The conquest of the Philippines by the United States, 1898-1925

The war went on for years, but the vigor and ferocity with which it was carried on by the able commanders of the American army have unfortunately never been fully comprehended by the public. This was largely due to the attempts of those in political office to minimize the importance of the struggle and to convince the people at home that the enemy was but a small fraction of the native population. Bearing in mind the statement of Secretary Root, therefore, we can appreciate the true progress of the war as shown by the war records in Washington. Thus:

On February 10, six days after the firing of that fatal shot which plunged the nation into war, General Lawton succeeded in dislodging an army of 4,000 Filipinos from Caloocan, on the outskirts of Manila. It was at this point, too, that General MacArthur came to realize the stupendous task that lay before his army.

When I first started in against these rebels [he said] I believed that Aguinaldo’s troops represented only a fraction.... I did not like to believe that the whole population of Luzon ... was opposed to us, but having come thus far, and having been brought much in contact with both insurgents and amigos, I have been reluctantly compelled to believe that the Filipino masses are loyal to Aguinaldo and the government which he leads⁠[1].

The island of Luzon alone at that time had a population of over three and a half million.

Four hundred miles south of Manila lie the Visayan Islands, one of the richest groups of the archipelago. Early in December, 1898, General Miller in command of an expedition composed largely of fresh arrivals from San Francisco had previously sailed for Iloilo, the largest city of the Visayas. Arriving there and finding the Filipinos supreme in command, he had courteously asked them to permit his troops to land. This request had been refused. Another request had followed on January 1, 1899, accompanied by a copy of McKinley’s Benevolent Proclamation claiming sovereignty over the archipelago. The Filipinos immediately asked if the American commander carried instructions from Aguinaldo, saying that they could do nothing without orders from their recognized leader “in cases affecting their Federal Government.”

I have the honor to notify you [said the Filipino leader in these islands hundreds of miles from Manila] that, in conjunction with the people, the army, and the committee, we insist upon our pretentions not to consent ... to any foreign interference without express orders from the central government of Luzon (that is, the Government headed by Aguinaldo) ... with which we are one in ideas, as we have been until now in sacrifices⁠[2].

And with regard to the claim of sovereignty made by McKinley seven weeks before the treaty was ratified, this is what the Filipinos in Iloilo said in another dispatch to General Miller:

The supposed authority of the United States began with the treaty of Paris, on the 10th of December, 1898. The authority of the Central Government of Malolos (the seat of Aguinaldo’s government) is founded in the sacred and natural bonds of blood, language, uses, customs, ideas (and) sacrifices⁠[3].

Here were bits of real eloquence substantiated by acts coming from Filipinos four hundred miles south of Manila. Compare these with Secretary Root’s statements about the “sixty tribes” and “sixty languages” and what conclusion are we forced to draw?

In the face of this stubborn resistance General Miller with his several thousand troops had, therefore, decided not to land, but instead picked up anchor and set sail for Manila. The President’s benevolent proclamation in Iloilo, as well as in Luzon, had thus completely failed.

Following the outbreak of February 4, however, Miller again returned with his troops, and, with the assistance of the armed vessels Baltimore and Petrel finally captured the city. Then followed the occupation of Cebu, the third largest city of the archipelago.

During the month of March the so-called “Visayan Military District” was organized and placed under the command of General Miller. This district included the southern islands of Panay, Negros, and Cebu, by far the richest sugar lands of the archipelago. On the thirty-first of the same month, General MacArthur entered the town of Malolos where, for several months, Aguinaldo’s seat of government had been located. One month later he succeeded in driving the main body of Aguinaldo’s army from that vicinity, and the march northward began in earnest. General Lawton in command of another army moved on a parallel line thus forming a big wing which captured and swept everything before them. A base for military operations was established also in San Fernando, forty miles north of Manila⁠[4].

During the summer months that followed the army of the American expeditionary forces was replaced largely by fresh recruits. By October the northern advance was again launched with greater severity towards the great plain of Luzon where Aguinaldo was still supreme. General Lawton with his vastly superior forces again swept everything before him. Generals Wheaton and MacArthur also followed in almost parallel lines, and by November 12 the main body of the Filipino army was forced to scatter. Some managed to return south where they joined the insurgents of that region. Aguinaldo himself succeeded in evading the net and escaped through Wheaton’s lines. After fleeing further northward he sought refuge in the mountains along the eastern coast⁠[5].

Having accomplished his task, General Lawton turned south in order to break the line of communication between the northern and southern armies of the Filipinos. He succeeded in this mission also but sacrificed his life in a battle just twelve miles from Manila.

The new year 1900 marked the beginning of a fresh series of campaigns. General Bates began by launching an aggressive drive in the province of Cavite, southwest of Manila. In the following month, February, General Bell sailed to the southern islands to capture the provinces of North and South Camarines and West Albay where the Filipino forces had been swelled by a number of those defeated in the north. Similar expeditions were sent to the Visayan islands and garrisons established everywhere. A total of four hundred different army posts was the final outcome of this campaign⁠[6].

In June of this same year, General MacArthur, believing that the backbone of the Philippine army had been broken, recommended a proclamation of amnesty. This was issued by the President on the twenty-first, but it soon became evident that although unable to fight in the open as an army, the Filipinos were determined to continue the uneven struggle by guerrilla warfare.

With Aguinaldo in full retreat, the amazing thing is that he was not overpowered sooner. The following account of the defeat of one of his loyal forces, as reported by American eye witnesses, may give the reason why.

It was a great fight that was fought away up on the trail of lonely Tirad Pass on that Saturday morning of December 2. It brought glory to Major Marsh’s battalion of the Thirty-Third volunteer infantry who were the victors. It brought no discredit to the little band of sixty Filipinos who fought and died there. Sixty was the number that, at Aguinaldo’s orders had come down into the pass that morning to arrest the onward march of the Americans. Seven were all that went back over the pass that night to tell Aguinaldo that they had tried and failed. Fifty-three of them were either killed or wounded. And among them, the last to retreat, we found the body of young General Gregorio del Pilar.

We had seen him cheering his men in the fight. One of our companies crouched up close under the side of the cliff where he had built his first intrenchment, heard his voice continually during the fight urging his men to greater effort, scolding them, praising them, cursing, appealing one moment to their love of their native land and the next instant threatening to kill them himself if they did not stand firm. Driven from the first intrenchment he fell slowly back to the second in full sight of our sharpshooters and under a heavy fire. Not until every man around him in the second intrenchment was down did he turn his white horse and ride slowly up the winding trail. Then we who were below saw an American squirm his way out to the top of a high flat rock, and take deliberate aim at the figure on the white horse. We held our breath, not knowing whether to pray that the sharpshooter would shoot straight or miss. Then came the spiteful crack of the Krag rifle and the man on horseback rolled to the ground, and when the troops charging up the mountain side reached him, the boy general of the Filipinos was dead.

We went up on the mountain side. After H company had driven the insurgents out of their second position and killed Pilar, the other companies had rushed straight up the trail, and never stopped until they were far up above the clouds and there was no longer an insurgent in sight. As we went up the trail we passed dead Filipino soldiers. We counted ten in all. Some had been shot several times. We found bloody trails that led to places on the edge of the cliffs, where wounded men had either jumped or fallen off. We passed the second intrenchment high up on the trail. It was built of heavy rocks well banked with earth. Just past this a few hundred yards we saw a solitary figure lying on the road. The body was almost stripped of clothing, and there were no marks of rank on the blood-soaked coat. But the face of the dead man had a look I had never noticed on the face of other dead men in insurgent uniform on the field of battle, in the wake of an American firing line. The features were clear cut and the forehead high and shapely. I decided the man must have been an insurgent officer. A soldier came running down the trail.

“That’s old Pilar,” he said, “we got the old rascal. I guess he’s sorry he ever went up against the Thirty-Third.”

“There ain’t no doubt about its being Pilar,” rattled on the young soldier. “We got his diary and letters and all his papers, and Sullivan of our company’s got his pants, and Snider’s got his shoes, but he can’t wear them because they’re too small, and a sergeant in G. Company got one of his silver spurs, and a lieutenant got the other, and somebody swiped the cuff buttons before I got here or I would have swiped them, and all I got was a stud button and his collar with blood on it.”

So this was the end of Gregorio del Pilar. Only twenty-two years old he managed to make himself a leader of men when he was hardly more than a boy, and at last had laid down his life for his convictions. Major Marsh had the diary. In it he had written under the date of December 2, the day he was killed:

“The General has given me the pick of all the men that can be spared and ordered me to defend the pass. I realize what a terrible task is given me. And yet I feel that this is the most glorious moment of my life. What I do is done for my beloved country. No sacrifice can be too great.”

A private sitting by the fire was exhibiting a handkerchief. “It’s old Pilar’s. It’s got ‘Dolores Hoses’ on the corner. I guess that was his girl. Well, it’s all over with Gregorio.”

“Anyhow,” said Private Sullivan, “I got his pants. He won’t need them any more.”

The man who had the general’s shoes strode proudly past, refusing with scorn a Mexican dollar and a pair of shoes taken from one of the private insurgent soldiers. A private sitting on a rock was examining a golden locket containing a curl of a woman’s hair. “Got the locket off his neck,” said the soldier....

As the main column started on its march for the summit of the mountain a turn in the trail brought us again in sight of the insurgent general far down below us. There had been no time to bury him. Not even a blanket or a poncho had been thrown over him.

A crow sat on the dead man’s feet. Another perched on his head. The fog settled down upon us. We could see the body no longer.

“We carved not a line and we raised not a stone,

But we left him alone in his glory.”

And when Private Sullivan went by in his trousers, and Snider with his shoes, and the other man who had the cuff buttons, and the sergeant who had the spur, and the lieutenant who had the other spur, and the man that had the handkerchief, and another that had his shoulder straps, it suddenly occurred to me that his glory was about all we had left him⁠[7].

In fairness to the sober thought of the Americans, however, it should be stated that the body of the Filipino general was later rescued from those who were despoiling it and buried with full military honors. Over his humble grave the American soldiers erected a stone bearing this convincing testimony:

GENERAL GREGORIO DEL PILAR
KILLED
AT THE BATTLE OF TIRAD PASS
DECEMBER 2, 1899
COMMANDING AGUINALDO’S REAR GUARD
AN OFFICER AND A GENTLEMAN

It was no doubt just such instances of bravery and personal sacrifices that finally led General Lawton to say:

“Taking into account the disadvantages they have to fight against in arms, equipment and military discipline,—without artillery, short of ammunition, powder inferior, shells reloaded until they are defective, inferior in every particular of equipment and supplies,—they are the bravest men I have ever seen.

What we want is to stop this accursed war.... These men are indomitable. At Bacoor bridge they waited until the Americans had brought their cannon to within thirty-five yards of their trenches. Such men have the right to be heard. All they want is a little justice”⁠[8].

This brief but colorful record of the first stages of the conquest, and the disastrous defeats of Aguinaldo’s army are seldom questioned. But it has often been asked why, seeing that victory over American arms was virtually impossible, the Filipinos should have persisted in sacrificing their lives and their fortunes by carrying on such an unequal struggle. The answer was properly given at that time by Apolinario Mabini, the intellectual leader of the revolution, the Alexander Hamilton of that epoch. He thus expressed the sentiments of his countrymen:

The Filipinos realize that they cannot expect any victory over the American forces; they are fighting to show the American people that they are sufficiently intelligent to know their rights despite any pretense to hide these rights with able sophistry....

The Filipinos maintain their fight against the American troops, not because of an especial hatred, but in order to show to the American people that, far from being indifferent as to their political situation they know how to sacrifice themselves for a government which assures them their individual liberty and which governs them in conformity with the wishes and the needs of the people. They have been unable to avoid that fight, owing to the fact that they have been unable to obtain from the American government any kind of formal and clear promise regarding the establishment of such a kind of government⁠[9].

In order to show that the Filipinos were not by nature of a warring disposition and that they were anxious to have peace and understanding, Mabini continued thus:

The present condition and state of war deprives the people of the chance to manifest freely their aspirations; therefore the Filipinos desire most ardently that the Congress of the United States provide for some means to listen to them before adopting a resolution that would mean a definite decision regarding their future....

I confidently hope that when the Americans and Filipinos have come to know each other better, not only will the present conflict come to an end but also future ones will be avoided. The opinion prevailing among the impartial part of the American nation appears to tend toward adhering to its old traditions and the spirit of justice and humanity, which constitute at the present time the sole hope of all upright Filipinos⁠[10].

In the spring of 1901 finally occurred the most important incident of the war. This was the dramatic ruse which culminated in the capture of Aguinaldo. It will be remembered that ever since the beginning of the campaign the leadership of Aguinaldo was undisputed. The capture of that great leader, therefore, meant everlasting glory to the American soldier brave enough to perform such an exploit.

The opportunity to attempt such a deed came when an officer of General Funston’s district in central Luzon intercepted a messenger from Aguinaldo bearing dispatches to one of his generals in that locality. The message directed the Filipino General Lacuna to send some reinforcements to Aguinaldo’s camp. Here was the golden opportunity. Why not impersonate the reinforcements called for? The plan was submitted to General MacArthur and adopted by him.

The American commander thereupon secured a company of Macabebe Filipino scouts for the purpose. These Macabebe scouts had been loyal to the Spanish military régime and when the Americans came they sided with the invader. They came from a small district in Pampanga province, the population of which at that time was a little over 25,000. In every respect they were pure blooded Filipinos, as later events proved, and the American commanders took advantage of this to deceive the wily Aguinaldo.

On March 6th the U. S. Vicksburg slipped quietly out of Manila Bay bearing the members of the enterprise. Outside the American commanders of whom there were four, no one had been told of the nature of the expedition. Once they were aboard, however, the Macabebes were told to discard their American uniforms and made to dress in such fashion as to most resemble a tired and haggard insurgent command. It was necessary to land over a hundred miles from Aguinaldo’s camp, as the smoke from the vessel might have attracted the attention of some peasant or insurgent lookout who would sound the alarm. General Funston’s account of the precautions taken in this expedition offers the most convincing proof that outside of a few natives, such as the Macabebes who had accepted American sovereignty, the rest of the native population as late as 1901 were hostile to the United States and loyal to Aguinaldo.

The party landed at night with all the ship’s lights screened, and the Vicksburg sailed away immediately agreeing to meet them at a nearer point eleven days later. Thence started the march through a hostile territory. The friendly Macabebes had been carefully drilled in the part they were to play, and the stories they were to tell in the villages that they passed. The story was to the effect that on their march cross country to join Aguinaldo they had encountered a small party of Americans drawing maps of the outlying country. A skirmish followed and after killing and wounding some of them they had succeeded in capturing the five Americans whom they were now bearing to Aguinaldo as prisoners of war.

As the party marched through the villages they were, therefore, received with pride and honor, the natives never suspecting that they were feeding and guiding the enemy, a convincing proof that all Filipinos look alike and do not differ from one another in appearance any more than a Massachusetts man does from a New Yorker. General Funston in his account of this enterprise later took particular pains to say that the village officials and insurrectionists whom they encountered were very humane and courteous to himself and the other four American “prisoners”⁠[11].

When within eight miles of Aguinaldo’s camp, quite exhausted from the long march, the leader of the Macabebe troop, a certain Hilario Tal Placido, sent a note in advance to Aguinaldo saying that he had halted his command at the beach for a short rest as they were exhausted from their long march and very much in need of food. The message also requested that some be sent to them. The food came, and Aguinaldo’s capturers were elated to find that the leader did not suspect the fate that awaited him.

Then came one of the emergencies which American wit had to encounter. Just as the final march was about to begin word came from Aguinaldo that the American prisoners should be left behind in charge of some of his guards. This was no doubt a precaution to prevent the Americans from knowing the exact location of the insurgent camp. After a hurried whispered conversation Funston directed the Macabebes under the command of Placido to go ahead and leave them behind, but to later send a forged order from Aguinaldo directing that the “prisoners” be sent up to the camp after all. This ruse was successfully accomplished also and Placido finally reached Aguinaldo’s presence, the American “prisoners” lagging a short distance behind and out of sight. Aguinaldo’s neatly uniformed guard of fifty men presented arms as Placido entered the insurgent leader’s office and while the Macabebes were nonchalantly forming a cordon around the guard, Placido entertained the President with his story of the march across the country. Then when he saw that the moment had come he went to the window and by a prearranged signal ordered the Macabebes to open fire. So unexpected was the attack that it succeeded in overpowering the guards.

Almost immediately after giving the order Placido, who was a very stout individual, turned and grabbed Aguinaldo, who weighed one hundred and fifteen pounds, threw him down and sat on him until General Funston and the rest of the Americans arrived. After a short rest the party hurriedly covered the remaining eight miles to a certain point in the coast where the Vicksburg had agreed to meet them. The rest of the trip by water was uneventful and in due course of time they reached Manila.

Aguinaldo was taken to the Palace to confront General MacArthur without a soul in Manila knowing about the successful ruse. The Filipino leader was most graciously treated and housed by General MacArthur. He was treated more like a guest than a prisoner of war, although, of course, he was watched night and day by a commissioned officer. It was most important that the leader be kept alive for his influence in quelling the revolution was sorely needed.

During the three weeks’ confinement of the great leader, therefore, everything was done to convince him that further resistance was impossible. Everything that the Americans had done and the attitude they were taking was carefully explained to him, so that he might realize the inflexibility of America’s purpose to remain in the islands for “the good of the Filipino,” whether they liked it or not. The programme explained to him was wittily described by an Englishwoman when she said that it was a plan

to have lots of American school teachers at once set to work to teach the Filipino English and at the same time keep plenty of American soldiers around to knock him on the head should he get a notion that he is ready for self-government before the Americans think he is⁠[12].

A quaint scheme indeed and “one characteristic of the dauntlessness of American energy”⁠[13].

And so Aguinaldo bowed to the inevitable. On April 19 he took his oath of allegiance and at the same time issued a proclamation recommending the abandonment of further resistance. Among other things he said:

The time has come, however, when they (the Filipinos) find their advance along this path (the path of their aspiration for freedom) impeded by an irresistible force.... Enough of blood, enough of tears and desolation.... By acknowledging and accepting the Sovereignty of the United States, I believe I am serving thee, my beloved country. May happiness be thine⁠[14].

The capture of Aguinaldo, in the estimation of General MacArthur was “the most momentous single event of the year,” inasmuch as he “was the incarnation of the insurrection”⁠[15]. When the news of his dramatic capture was first received in Washington, Funston was immediately raised to the rank of Brigadier-General, a convincing testimony that the Washington authorities knew Aguinaldo’s importance.

Although the surrender of the Filipino leader was a severe loss to the Filipinos, however, the war went on in full if not with increasing ferocity. Filipino forces were active in the southern islands of Mindoro, Samar, Cebu and Bohol. This condition was deemed sufficient to justify the establishment of the notorious reconcentration camps, the hideous cruelty of which had precipitated the Cuban war⁠[16]. For the island of Samar, the Filipinos had to contend with General “Hell Roaring Jake Smith,” so called because of his methods of conducting “civilized warfare”⁠[17]. We shall make General Smith’s acquaintance later on.

The province of Batangas, not over sixty miles south of Manila was also seething with rebellion. The official reports from the army files tell us graphically what measures were taken to force the native population to submit to American arms. General Bell was in charge of this district. His Circular Order No. 22, to be found in Senate Document 331, 1902, p. 1628, read as follows:

To combat such a population, it is necessary to make the state of war as insupportable as possible, and there is no more efficacious way of accomplishing this than by keeping the minds of the people in such a state of anxiety and apprehension that living under such conditions will soon become unbearable. Little should be said. The less said the better. Let acts, not words, convey the intention.

If we compare this official order with President McKinley’s benevolent proclamation instructing the military administration to win the confidence, respect and affection of the Filipinos, the contrast presented is extraordinary to say the least.

General Bell’s Christmas Day product is even more convincing. His report of December 26, 1901, read as follows:

I am now assembling in the neighborhood of 2,500 men who will be used in columns of about fifty men each. I take so large a command for the purpose of thoroughly searching each ravine, valley and mountain peak for insurgents and for food, expecting to destroy everything I find outside of towns. All able-bodied men will be killed or captured.... These people need a thrashing to teach them some good common sense; and they should have it for the good of all concerned.

No official estimate of the number of people killed by such measures throughout the islands since the beginning of the war has ever been made. General J. M. Bell, however, made the estimate that in Luzon alone one-sixth of the native population had been wiped out as a consequence of the war⁠[18]. Luzon then had a population of over three and a half million, and one-sixth of that number meant 600,000 men, women and children. How many of these were killed by powder and lead? General Bell himself gave a suggestive answer when he said as a part of the same statement that:

The loss of life by killing alone has been very great but I think that not one man has been slain except where his death served the legitimate purpose of war. It has been thought necessary to adopt what in other countries would probably be thought harsh measures.

A Republican Congressman who visited the islands in 1902 confirmed these estimates in an interview published in the Boston Transcript of March 4. Said he:

You never hear of any disturbances in Northern Luzon; and the secret of its pacification is, in my opinion, the secret of pacification of the archipelago. They never rebel in northern Luzon because there isn’t anybody there to rebel. The country was marched over and cleaned in a most resolute manner. The good Lord in heaven only knows the number of Filipinos that were put under ground. Our soldiers took no prisoners, they kept no records; they simply swept the country, and wherever or whenever they could get hold of a Filipino they killed him. The women and children were spared, and may now be noticed in disproportionate numbers in that part of the island.

The army song of that period vividly typified the feeling of the soldier towards the Filipino. Sung to the tune of “Tramp, tramp, tramp,” the refrain was as follows:

Although no very careful estimate of the total casualties has been made, it is certain from the records, official and semi-official, that the Filipinos killed in battle far outnumbered the American losses. Judge Blount’s examination of the available war records showed a ratio of sixteen Filipinos to every one American killed⁠[20]. Commenting on this disparity in the numbers killed the famous American historian Latane adds that it “cannot be attributed to the superior marksmanship of the American soldiers; it was due rather to the fact that the Filipinos were in many cases not armed with rifles, and in some cases perhaps, to the ruthless slaughter of the wounded”⁠[21].

Considering the fact that the general belief among the American people was that their presence in the islands was merely for the purpose of helping the Filipino, it is indeed astounding to learn how this conquest was being carried along in their name. But did the administration in Washington cherish a similar purpose? We would do well to look for light on this subject.

On page 96, Volume II, of Olcott’s Life of McKinley, which is the standard biography of that President, there appears a facsimile of a memorandum written in Mr. McKinley’s own handwriting and recording a conversation which he had with Admiral Dewey. The piece of paper used by the President was of the White House stationery, and it bore the date of October 3, 1899.

“What is our duty?” was one of the President’s questions. And as Admiral Dewey answered, McKinley wrote his memorandum, as follows:

“Keep the Island permanently. Valuable in every way.”

Then followed questions regarding the number of troops and ships needed for this permanent occupation.

And as if to assure himself of his position, the President finally asked:

“Should we give up the Islands?”

And then follows this grim reply:

“Never—never.”