CHAPTER X
THE OPERATION ORDER, ORDERS, LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION
Before August, 1914, the Operation order was the English term for our Field order. Both orders had the same functions and about the same form. At times, the term operation order was used by us to include only battle orders, but on the whole, the terms Operation orders and Field orders practically amounted to American and English designations of the same thing.
In the beginning of the present war, after a few weeks of open conflict, this kind of fighting in France gave way to a vast siege. The English found themselves, after some cross-country fighting, in the trenches. There the operation order which had provided for situations of march, halt, bivouac, and battle, was gradually made over to suit the peculiar needs of defenses, raids, and frontal attacks. The barrage fire, bombs, mortars, machine guns, and intricate lines of communication added to the number of details to be considered. Little by little the will of the commander expressed itself in such completeness that the former size of his operation order passed all bounds. It was natural, then, that although the scope and character of the English order steadily changed, its name remained the same.
When the Americans came to take part in the war, the operation order had during the previous years of struggle developed out of all resemblance to its former self. It was no longer a field order as we know the term. It was fully grown to meet the tremendous progress of English experience in the trenches. The consequence was that the American, finding both the state of siege and the order to cover it beyond his experience, associated the English name with the novel warfare. Thus, today, the operation order is a term used in connection with the disposition of troops on the battle fronts of Europe.
We should bear in mind, then, that the operation order is nothing more than a field order fitted to trench conditions. We must not gain the idea that it has supplanted the order which goes with mobile exercises on open ground. Open warfare began this conflict, and will, provided it be ended by martial victory, bring it to a close. Open warfare has been the rule on the long Russian, Italian, Serbian, Turkish, and Roumanian fronts. We must not be led astray in our estimate of the proportions because the front in France and Belgium is the most vital one to us from a strategic standpoint. Field orders, which are the accompaniments of open warfare, should still form the larger part of our study.
Nevertheless, the operation order is the order next in importance to the field order. It must be framed with mathematical precision under fire.
It has the greatest conciseness, but is not brief. It goes into the minutest details, but its details are tersely put. In certain parts it is telegraphic like the field message; in others it has completed sentences like those of the field order. It has an orderly arrangement of paragraphs and brief and unmistakable language. If we are able to compose a good field message and order, we should find, after we have familiarized ourselves with the technique of the trenches, that the construction of the operation order will fall naturally into place in our minds.
Unfortunately, we are forbidden to place an example of one of our own operation orders upon these pages. But we may have the opportunity of viewing a German one, which contains the principles of our own. The example given was issued by a regimental commander for a raid. The action actually took place near La Boisselle, April 11, 1916.
110th Reserve Infantry Regiment. In the field, 6th April, 1916.
Regimental Orders for a Raid on the Spion
1. The raid will probably take place at dusk the 11th of April.
2. Organization of the raiding party—
In command.—Captain Wagener, assisted by Lieutenant Boening, Assistant-Surgeon Wisser, one bugler and six stretcher bearers.
Patrol commanders.—Lieutenants Stradtmann, Freund, Dumas, and Böhlefeld.
Raiding party.—50 men of the 110th Reserve Infantry Regiment and four Pioneers of the 1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion.
3. Upon the day fixed, the raiding party will be assembled in Dug-outs Nos. 1-10, on the right wing of the left-hand battalion. Dug-out No. 9 will be used as advanced regimental command post.
The assaulting party must not exceed three officers and 30 men. The remaining officers and men will be at Captain Wagener’s disposal for use as supports.
Shortly after dusk the assaulting party will leave the Blaue Stellung by Sap No. 3 with the object of breaking into the enemy’s position in the neighborhood of the Süd Spion, from which point the enemy’s trenches will be cleared northwards, if possible, as far as the Spion. Unless prevented by the enemy’s fire, the raiding party will return to our Blaue Stellung by the same way.
4. For 25 minutes before the commencement of the raid, the artillery will prepare for the assault by shelling the enemy’s trenches between Besenhecke and the Windmühle, and also the Weisse Steinmauer. During the raid the artillery will control by its fire all the enemy’s trenches likely to prove a source of danger to the enterprise.
5. In order to draw the fire of the enemy’s artillery away from the spot to be raided, a feint attack against the enemy’s position just north of La Boiselle Cemetery will start 15 minutes after the artillery opens fire.
6. In order that the registration of the objective by the heavy artillery and Minenwerfer shall not be apparent, on the morning of the day before the raid—probably the 10th April—a feint bombardment of Target-sectors 76-79 will be carried out, combined with a mine explosion, with the object of misleading the enemy. The exact time will be fixed beforehand by the artillery commander, Officer Commanding Ersatz Abteilung, 76th Artillery Regiment.
7. The machine gun officer will arrange that, during the whole time of the raid, the enemy’s rear trenches in Target-sectors 76-81 are kept under a constant fire, with a view to causing him all possible loss, and, at the same time, to safeguarding our patrol against counter-attacks.
8. The Officer Commanding 1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion, will arrange for a gallery of the left-hand minefield to be ready charged by the morning of the day before the raid, and for a gallery of the right-hand minefield to be ready charged by the evening of the raid. The former will be sprung at the conclusion of the feint bombardment, the latter as an introduction to the feint attack.
From today, the “earth mortars” (Erdmörser) will systematically cut the enemy’s wire opposite the Blinddarm. On the day before the raid, they will coöperate with all other close-range weapons to assist in the feint bombardment of Target-sectors 76-78. On the evening of the raid, they will assist in the feint attack by bombarding Target-sectors 76 and 77 (see Appendices 3 and 4).
Throughout the raid, the “ Albrecht-Mörser,” in position on the Lehmgrubenhöhe, will heavily bombard the enemy’s trenches in the Nordrondell. Particular care will be taken that the enemy’s machine guns do not interfere with the raid from that quarter (see Appendix 1).
9. The Officer Commanding 228th Minenwerfer Company will register the enemy’s wire at the point of entry with one heavy and two medium Minenwerfer in the course of the feint bombardment on the day before the raid. He will also take part in this bombardment and fire 30 medium Minenwerfer shells at the Weisse Steinmauer (see Appendix 4). On the afternoon of the same day, with both medium Minenwerfer mounted in the Minenwerfer Weg, he will cut the enemy’s wire at 76y, and throughout the whole night and the following day will keep up a desultory fire.
On the evening of the raid, the wire in front of the point of entry of the raiding party will be cut on a width of 50 meters by the heavy and two medium Minenwerfer (see Appendix 1). Meanwhile, the two other medium Minenwerfer will take part in the feint attack against 76y (see Appendix 3). The light Minenwerfer at the disposal of the 228th Minenwerfer Company will take part in the feint bombardment and in the feint attack, in accordance with the orders (para. 8) issued for the close-range weapons of the 1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion (see Appendices 3 and 4). The Officer Commanding 228th Minenwerfer Company will receive further detailed instructions from Captain Wagener.
10. On the evening of the raid, battalions will hold themselves in a state of readiness for an alarm. Arrangements will be made that, in the event of the enemy opening a barrage on our trenches, as may well happen, the number of sentries will be reduced to a minimum. Gas masks and other gas equipment must be held ready for use.
11. I shall be at the regimental command post from the morning of the day before the raid. From 6 p. m. of the evening of the raid, I shall be in the advanced regimental command post in Dug-out No. 9 on the right wing of the left-hand battalion. Captain Wagener will maintain constant communication with me. The artillery liaison officer will also be with me.
(Signed) FRHR. V. VIETINGHOFF.
| Distribution | ||
| { Headquarters | 2 | |
| { 3 Battalions | 3 | |
| 110th Reserve Infantry Regiment |
{ 12 Companies | 12 |
| { Labor Company | 1 | |
| { 1st Machine Gun Company | 1 | |
| { 2nd Machine Gun Company | 2 | |
| { 55th Machine Gun Section | 1 | |
| { Captain Wagener | 2 | |
| 29th Reserve Field Artillery Regiment | 1 | |
| Ersatz Abteilung, 176th Field Artillery Regiment | 1 | |
| 1st Abteilung, 29th Regiment Field Artillery | 1 | |
| 1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion | 1 | |
| 228th Minenwerfer Company | 1 | |
| Division | 1 | |
| Brigade | 1 | |
| 109th Reserve Infantry Regiment | 1 | |
| 111th Reserve Infantry Regiment | 1 | |
| Spare copies | 5 | |
| 37 | ||