The English Language

These are instances of pleonasm in the strictest sense of the term.

§ 493. Collocation.—As a general rule, the adjective precedes the substantive—a good man, not a man good.

When, however, the adjective is qualified by either the expression of its degree, or accompanied by another adjective, it may follow the substantive—

Single simple adjectives thus placed after their substantive, belong to the poetry of England, and especially to the ballad poetry—sighs profound—the leaves green.

§ 494. Government.—The only adjective that governs a case, is the word like. In the expression, this is like him, &c., the original power of the dative remains. This we infer—

1. From the fact that in most languages which have inflections to a sufficient extent, the word meaning like governs a dative case.

2. That if ever we use in English any preposition at all to express similitude, it is the preposition to—like to me, like to death, &c.

Expressions like full of meat, good for John, are by no means instances of the government of adjectives; the really governing words being the prepositions to and for respectively.

The most that can be said, in cases like these, is that particular adjectives determine the use of particular prepositions—thus the preposition of, generally follows the adjective full, &c.

§ 495. The positive degree preceded by the adjective more, is equivalent to the comparative form—e. g., more wise=wiser.

The reasons for employing one expression in preference to the other, depend upon the nature of the particular word used.

When the word is, at one and the same time, of Anglo-Saxon origin and monosyllabic, there is no doubt about the preference to be given to the form in -er. Thus, wis-er is preferable to more wise.

When, however, the word is compound, or trisyllabic, the combination with the word more, is preferable.

Between these two extremes, there are several intermediate forms wherein the use of one rather than another, will depend upon the taste of the writer. The question, however, is a question of euphony, rather than of aught else. It is also illustrated by the principle of not multiplying secondary elements. In such a word as fruit-full-er, there are two additions to the root. The same is the case with the superlative, fruit-full-est.

§ 496. The 9th Chapter of Part IV., should be read carefully. There, there is indicated a refinement upon the current notions as to the power of the comparative degree, and reasons are given for believing that the fundamental notion expressed by the comparative inflexion is the idea of comparison or contrast between two objects.

In this case, it is better in speaking of only two objects to use the comparative degree rather than the superlative—even when we use the definite article the. Thus—

is preferable to

This principle is capable of an application more extensive than our habits of speaking and writing will verify. Thus, to go to other parts of speech, we should logically say—

rather than

but not

This statement may be refined on. It is chiefly made for the sake of giving fresh prominence to the idea of duality expressed by the terminations -er and -ter.

§ 497. The absence of inflection simplifies the syntax of adjectives. Violations of concord are impossible. We could not make an adjective disagree with its substantive if we wished.

CHAPTER IV.

SYNTAX OF PRONOUNS.

§ 498. The syntax of substantives is, in English, simple, from the paucity of its inflections, a condition which is unfavourable towards the evolution of constructional complexities; the most remarkable exception being the phenomenon of convertibility noticed above.

The same is the case with adjectives. The want of inflexion simplifies their syntax equally with that of the substantives.

But with the pronouns this is not the case. Here we have—

1. Signs of gender; 2. Signs of case; 3. Signs of number, to a greater extent, and with more peculiarities, than elsewhere.

Furthermore, the pronouns exhibit in a great degree the phenomena of conversion indicated in p. 400.

§ 499. Pleonasm in the syntax of pronouns.—In the following sentences the words in italics are pleonastic.

Of these forms, the first is more common than the second and third, and the fourth more common than the first.

§ 500. The fourth has another element of importance. It has given rise to the absurd notion that the genitive case in -s (father-s) is a contraction from his (father his).

To say nothing about the inapplicability of this rule to feminine genders, and plural numbers, the whole history of the Indo-Germanic languages is against it.

1. We cannot reduce the queen's majesty to the queen his majesty.

2. We cannot reduce the children's bread to the children his bread.

3. The Anglo-Saxon forms are in -es, not in his.

4. The word his itself must be accounted for; and that cannot be done by assuming to be he + his.

5. The -s in father's is the -is in patris, and the -ος in πατέρος.

§ 501. The preceding examples illustrate an apparent paradox, viz., the fact of pleonasm and ellipsis being closely allied. The king he is just, dealt with as a single sentence, is undoubtedly pleonastic. But it is not necessary to be considered as a mere simple sentence. The king—may represent a first sentence incomplete, whilst he is just represents a second sentence in full. What is pleonasm in a single sentence, is ellipsis in a double one.

CHAPTER V.

THE TRUE PERSONAL PRONOUNS.

§ 502. Personal pronouns.—The use of the second person plural instead of the second singular has been noticed in p. 246. This use of one number for another is current throughout the Gothic languages. A pronoun so used is conveniently called the pronomen reverentiæ.

§ 503. In English, however, there is a second change over and above the change of number, viz. that of case. We not only say ye instead of thou, but you instead of ye.—(See p. 245).

Mr. Guest remarks, "that at one time the two forms ye and you seem to have been nearly changing place in our language.

In German and the Danish the pronomen reverentiæ is got at by a change, not of number, but of person—in other words, the pronoun of the third person is used instead of that of the second; just as if, in the English, we said will they walk=will you walk, will ye walk, wilt thou walk.

§ 504. Dativus ethicus.—In the phrase

the me is expletive, and is equivalent to for me. This expletive use of the dative is conveniently called the dativus ethicus. It occurs more frequently in the Latin than in the English, and more frequently in the Greek than in the Latin.

§ 505. The reflected personal pronoun.—In the English language there is no equivalent to the Latin se, the German sich, and the Scandinavian sik, and sig.

It follows from this that the word self is used to a greater extent than would otherwise be the case.

I strike me is awkward, but not ambiguous.

Thou strikest thee is awkward, but not ambiguous.

He strikes him is ambiguous; inasmuch as him may mean either the person who strikes or some one else. In order to be clear we add the word self when the idea is reflective. He strikes himself is, at once, idiomatic, and unequivocal.

So it is with the plural persons.

We strike us is awkward, but not ambiguous.

Ye strike you is the same.

They strike them is ambiguous.

This shows the value of a reflective pronoun for the third person.

As a general rule, therefore, whenever we use a verb reflectively we use the word self in combination with the personal pronoun.

Yet this was not always the case. The use of the simple personal pronoun was current in Anglo-Saxon, and that, not only for the two first persons, but for the third as well.

The exceptions to this rule are either poetical expressions, or imperative moods.

§ 506. Reflective neuters.—In the phrase I strike me the verb strike is transitive; in other words, the word me expresses the object of an action, and the meaning is different from the meaning of the simple expression I strike.

In the phrase I fear me (used by Lord Campbell in his Lives of the Chancellors), the verb fear is intransitive or neuter; in other words, the word me (unless, indeed, fear mean terrify) expresses no object of any action at all; whilst the meaning is the same as in the simple expression I fear.

Here the reflective pronoun appears out of place, i. e., after a neuter or intransitive verb.

Such a use, however, is but the fragment of an extensive system of reflective verbs thus formed, developed in different degrees in the different Gothic languages; but in all more than in the English.

§ 507. Equivocal reflectives.—The proper place of the reflective is after the verb.

The proper place of the governing pronoun is, in the indicative and subjunctive moods, before the verb.

Hence in expressions like the preceding there is no doubt as to the power of the pronoun.

The imperative mood, however, sometimes presents a complication. Here the governing person may follow the verb.

Mount ye=either be mounted, or mount yourselves. In phrases like this, and in phrases

the construction is ambiguous. Ye may either be a nominative case governing the verb busk, or an accusative case governed by it.

This is an instance of what may be called the equivocal reflective.

CHAPTER VI.

ON THE SYNTAX OF THE DEMONSTRATIVE PRONOUNS, AND THE PRONOUNS OF THE THIRD PERSON.

§ 508. Reasons have been given in p. 249, for considering the so-called pronouns of the third person (he, she, it, they) demonstrative rather than truly personal.

§ 509. As his, and her, are genitive cases (and not adjectives), there is no need of explaining such combinations as his mother, her father, inasmuch as no concord of gender is expected. The expressions are respectively equivalent to

§ 510. From p. 250, it may be seen that its is a secondary genitive, and it may be added, that it is of late origin in the language. The Anglo-Saxon form was his, the genitive of he for the neuter and masculine equally. Hence, when, in the old writers, we meet his, where we expect its, we must not suppose that any personification takes place, but simply that the old genitive common to the two genders is used in preference to the modern one limited to the neuter, and irregularly formed. This has been illustrated by Mr. Guest.

The following instances are the latest specimens of its use.

"The apoplexy is, as I take it, a kind of lethargy. I have read the cause of his effects in Galen; it is a kind of deafness."—2 Henry IV. i. 2.

"If the salt have lost his flavour, wherewith shall it be seasoned. It is neither fit for the land nor yet for the dunghill, but men cast it out."—Luke xiv. 35.

"Some affirm that every plant has his particular fly or caterpillar, which it breeds and feeds."—Walton's Angler.

"This rule is not so general, but that it admitteth of his exceptions."—Carew.

"The genitive its is of late introduction into our language. Though used by our dramatists and many of their cotemporaries, it does not occur in the versions of our Bible, the substitute being his or the compound term thereof."—Phil. Trans., No. 25.

§ 511. For the archaic and provincial use of him and he for it see ibid.; remembering that the two cases are different. His for its is an old form retained: him and he for it are really changes of gender.

§ 512. Take them things away.—Here we have them for those. The expression, although not to be imitated, is explained by the originally demonstrative power of them.

Sometimes the expression is still more anomalous, and we hear the so-called nominative case used instead of the accusative. In the expression take they things away, the use of they for them (itself for those) is similarly capable of being, down to a certain period of our language, explained as an archaism. The original accusative was þa, and þo: the form in -m being dative.

§ 513. This and that.—The remarks upon the use of these words in certain expressions is brought at once to the Latin scholar by the quotation of the two following lines from Ovid, and the suggestion of a well-known rule in the Eton Latin Grammar.

Here hic (=this or the one) refers to the antecedent last named (the air); whilst ille (=that or the other) refers to the antecedent first named (the sea).

Now on the strength of this example, combined with others, it is laid down as a rule in Latin that hic (this) refers to the last-named antecedent, ille to the first-named.

§ 514. What is the rule in English?

Suppose we say John's is a good sword and so is Charles's; this cut through a thick rope, the other cut through an iron rod. Or instead of saying this and that we may say the one and the other. It is clear that, in determining to which of the two swords the respective demonstratives refer, the meaning will not help us at all, so that our only recourse is to the rules of grammar; and it is the opinion of the present writer that the rules of grammar will help us just as little. The Latin rule is adopted by scholars, but still it is a Latin rule rather than an English one.

The truth is, that it is a question which no authority can settle; and all that grammar can tell us is (what we know without it) that this refers to the name of the idea which is logically the most close at hand, and that to the idea which is logically the most distant.

What constitutes nearness or distance of ideas, in other words, what determines the sequence of ideas is another question. That the idea, however, of sequence, and, consequently of logical proximity and logical distance, is the fundamental idea in regard to the expressions in question is evident from the very use of the words this and that.

Now the sequence of ideas is capable of being determined by two tests.

1. The idea to which the name was last given, or (changing the expression) the name of the last idea may be the nearest idea in the order of sequence, and, consequently, the idea referred to by the pronoun of proximity. In this case the idea closest at hand to the writer of the second line of the couplet quoted above was the idea of the atmosphere (aer), and it was, consequently, expressed by (this) hic.

2. Or the idea to which the name was first given, or (changing the expression) the name of the first idea may be the nearest idea in the order of sequence, and consequently the idea referred to it by the pronoun of proximity; inasmuch as the idea which occurs first is the most prominent one, and what is prominent appears near. In this case, the idea closest at hand to the writer of the second line of the couplet quoted above would have been the idea of the sea (pontus), and it would, consequently, have been the idea expressed by this (hic).

As Ovid, however, considered the idea at the end of the last half of one sentence to be the idea nearest to the beginning of the next, we have him expressing himself as he does. On the other hand, it is easy to conceive a writer with whom the nearest idea is the idea that led the way to the others.

As I believe that one and the same individual may measure the sequence of his ideas sometimes according to one of these principles, and sometimes according to another, I believe that all rules about the relations of this and that are arbitrary.

It is just a matter of chance whether a thinker take up his line of ideas by the end or by the beginning. The analogies of such expressions as the following are in favour of this, in English, applying to the first subject, that to the second; since the word attorney takes the place of this, and applies to the first name of the two, i. e., to Thurlow.

"It was a proud day for the bar when Lord North made Thurlow (1) and (2) Wedderburn (1) Attorney (2) and Solicitor General."—Mathias from Lord Campbell's Lives of the Chancellors.

CHAPTER VII.

ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE WORD SELF.

§ 515. The undoubted constructions of the word self, in the present state of the cultivated English, are three-fold.

1. Government.—In my-self, thy-self, our-selves, and your-selves, the construction is that of a common substantive with an adjective or genitive case. My-self=my individuality, and is similarly construed—mea individualitas (or persona), or mei individualitas (or persona).

2. Apposition.—In him-self and them-selves, when accusative, the construction is that of a substantive in apposition with a pronoun. Him-self=him, the individual.

3. Composition.—It is only, however, when himself and themselves, are in the accusative case, that the construction is appositional. When they are used as nominatives, it must be explained on another principle. In phrases like

He himself was present.

They themselves were present.

There is neither apposition nor government; him and them, being neither related to my and thy, so as to be governed, nor yet to he and they, so as to form an apposition. In order to come under one of these conditions, the phrases should be either he his self (they their selves), or else he he self (they they selves). In this difficulty, the only logical view that can be taken of the matter, is to consider the words himself and themselves, not as two words, but as a single word compounded; and even then, the compound will be of an irregular kind; inasmuch as the inflectional element -m, is dealt with as part and parcel of the root.

§ 516. Her-self.—The construction here is ambiguous. It is one of the preceding constructions. Which, however it is, is uncertain; since her may be either a so-called genitive, like my, or an accusative like him.

Itself—is also ambiguous. The s may represent the -s in its, as well as the s- in self.

This inconsistency is as old as the Anglo-Saxon stage of the English language.

§ 517. In the exhibition of the second construction of the word self it was assumed that the case was a case of apposition, and that self was substantival in character. Nevertheless, this is by no means a necessary phenomenon. Self might, as far as its power is determined by its construction alone, in words like himself as easily be an adjective as a substantive. In which case the construction would be a matter, not of apposition, but of agreement. To illustrate this by the Latin language, himself, might equal either eum personam (him, the person), or eum personalem (him personal). The evidence, however, of the forms like myself, as well as other facts adduceable from comparative philology, prove the substantival character of self. On the other hand, it ought not to be concealed that another word, whereof the preponderance of the adjectival over the substantival power is undoubted, is found in the Old English, with just the same inconsistency as the word self; i.e., sometimes in government (like a substantive), and sometimes in either concord or apposition, like a word which may be either substantive or adjective. This word is one; the following illustrations of which are from Mr. Guest.—Phil. Trans. No. 22.

Here his one, her one, mean his singleness, her singleness.

Here him one = himself in respect to its construction.

§ 518. As to the inflection of the word -self, all its compounds are substantives; inasmuch as they all take plural forms as far as certain logical limitations will allow them to do so—ourselves, yourselves, themselves.

Myself, thyself, himself, itself, and herself, are naturally singular, and under no circumstances can become plural.

Themselves is naturally plural, and under no circumstances can become singular.

Ourselves and yourselves are naturally plural; yet under certain circumstances they become singular.

a. Just as men say we for I, so may they say our for my.

b. Just as men say you for thou, so may they say your for thy.

In respect to the inflection in the way of case, there are no logical limitations whatever. There is nothing against the existence of a genitive form self's except the habit of the English language not to use one, founded on the little necessity for so doing.—Are you sure this is your own? Yes, I am sure it is my own self's. Such an expression is both logic and grammar.

When an adjective intervenes between self and its personal pronoun the construction is always in the way of government; in other words, the personal pronoun is always put in the genitive case.

§ 519. The construction of self and a personal pronoun with a verb may be noticed in this place. It is only in the case of the two pronouns of the singular number that any doubt can arise.

1. When myself or thyself stands alone, the verb that follows is in the third person—myself is (not am) weak, thyself is (not art) weak. Here the construction is just the same as in the proposition my body is weak.

2. When myself or thyself is preceded by I or thou, the verb that follows is in the first person—I, myself, am (not is) weak; thou, thyself, art (not is) weak.

CHAPTER VIII.

ON THE POSSESSIVE PRONOUNS.

§ 520. The possessive pronouns fall into two classes. The first class contains the forms connected, partially in their etymology and wholly in their syntax, with my and thy, &c. The second class contains the forms connected, partially in their etymology and wholly in their syntax, with mine and thine, &c.

The first class is the class of what may be called the oblique possessives; the name being founded upon the etymological fact of their being connected with the oblique cases of the pronominal inflection.—My, thy, his (as in his book), her, its (as in its book), our, your, their. These are conveniently considered as the equivalents to the Latin forms mei, tui, ejus, nostrum, vestrum, eorum.

The second class is the class of what may be called the absolute possessives; the name being founded upon the syntactic fact of their being able to form the term of a proposition by themselves; as whose is this? Mine (not my).—Mine, thine, his (as in the book is his), hers, ours, yours, theirs are conveniently considered as the equivalents to the Latin forms meus, mea, meum; tuus, tua, tuum; suus, sua, suum; noster, nostra, nostrum; vester, vestra, vestrum. How far either or both of these two classes of pronouns are cases, or adjectives, is a point of etymology that has already been noticed (Part IV., chap. 37).

How far either or both are cases or adjectives is, in syntax, a matter of indifference.

§ 521. There is, however, a palpable difference between the construction of my and mine. We cannot say this is mine hat, and we cannot say this hat is my. Nevertheless, this difference is not explained by any change of construction from that of adjectives to that of cases. As far as the syntax is concerned the construction of my and mine is equally that of an adjective agreeing with a substantive, and of a genitive (or possessive) case governed by a substantive.

Now a common genitive case can be used in two ways; either as part of a term, or as a whole term (i. e., absolutely).—1. As part of a term—this is John's hat. 2. As a whole term—this hat is John's.

And a common adjective can be used in two ways; either as part of a term, or as a whole term (i. e., absolutely).—1. As part of a term—these are good hats. 2. As a whole term—these hats are good.

Now whether we consider my, and the words like it, as adjectives or cases, they possess only one of the properties just illustrated, i. e., they can only be used as part of a term—this is my hat; not this hat is my.

And whether we consider mine, and the words like it, as adjectives or cases, they possess only one of the properties just illustrated, i. e., they can only be used as whole terms, or absolutely—this hat is mine; not this is mine hat.

For a full and perfect construction whether of an adjective or a genitive case, the possessive pronouns present the phenomenon of being, singly, incomplete, but, nevertheless, complimentary to each other when taken in their two forms.

In the absolute construction of a genitive case, the term is formed by the single word only so far as the expression is concerned. A substantive is always understood from what has preceded.—This discovery is Newton's=this discovery is Newton's discovery.

The same with adjectives.—This weather is fine=this weather is fine weather.

And the same with absolute pronouns.—This hat is mine=this hat is my hat; and this is a hat of mine=this is a hat of my hats.

In respect to all matters of syntax considered exclusively, it is so thoroughly a matter of indifference whether a word be an adjective or a genitive case that Wallis considers the forms in -'s like father's, not as genitive cases but as adjectives. Looking to the logic of the question alone he is right, and looking to the practical syntax of the question he is right, also. He is only wrong on the etymological side of the question.

"Nomina substantiva apud nos nullum vel generum vel casuum discrimen sortiuntur."—p. 76.

"Duo sunt adjectivorum genera, a substantivis immediate descendentia, quæ semper substantivis suis præponuntur. Primum quidem adjectivum possessivum libet appellare. Fit autem a quovis substantivo, sive singulari sive plurali, addito -s.—Ut man's nature, the nature of man, natura humana vel hominis; men's nature, natura humana vel hominum; Virgil's poems, the poems of Virgil, poemata Virgilii vel Virgiliana."—p. 89.

CHAPTER IX.

THE RELATIVE PRONOUNS.

§ 522. The word that, although originally, when a demonstrative pronoun, a neuter singular, is now used as a relative for all genders, and both numbers.

§ 523. Etymologically, which is no true neuter of who, but a compound word. It is used, however, with less latitude than that. The beginning of the Lord's Prayer exhibits it in combination with a masculine noun. Generally, however, it is confined to the neuter gender; in which it is common to both numbers.

§ 524. Which has so nearly replaced what that the general use of this last word with its proper power, as a neuter relative, is, in the present English, vulgar, e.g.,

In one case, however, what is used as a true relative, viz., when the antecedent is either this or that.

§ 525. The word as, properly a conjunction, is occasionally used as a relative—the man as rides to market.

This expression is not to be imitated. It ought, however, to be explained. As is a conjunction denoting comparison. The ideas of comparison and equivalence are allied. The relative is ex vi termini the equivalent, in one part of a sentence, to the antecedent in another.

(1) The man—(2) who speaks.

Here who=man.

(1) As white—(2) as snow.

Here snow=white.

§ 526. It is necessary that the relative be in the same gender as the antecedent—the man who—the woman who—the thing which.

§ 527. It is necessary that the relative be in the same number with the antecedent. As, however, who, which, whom, are equally singular and plural, and as what, which is really singular, is not used as a relative, the application of this law is limited to the word whose. Now whose is, etymologically, a genitive case, and a genitive case of the singular number. Hence the expression the men whose daggers stabbed Cæsar can only be justified by considering that the word whose is plural as well as singular. Such is the case. If not the expression is as illogical as homines cujus sicæ, &c. would be in Latin.

§ 528. It is not necessary for the relative to be in the same case with its antecedent.

§ 529. The reason why the relative must agree with its antecedent in both number and gender, whilst it need not agree with it in case, is found in the following observations.

1. All sentences containing a relative contain two verbs—John who (1) trusts me (2) comes here.

2. Two verbs express two actions—(1) trust (2) come.

3. Whilst, however, the actions are two in number, the person or thing which does, or suffers them is single—John.

4. He (she or it) is single ex vi termini. The relative expresses the identity between the subjects (or objects) of the two actions. Thus who=John, or is another name for John.

5. Things and persons that are one and the same, are of one and the same gender. The John who trusts is necessarily of the same gender with the John who comes.

6. Things and persons that are one and the same, are of one and the same number. The number of Johns who trust, is the same as the number of Johns who come. Both these elements of concord are immutable.

7. But a third element of concord is not immutable. The person or thing that is an agent in the one part of the sentence, may be the object of an action in the other. The John whom I trust may trust me also. Hence

As the relative is only the antecedent in another form, it may change its case according to the construction.

§ 530. The books I want are here.—This is a specimen of a true ellipsis. In all such phrases in full, there are three essential elements.

1. The first proposition; as the books are here.

2. The second proposition; as I want.

3. The word which connects the two propositions, and without which, they naturally make separate, independent, unconnected statements.

Now, although true and unequivocal ellipses are scarce, the preceding is one of the most unequivocal kind—the word which connects the two propositions being wanting.

§ 531. One or two points connected with the construction of those sentences wherein relative pronouns occur, are necessary to be familiarly understood in order for us to see our way clearly to certain real and apparent anomalies in the syntax of this class of words.

1. Every sentence wherein a relative occurs, is complex, i.e., it consists of two propositions—the man who rides is come=(1) the man is come; (2) who rides. Here the relative who has no meaning in itself, but takes a meaning from the noun of the preceding clause.

2. The relative is the demonstrative or personal pronoun under another form.—The two propositions (1) the man is come; (2) who rides=(1) the man is come; (2) he rides.

3. The demonstrative or personal pronoun is the substantive in another form.—The two propositions (1) the man is come; (2) he rides=(1) the man is come; (2) the man rides.

4. Hence the relative is the equivalent to a demonstrative pronoun, or to a substantive, indifferently.

5. But the relative is the equivalent to the pronoun and substantive, and something more. In sentences like