The English Language

The reflective pronoun often becomes reciprocal.

These statements are made for the sake of illustrating, not of exhausting, the subject. It follows, however, as an inference from them, that the classification of pronouns is complicated. Even if we knew the original power and derivation of every form of every pronoun in a language, it would be far from an easy matter to determine therefrom the paradigm that they should take in grammar. To place a word according to its power in a late stage of language might confuse the study of an early stage. To say that because a word was once in a given class, it should always be so, would be to deny that in the present English they, these, and she are personal pronouns at all.

The two tests, then, of the grammatical place of a pronoun, its present power and its original power, are often conflicting.

In the English language the point of most importance in this department of grammar is the place of forms like mine and thine; in other words, of the forms in -n. Are they genitive cases of a personal pronoun, as mei and tui are supposed to be in Latin, or are they possessive pronouns like meus and tuus?

Now, if we take up the common grammars of the English language as it is, we find, that, whilst my and thy are dealt with as genitive cases, mine and thine are considered adjectives. In the Anglo-Saxon grammars, however, min and þin, the older forms of mine and thine, are treated as genitives; of which my and thy have been dealt with as abbreviated forms, and that by respectable scholars.

Now, to prove from the syntax of the older English that in many cases the two forms were convertible, and to answer that the words in question are either genitive cases or adjectives, is lax philology; since the real question is, which of the two is the primary, and which the secondary meaning?

§ 447. The à priori view of the likelihood of words like mine and thine being genitive cases, must be determined by the comparison of three series of facts.

1. The ideas expressed by the genitive case, with particular reference to the two preponderating notions of possession and partition.

2. The circumstance of the particular notion of possession being, in the case of the personal pronouns of the two first persons singular, generally expressed by a form undoubtedly adjectival.

3. The extent to which the idea of partition becomes merged in that of possession, and vice versâ.

§ 448. The ideas of possession and partition as expressed by genitive forms.—If we take a hundred genitive cases, and observe their construction, we shall find, that, with a vast majority of them, the meaning is reducible to one of two heads; viz., the idea of possession or the idea of partition.

Compared with these two powers all the others are inconsiderable, both in number and importance; and if, as in the Greek and Latin languages, they take up a large space in the grammars, it is from their exceptional character rather than from their normal genitival signification.

Again, if both the ideas of possession and partition may, and in many cases must be, reduced to the more general idea of relation, this is a point of grammatical phraseology by no means affecting the practical and special bearings of the present division.

§ 449. The adjectival expression of the idea of possession.—All the world over, a property is a possession; and persons, at least, may be said to be the owners of their attributes. Whatever may be the nature of words like mine and thine, the adjectival character of their Latin equivalents, meus and tuus, is undoubted.

The ideas of partition and possession merge into one another.—A man's spade is the possession of a man; a man's hand is the part of a man. Nevertheless, when a man uses his hand as the instrument of his will, the idea which arises from the fact of its being part of his body is merged in the idea of the possessorship which arises from the feeling of ownership or mastery which is evinced in its subservience and application. Without following the refinements to which the further investigation of these questions would lead us, it is sufficient to suggest that the preponderance of the two allied ideas of partition and possession is often determined by the personality or the non-personality of the subject, and that, when the subject is a person, the idea is chiefly possessive; when a thing, partitive—caput fluvii=the head, which is a part, of a river; caput Toli=the head, which is the possession, of Tolus.

But as persons may be degraded to the rank of things, and as things may, by personification, be elevated to the level of persons, this distinction, although real, may become apparently invalid. In phrases like a tributary to the Tiber—the criminal lost his eye—this field belongs to that parish—the ideas of possessorship and partition, as allied ideas subordinate to the idea of relationship in general, verify the interchange.

§ 450. These observations should bring us to the fact that there are two ideas which, more than any other, determine the evolution of a genitive case—the idea of partition and the idea of possession; and that genitive cases are likely to be evolved just in proportion as there is a necessity for the expression of these two ideas.—Let this be applied to the question of the à priori probability of the evolution of a genitive case to the pronouns of the first and second persons of the singular number.

§ 451. The idea of possession, and its likelihood of determining the evolution of a genitive form to the pronouns of the first and second person singular. —It is less likely to do so with such pronouns than with other words, inasmuch as it is less necessary. It has been before observed, that the practice of most languages shows a tendency to express the relation by adjectival forms—meus, tuus.

An objection against the conclusiveness of this argument will be mentioned in the sequel.

§ 452. The idea of partition, and its likelihood of determining the evolution of a genitive form, &c.—Less than with other words.

A personal pronoun of the singular number is the name of a unity, and, as such, the name of an object far less likely to be separated into parts than the name of a collection. Phrases like, some of them, one of you, many of us, any of them, few of us, &c., have no analogues in the singular number, such as one of me, a few of thee, &c. The partitive words that can combine with singular pronouns are comparatively few; viz., half, quarter, part, &c.: and they can all combine equally with plurals—half of us, a quarter of them, a part of you, a portion of us. The partition of a singular object with a pronominal name is of rare occurrence in language.

This last statement proves something more than appears at first sight. It proves that no argument in favour of the so-called singular genitives, like mine and thine, can be drawn from the admission (if made) of the existence of the true plural genitives ou-r, you-r, thei-r. The two ideas are not in the same predicament. We can say, one of ten, or ten of twenty; but we cannot say one of one—Wæs hira Matheus sum=Matthew was one of them; Andreas—Your noither=neither of you; Amis and Ameloun—from Mr. Guest: Her eyder=either of them; Octavian.—Besides this, the form of the two numbers are neither identical, nor equally genitival; as may be seen by contrasting mi-n and thi-n with ou-r and you-r.

§ 453. Such are the chief à priori arguments against the genitival character of words like mine and thine.

Akin to these, and a point which precedes the à posteriori evidence as to the nature of the words in question, is the determination of the side on which lies the onus probandi. This question is material; inasmuch as, although the present writer believes, for his own part, that the forms under discussion are adjectival rather than genitival, this is not the point upon which he insists. What he insists upon is the fact of the genitival character of mine and thine requiring a particular proof; which particular proof no one has yet given: in other words, his position is that they are not to be thought genitive until proved to be such.

It has not been sufficiently considered that the primâ facie evidence is against them. They have not the form of a genitive case—indeed, they have a different one; and whoever assumes a second form for a given case has the burden of proof on his side.

§ 454. Against this circumstance of the -n in mine and thine being the sign of anything rather than of a genitive case, and against the primâ facie evidence afforded by it, the following facts may, or have been, adduced as reasons on the other side. The appreciation of their value, either taken singly or in the way of cumulative evidence, is submitted to the reader. It will be seen that none of them are unexceptionable.

§ 455. The fact, that, if the words mine and thine are not genitive cases, there is not a genitive case at all.—It is not necessary that there should be one. Particular reasons in favour of the probability of personal pronouns of the singular number being destitute of such a case have been already adduced. It is more likely that a word should be defective than that it should have a separate form.

§ 456. The analogy of the forms mei and ἐμοῦ in Latin and Greek.—It cannot be denied that this has some value. Nevertheless, the argument deducible from it is anything but conclusive.

1. It is by no means an indubitable fact that mei and ἐμοῦ are really cases of the pronoun. The extension of a principle acknowledged in the Greek language might make them the genitive cases of adjectives used pronominally. Thus,

Assume the omission of the article and the extension of the Greek principle to the Latin language, and ἐμοῦ and mei may be cases, not of ἐμὲ and me, but of ἐμὸς and meus.

2. In the classical languages the partitive power was expressed by the genitive.

This is a reason for the evolution of a genitive power. Few such forms exist in the Gothic; part my is not English, nor was dæl min Anglo-Saxon,=part of me, or pars mei.

§ 457. The following differences of form, are found in the different Gothic languages, between the equivalents of mei and tui, the so-called genitives of ego and tu, and the equivalents of meus and tuus, the so-called possessive adjectives.

In this list, those languages where the two forms are alike are not exhibited. This is the case with the Anglo-Saxon and Old Saxon.

In the above-noticed differences of form lie the best reasons for the assumption of a genitive case, as the origin of an adjectival form; and, undoubtedly, in those languages, where both forms occur, it is convenient to consider one as a case and one as an adjective.

§ 458. But this is not the present question. In Anglo-Saxon there is but one form, min and þin=mei and meus, tui and tuus, indifferently. Is this form an oblique case or an adjective?

This involves two sorts of evidence.

§ 459. Etymological evidence.—Assuming two powers for the words min and þin, one genitive, and one adjectival, which is the original one? or, going beyond the Anglo-Saxon, assuming that of two forms like meina and meins, the one has been derived from the other, which is the primitive, radical, primary, or original one?

Men, from whom it is generally unsafe to differ, consider that the adjectival form is the derived one; and, as far as forms like mîner, as opposed to mîn, are concerned, the evidence of the foregoing list is in their favour. But what is the case with the Middle Dutch? The genitive mîns is evidently the derivative of mîn.

The reason why the forms like mîner seem derived is because they are longer and more complex than the others. Nevertheless, it is by no means an absolute rule in philology that the least compound form is the oldest. A word may be adapted to a secondary meaning by a change in its parts in the way of omission, as well as by a change in the way of addition. Such is the general statement. Reasons for believing that in the particular cases of the words in question such is the fact, will be found hereafter.

As to the question whether it is most likely for an adjective to be derived from a case, or a case from an adjective, it may be said, that philology furnishes instances both ways. Ours is a case derived, in syntax at least, from an adjective. Cujus (as in cujum pecus) and sestertium are Latin instances of a nominative case being evolved from an oblique one.

§ 460. Syntactic evidence.—If in Anglo-Saxon we found such expressions as dæl min=pars mei, hælf þin=dimidium tui, we should have a reason, as far as it went, for believing in the existence of a genitive with a partitive power. Such instances, however, have yet to be quoted; whilst, even if quoted, they would not be conclusive. Expressions like σὸς πόθος=desiderium tui, σῆ προμηθίᾳ = providentiâ propter te, show the extent to which the possessive expression encroaches on the partitive.

1. The words min or þin, with a power anything rather than possessive, would not for that reason be proved (on the strength of their meaning) to be genitive cases rather than possessive pronouns; since such latitude in the power of the possessive pronoun is borne out by the comparison of languages—πατὲρ ἡμῶν (not ἡμέτερος) in Greek is pater noster (not nostrum) in Latin.

§ 461. Again—as min and þin are declined like adjectives, even as meus and tuus are so declined, we have means of ascertaining their nature from the form they take in certain constructions; thus, minra=meorum, and minre=meæ, are the genitive plural and the dative singular respectively. Thus, too, the Anglo-Saxon for of thy eyes should be eagena þinra, and the Anglo-Saxon for to my widow, should be wuduwan minre; just as in Latin, they would be oculorum tuorum, and viduæ meæ.

If, however, instead of this we find such expressions as eagena þin, or wuduwan min, we find evidence in favour of a genitive case; for then the construction is not one of concord, but one of government, and the words þin and min must be construed as the Latin forms tui and mei would be in oculorum mei, and viduæ mei; viz.: as genitive cases. Now, whether a sufficient proportion of such constructions (real or apparent) exist or not, they have not yet been brought forward.

Such instances have yet to be quoted; whilst even if quoted, they would not be conclusive.

§ 462. A few references to the Deutsche Grammatik will explain this.

As early as the Mœso-Gothic stage of our language, we find rudiments of the omission of the inflection. The possessive pronouns in the neuter singular sometimes take the inflection, sometimes appear as crude forms, nim thata badi theinata=ἆρον σοῦ τὸν κράββατον (Mark ii. 9.) opposed to nim thata badi thein two verses afterwards. So also with mein and meinata.—Deutsche Grammatik, iv. 470. It is remarkable that this omission should begin with forms so marked as those of the neuter (-ata). It has, perhaps, its origin in the adverbial character of that gender.

Old High German.—Here the nominatives, both masculine and feminine, lose the inflection, whilst the neuter retains it—thin dohter, sîn quenâ, min dohter, sinaz lîb. In a few cases, when the pronoun comes after, even the oblique cases drop the inflection.—Deutsche Grammatik, 474-478.

Middle High German.—Preceding the noun, the nominative of all genders is destitute of inflection; sîn lîb, mîn ere, dîn lîb, &c. Following the nouns, the oblique cases do the same; ine herse sîn.—Deutsche Grammatik, 480. The influence of position should here be noticed. Undoubtedly a place after the substantive influences the omission of the inflection. This appears in its maximum in the Middle High German. In Mœso-Gothic we have mein leik and leik meinata.—Deutsche Grammatik, 470.

§ 463. Now by assuming (which is only a fair assumption) the extension of the Middle High German omission of the inflection to the Anglo-Saxon; and by supposing it to affect the words in question in all positions (i.e., both before and after their nouns), we explain these constructions by a process which, in the mind of the present writer, is involved in fewer difficulties than the opposite doctrine of a genitive case, in words where it is not wanted, and with a termination which is foreign to it elsewhere.

To suppose two adjectival forms, one inflected (min, minre, &c.), and one uninflected, or common to all genders and both numbers (min), is to suppose no more than is the case with the uninflected þe, as compared with the inflected þæt.—See pp. 251-253.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE WEAK PRÆTERITE.

§ 464. The remote origin of the weak præterite in -d or -t, has been considered by Grimm, in the Deutsche Grammatik. He maintains that it is the d in d-d, the reduplicate præterite of do. In all the Gothic languages the termination of the past tense is either -da, -ta, -de, -ði, -d, -t, or -ed, for the singular, and -don, -ton, -tûmês, or -ðum, for the plural; in other words, d, or an allied sound, appears once, if not oftener. In the plural præterite of the Mœso-Gothic we have something more, viz. the termination -dêdum; as nas-idêdum, nas-idêduþ, nas-idêdum, from nas-ja; sôk-idêdum, sôk-idêduþ, sôk-idêdum from sôk-ja; salb-ôdêdum, salb-ôdêduþ, sâlb-ôdêdun, from salbô. Here there is a second d. The same takes place with the dual form salb-ôdêduts; and with the subjunctive forms, salb-ôdêdjan, salb-ôdêduts, salb-ôdêdi, salb-ôdêdeits, salb-ôdêdeima, salb-ôdêdeiþ, salb-ôdêdeina. The English phrase, we did salve, as compared with salb-ôdêdum, is confirmatory of this.—Deutsche Grammatik, i. 1042.

§ 465. Some remarks of Dr. Trithen's on the Slavonic præterite, in the Transactions of the Philological Society, induce me to identify the d- in words like moved, &c., with the -t of the passive participles of the Latin language; as found in mon-it-us, voc-at-us, rap-t-us, and probably in Greek forms like τυφ-θ-είς.

l. The Slavonic præterite is commonly said to possess genders: in other words, there is one form for speaking of a past action when done by a male, and another for speaking of a past action when done by a female.

2. These forms are identical with those of the participles, masculine or feminine, as the case may be. Indeed the præterite is a participle; and the fact of its being so accounts for the apparently remarkable fact of its inflection. If, instead of saying ille amavit, the Latins said ille amatus, whilst instead of saying illa amavit they said illa amata, they would exactly use the grammar of the Slavonians.

3. Hence, as one language, the Slavonic gives us the undoubted fact of an active præterite growing out of a passive participle (unless, indeed, we chose to say that both are derived from a common origin); and as the English participle and præterite, when weak, are nearly identical, we have reason for believing that the d, in the English active præterite, is the t in the Latin passive participle.

§ 466. The following extract exhibits Dr. Trithen's remarks on the Slavonic verb:—

"A peculiarity which distinguishes the grammar of all the Slavish languages, consists in the use of the past participle, taken in an active sense, for the purpose of expressing the præterite. This participle generally ends in l; and much uncertainty prevails both as to its origin and its relations, though the termination has been compared by various philologists with similar affixes in the Sanscrit, and the classical languages.

"In the Old Slavish, or the language of the church, there are three methods of expressing the past tense: one of them consists in the union of the verb substantive with the participle; as,

Rek esm´ chital esmi´

Rek esi´ chital esi´

Rek est´ chital est´.

"In the corresponding tense of the Slavonic dialect we have the verb substantive placed before the participle:

Yasam imao mi´ smo imali

Ti si imao vi´ ste imali

On ye imao omi su imali.

"In the Polish it appears as a suffix:

Czytalem czytalismy

Czytales czytaliscie

Czytal czytalie.

"And in the Servian it follows the participle:

Igrao sam igrali smo

Igrao si igrali ste

Igrao ye igrali su.

"The ending ao, of igrao and imao, stands for the Russian al, as in some English dialects a' is used for all."

PART V.

SYNTAX.

————

CHAPTER I.

ON SYNTAX IN GENERAL.

§ 467. The word syntax is derived from the Greek syn (with or together), and taxis (arrangement). It relates to the arrangement, or putting together of words. Two or more words must be used before there can be any application of studied syntax.

Much that is considered by the generality of grammarians as syntax, can either be omitted altogether, or else be better studied under another name.

§ 468. To reduce a sentence to its elements, and to show that these elements are, 1, the subject, 2, the predicate, 3, the copula; to distinguish between simple terms and complex terms,—this is the department of logic.

To show the difference in force of expression, between such a sentence as great is Diana of the Ephesians, and Diana of the Ephesians is great, wherein the natural order of the subject and predicate is reversed, is a point of rhetoric.

I am moving.—To state that such a combination as I am moving is grammatical, is undoubtedly a point of syntax. Nevertheless it is a point better explained in a separate treatise, than in a work upon any particular language. The expression proves its correctness by the simple fact of its universal intelligibility.

I speaks.—To state that such a combination as I speaks, admitting that I is exclusively the pronoun in the first person, and that speaks is exclusively the verb in the third, is undoubtedly a point of syntax. Nevertheless, it is a point which is better explained in a separate treatise, than in a work upon any particular language. An expression so ungrammatical, involves a contradiction in terms, which unassisted common sense can deal with. This position will again be reverted to.

There is to me a father.—Here we have a circumlocution equivalent to I have a father. In the English language the circumlocution is unnatural. In the Latin it is common. To determine this, is a matter of idiom rather than of syntax.

I am speaking, I was reading.—There was a stage in the Gothic languages when these forms were either inadmissible, or rare. Instead thereof, we had the present tense, I speak, and the past, I spoke. The same is the case with the classical languages in the classical stage. To determine the difference in idea between these pairs of forms is a matter of metaphysics. To determine at what period each idea came to have a separate mode of expression is a matter of the history of language. For example, vas láisands appears in Ulphilas (Matt. vii. 29). There, it appears as a rare form, and as a literal translation of the Greek ἦν διδασκών (was teaching). The Greek form itself was, however, an unclassical expression for ἐδίδασκε. In Anglo-Saxon this mode of speaking became common, and in English it is commoner still.—Deutsche Grammatik, iv. 5. This is a point of idiom involved with one of history.

Swear by your sword—swear on your sword.—Which of these two expressions is right? This depends on what the speaker means. If he mean make your oath in the full remembrance of the trust you put in your sword, and with the imprecation, therein implied, that it shall fail you, or turn against you if you speak falsely, the former expression is the right one. But, if he mean swear with your hand upon your sword, it is the latter which expresses his meaning. To take a different view of this question, and to write as a rule that verbs of swearing are followed by the preposition on (or by) is to mistake the province of the grammar. Grammar tells no one what he should wish to say. It only tells him how what he wishes to say should be said.

Much of the criticism on the use of will and shall is faulty in this respect. Will expresses one idea of futurity, shall another. The syntax of the two words is very nearly that of any other two. That one of the words is oftenest used with a first person, and the other with a second, is a fact, as will be seen hereafter, connected with the nature of things, not of words.

§ 469. The following question now occurs. If the history of forms of speech be one thing, and the history of idioms another; if this question be a part of logic, and that question a part of rhetoric; and if such truly grammatical facts as government and concord are, as matters of common sense, to be left uninvestigated and unexplained, what remains as syntax? This is answered by the following distinction. There are two sorts of syntax; theoretical and practical, scientific and historical, pure and mixed. Of these, the first consists in the analysis and proof of those rules which common practice applies without investigation, and common sense appreciates, in a rough and gross manner, from an appreciation of the results. This is the syntax of government and concord, or of those points which find no place in the present work, for the following reason—they are either too easy or too hard for it. If explained scientifically they are matters of close and minute reasoning; if exhibited empirically they are mere rules for the memory. Besides this they are universal facts of languages in general, and not the particular facts of any one language. Like other universal facts they are capable of being expressed symbolically. That the verb (A) agrees with its pronoun (B) is an immutable fact: or, changing the mode of expression, we may say that language can only fulfil its great primary object of intelligibility when A = B. And so on throughout. A formal syntax thus exhibited, and even devised à priori, is a philological possibility. And it is also the measure of philological anomalies.

§ 470. Pure syntax.—So much for one sort of syntax; viz., that portion of grammar which bears the same relation to the practice of language, that the investigation of the syllogism bears to the practice of reasoning. The positions concerning it are by no means invalidated by such phrases as I speaks (for I speak), &c. In cases like these there is no contradiction; since the peculiarity of the expression consists not in joining two incompatible persons, but in mistaking a third person for a first—and as far as the speaker is concerned, actually making it so. I must here anticipate some objections that may be raised to these views, by stating that I am perfectly aware that they lead to a conclusion which to most readers must appear startling and to some monstrous, viz., to the conclusion that there is no such thing as bad grammar at all; that everything is what the speaker chooses to make it; that a speaker may choose to make any expression whatever, provided it answer the purpose of language, and be intelligible; that, in short, whatever is is right. Notwithstanding this view of the consequence I still am satisfied with the truth of the premises. I may also add that the terms pure and mixed, themselves suggestive of much thought on the subject which they express, are not mine but Professor Sylvester's.

§ 471. Mixed syntax.—That, notwithstanding the previous limitations, there is still a considerable amount of syntax in the English, as in all other languages, may be seen from the sequel. If I undertook to indicate the essentials of mixed syntax, I should say that they consisted in the explanation of combinations apparently ungrammatical; in other words, that they ascertained the results of those causes which disturb the regularity of the pure syntax; that they measured the extent of the deviation; and that they referred it to some principle of the human mind—so accounting for it.

I am going.—Pure syntax explains this.

I have gone.—Pure syntax will not explain this. Nevertheless, the expression is good English. The power, however, of both have and gone is different from the usual power of those words. This difference mixed syntax explains.

§ 472. Mixed syntax requires two sorts of knowledge—metaphysical, and historical.

1. To account for such a fact in language as the expression the man as rides to market, instead of the usual expression the man who rides to market, is a question of what is commonly called metaphysics. The idea of comparison is the idea common to the words as and who.

2. To account for such a fact in language as the expression I have ridden a horse is a question of history. We must know that when there was a sign of an accusative case in English the word horse had that sign; in other words that the expression was, originally, I have a horse as a ridden thing. These two views illustrate each other.

§ 473. In the English, as in all other languages, it is convenient to notice certain so-called figures of speech. They always furnish convenient modes of expression, and sometimes, as in the case of the one immediately about to be noticed, account for facts.

§ 474. Personification.—The ideas of apposition and collectiveness account for the apparent violations of the concord of number. The idea of personification applies to the concord of gender. A masculine or feminine gender, characteristic of persons, may be substituted for the neuter gender, characteristic of things. In this case the term is said to be personified.

The cities who aspired to liberty.—A personification of the idea expressed by cities is here necessary to justify the expression.

It, the sign of the neuter gender, as applied to a male or female child, is the reverse of the process.

§ 475. Ellipsis (from the Greek elleipein=to fall short), or a falling short, occurs in sentences like I sent to the bookseller's. Here the word shop or house is understood. Expressions like to go on all fours, and to eat of the fruit of the tree, are reducible to ellipses.

§ 476. Pleonasm (from the Greek pleonazein=to be in excess) occurs in sentences like the king, he reigns. Here the word he is superabundant. In many pleonastic expressions we may suppose an interruption of the sentence, and afterwards an abrupt renewal of it; as the king—he reigns.

The fact of the word he neither qualifying nor explaining the word king, distinguishes pleonasm from apposition.

Pleonasm, as far as the view above is applicable, is reduced to what is, apparently, its opposite, viz., ellipsis.

My banks, they are furnished,—the most straitest sect,—these are pleonastic expressions. In the king, he reigns, the word king is in the same predicament as in the king, God bless him.

The double negative, allowed in Greek and Anglo-Saxon, but not admissible in English, is pleonastic.

The verb do, in I do speak, is not pleonastic. In respect to the sense it adds intensity. In respect to the construction it is not in apposition, but in the same predicament with verbs like must and should, as in I must go, &c.; i. e. it is a verb followed by an infinitive. This we know from its power in those languages where the infinitive has a characteristic sign; as, in German,

Besides this, make is similarly used in Old English.—But men make draw the branch thereof, and beren him to be graffed at Babyloyne.—Sir J. Mandeville.

§ 477. The figure zeugma.—They wear a garment like that of the Scythians, but a language peculiar to themselves.—The verb, naturally applying to garment only, is here used to govern language. This is called in Greek, zeugma (junction).

§ 478. My paternal home was made desolate, and he himself was sacrificed.—The sense of this is plain; he means my father. Yet no such substantive as father has gone before. It is supplied, however, from the word paternal. The sense indicated by paternal gives us a subject to which he can refer. In other words, the word he is understood, according to what is indicated, rather than according to what is expressed. This figure in Greek is called pros to semainomenon (according to the thing indicated).

§ 479. Apposition.—Cæsar, the Roman emperor, invades Britain.—Here the words Roman emperor explain, or define, the word Cæsar; and the sentence, filled up, might stand, Cæsar, that is, the Roman emperor, &c. Again, the words Roman emperor might be wholly ejected; or, if not ejected, they might be thrown into a parenthesis. The practical bearing of this fact is exhibited by changing the form of the sentence, and inserting the conjunction and. In this case, instead of one person, two are spoken of, and the verb invades must be changed from the singular to the plural.

Now the words Roman emperor are said to be in apposition to Cæsar. They constitute, not an additional idea, but an explanation of the original one. They are, as it were, laid alongside (appositi) of the word Cæsar. Cases of doubtful number, wherein two substantives precede a verb, and wherein it is uncertain whether the verb should be singular or plural, are decided by determining whether the substantives be in apposition or the contrary. No matter how many nouns there may be, as long as it can be shown that they are in apposition, the verb is in the singular number.

§ 480. Collectiveness as opposed to plurality.—In sentences like the meeting was large, the multitude pursue pleasure, meeting, and multitude are each collective nouns; that is, although they present the idea of a single object, that object consists of a plurality of individuals. Hence, pursue is put in the plural number. To say, however, the meeting were large would sound improper. The number of the verb that shall accompany a collective noun depends upon whether the idea of the multiplicity of individuals, or that of the unity of the aggregate, shall predominate.

Sand and salt and a mass of iron is easier to bear than a man without understanding.—Let sand and salt and a mass of iron be dealt with as a series of things the aggregate of which forms a mixture, and the expression is allowable.

The king and the lords and commons forms an excellent frame of government.—Here the expression is doubtful. Substitute with for the first and, and there is no doubt as to the propriety of the singular form is.

§ 481. The reduction of complex forms to simple ones.—Take, for instance, the current illustration, viz., the-king-of-Saxony's army.—Here the assertion is, not that the army belongs to Saxony, but that it belongs to the king of Saxony; which words must, for the sake of taking a true view of the construction, be dealt with as a single word in the possessive case. Here two cases are dealt with as one; and a complex term is treated as a single word.

The same reasoning applies to phrases like the two king Williams. If we say the two kings William, we must account for the phrase by apposition.

§ 482. True notion of the part of speech in use.—In he is gone, the word gone must be considered as equivalent to absent; that is, as an adjective. Otherwise the expression is as incorrect as the expression she is eloped. Strong participles are adjectival oftener than weak ones; their form being common to many adjectives.

True notion of the original form.—In the phrase I must speak, the word speak is an infinitive. In the phrase I am forced to speak, the word speak is (in the present English) an infinitive also. In one case, however, it is preceded by to; whilst in the other, the particle to is absent. The reason for this lies in the original difference of form. Speak - to=the Anglo-Saxon sprécan, a simple infinitive; to speak, or speak + to=the Anglo-Saxon to sprécanne, an infinitive in the dative case.

§ 483. Convertibility.—In the English language, the greater part of the words may, as far as their form is concerned, be one part of speech as well as another. Thus the combinations s-a-n-th, or f-r-e-n-k, if they existed at all, might exist as either nouns or verbs, as either substantives or adjectives, as conjunctions, adverbs, or prepositions. This is not the case in the Greek language. There, if a word be a substantive, it will probably end in -s, if an infinitive verb, in -ein, &c. The bearings of this difference between languages like the English and languages like the Greek will soon appear.

At present, it is sufficient to say that a word, originally one part of speech (e.g. a noun), may become another (e.g. a verb). This may be called the convertibility of words.

There is an etymological convertibility, and a syntactic convertibility; and although, in some cases, the line of demarcation is not easily drawn between them, the distinction is intelligible and convenient.

§ 484. Etymological convertibility.—The words then and than, now adverbs or conjunctions, were once cases: in other words, they have been converted from one part of speech to another. Or, they may even be said to be cases, at the present moment; although only in an historical point of view. For the practice of language, they are not only adverbs or conjunctions, but they are adverbs or conjunctions exclusively.

§ 485. Syntactic convertibility.—The combination to err, is at this moment an infinitive verb. Nevertheless it can be used as the equivalent to the substantive error.

To err is human=error is human. Now this is an instance of syntactic conversion. Of the two meanings, there is no doubt as to which is the primary one; which primary meaning is part and parcel of the language at this moment.

The infinitive, when used as a substantive, can be used in a singular form only.

To err=error; but we have no such form as to errs=errors. Nor is it wanted. The infinitive, in a substantival sense, always conveys a general statement, so that even when singular, it has a plural power; just as man is mortal=men are mortal.

§ 486. The adjective used as a substantive.—Of these, we have examples in expressions like the blacks of Africa—the bitters and sweets of life—all fours were put to the ground. These are true instances of conversion, and are proved to be so by the fact of their taking a plural form.

Let the blind lead the blind is not an instance of conversion. The word blind in both instances remains an adjective, and is shown to remain so by its being uninflected.

§ 487. Uninflected parts of speech, used as substantive.—When King Richard III. says, none of your ifs, he uses the word if as a substantive=expressions of doubt.

So in the expression one long now, the word now=present time.

§ 488. The convertibility of words in English is very great; and it is so because the structure of the language favours it. As few words have any peculiar signs expressive of their being particular parts of speech, interchange is easy, and conversion follows the logical association of ideas unimpeded.

The convertibility of words is in the inverse ratio to the amount of their inflection.

CHAPTER II.

SYNTAX OF SUBSTANTIVES.

§ 489. The phenomena of convertibility have been already explained.

The remaining points connected with the syntax of substantives, are chiefly points of either ellipsis, or apposition.

Ellipsis of substantives.—The historical view of phrases, like Rundell and Bridge's, St. Pauls', &c., shows that this ellipsis is common to the English and the other Gothic languages. Furthermore, it shows that it is met with in languages not of the Gothic stock; and, finally, that the class of words to which it applies, is, there or thereabouts, the same generally.

A. 1. The words most commonly understood, are house and family, or words reducible to them. In Latin, Dianæ=ædem Dianæ.—Deutsche Grammatik, iv. 262.

2. Country, retinue.—Deutsche Grammatik, iv. 262.

3. Son, daughter, wife, widow.—Deutsche Grammatik, iv. 262.—Νηλεὺς Κόδρου, Greek.

B. The following phrases are referable to a different class of relations—

1. Right and left—supply hand. This is, probably, a real ellipsis. The words right and left, have not yet become true substantives; inasmuch as they have no plural forms. In this respect, they stand in contrast with bitter and sweet; inasmuch as we can say he has tasted both the bitters and sweets of life. Nevertheless, the expression can be refined on.

2. All fours.—To go on all fours. No ellipsis. The word fours, is a true substantive, as proved by its existence as a plural.

From expressions like ποτήριον ψυχροῦ (Matt. xiv. 51), from the Greek, and perfundit gelido (understand latice), from the Latin, we find that the present ellipsis was used with greater latitude in the classical languages than our own.

§ 490. Proper names can only be used in the singular number.—This is a rule of logic, rather than of grammar. When we say the four Georges, the Pitts and Camdens, &c., the words that thus take a plural form, have ceased to be proper names. They either mean—

1. The persons called George, &c.

2. Or, persons so like George, that they may be considered as identical.

§ 491. Collocation.—In the present English, the genitive case always precedes the noun by which it is governed—the man's hat=hominis pileus; never the hat man's=pileus hominis.

CHAPTER III.

SYNTAX OF ADJECTIVES.

§ 492. Pleonasm.—Pleonasm can take place with adjectives only in the expression of the degrees of comparison. Over and above the etymological signs of the comparative and superlative degrees, there may be used the superlative words more and most.

And this pleonasm really occurs—