FOOTNOTES
[1] Mommsen, Röm. Gesch., V, p. 41; 51; Idem, Die Oertlichkeit der Varusschlacht, p. 207; Gardthausen, I, p. 1199. Ch. Gailly de Taurines (Les Légions de Varus, Paris, 1911, p. 73) places the number as probably 22,000.
[2] Vell., II, 119.
[3] Velleius’ words (II, 119) suggest a series of changing incidents and conditions: “ordinem atrocissimae calamitatis; exercitus iniquitate fortunae circumventus ... inclusus silvis, paludibus, insidiis”; cf. also Tac., Ann., I, 65: “Quintilium Varum sanguine oblitum et paludibus emersum”.
[4] Vell., II, 117; II, 120: “ex quo apparet Varum magis imperatoris defectum consilio quam virtute destitutum militum se magnificentissimumque perdidisse exercitum”; Suet., Tib., 18: “Varianam cladem temeritate et neglegentia ducis accidisse.” Cf. also Tac., Ann., II, 46: “quoniam tres vagas legiones et ducem fraudis ignarum perfidia deceperit” [Arminius], where “vagas” suggests an army marching in loose order, ignorant of the territory and without proper leadership. So Mommsen (Röm. Gesch., V, p. 40) calls Varus: “Ein Mann ... von trägem Körper und stumpfem Geist und ohne jede militärische Begabung und Erfahrung”; Deppe (Rh. Jahrbr., 87, p. 59) accepting Zangemeister’s date for the defeat of Varus as August 2, 9 A. D. (see Westd. Zeitschr., 1887, pp. 239-242) says that the battle followed a feast day, which explains the enigma of how a Roman army of 18,000 men could be annihilated by an unorganized German host: “Die Soldaten waren an diesem Tage noch festkrank, nicht geordnet, überhaupt unvorbereitet, entsprechend der Angabe des Tacitus, der sie in den Ann., II, 46, nennt ‘tres vacuas [vagas] legiones et ducem fraudis ignarum’”.
[5] Dio, 56, 20 f. says that the Romans were fewer at every point than their assailants; moreover, the latter increased as the battle continued, since many of those who at first wavered later joined them, particularly for the sake of plunder. Mommsen (Die Oertlichkeit, etc., p. 209) thinks that from the communities which joined the Cherusci in the uprising the Romans were confronted by numbers probably two or three times their equal.
[6] Cf. Tac., Ann., II, 46: “At se [Maroboduum] duodecim legionibus petitum duce Tiberio inlibatam Germanorum gloriam servavisse.” Mommsen (Röm. Gesch., V, p. 34) estimates the combined strength (regular and auxiliary) of the two armies in the campaign against Maroboduus at almost double that of their opponents, whose fighting force was 70,000 infantry and 4,000 horsemen.
[7] See Eduard Meyer, “Kaiser Augustus” (in Kleine Schriften, Halle a. S., 1900, p. 486); Mommsen, Röm. Gesch., V, p. 37; Shuckburgh, Suet., Aug., 24; Vell., II, 114. Ritterling (“Zur Geschichte des römischen Heeres in Gallien,” Rh. Jahrbr., 114-115, p. 162) argues, on the basis of three legions each to the nine provinces, that Augustus retained 27 legions after the battle of Actium. This is out of harmony with the well-known view of Mommsen that Augustus had only 18 legions until the year 6 A. D., at which time he raised eight new legions in view of the uprising in Illyricum.
[8] Gesch. der röm. Kaiserzeit, I, p. 232 f.: “Der Verlust—er mag 16.000 betragen haben—erscheint trotz alledem nicht bedeutend genug, um eine Wendung in der germanischen Politik zu rechtfertigen.” Koepp (Die Römer in Deutschland, p. 34) agrees that it is absurd to think that the loss of three legions could produce such a change in policy: “so ist es doch schwer zu glauben, dass er [Augustus] in besonnenen Stunden aus dem Verlust dreier Legionen die Konsequenz gezogen haben sollte, dass es mit der Provinz Germanien aus und vorbei sein müsse.” Much the same view is expressed by him in Westfalen, I, p. 40: “nicht als ob der Untergang dreier Legionen ein Verlust gewesen wäre, der das Reich in seinen Grundfesten hätte erschüttern können; wenn man in Pannonien fünfzehn Legionen aufgeboten hatte, so hätte man auch am Rhein eine ähnliche Waffenmacht zusammenbringen können, wenn wirklich der Sieg des Arminius zu einer Gefahr des Reiches geworden wäre. Und später noch ist Brittannien erobert worden, ist Dacien Provinz geworden, ist der Kampf gegen die Parther aufgenommen worden.”
[9] Hist. of Rome, V, p. 61; cf. also p. 54: “The Romano-German conflict was not a conflict between two powers equal in the political balance, in which the defeat of the one might justify the conclusion of an unfavorable peace; it was a conflict in which ... an isolated failure in the plan as sketched might as little produce any change as the ship gives up its voyage because a gust of wind drives it out of its course.”
[10] Kaiser Augustus, p. 116.
[11] Kaiser Augustus, p. 486; cf. Dio, 57, 5. However, Meyer attaches undue significance to this fact. While the old rule confined service in the army to citizens, in times of peril freedmen, or slaves manumitted especially for the occasion, had been enrolled many times previous to the occasion referred to—indeed as early as the Punic wars. See examples cited by Shuckburgh, Suet., Aug., 25. According to Suetonius libertini were employed twice by Augustus: “Libertino milite, praeterquam Romae incendiorum causa et si tumultus in graviore annona metueretur, bis usus est: semel ad praesidium coloniarum Illyricum contingentium, iterum ad tutelam ripae Rheni.” These two occasions, at the uprising in Pannonia, and after the defeat of Varus, are mentioned also by Dio, 55, 31 and 56, 23.
[12] This is the figure given by Ed. Meyer (“Bevölkerung des Altertums,” Conrad’s Handw. d. Staatsw., 3rd ed., II (1909), p. 911), who accepts with slight modifications, Beloch’s calculations. The latter (Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt (1886), p. 507) gave 54,000,000 at the time of the death of Augustus. In a later essay (Rh. Mus., IV (1889), p. 414 ff.) Beloch raises materially his estimate of the population of Gaul, which, if accepted, and it seems very plausible, would affect somewhat the total for the empire. Thus H. Delbrück (Gesch. d. Kriegskunst, II, 2nd ed. (1909), p. 175) after Beloch’s revision, calculates the population of the empire at sixty to sixty-five millions, and O. Seeck (Jahrb. für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, III, 13 (1897), p. 161 ff.), would prefer in many instances much more generous calculations than those of Beloch. Compare, however, Beloch’s vigorous reply in the same volume. We have preferred to accept, however, the more conservative figure.
[13] That this was the custom followed for the socii and auxilia during the period of the republic is suggested by Pliny, N. H., 25, 33, 6, and the same general proportion seems to have been observed later, as Tacitus, Ann., IV, 5, in speaking of the “sociae triremes alasque et auxilia cohortium,” adds, “neque multo secus in numero virium.” Detailed information regarding the size of these auxiliary contingents is nowhere given. See Liebenam, art. “Exercitus,” Pauly-Wiss., VI, 1601, 1607. G. L. Cheesman (The Auxilia of the Roman Imperial Army, Oxford, 1914 p. 53 ff.) finds that the auxilia under Augustus were at least as numerous as the legionaries, and later became more so. He calculates 180,000 for the year 69 A. D., and 220,000 for the middle of the second century A. D. Cf. also Delbrück, op. cit., II, p. 203 (2nd ed.).
[14] Cf. Ed. Meyer, ibid., p. 909. The evidence for the enrollment of foreigners in the legions at this time is conveniently summarized by Liebenam, art. “Dilectus,” Pauly-Wiss., V, 611 ff.
[15] Mommsen, Eph. Epigr., V (1884), p. 159 ff.; Hermes, XIX (1884), p. 1 ff., esp. p. 11.
[16] We must remember that this restriction in the recruiting sources of the legionaries was wholly an act of free choice on the part of Augustus, whatever the motive may have been. That suggested by Seeck, l. c., p. 611, does not seem very probable; it involved a change in the usage to which men had already become accustomed in the civil wars, and it was gradually but completely abandoned by his successors. There was nothing in the general conditions which required it.
[17] Rh. Mus., XLVIII (1893), p. 602 ff. His conclusions in part rest on none too certain foundations, and introduce an insufficiently motivated complexity in the system of levying troops, for Augustus at the beginning of his career used non-citizen soldiers freely, and after the defeat of Varus, of the two new legions which were raised one was a Galatian contingent, the Deiotariana, which was given citizenship and a place in the army (Mommsen, Res Gestae Divi Augusti, 2nd ed. (1885), p. 70; O. Seeck, Gesch. d. Untergangs d. ant. Welt, 3rd ed., I, p. 260), and the other was recruited from the non-citizen population of Rome (Tac., Ann., I, 31, “vernacula multitudo”; cf. Mommsen, Hermes, XIX (1884), p. 15, n. 1). Seeck’s statement of the system which he believes Augustus followed is: “Prätorianer und Stadtsoldaten rekrutirten sich aus Latium, Etrurien, Umbrien, und den frühesten Bürgercolonien; den übrigen Italikern sind die Legionen zugewiesen, den Bürgern der Provinz die Freiwilligencohorten; aus den Libertinen setzen sich die Mannschaften der Flotte und der Feuerwehr zusammen; die Nichtbürger bilden Cohorten und Alen und einen Theil der Flotte.”
[18] In B. C. 8 it was 4,233,000; in A. D. 14, 4,957,000. See the Mon. Anc., 8. Of course if we accept the view still defended by Gardthausen and Kornemann that this number represented only the male population (Augustus, II, 532; and Jahrb. für Nationalökonomie u. Statistik, III, 14 (1897), p. 291 ff.), a citizen army of more than a million men might have been raised, but the view of Beloch and Ed. Meyer that the numbers in the Mon. Anc. include women and children seems the only one possible. See Meyer’s complete refutation of Kornemann, Jahrb. für Nationalökonomie, III, 15 (1898), p. 59 ff.
[19] This figure, 800,000, is modest, amounting to roughly 1½% of the total population, about the same proportion which Germany and France have for some time past kept under arms in time of peace, while their war strength is several times as great as this. Rome did actually at one time, the crisis of the Second Punic War, have at least 7½% of her total population in the field, even according to the most conservative estimates. Cf. H. Delbrück, Gesch. d. Kriegskunst, I, 2nd ed. (1908), pp. 349, 355 ff.
[20] Mommsen, Hermes, XIX (1884), p. 3, n. 3, gives the number of Roman citizens who were engaged in the war between Octavian and Antony as 300,000, which makes a total of 600,000 troops or more.
[21] The details in Marquardt, Röm. Staatsver., V, 2 (2nd ed., 1884), p. 444 f.
[22] Or possibly 28; see von Domaszewski, “Zur Geschichte des Rheinheeres,” Röm.-Germ. Korrespondenzblatt, 1910, on the date of the establishment of the twenty-first and twenty-second legions. There is some question about the exact date at which the increase in the size of the legions was made (see the literature cited by Gardthausen, Augustus, II, p. 775), but that does not affect our argument. See above note 7.
[23] Mommsen, op. cit., p. 75; Liebenam in Pauly-Wiss., VI, 1605. We must remember that this number was somewhat low; and was gradually raised by succeeding emperors. Claudius added two legions, Nero one, and Galba two, so that Vespasian had thirty, and that number seems to have been maintained until the time of Septimius Severus, who added three more. It is significant that Trajan found 30 legions quite sufficient for extensive and difficult conquests, so that 25 would doubtless have been regarded even by him as adequate for the conquest of Germany. For the evidence of the gradual increase in the army see Marquardt, op. cit., p. 448 ff.
[24] The evidence for the size of the legion at this time is conveniently summarized by R. Cagnat, “Legio,” Daremberg et Saglio, III, p. 1050 f. The most elaborate discussion of the size of the legion (especially that of Caesar) is in Fr. Stolle, Lager und Heer der Römer, 1912, pp. 1-23. He finds what he regards as evidence for legions of varying size, from 3600 up to 5000 men. The standard legion of the empire, however, can hardly have been less than 6000. Cf. also Fröhlich’s review of Stolle’s work, Berl. Philol. Wochenschr., 1913, 530 ff.
[25] A list of these is given by Liebenam, op. cit., p. 1607 ff.
[26] Calculations as to the effective strength of the standing army of Augustus vary somewhat. H. Furneaux (The Annals of Tacitus, I (1884), p. 109), gives 350,000; Mommsen (Hermes, XIX (1884), p. 4—apparently excluding the naval forces), 300,000 as a maximum figure; Seeck (Rh. Mus., XLVIII (1893), p. 618) reckons on the basis of 20 legions (which would be applicable only down to the year 6 A. D.) 132,000 citizen soldiery out of Italy: in his Gesch. des Untergangs d. ant. Welt, 3rd ed., I (1910), p. 255, on a basis of 25 to 30 legions, from Augustus to Diocletian, he calculates the total forces of the empire at 300,000 to 350,000; H. Delbrück (Gesch. d. Kriegskunst, II, 2nd ed. (1904), p. 174) counting only the 25 legions, estimates 225,000 men; if other contingents be included the total would certainly exceed 250,000 even on the basis of his extremely low estimates; Gardthausen (Augustus, I, p. 635) estimates 250,000-300,000. The figure 200,000 which he gives on p. 637 seems to refer to the conditions before 6 A. D., when only 18 legions were maintained. G. Boissier’s number, 500,000 (L’opposition sous les Césars, 3rd ed. 1892, p. 4), seems to count the auxilia three times, once in making up the number 250,000 for the legions, and again in doubling that!
[27] For historical parallels to this condition compare Miss Ellen Semple, Influences of Geographic Environment, New York, 1911, p. 215 ff.
[28] E. M. Arndt, Zeitschr. f. Geschichtswissenschaft, III (1845), p. 244, calculated a population of 800-1000 per (German) square mile, but only then on the assumption, which no man would now accept, that the Roman reports about the primitive conditions of agriculture were incorrect. On this estimate the population of Germany between the Rhine, Elbe, and the Main-Saale line, which is the part generally considered in the question of conquest, would have been roughly 1,840,000 to 2,300,000. H. Von Sybel (Entstehung d. deutschen Königtums, 1881, p. 80) estimates the Germans at 12,000,000, basing his calculation on a highly problematic series of inferences regarding the extent of territory which the Sugambri once occupied, 40,000 of whom were said to have been transferred to the west bank of the Rhine by Tiberius. Karl Lamprecht, Deutsche Geschichte (1894), I, p. 236 accepts the traditional statement that the Goths alone amounted to five-sixths of a million, a reckoning which would make the total population of Germany many times that number. Even G. Waitz, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte (1880), I, p. 19, takes at their face value such Roman exaggerations as 300,000 warriors for the Cimbri and Teutones, 60,000 for the Bructeri, and the like, figures which presuppose an incredibly dense population.
[29] Histoire des Institutions politiques de l’ancienne France, I (1875), “L’Invasion Germanique,” p. 310 ff. For Delbrück’s results see the chapter entitled “Zahlen,” Gesch. d. Kriegskunst, II, 2nd ed. (1909), p. 294 ff. On the actual number of the Vandals and their allies, a cardinal point in the discussion, compare H. Delbrück, Preuss. Jahrb., 81 (1895), 475 f. O. Seeck (Jahrb. für Nationalökonomie u. Statistik, III, 13 (1897), p. 173 ff.) argued unsuccessfully for the older view, but Delbrück (Gesch. d. Kriegskunst, II, 2nd ed. (1909), p. 308 f.) has completely settled this specific question.
[30] “Observations sur l’état et le nombre des populations germaniques dans la seconde moitié du IVe siècle, d’après Ammien Marcellin,” Mélanges Cagnat, Paris, 1912, pp. 247-267.
[31] “Der urgermanische Gau und Staat,” Preussische Jahrbücher, 81, (1895), p. 471 ff. The main arguments here presented (except the detailed criticism and comparison of a number of ancient estimates, p. 474 ff.) are repeated with some slight modifications in his Gesch. d. Kriegskunst, II, 2nd ed. (1909), p. 12 ff. L. Schmidt, Gesch. der deutschen Stämme, I (1904), p. 48, accepts Delbrück’s calculations indeed, though with some reserve; p. 46 f. he criticizes effectively the absurd exaggerations with which the pages of many ancient authors abound.
[32] Preuss. Jahrb., p. 482.
[33] Grundriss der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre, I, Leipzig, 1901, p. 158 ff., especially 159 f. and 183.
[34] Velleius, II, 109.
[35] Op. cit., I, p. 48; II, p. 209.
[36] See Gardthausen, Augustus, I. p. 1169 on this campaign.
[37] This is the calculation Caesar uses for the Helvetians (Bell. Gall., I, 29), and Velleius (II, 116) for the Pannonian rebels. Cf. Beloch, Rh. Mus., LIV (1899), p. 431, 1. L. Schmidt uses the ratio of one to five. It seems more reasonable, however, to use the Roman system of reckoning. Delbrück, Preuss. Jahrb., 81, p. 480, uses the one to five ratio for the proportion of warriors who might be expected to attend the war council, but that is a slightly different thing from the utmost that a tribe could do in a desperate situation.
[38] That the Cheruscan confederacy was originally not more powerful than the Marcomannic seems clear from the fact that, even after the defection of the Semnones, Longobardi and certain Suebian tribes (Tacitus, Ann., II, 45) Arminius and Maroboduus fought a drawn battle. Tacitus’ statement that the counter defection of Inguiomerus was a complete offset is most improbable; see L. Schmidt, op. cit., II, 2, 181.
[39] La population française. Histoire de la population avant 1789, I, Paris, 1889, p. 99 ff. Otto Hirschfeld (Sitzungsber. d. Berl. Akad., 1897, p. 1101) also uses this bit of evidence as a basis for calculations. Beloch, however, (Rh. Mus., LIV (1899), p. 414 f.) utterly rejects it, because he insists on taking the word ἄνδρες here as equivalent to fighting men. That is doubtless correct, but as it makes arrant nonsense of the calculation, it should not be ascribed to so well-informed a scientist as Posidonius, but only to the stupid Diodorus, who has thus changed what must have been an estimate only of the total population, into one of the number capable of bearing arms. Beloch’s remark that the ancient Gauls had no idea of the total population, but only of the fighting men, seems to go too far. If one number be known it is an easy matter to calculate the other. Certainly Posidonius was capable of multiplying any figures the Gauls may have given him for their fighting men by 4 or 5, in order to secure an estimate of the whole population. Besides, the Gauls must have had a certain accepted proportion between the total population of a district and the number of fighting men it could produce. They had a great many more occasions to make use of such calculations than any one in modern times would ever have; for questions of life and death depended only too frequently on just such estimates.
[40] Strabo, IV, 3, 2.
[41] Rh. Mus., LIV (1899), pp. 438, 443.
[42] Delbrück, Preuss. Jahrb., p. 47 f. Any exact calculation of the total number of tribes in Germany is impossible because our knowledge of the different tribal names comes from diverse periods, and the designations of clans and confederacies varied greatly from time to time.
[43] Delbrück, Preuss. Jahrb., p. 428, note, and Geschichte der Kriegskunst, I, 2nd ed. (1909), p. 14.
[44] Deutsches Wirtschaftsleben im Mittelalter, Leipzig, 1886, I, p. 148 ff., esp. 161 ff.
[45] Assuming that the region occupied by the Germans in the time of Augustus was approximately as large as the modern German empire. Agrippa’s imperfect calculation, even including Raetia and Noricum, was to be sure much smaller, i. e., 686 × 248 m.; Pliny, Nat. Hist., IV, 98.
[46] See Beloch, Rh. Mus., LIV (1899), pp. 418, 423, 428. In his Bevölkerung, p. 457, he had estimated one in ten, which was too large a fraction.
[47] Tac., Ann., I, 56.
[48] Tac., Ann., II, 16. This was the force later kept at the Rhine. Tacitus, Ann., IV, 5; Josephus, II, 16, 4.
[49] Delbrück, Preuss. Jahrb., p. 481 f., has well refuted the Roman claims of great numerical superiority on the part of the Germans, and concludes that the forces on both sides were about equal. Judging from the campaign against Maroboduus, which it may be noted, is the only one in which we have apparently reliable information regarding the strength of both sides, one might safely infer that, at least under Tiberius, the Romans enjoyed actual numerical superiority.
[50] Delbrück, Preuss. Jahrb., p. 481, exaggerates somewhat the advantage in cavalry which the Germans enjoyed.
[51] Velleius, II, 106.
[52] The overwhelmingly superior force of Rome is specifically admitted by some historians, but hardly seems as yet to be generally accepted. See especially Fustel de Coulanges, Histoire des institutions politiques de l’ancienne France, vol. II, 2nd ed. (by C. Jullian), Paris, 1891, p. 328; Ed. Meyer, Kl. Schr., p. 486; von Domaszewski, Geschichte der römischen Kaiser, Leipzig, 1909, p. 245. The same thing is meant also by J. Beloch where he observes that the Romans recognized “dass die Eroberung grössere Anstrengungen kosten würde als das Objekt wert war” (Griechische Geschichte, 2nd ed., vol. I, 1 (1912), p. 14).
[54] Cf. Koepp, Die Römer in Deutschland, p. 35: “Kurz, als Tiberius am Rhein erschien, waren die Befürchtungen der ersten Aufregung schon zerstreut, die Folgen des Unglücksfalls eingedämmt. Rasch war das Heer ergänzt, ja vermehrt”; Hübner, op. cit., p. 111: “Nach des Varus Niederlage musste zeitweilig das rechtsrheinische Gebiet verlassen werden; Tiberius und Germanicus gewannen es wieder”; Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, V, 53: “The defeat was soon compensated, in so far as the Rhine army was immediately not simply made up to its strength, but considerably reinforced”; Gardthausen, I, p. 1223: “damals ... wurde die Rheinarmee auf acht Legionen verstärkt.” So Niese, Röm. Gesch., p. 298.
[55] Vell., II, 120: “mittitur [Tiberius] ad Germaniam ... ultro Rhenum cum exercitu transgreditur.”
[56] Suet., Tib., 18 and 19; Gardthausen, I, p. 1224.
[57] Gardthausen, I, p. 1225.
[58] Suet., Tib., 19.
[59] Cf. Tac., Ann., II, 26, 4: “Precante Germanico annum efficiendis coeptis.” This is the basis of Mommsen’s statement (Hist. of Rome, V, p. 59): [Germanicus] “reported to Rome that in the next campaign he should have the subjugation of Germany complete.” And just preceding this the same author says: “The second tropaeum of Germanicus [in the Teutoburg forest] spoke of the overthrow of all the Germanic tribes between the Rhine and the Elbe.” See also p. 54 f. for further discussion of the campaigns of Tiberius and Germanicus. Mommsen speaks of the campaigns of the summers 12, 13, and 14 as years of inaction, a mere continuance of the war, of which nothing at all is reported. This gap in the record Riese explains, Forschungen, etc., p. 13 by the meagerness of our sources (Velleius, Suetonius, and Dio) covering the last years of Augustus, as compared with the fuller account in Tacitus of the early years of the regency of Tiberius. So Koepp, op. cit., p. 34.
[60] Hist. of Rome, V, p. 62.
[61] I, p. 1201.
[62] Cf. p. 36.
[63] Cf. Gardthausen, I, p. 492: “Mit einem Worte Augustus ist derselbe geblieben: kalt, klar und klug sein ganzes Leben lang, keineswegs so genial wie Julius Caesar, aber entschieden verständiger.” These characteristics are uncontradicted save, of course, by the rhetorically embellished gossip about Augustus’ discomposure after the defeat of Varus; see Suet., Aug., 23; Dio, 56, 23. There is not the slightest evidence of a panic at Rome or of alarm on the part of any one except Augustus. Yet at the Pannonian-Dalmatian revolt, only a short time before (6-9 A. D.), the people were greatly wrought up because of wars and famines (Dio, 55, 31), and Augustus announced in the senate that in a few days the enemy might reach Rome, while Tiberius was provided with 15 legions (Velleius, II, 111, 1). So there was profound alarm at Rome at the time of the Marcomannic war (167-180 A. D. See Julius Capitolinus, Marcus Antoninus, 13, 1 and Ammianus, XXXI, 5, 13), while at the invasion of the Cimbri and Teutones all Italy was palsied with fear (Sall., Jug., 114; Orosius, 5, 15, 7; 6, 14, 2). But at the defeat of Varus we hear nothing of the kind. Besides, Augustus was now well advanced in years, his health was precarious, his daughter and granddaughter had humiliated and cruelly disappointed him, while the successive deaths in his family had forced him to adopt as his heir and successor Tiberius, whom he greatly disliked. It is small wonder that in his old age and bereavements he should give way to some momentary weakness. The Varus calamity, coming so soon after the Pannonian revolt, and just at the time when the strain from the latter had momentarily lifted, must have been too much for Augustus to bear.
[64] Gardthausen, I, p. 508. This view of Augustus is not invalidated by Gardthausen’s further statement: “Der Kaiser scheute sich nicht zurückzutreten, wenn der Widerstand grösser war als die Mittel, die er darauf verwenden wollte oder konnte.” These words are nothing more than an attempt to explain what all who hold to the traditional view are forced to explain, viz., Augustus’ reversal of policy in “die schwere Wahl zwischen der Politik des dauernden Friedens und der Politik der fortgesetzten Eroberung.”
[65] Kleine Schriften, p. 462.
[66] Meyer, l. c.: “Der Vorwurf, dass er feige gewesen sei, ist gewiss unbegründet.”
[67] The reduction of the army after the battle of Actium shows that Augustus wished no larger standing forces than would be sufficient for the internal and external peace of the empire. See Gardthausen, I, p. 637; Furneaux, Tacitus, Introd., p. 121; Mommsen, Germanische Politik, etc., p. 8: “ja man darf sagen, dass Augustus das Militärwesen in einem Grade auf die Defensive beschränkte.”
[68] Monumentum Ancyranum, V, 14. Cf. Dio, 56, 33; Suet., Aug., 101; Tac., Ann., I, 11: “quae cuncta sua manu perscripserat Augustus addideratque consilium coercendi intra terminos imperii, incertum metu an per invidiam.” The sneer, “metu an per invidiam”, found in the words of Tacitus, who wrote in the time of the great expansive conquests of Trajan, and who had only contempt for the prudent foreign policy of Augustus (see Furneaux on this passage), has undoubtedly caused many to restrict Augustus’ peace policy to the period after Varus’ defeat. But no such restriction should be made. We now know that the Monum. Ancyr. was not written at one time, nor at the end of Augustus’ life, but was finished in 6 A. D. See Chapter III, notes 84 and 88. This shows that his counsel of peace and his advice not to extend the limits of the empire was made prior to, and hence not as a result of, the defeat of Varus (9 A. D.), as has so frequently been asserted.
[69] Aug., 21: “nec ulli genti sine iustis et necessariis causis bellum intulit.”
[70] Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. 1910, I, p. 1 f.
[71] Gardthausen, I, p. 317: “Freude am Kriege und an Eroberungen ist bekanntlich das Letzte, was man dem jugendlichen und doch staatsklugen Caesar billiger Weise vorwerfen konnte.” Tacitus’ statement (Ann., I, 3), that Augustus’ later wars against the Germans were “abolendae magis infamiae ob amissum cum Quintilio Varo exercitum quam cupidine proferendi imperii”, does not necessarily mean, as is often inferred, that the earlier wars aimed to enlarge the empire.
[72] Vell., II, 89: “Finita vicesimo anno bella civilia, sepulta externa, revocata pax, sopitus ubique armorum furor, restituta vis legibus, iudiciis auctoritas.” This is well expressed by Botsford, Hist. of Rome, p. 205: “The chief aim of Augustus was to protect the frontiers, to maintain quiet by diplomacy and to wage war solely for the sake of peace.”
[73] Kleine Schriften, p. 455.
[74] Gardthausen, I, p. 477: “Der Friede war der Preis, um den Rom sich die Herrschaft des Augustus gefallen liess; und auch seine Nachfolger haben im Wesentlichen eine Politik des Friedens befolgt.” Cf. Lang, op. cit., p. 56: “Sein [Tiberius] Ziel war es daher, als er zur Herrschaft gekommen war, im Sinne und in Fortsetzung der Politik seines Adoptivvaters und Vorgängers Augustus, ihnen [den Provinzen] diese Ruhe und Ordnung zu verschaffen.”
[75] Suet., Aug., 22: “Ianum Quirinum, semel atque iterum a condita urbe ante memoriam suam clausum, in multo breviore temporis spatio terra marique pace parta ter clusit.”
[76] Davis, Outline Hist. of the Rom. Empire, New York, 1907, p. 59.
[77] Dio, 54, 20; Suet., Aug., 23.
[78] See Eduard Meyer, Kleine Schriften, p. 230: “He [Augustus] might have followed the precedent of Caesar and have aspired to world-conquest and absolute monarchy; by shrinking from it, by giving the state a new constitution and retaining for himself only limited powers, he made world-conquest impossible”; Ibid., p. 470 f.; Gardthausen, I, p. 1069; Drumann, Röm. Gesch., IV (1910), p. 300; Gibbon (see above p. 57). It is refuted also by the emperor Julian, who shows himself to be singularly well-informed regarding the history of the early empire (Cf. J. Geffcken, Kaiser Julianus, Leipzig, 1914, p. 150: “Julian zeigt ... wie gründlich er sich mit der Geschichte jener Zeit beschäftigt hat”). In The Caesars, 326 C, he represents Augustus as saying: “For I did not give way to boundless ambition and aim at enlarging her [Rome’s] empire at all costs, but assigned for it two boundaries defined as it were by nature herself, the Danube and the Euphrates. Then after conquering the Scythians and Thracians I did not employ the long reign that you gods vouchsafed me in making projects for war after war, but devoted my leisure to legislation and to reforming the evils that war had caused.” (Trans. by Wilmer Cave Wright).
[79] Op. cit., p. 12. There is at least consistency in von Ranke’s position. The only conceivable reason for the conquest of Germany would be precisely such a fantastic dream of universal empire. But the weakness of the whole argument of those who claim that Germany’s conquest was intended is that its logical consequences lead to absurd results, contradicting all that we know of the character of the emperor and of his times.
[80] II, 39.
[81] Cf. Drumann, Gesch. Roms,² 1910, IV, p. 300: “Octavian ergriff als Imperator das Schwert nur zu seiner Verteidigung; er führte nur gerechte Kriege; die Lorbeeren reizten ihn nicht, und darin, nicht in der Ueberzeugung, dass ein endloss vergrösserter Koloss in sich zusammenstürzt, lag die erste und vorzügliche Ursache seiner Mässigung. Gern hätte er den Tempel des Janus für immer geschlossen.”
[82] “Zum Monum. Ancyr.” Beiträge zur alten Gesch., II (1902), pp. 141-162.
[83] This view, together with the statement that the last addition was made by Augustus in 14 A. D., was subsequently modified by Kornemann in placing the number of revisions at seven (Klio, IV (1904), pp. 88-97), and the final revision at the end or middle of the year 6 A. D. (Beiträge zur alten Gesch., III (1903), p. 74 f.).
[84] “Zur Entstehung des Monum. Ancyr.,” Hermes, 38 (1903), pp. 618-628.
[85] Vulić, “Quando fu scritto il monumento Ancyrano,” Riv. di Storia Ant., XIII (1909), pp. 41-46, objects to the theory of interpolation in chapter 26. In it Augustus says: “Gallias et Hispanias provincias et Germaniam ... pacavi”, i. e. the Gauls and the Spains are considered real provinces, while Germany is a neighboring territory, over which for the time Rome’s beneficent influence was extended. The necessity of bringing out this distinction made imperative the repetition of the word “provinciae” (read two lines above), and this repetition justifies the abandonment of the geographical order.
[86] “Nochmals das Monum. Ancyr.,” Klio, IV (1904), pp. 88-97.
[87] “Récents Travaux sur les Res Gestae Divi Augusti,” Mélanges Cagnat, Paris, 1912, p. 144.
[88] Cf. Bésnier, op. cit., p. 145: “nous savons en tout cas, qu’ Auguste n’a pas improvisé son apologie à la veille de sa mort, qu’il a commencé de bonne heure à la rédiger, au moins dès l’an 12 av. J.-C. et peut-être plus tot encore, qu’en l’an 6 de notre ére il a cessé d’y travailler, et que dans l’intervalle il l’a enrichie graduellement d’additions nombreuses et significatives.... Le souple génie politique d’Auguste s’y manifeste tout entier et l’on y retrouve, présentées sous le meilleur jour, les grandes pensées dont il s’est inspire tour à tour pendant son règne si long et si bien rempli.”
[89] Cf. Ritterling, op. cit., p. 176: “Aber eine durchgreifende Aenderung ist sicher erst infolge der lollianischen Niederlage und des durch diese hervorgerufenen Umschwunges der römischen Politik gegenüber den Germanen vorgenommen worden. Bisher war die Kriegführung gegen die Germanen eine in der Hauptsache rein defensive gewesen ... Eine Eroberung des rechtsrheinischen Gebietes lag der bisherigen römischen Politik durchaus fern. Jetzt fasste Augustus die völlige Einverleibung Germaniens bis an die Elbe ins Auge und traf während seiner mehrjährigen Anwesenheit in Gallien von 16 bis 13 die in grossem Stile angelegten Vorbereitungen zur Ausführung dieses Planes.”
[90] Op. cit., p. 25.
[91] Monumentum Ancyranum, VI, 3.
[92] Mommsen, Röm. Gesch., V, p. 23; Gardthausen, I, p. 1066; Jullian, Histoire de la Gaule, Paris, 1914, IV, p. 108.
[93] Dio, 54, 20; Vell., II, 97; Suet., Aug., 23.
[94] Paul Meyer, Der Triumphzug des Germanicus, p. 85.
[95] I, p. 1067. According to Niese, op. cit., p. 295, the decision came later, and by reason of a new attack from the Sugambri: “Dann erfolgte 12 v. Chr. ein neuer Angriff des Sugambrers Melo, und nun ward beschlossen, um Gallien zu sichern und zu beruhigen, über den Rhein hinüberzugreifen und die Germanen zu unterwerfen.”
[96] Kleine Schriften, p. 471.
[97] Op. cit., p. 214: “Der Kaiser entschloss sich jetzt von seinem Grundsatz, das Reich nicht durch Eroberung zu mehren, abzugehen und ... auf diese Weise eine Grenze herzustellen welche leichter zu vertheidigen und kürzer war als die jetzt bestehende.”
[98] Germanische Politik, etc., p. 9.
[99] Op. cit., 29.
[100] The same statement is made by other historians, e. g., Merivale, General Hist. of Rome, New York, 1876, p. 431; Bury (Hist. of the Roman Empire, New York, 1893, p. 125), who speaks of “The project of extending the empire to the Albis, into which perhaps the cautious emperor was persuaded by the ardor of his favorite stepson, Drusus.” Cf. Mommsen, Germanische Politik, etc., p. 10: “Ob Augustus ganz von freien Stücken sich dazu entschloss, die Friedenspolitik zu verlassen, oder ob er dem Drängen der Seinigen [Agrippa, Tiberius, and Drusus] nachgab, die Niederlage des Lollius gab den Ausschlag.”
[101] I, p. 1049 f.
[102] Op. cit., V, p. 142.
[103] Eduard Meyer, Kleine Schriften, p. 230, citing Augustus’ decision against imperial expansion, as a remarkable instance of the power and consequence of the individual action in history, says: “If we put the question, how it came to pass that the ... Germans were not bent under the yoke of Rome ... the only reason history can give is that it was the result of the decision which Augustus made concerning the internal organization of the empire, when he had become its absolute master by the battle of Actium. This decision sprang from his character and his own free will.” On the other hand Beloch, Griech. Gesch.², I, 1 (1912), p. 15, takes the traditional view: “nicht der Wille zur Eroberung hat den Römern gefehlt, sondern die Macht; wenn man lieber will, sie erkannten dass die Eroberung grössere Anstrengungen kosten würde, als das Objekt wert war.”
[104] Kaiser Augustus, p. 111.
[105] I, p. 1048 f.
[106] Op. cit., V, p. 153 f.
[107] Mommsen, Germanische Politik, etc., p. 13: “wie Gallien durch Caesar, so war vierzig Jahre später Germanien zum römischen Reiche gebracht, die neue Monarchie mit Waffenruhm und Siegesglanz geschmückt worden.” In explanation of the fact that still later, in Tiberius’ time, Germany is spoken of as “almost a province” (Vell., II, 97, 4), Mommsen says: “so ist es begreiflich genug, dass man das nachherige Aufgeben desselben mit dem Willen des Augustus zu beschönigen bemüht war.” Niese, Grundriss der röm. Gesch., 1910, p. 297; Gardthausen, II, p. 1197; Fr. Kauffman, “Deutsche Altertumskunde” (in Matthias’ Handbuch d. deutschen Unterrichts, München, 1913, p. 317): “In den Jahren 12 v. Ch. Geb. bestand offiziell eine römische Provinz Germanien, die das Land vom Rhein bis zur Elbe unfasste.”
[108] But see the evidence to prove that as late as 6 A. D. Augustus did not consider Germany a province. (See Chapter III, note 85). Augustus’ own opinion as to whether it was or was not a province at this date is of the highest value for our question. For if he did not so consider it, then a great deal of first class documentary evidence is necessary to establish the fact that it really was a province. Similarly some convincing reason must be given to account for his failure to call it a province. Such evidence is not forthcoming. On the other hand there is no evidence to show that Augustus did regard it as a province but was hindered by the defeat of Varus from formally organizing it as such. For since no part of the Monum. Ancyr. was written after 6 A. D., it cannot be cited as evidence of any change in Augustus’ views after 9 A. D., as is often done on the assumption that the final revision of that document took place in 14 A. D.
[109] II, p. 1089.
[110] I, p. 1198: “Wenn auch die von Schuchhardt gefundenen Reste zweifelhaft sind, so bleibt doch immer die Thatsache bestehen, dass die Römer im Innern von Deutschland Castelle angelegt haben.”
[111] Die Römer in Deutschland, p. 34. Eduard Meyer, in Kleine Schriften, p. 230, expresses the same view in different words: “Now the very existence of Teutonic languages is a consequence of the fact that Germany was not subdued by the Romans.... Caesar would have subdued Germany as well as he did Gaul when he had once begun; but for the military and financial organization which Augustus gave to the Roman world, the task was too great indeed. So the emperor left Germany to herself.”
[112] Westfalen, p. 40: “das rechtsrheinische Germanien ist niemals eigentlich Provinz gewesen, auch nicht vor der Varusschlacht.”
[113] Studia Romana, 1859, P. 130.
[114] Röm. Gesch., V, p. 23 f.
[115] In Germanische Politik, etc., p. 13, Mommsen suggests that these terms, Upper and Lower Germany, later and improperly applied to the small territory on the left bank of the Rhine, were probably original designations for Germany between the Rhine and the Elbe. For the correct status, see Riese’s view as given below, p. 73 ff.
[116] “Die Verwaltung der Rheingrenze,” etc., Commentationes philologae in honorem Th. Mommseni, p. 434.
[117] Röm. Staatsverwaltung, I (1881), p. 271.
[118] Op. cit., p. 212.
[119] p. 219.
[120] p. 229.
[121] p. 233. Pelham, “The Roman Frontier in Southern Germany” (in Essays on Roman History, 1910, p. 179 f.), while speaking repeatedly of Upper and Lower Germany, limits his discussion for the most part to the period after Augustus’ time and specifically to the territory lying along the left bank of the Rhine. He says, referring to Tacitus’ statement (Germ., 29) to the effect that a stretch of territory beyond the Upper Rhine had been annexed by Rome and made a part of the province, that Upper Germany must be the province meant; that the land annexed to it was in reality “debatable land” (dubiae possessionis of Tacitus), and had been so for more than 150 years. The last sentence clearly indicates that, in the writer’s view, Rome had never had the land organized as her own territory.
[122] Forschungen zur Gesch. der Rheinlande in der Römerzeit, p. 5 f. See also Riese in Westdeutsche Zeitschrift f. Gesch. u. Kunst, Korrespondenz-Blatt, xiv (1895), p. 156 f. He shows here that the two provinces, Upper and Lower Germany, were not established until the time of Domitian, some time between 82-90 A. D.: “Vor dem Jahre 90 gab es also ... nur eine Germania, in der ein exercitus Germanicus als superior und inferior unter zwei zu gegenseitiger Hülfe verbundenen Heereslegaten standen; dagegen gab es keine Germania superior und keine Germania inferior.... Auch ist jene Germania keine Provinz, sondern der Heeresbezirk der gallischen Provinzen.”
[123] Plin., N. H., iv, 105; Dio, 53, 12; Oros., I, 2.
[124] Ritterling (op. cit., p. 162) believes, however, that there were only two Gauls, and that the division took place at the beginning of Augustus’ reign: “Bei der Neuordnung des Reiches nach Beendigung der Bürgerkriege, i. J. 727-27, war ganz Gallien in zwei Kommandobezirke geteilt worden: der eine umfasste Aquitania und Narbonensis, der andere Gallia comata, also die Gebiete der späteren Provinzen Lugdunensis und Belgica.” See also Gardthausen, I, 662; II, 355.
[126] Marquardt, Röm. Staatsverwaltung, I², 504.
[127] There seems to be no doubt that the military forces of all the Gauls were at this time under the direction of one commander; further that this position was in the nature of a commandership-in-chief of all the forces, on the lower, middle, and upper Rhine. Cf. Ritterling, op. cit., p. 187: “die Neuordnung der politischen und militärischen Verhältnisse Galliens durch Augustus seit dem Jahre 739-15 musste notwendig auch eine Aenderung in der Organisation des Heereskommandos zur Folge haben. Dem Statthalter der neugebildeten Provinz Belgica, in deren Gebiet jetzt beide gallischen Heere ihre Standlager hatten, konnte unmöglich diese bedeutendste Streitmacht des Reiches und die Führung des Krieges gegen die Germanen anvertraut werden. Anderseits machte die Grösse der militärischen Aufgaben und das Ineinandergreifen der geplanten Operationen am Mittel- und Niederrhein ein einheitliches Oberkommando notwendig.”
[128] Characters and Events of Roman History, p. 165.
[129] See also Sadée, Römer und Germanen, II. Theil, p. 99 (the chapter “Die Befreiung Deutschlands durch Arminius”); Wolf, Die That des Arminius, p. 41 f. (“Der Befreiungskampf”). Eduard Meyer’s statement that it was not possible for Rome to raise sufficient citizen troops to win back the advantage lost in 9 A. D. has already been answered (see p. 38).
[130] Reitzenstein, “Das deutsche Heldenlied bei Tacitus,” Hermes, 48 (1913), p. 268, quite correctly observes that the defeat of Varus had no such significance; that there was no change in Rome’s policy until Germanicus’ time, and that Rome’s contest with Germany through three decades did nothing to unite the strength of her antagonist, for hatred toward Arminius and the desire for his downfall characterize a political situation which is found at a much later time.
[131] Cf. also Mommsen, Germanische Politik, etc., p. 14 f.: “Die Unterwerfung Germaniens ... stockt mit dem Jahre 747 [7 B. C.] plötzlich. Wenn die sachlichen Verhältnisse dafür schlechterdings keinen Grund an die Hand geben, so liegt derselbe in den persönlichen klar genug vor.” As reasons of a private character he mentions: (1) the deaths of Agrippa and Drusus; (2) the estrangement of Tiberius. Then, after Tiberius’ return and the beginning of the war anew (4 A. D.), the following events: (1) the Dalmatian-Pannonian uprising; (2) the defeat of Varus; (3) the recall of Germanicus and the conditions surrounding the absolute monarchy of Tiberius.
[132] II, p. 1214; this is also the view of Ferrero, Characters and Events, p. 165.
[133] Op. cit., p. 117: “Freilich gehörte dazu eine sehr grosse Anstrengung; nur Heere von mehreren Legionen durften sich in das germanische Gebiet tiefer hineinwagen. Aber Cäsar hatte zuletzt in Gallien zum wenigsten 11 oder 12 Legionen gehabt. Germanicus hatte nur 8. Man sieht nicht weshalb das römische Reich nicht diese oder eine noch grössere Zahl Legionen viele Jahre hintereinander hätte über den Rhein schicken, oder wie die germanischen Grenzvölker sich dagegen hätten wehren können.”
[134] Practically the same point is made by Paul Meyer, op. cit., p. 86. That is, Germanicus was making notable progress in his campaigns, but was forced by the suspicions and jealousy of Tiberius to sheathe his sword. For the purpose of closing his career an elaborate and well deserved triumph was given him May 26, 17 A. D. Von Ranke, op. cit., p. 28, on the other hand, does not believe that hostilities were renewed against the Germans under Tiberius for purposes of conquest “sondern nur darauf, die Ehre der römischen Waffen herzustellen.” Hence the Roman troops were withdrawn because “die Germanen wurden, wie Tiberius mit Recht bemerkt, für die römische Welt durch ihre inneren Entzweiungen unschädlich.”
[135] Die Römer in Deutschland, p. 45.
[136] This is not convincing to Riese (p. 12, n. 1): “Allerdings bildeten diese Schädigungen ... nur einen und zwar nicht den wichtigsten Grund der Abberufung des Germanicus.” As for the matter of the great costs of such a campaign, one should bear in mind that the difference in cost between maintaining an ancient army on a war footing and on a peace footing was relatively slight. There was no great expense involved in the wastage of artillery and of equipment, when most of the fighting was done hand to hand, and when the soldiers required less rather than more supplies while living in part from the enemy’s country. As a professional standing army was always ready, and no new levies of troops required, not even in the greater wars, regular campaigns in Germany would have been a very slight drain on the treasury.
[137] See op. cit., p. 20.
[138] Cf. Merivale: History of the Romans under the Empire, IV, p. 240: “These repeated advances ... though far from having the character of conquests, could not altogether fail in extending the influence of Rome throughout a great portion of central Europe. They inspired a strong sense of her invincibility, and of her conquering destiny; at the same time they exalted the respect of the barbarians for the southern civilization, which could marshal such irresistible forces at so vast a distance from the sources of its power.”