The English Language

"The ego, with reference to the non-ego, is apt, thinking of himself, to propound the alternative, 'Shall I compel, or shall I leave him to do as he likes?' so that, thinking of the other, the alternative is, 'shall he be restrained, or shall he be left to his own will?' Accordingly, the express introduction of his own will is likely to have reference to compulsion, in case of opposition: the express introduction of the will of another, is likely to mean no more than the gracious permission of the ego to let non-ego do as he likes. Correlatively, the suppression of reference to his own will, and the adoption of a simply predictive form on the part of the ego, is likely to be the mode with which, when the person is changed, he will associate the idea of another having his own way; while the suppression of reference to the will of the non-ego is likely to infer restraint produced by the predominant will of the ego.

"Occasionally, the will of the non-ego is referred to as under restraint in modern times. To I will not, the answer is sometimes you shall, meaning, in spite of the will—sometimes you will, meaning that the will will be changed by fear or sense of the inutility of resistance."^[62]

§ 591. I am beaten.—This is a present combination, and it is present on the strength of the verb am, not on the strength of the participle beaten, which is præterite.

The following table exhibits the expedients on the part of the different languages of the Gothic stock, since the loss of the proper passive form of the Mœso-Gothic.

§ 592. Ought, would, &c., used as presents.—These words are not in the predicament of shall.

They are present in power, and past in form. So, perhaps, is shall.

But they are not, like shall, perfect forms; i. e., they have no natural present element in them.

They are aorist præterites. Nevertheless, they have a present sense.

So had their equivalents in Greek: ἐχρῆν=χρὴ, ἔδει=δεῖ, προσῆκεν=προσήκει.

In Latin, too, would was often not represented by either volo or volebam, but by velim.

I believe that the usus ethicus is at the bottom of this construction.

The assertion of duty or obligation is one of those assertions which men like to soften in the expression: should, ought.

So is the expression of power, as denoted by may or can—might, could.

Very often when we say you should (or ought to) do this, we leave to be added by implication—but you do not.

Very often when we say I could (or might) do this, we leave to be added by implication—but I do not exert my power.

Now, if what is left undone be the present element in this assertion, the duty to do it, or the power of doing it, constitutes a past element in it; since the power (or duty) is, in relation to the performance, a cause—insufficient, indeed, but still antecedent. This hypothesis is suggested rather than asserted.

§ 593. By substituting the words I am bound for I ought, we may see the expedients to which this present use of the præterite forces us.

I am bound to do this now = I owe to do this now. However, we do not say owe, but ought.

Hence, when we wish to say I was bound to do this two years ago, we cannot say I ought (owed) to do this, &c., since ought is already used in a present sense.

We therefore say, instead, I ought to have done this two years ago; which has a similar, but by no means an identical meaning.

I was bound to pay two years ago, means two years ago I was under an obligation to make a payment, either then or at some future time.

I was bound to have paid, &c., means I was under an obligation to have made a payment.

If we use the word ought, this difference cannot be expressed.

Common people sometimes say, you had not ought to do so and so; and they have a reason for saying it.

The Latin language is more logical. It says not debet factum fuisse, but debuit fieri.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE SYNTAX OF ADVERBS.

§ 594. The syntax of the adverb is simpler than that of any other part of speech, excepting, perhaps, that of the adjective.

Adverbs have no concord.

Neither have they any government. They seem, indeed, to have it, when they are in the comparative or superlative degree; but it is merely apparent. In this is better than that, the word that is governed neither by better nor by than. It is not governed at all. It is a nominative case; the subject of a separate proposition. This is better (i. e., more good) than that is good. Even if we admit such an expression as he is stronger than me to be good English, there is no adverbial government. Than, if it govern me at all, governs it as a preposition.

The position of an adverb is, in respect to matters of syntax, pre-eminently parenthetic; i. e., it may be omitted without injuring the construction. He is fighting—now; he was fighting—then; he fights—bravely; I am—almost—tired, &c.

§ 595. By referring to the Chapter on the Adverbs, we shall find that the neuter adjective is frequently converted into an adverb by deflection. As any neuter adjective may be so deflected, we may justify such expressions as full (for fully) as conspicuous, and peculiar (for peculiarly) bad grace, &c. We are not, however, bound to imitate everything that we can justify.

§ 596. The termination -ly was originally adjectival. At present it is a derivational syllable by which we can convert an adjective into an adverb: brave, brave-ly. When, however, the adjective ends in -ly already, the formation is awkward. I eat my daily bread is unexceptionable English; I eat my bread daily is exceptionable. One of two things must here take place: the two syllables -ly are packed into one (the full expression being dai-li-ly), or else the construction is that of a neuter adjective deflected.

Adverbs are convertible. The then men=οἱ νῦν βρότοι, &c. This will be seen more clearly in the Chapter on Conjunctions.

§ 597. It has been remarked that in expressions like he sleeps the sleep of the righteous, the construction is adverbial. So it is in expressions like he walked a mile, it weighs a pound. The ideas expressed by mile and pound are not the names of anything that serves as either object or instrument to the verb. They only denote the manner of the action, and define the meaning of the verb.

§ 598. From whence, from thence.—This is an expression which, if it have not taken root in our language, is likely to do so. It is an instance of excess of expression in the way of syntax; the -ce denoting direction from a place, and the preposition doing the same. It is not so important to determine what this construction is, as to suggest what it is not. It is not an instance of an adverb governed by a preposition. If the two words be dealt with as logically separate, whence (or thence) must be a noun=which place (or that place); just as from then till now=from that time to this. But if (which is the better view) the two words be dealt with as one (i. e., as an improper compound) the preposition from has lost its natural power, and become the element of an adverb.

CHAPTER XXV.

ON PREPOSITIONS.

§ 599. All prepositions govern an oblique case. If a word cease to do this, it ceases to be a preposition. In the first of the two following sentences the word up is a preposition, in the second an adverb.

All prepositions in English precede the noun which they govern. I climbed up the tree, never I climbed the tree up. This is a matter not of government, but of collocation. It is the case in most languages; and, from the frequency of its occurrence, the term pre-position (or prefix) has originated. Nevertheless, it is by no means a philological necessity. In many languages the prepositions are post-positive, following their noun.

§ 600. No preposition, in the present English, governs a genitive case. This remark is made, because expressions like the part of the body=pars corporis,—a piece of the bread=portio panis, make it appear as if the preposition of did so. The true expression is, that the preposition of followed by an objective case, is equivalent, in many instances, to the genitive case of the classical languages.

§ 601. The writer, however, of a paper on English preterites and genitives, in the Philological Museum (II. 261) objects to the current doctrine concerning such constructions as, this is a picture of the king's. Instead of considering the sentence elliptic, and equivalent to this is a picture of or (from) the king's pictures, he entertains the following view,—"I confess, however, that I feel some doubt whether this phrase is indeed to be regarded as elliptical, that is, whether the phrase in room of which it is said to stand, was ever actually in use. It has sometimes struck me that this may be a relict of the old practice of using the genitive after nouns as well as before them, only with the insertion of the preposition of. One of the passages quoted above from 'Arnold's Chronicle,' supplies an instance of a genitive so situated; and one cannot help thinking that it was the notion that of governed the genitive, that led the old translators of Virgil to call his poem The Booke of Eneidos, as it is termed by Phaer, and Gawin Douglas, and in the translation printed by Caxton. Hence it may be that we put the genitive after the noun in such cases, in order to express those relations which are most appropriately expressed by the genitive preceding it. A picture of the king's is something very different from the king's picture: and so many other relations are designated by of with the objective noun, that if we wish to denote possession thereby, it leaves an ambiguity: so, for this purpose, when we want to subjoin the name of the possessor to the thing possest, we have recourse to the genitive, by prefixing which we are wont to express the same idea. At all events as, if we were askt whose castle Alnwick is, we should answer, The Duke of Northumberland's; so we should also say, What a grand castle that is of the Duke of Northumberland's! without at all taking into account whether he had other castles besides: and our expression would be equally appropriate, whether he had or not."

Again, Mr. Guest quotes, amongst other passages, the following:—

Yet neither class of examples is conclusive.

Ours does not necessarily mean of us. It may also mean of our hills, i. e., of the hills of our choice. Nightes may mean of the night's hours. In the expression, what a grand castle, &c., it is submitted to the reader that we do take into our account other castles, which the Duke of Northumberland may or may not have. The Booke of Eneidos is a mistaken Latinism. As it does not seem to have been sufficiently considered that the real case governed by of (as by de in Latin) is the ablative, it is the opinion of the present writer that no instance has yet been produced of of either governing, or having governed a genitive case.

§ 602. It is not so safe to say in the present English that no preposition governs a dative. The expression give it him is good English; and it is also equivalent to the Latin da ei. But we may also say give it to him. Now the German zu=to governs a dative case, and in Anglo-Saxon, the preposition to, when prefixed to the infinitive mood, required the case that followed it to be a dative.

§ 603. When the infinitive mood is used as the subject of a proposition, i.e., as a nominative case, it is impossible to allow to the preposition to, by which it is preceded, any separate existence whatever,—to rise=rising; to err=error. Here the preposition must, for the purposes of syntax, be considered as incorporated with the noun, just like an inseparable inflection. As such it may be preceded by another preposition. The following example, although a Grecism, illustrates this:—

§ 604. Akin to this, but not the same, is the so-called vulgarism, consisting of the use of the preposition for. I am ready to go=I am ready for going=the so-called vulgarism, I am ready for to go. Now, this expression differs from the last in exhibiting, not only a verbal accumulation of prepositions, but a logical accumulation as well: inasmuch as for and to express like ideas.

§ 605. Composition converts prepositions into adverbs. Whether we say upstanding or standing-up, we express the manner in which an action takes place, and not the relation between two substantives. The so-called prepositional compounds in Greek (ἀναβαίνω, ἀποθνήσκω, &c.) are all adverbial.

CHAPTER XXVI.

ON CONJUNCTIONS.

§ 606. A CONJUNCTION is a part of speech which connects propositions,—the day is bright, is one proposition. The sun shines, is another. The day is bright because the sun shines is a pair of propositions connected by the conjunction, because.

From this it follows, that whenever there is a conjunction, there are two subjects, two copulas, and two predicates: i.e., two propositions in all their parts.

But this may be expressed compendiously. The sun shines, and the moon shines, may be expressed by the sun and moon shine.

Nevertheless, however compendious may be the expression, there are always two propositions wherever there is one conjunction. A part of speech that merely combines two words is a preposition—the sun along with the moon shines.

It is highly important to remember that conjunctions connect propositions.

It is also highly important to remember that many double propositions may be expressed so compendiously as to look like one. When this takes place, and any question arises as to the construction, they must be exhibited in their fully expanded form; i.e., the second subject, the second predicate, and the second copula must be supplied. This can always be done from the first proposition,—he likes you better than me=he likes you better than he likes me. The compendious expression of the second proposition is the first point of note in the syntax of conjunctions.

§ 607. The second point in the syntax of conjunctions is the fact of their great convertibility. Most conjunctions have been developed out of some other part of speech.

The conjunction of comparison, than, is derived from the adverb of time, then; which is derived from the accusative singular of the demonstrative pronoun.

The conjunction, that, is derived also from a demonstrative pronoun.

The conjunction, therefore, is a demonstrative pronoun + a preposition.

The conjunction, because, is a substantive governed by a preposition.

One and the same word, in one and the same sentence, may be a conjunction or preposition, as the case may be.

All fled but John.—If this mean all fled except John, the word but is a preposition, the word John is an accusative case, and the proposition is single. If, instead of John, we had a personal pronoun, we should say all fled but him.

All fled but John.—If this mean all fled, but John did not fly, the word but is a conjunction, the word John is a nominative case, and the propositions are two in number. If, instead of John, we had a personal pronoun, we should say, all fled but he.

From the fact of the great convertibility of conjunctions it is often necessary to determine whether a word be a conjunction or not. If it be a conjunction, it cannot govern a case. If it govern a case, it is no conjunction but a preposition. A conjunction cannot govern a case, for the following reason,—the word that follows it must be the subject of the second proposition, and, as such, a nominative case.

§ 608. The third point to determine in the syntax of conjunctions is the certainty or uncertainty in the mind of the speaker as to the facts expressed by the propositions which they serve to connect.

1. Each proposition may contain a certain, definite, absolute fact—the day is clear because the sun shines. Here, there is neither doubt nor contingency of either the day being clear, or of the sun shining.

2. Of two propositions one may be the condition of the other—the day will be clear if the sun shine. Here, although it is certain that if the sun shine the day will be clear, there is no certainty of the sun shining. Of the two propositions one only embodies a certain fact, and that is certain only conditionally.

Now an action, wherein there enters any notion of uncertainty, or indefinitude, and is at the same time connected with another action, is expressed, not by the indicative mood, but by the subjunctive. If the sun shine (not shines) the day will be clear.

Simple uncertainty will not constitute a subjunctive construction,—I am, perhaps, in the wrong.

Neither will simple connection,—I am wrong because you are right.

But, the two combined constitute the construction in question,—if I be wrong, you are right.

Now, a conjunction that connects two certain propositions may be said to govern an indicative mood.

And a conjunction that connects an uncertain proposition with a certain one, may be said to govern a subjunctive mood.

The government of mood is the only form of government of which conjunctions are capable.

§ 609. Previous to the question of the government of conjunctions in the way of mood, it is necessary to notice certain points of agreement between them and the relative pronouns; inasmuch as, in many cases, the relative pronoun exerts the same government, in the way of determining the mood of the verb, as the conjunction.

Between the relative pronouns and conjunctions in general there is this point of connection,—both join propositions. Wherever there is a relative, there is a second proposition. So there is wherever there is a conjunction.

Between certain relative pronouns and those particular conjunctions that govern a subjunctive mood there is also a point of connection. Both suggest an element of uncertainty or indefinitude. This the relative pronouns do, through the logical elements common to them and to the interrogatives: these latter essentially suggesting the idea of doubt. Wherever the person, or thing, connected with an action, and expressed by a relative be indefinite, there is room for the use a subjunctive mood. Thus—he that troubled you shall bear his judgment, whosoever he be.

§ 610. By considering the nature of such words as when, their origin as relatives on the one hand, and their conjunctional character on the other hand, we are prepared for finding a relative element in words like till, until, before, as long as, &c. These can all be expanded into expressions like until the time when, during the time when, &c. Hence, in an expression like seek out his wickedness till thou find (not findest) none, the principle of the construction is nearly the same as in he that troubled you, &c., or vice versâ.^[63]

§ 611. In most conditional expressions the subjunctive mood should follow the conjunction. All the following expressions are conditional.

2. Let us go and sacrifice to the Lord our God, lest he fall upon us with pestilence.—Old Testament.

4. If this be the case.

5. Although my house be not so with God.—Old Testament.

6. He shall not eat of the holy thing unless he wash his flesh with water.—Old Testament.

Expressions like except and unless are equally conditional with words like if and provided that, since they are equivalent to if—not.

Expressions like though and although are peculiar. They join propositions, of which the one is a primâ facie reason against the existence of the other: and this is the conditional element. In the sentence, if the children be so badly brought up, they are not to be trusted, the bad bringing-up is the reason for their being unfit to be trusted; and, as far as the expression is concerned, is admitted to be so. The only uncertainty lies in the question as to the degree of the badness of the education. The inference from it is unequivocal.

But if, instead of saying if, we say although, and omit the word not, so that the sentence run although the children be so badly brought up they are to be trusted, we do two things: we indicate the general relation of cause and effect that exists between bad bringing-up and unfitness for being trusted, but we also, at the same time, take an exception to it in the particular instance before us. These remarks have been made for the sake of showing the extent to which words like though, &c., are conditional.

It must be remembered, however, that conjunctions, like the ones lately quoted, do not govern subjunctive moods because they are conditional, but because, in the particular condition which they accompany, there is an element of uncertainty.

§ 612. This introduces a fresh question. Conditional conjunctions are of two sorts:—

1. Those which express a condition as an actual fact, and one admitted as such by the speaker.

2. Those which express a condition as a possible fact, and one which the speaker either does not admit, or admits only in a qualified manner.

Since the children are so badly brought up, &c.—This is an instance of the first construction. The speaker admits as an actual fact the bad bringing-up of the children.

If the children be so badly brought-up, &c.—This is an instance of the second construction. The speaker admits as a possible (perhaps, as a probable) fact the bad bringing-up of the children: but he does not adopt it as an indubitable one.

§ 613. Now, if every conjunction had a fixed unvariable meaning, there would be no difficulty in determining whether a condition was absolute, and beyond doubt, or possible, and liable to doubt. But such is not the case.

Although may precede a proposition which is admitted as well as one which is doubted.

a. Although the children are, &c.

b. Although the children be, &c.

If, too, may precede propositions wherein there is no doubt whatever implied: in other words it may be used instead of since.

In some languages this interchange goes farther than in others; in the Greek, for instance, such is the case with εἰ, to a very great extent indeed.

Hence we must look to the meaning of the sentence in general, rather than to the particular conjunction used.

It is a philological fact (probably referable to the usus ethicus) that if may stand instead of since.

It is also a philological fact that when it does so it should be followed by the indicative mood.

This is written in the way of illustration. What applies to if applies to other conjunctions as well.

§ 614. As a point of practice, the following method of determining the amount of doubt expressed in a conditional proposition is useful:—

Insert, immediately after the conjunction, one of the two following phrases,—(1.) as is the case; (2.) as may or may not be the case. By ascertaining which of these two supplements expresses the meaning of the speaker, we ascertain the mood of the verb which follows.

When the first formula is one required, there is no element of doubt, and the verb should be in the indicative mood. If (as is the case), he is gone, I must follow him.

When the second formula is the one required, there is an element of doubt, and the verb should be in the subjunctive mood. If (as may or may not be the case) he be gone, I must follow him.

§ 615. The use of the word that in expressions like I eat that I may live, &c., is a modification of the subjunctive construction, that is conveniently called potential. It denotes that one act is done for the sake of supplying the power or opportunity for the performance of another.

In English the word that, so used, cannot be said to govern a mood, although generally followed by either may or might. It should rather be said to require a certain combination to follow it. The most important point connected with the powers of that is the so-called succession of tenses.

§ 616. The succession of tenses.—Whenever the conjunction that expresses intention, and consequently connects two verbs, the second of which takes place after the first, the verbs in question must be in the same tense.

I do this that I may gain by it.

I did this that I might gain by it.

In the Greek language this is expressed by a difference of mood; the subjunctive being the construction equivalent to may, the optative to might. The Latin idiom coincides with the English.

A little consideration will show that this rule is absolute. For a man to be doing one action (in present time) in order that some other action may follow it (in past time) is to reverse the order of cause and effect. To do anything in A.D. 1851, that something may result from it in 1850 is a contradiction; and so it is to say I do this that I might gain by it.

The reasons against the converse construction are nearly, if not equally cogent. To have done anything at any previous time in order that a present effect may follow, is, ipso facto, to convert a past act into a present one, or, to speak in the language of the grammarian, to convert an aorist into a perfect. To say I did this that I may gain by it, is to make, by the very effect of the expression, either may equivalent to might, or did equivalent to have done.

I did this that I might gain.

I have done this that I may gain.

A clear perception of the logical necessity of the law of the succession of tenses, is necessary for understanding the nature of several anomalous passages in the classical writers. In the following, an aorist is followed not by an optative, but by a subjunctive.

Here it is necessary to construe ἔδωκε, has given and continues to allow, which is to construe it like a perfect^[64] tense. Upon similar passages Mathiæ writes, "but frequently the conjunctive is used, although the preceding word be in the time past, viz., when the verb which depends upon the conjunction shows an action continued to the present time." That means when the verb is really a perfect.

In Latin, where the same form is both aorist and perfect, the succession of tenses is a means of determining which of the two meanings it conveys. Veni ut videam=I have come that I may see. Veni ut viderem=I came that I might see.

Arnold states, from Krüger and Zumpt, that even where the præterite was clearly a perfect (i. e., =to have with the participle), the Roman ear was so accustomed to the imperfect subjunctive, that it preferred such an expression as diu dubitavi num melius esset to diu dubitavi num melius sit. The latter part of the statement is sure enough; but it is by no means so sure that dubitavi, and similar forms in similar constructions are perfects. There is no reason for considering this to be the case in the present instance. It seems to be so, because it is connected with diu; but an action may last a long time, and yet not last up to the time of speaking. Diu dubitavi probably expresses, I doubted a long time, and leaves it to be inferred that now I do not doubt.

§ 617. It has been stated above that whilst the Latin and English have a succession of tenses, the Greek language exhibits what may be called a succession of moods. This suggests inquiry. Is the difference real? If so, how is it explained? If not, which of the two grammatical systems is right?—the English and Latin on the one side, or the Greek on the other? Should τύπτοιμι be reduced to a past tense, or verberarem be considered an optative mood.

The present writer has no hesitation in stating his belief, that all the phænomena explicable by the assumption of an optative mood are equally explicable by an expansion of the subjunctive, and a different distribution of its tenses.

1. Let τύψω be considered a subjunctive future instead of a subjunctive aorist.

2. Let τύῶτοιμι be considered an imperfect subjunctive.

3. Let τετύφοιμι be considered a pluperfect subjunctive.

4. Let τύψαιμι be considered an aorist subjunctive.

Against this view there are two reasons:

1. The double forms τύψαιμι and τύψοιμι, one of which would remain unplaced.

2. The use of the optative and conjunctive in simple propositions, as—

The first reason I am not prepared to impugn. Valeat quantum, &c. The second indicates a class of expressions which tense will not explain, and which mood will. Yet this is not conclusive. Would that thou wert is thoroughly optative: yet it is expressed by a tense.

The form of the so-called optatives proves nothing. Neither the subjunctive nor the optative has any signs of mood at all, except the negative one of the absence of the augment. Their signs are the signs of tense.

In favour of the view are the following reasons:—

1. The analogy of other languages. The imperfect has a subjunctive in Latin. So has the future.

2. The undoubtedly future character of the so-called aorist imperative. To give an order to do a thing in past time is a philological contradiction. Forms like βλέψον must be future. Though θὲς and τίθει differ in power, they both mean an action subsequent to, or, at any rate, simultaneous with the order given; certainly not one anterior to it.

§ 618. Be may stand for may be. In this case the preterite is not were but might be. The sentence, what care I how fair the lady be, if she be not fair to her admirer? is accurate. Here be = may be. But, what cared I how fair the lady were, if she were not fair to her admirer? is inaccurate. It ought to run thus,—what cared I how fair the lady might be, if she were not fair to her admirer?^[65]

§ 619. Disjunctives.—Disjunctives (or, nor) are of two sorts, real, and nominal.

A king or queen always rules in England. Here the disjunction is real; king or queen being different names for different objects. In all real disjunctions the inference is, that if one out of two (or more) individuals (or classes) do not perform a certain action, the other does.

A sovereign or supreme ruler always rules in England. Here the disjunction is nominal; sovereign and supreme governor being different names for the same object. In all nominal disjunctives the inference is, that if an agent (or agents) do not perform a certain action under one name, he does (or they do) it under another.

Nominal disjunctives are called by Harris, subdisjunctives.

In the English language there is no separate word to distinguish the nominal from the real disjunctive. In Latin, vel is considered by Harris to be disjunctive, sive subdisjunctive. As a periphrasis the combination in other words is subdisjunctive.

Both nominal and real disjunctives agree in this,—whatever may be the number of nouns which they connect, the construction of the verb is the same as if there were but one—Henry or John, or Thomas, walks (not walk); the sun, or solar luminary, shines (not shine). The disjunctive isolates the subject however much it may be placed in juxtaposition with other nouns.

§ 620. Either, neither.—Many disjunctives imply an alternative. If it be not this person (or thing) that performs a certain action (or exists in a certain state) it is some other. If a person (or thing) do not perform a certain action (or exist in a certain state), under one name, he (or it) does so under another. This alternative is expressed by the word either.

When the word either is connected immediately with the copula of a proposition, it is, if not a true conjunction, at least a part of a conjunctional periphrasis.—This either is or is not so.

When it belongs more to one of the terms of a proposition than to the copula, it is a pronoun,—Either I or you is in the wrong. It is either you or I.

I use the words, part of a conjunctional periphrasis, because the full conjunction is either + or (or neither + nor); the essential conjunctions being the latter words. To these, either (or neither) is superadded, indicating the manner in which the disjunction expressed by or (or nor) takes place; i. e., they show that it takes place in the manner of an alternative. Now, this superadded power is rather adverbial than conjunctional.

§ 621. From the pronominal character of the word either, when it forms part of a term, and from the power of the disjunctive, or, in isolating the subject of the verb, combined with an assumption which will be explained hereafter, we get at the principle of certain rules for doubtful constructions.

In expressions like either you or I is in the wrong, we must consider either not only as a pronoun, but as the leading pronoun of the proposition; a pronoun of which or I is an explanation; and, finally, as the pronoun which determines the person of the verb. Either you or I is wrong=one of us (you or I) is wrong.

Then, as to expressions like I, or you, am in the wrong. Here, I is the leading pronoun, which determines the person of the verbs; the words, or you, being parenthetic, and subordinate. These statements bear upon the rules of p. 457.

§ 622. Will this principle justify such expressions as either they or we is in the wrong?

Or will it justify such expressions as either he or they is in the wrong?

Or will it justify such expressions as I or they am in the wrong? In all which sentences one pronoun is plural.

Perhaps not. The assumption that has been just alluded to, as helping to explain certain doubtful constructions, is the following, viz., that in cases of apposition, disjunction, and complex terms, the first word is the one which determines the character of the sentence wherein it occurs. This is a practice of the English language, which, in the opinion of the present writer, nothing but a very decided preponderance of a difference in person, gender, or number, can overrule. Such may fairly be considered to be the case in the three examples just adduced; especially as there is also the secondary influence of the conjunctional character of the word either. Thus, although we say,—

One of two parties, they or we, is in the wrong.

We also say,—

Either they or we are in the wrong.

As for the other two expressions, they are in the same predicament, with an additional reason for the use of the plural. It contains the singular. The chief object of the present remarks has been less to explain details than to give due prominence to the following leading principles.

1. That either (or neither) is^[66] essentially singular in number.

2. That it is, like any common noun, of the third person.

3. That it is pronominal where it is in apposition with another noun.

4. That when it is the first word of the proposition it determines the concord of the verb, unless its character of a noun of the singular number and third person be disguised by the prominence of some plural form, or some pronoun of the first or second person in the latter part of the term.

5. That in a simple disjunctive proposition (i.e., one where either does not occur) all nouns are subordinate to the first.

§ 623. I believe that the use of either is limited to real disjunctives; in other words, that we can say either a king or a queen always reigns in England, but that we cannot say either a sovereign or a supreme ruler always reigns in England.

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE SYNTAX OF THE NEGATIVE.

§ 624. When the verb is in the infinitive mood, the negative precedes it.—Not to advance is to retreat.

When the verb is not in the infinitive mood, the negative follows it.—He advanced not. I cannot.

This rule is absolute. It only seems to precede the verb in such expressions as I do not advance, I cannot advance, I have not advanced, &c. However, the words do, can, and have, are no infinitives; and it consequently follows them. The word advance is an infinitive, and it consequently precedes it. Wallis's rule makes an equivalent statement, although differently. "Adverbium negandi not (non) verbo postponitur (nempe auxiliari primo si adsit; aut si non adsit auxiliare, verbo principali): aliis tamen orationis partibus præfigi solet."—P. 113.

That the negative is rarely used, except with an auxiliary, in other words, that the presence of a negative converts a simple form like it burneth not into the circumlocution it does not burn, is a fact in the practice of the English language. The syntax is the same in either expression.

§ 625. What may be called the distribution of the negative is pretty regular in English. Thus, when the word not comes between an indicative, imperative, or subjunctive mood and an infinitive verb, it almost always is taken with the word which it follows—I can not eat may mean either I can—not eat (i.e., I can abstain), or I can not—eat (i.e., I am unable to eat); but, as stated above, it almost always has the latter signification.

But not always. In Byron's "Deformed Transformed" we find the following lines:—