and wounding of more than 3000 Filipinos and, I suppose, their utter disorganization?

Gen. MacArthur: It resulted fortunately in a great victory for the American arms.

Sen. Patterson: And from that time forward the war has gone on?

Gen. MacArthur: It has been in progress ever since⁠[7].

Now, why did the American commander thus receive the request for parley, and why did he begin the war? Certainly, the incident of the night before was one that might well have been dealt with at a friendly conference. The discharge of the firearms was a mistake, an accident, at the most the act of an individual. Certainly it was nothing that would justify a war, so that when Otis not only refused Aguinaldo’s message but also attacked and killed thousands of Filipinos in one day, he acted either with or without orders. When General Otis made a report of this engagement to the War Department he said it “was one strictly defensive on the part of the insurgents and one of vigorous attack by our forces”⁠[8].

The Constitution of the United States strictly provides that Congress alone may declare war. That body certainly had not done so, and no one familiar with the feeling in the United States at this time can believe that Congress would have declared war on their Philippine allies. The Filipinos had done nothing but help the Americans, and if there were any of the latter who were hostile to the natives they were those who, intending to rob the Filipinos of their country, feared that they would encounter resistance. Only one conclusion is possible—the bloody war that followed the attack of February 5 was caused by an act of usurpation.

It may be going too far to say that the attack on the Filipino army was ordered by McKinley, but this much is clear, that he never expressed any disapproval, and that when in dealing with the existing hostilities he told the American people that there would “be no useless parley,” he made himself a party to the usurpation.

The reader will no doubt ask,—what was the significance of this outbreak, what did it accomplish for the President and his administration? Senator Patterson of Colorado ably described the situation in these words:

That attack of February 4 and 5 [he said] became an absolute necessity for the success of the imperialistic marplots at Washington. The treaty was before the Senate. It had been agreed that a vote upon it should be taken on February 6. It was known to everyone that there were lacking two votes of the number required to ratify it. The Filipinos were praying that its ratification would be defeated, for then the treaty would be amended so that Spain would relinquish sovereignty over the Philippines as it had provided for Cuba. The Filipinos had all to gain by preserving the status of the armies as it was before February 6. The imperialists had everything to gain by precipitating a conflict⁠[9].

This question may also well be asked—why did General Otis call the Filipinos “insurgents,” and why was that term constantly employed by the administration in Washington throughout the war? On the day when the battle of February 5 was fought the Filipinos were encamped on grounds assigned to them by the American commanders as their late allies. Following the accidental shooting of two Filipinos by American sentinels and an unauthorized exchange of shots between the lines the American forces had launched a “vigorous attack,” killing thousands of men who had resisted in a “strictly defensive” manner. When this attack was made the treaty was before the Senate and the United States had no title whatsoever to the Island. The Filipinos on the other hand certainly had the right to live in their own country and to defend themselves when attacked. Yet the skillful use of the word “insurrecto” in 1899 and during the years that followed carried an entirely false impression to the people of the United States. It was deception, pure and simple.

Of course, this outbreak had to be justified by the administration in reporting it to the American people. Three different means of deception were therefore adopted. The first was to assert positively that the treacherous Filipinos were to blame for the outbreak. “The first blow was struck by the inhabitants,” said Mr. McKinley, “they assailed our sovereignty, and there will be no useless parley, no pause, until the insurrection is suppressed and American authority acknowledged and established”⁠[10]. On another occasion he went on to say, “We never dreamed that the little body of insurgents whom we have just emancipated from oppression,—we never for a moment believed that they would turn upon the flag that had sheltered them against Spain”⁠[11].

The second was to draw a veil of secrecy over the Philippine events and to establish a censorship of the press. How vigorously the censorship was enforced may be easily inferred from the fact that the staff correspondents of the leading American papers in Manila united in a statement to the American people.

We believe [they said] that owing to official dispatches from Manila made public in Washington, the people of the United States have not received a correct impression of the situation in the Philippines.... The censorship has compelled us to participate in these misrepresentations by excising or altering uncontroverted statements of fact, on the plea as General Otis stated, that “they would alarm the people at home” or “have the people of the United States by the ears.”

Of course, the Manila censor would not permit such a dispatch to be sent from his office. The protest was, therefore, sent by mail to Hongkong and from there cabled to the United States. It was published in the newspapers of this country on July 17, 1899⁠[12].

The American correspondent of the Associated Press, Mr. Robert M. Collins, more graphically described the situation which confronted them.

Recently [he wrote in his letter of July 30, 1899, to Mr. Melville Stone, General Manager] I filed what I thought was the most inoffensive statement that the business men who had appeared before the commission had advocated a retention of the existing system of currency. The censor said, “I ought not to let that go. That would be a lift for Bryan. My instructions are to shut off everything that could hurt McKinley’s administration”⁠[13].

In this way, therefore, were facts being kept away, not from the enemy, but from the people of the United States who were being called upon to sanction the conquest of the Philippines. In this way truth was suppressed.

The third method was to assert that only a small fraction of the population was opposed to American sovereignty.

Well, whom are we fighting [said the Secretary of War Root]? Are we fighting the Philippine nation? No! There is none. There are hundreds of islands inhabited by more than sixty tribes, speaking more than sixty languages, and all but one ready to accept American sovereignty⁠[14].

That this statement was also absolutely unjustified will be shown in the next chapter.