CHAPTER XVI.
The manners of middle-aged men, are between those of youth and old men. And therefore they neither dare, nor fear too much; but both as is fit. They neither believe all, nor reject all; but judge. They seek not only what is honourable, nor only what is profitable; but both. They are neither covetous, nor prodigal; but in the mean. They are neither easily angry, nor yet stupid; but between both. They are valiant and withal temperate.
And in general, whatsoever is divided in youth and old men, is compounded in middle-age. And whereof the excess or defect is in youth or old men, the mediocrity is in those of middle-age.
Middle-age for the body, I call the time from thirty to five and thirty years: for the mind, the nine-and-fortieth, or thereabouts.
CHAPTER XVII.
Of manners that proceed from the several ages we have already spoken. We are next to speak of those that rise from several fortunes.
The manners of the nobility are: to be ambitious. To undervalue their ancestors' equals; for the goods of fortune seem the more precious for their antiquity.
Nobility is the virtue of a stock. And generosity, is not to degenerate from the virtue of his stock. For as in plants, so in the races of men, there is a certain progress; and they grow better and better to a certain point; and change, viz. subtile wits into madness, and staid wits into stupidity and blockishness.
CHAPTER XVIII.
Rich men are contumelious, and proud; this they have from their riches; for seeing everything may be had for money, having money they think they have all that is good. And effeminate: because they have wherewithal to subminister to their lust. And boasters of their wealth, and speak in high terms foolishly; for men willingly talk of what they love and admire, and think others affect the same that they do; and the truth is, all sorts of men submit to the rich. And think themselves worthy to command, having that by which men attain command. And in general they have the manners of fortunate fools. They do injury, with intention not to hurt, but to disgrace; and partly also through incontinence.
There is a difference between new and ancient riches. For they that are newly come to wealth, have the same faults in a greater degree; for new riches are a kind of rudeness and apprenticeship of riches.
CHAPTER XIX.
The manners of men in power, are the same, or better than those of the rich. They have a greater sense of honour than the rich, and their manners are more manly. They are more industrious than the rich, for power is sustained by industry. They are grave, but without austereness; for being in place conspicuous, they carry themselves the more modestly; and have a kind of gentle and comely gravity, which the Greeks call σεμνότης. When they do injuries, they do great ones.
The manners of men that prosper, are compounded of the manners of the nobility, the rich, and those that are in power; for to some of these all prosperity appertains.
Prosperity in children, and goods of the body, make men desire to exceed others in the goods of fortune.
Men that prosper have this ill; to be more proud and inconsiderate than others. And this good; that they worship God, trusting in him, for that they find themselves to receive more good than proceeds from their industry.
The manners of poor men, obscure men, men without power, and men in adversity, may be collected from the contrary of what has been said.
CHAPTER XX.
COMMON PLACES OR PRINCIPLES CONCERNING WHAT MAY BE DONE, WHAT HAS BEEN DONE, AND WHAT SHALL BE DONE; OR OF FACT POSSIBLE, PAST AND FUTURE. ALSO OF GREAT AND LITTLE.
We have hitherto set down such principles as are peculiar to several kinds of orations. Now we are to speak of such places as are common to them all; as these: possible, done, or past, future, great, small.
Possible is that: the contrary whereof is possible. And the like whereof is possible. And than which some harder thing is possible. And the beginning whereof is possible. And the end whereof is possible. And the usual consequent whereof is possible. And whatsoever we desire. And the beginning whereof is in the power of those whom we can either compel or persuade. And part whereof is possible. And part of the whole that is possible. And the general, if a particular. And a particular, if the general. And of relatives, if one, the other. And that which without art and industry is possible, is much more so with art and industry. And that which is possible to worse, weaker, and more unskilful men, is much more so to better, stronger, and more skilful.
The principles concerning impossible are the contraries of these.
That has been done: than which a harder thing has been done. And the consequent whereof has been done. And that which being possible, he had a will to do, and nothing hindered. And that which was possible to him in his anger. And that which he longed to do. And that which was before upon the point of doing. And whose antecedent has been done; or that for which it uses to be done. And if that for whose cause we do this, then this.
The principles concerning not done are the contraries of these.
That shall be done: which some man can, and means to do. And which some man can, and desires to do. And which is in the way, and upon the point to be done. And the antecedents whereof are past. And the motive whereof is past.
Of great and small, more and less, see Chapter VII. of Book I.
CHAPTER XXI.
Of the principles, both general and special, from whence proofs are to be drawn, has been already spoken. Now follow the proofs themselves, which are examples or enthymemes.
An example, is either an example properly so called, as some action past; or a similitude, which also is called a parable; or a fable, which contains some action feigned.
An example, properly so called, is this: Darius came not into Greece till he had first subdued Egypt; Xerxes also conquered Egypt first; then afterwards crossed the Hellespont; we ought therefore to hinder the King of Persia from conquering Egypt.
A similitude, or parable, is such as followeth: They who choose their magistrates by lot, are like them that choose for their champions those on whom the lot shall fall, rather than those who have the greatest strength; and for their pilot, not him that hath skill, but him whose name is drawn out of the urn.
A fable is in this manner: The horse desiring to drive out the stag from his common pasture, took a man to assist him; and having received into his mouth a bridle, and a rider upon his back, obtained his intent, but became subject to the man. So you of Himera, having, in hope to be revenged of your enemies, given unto Phalaris sovereign authority, that is to say, taken a bridle into your mouths; if you shall also give him a guard to his person, that is, let him get up upon your backs, you become his slaves presently, past recovery.
To find out examples, that is, actions done that may serve our purpose, is therefore hard, because not in our power. But to find fables and similitudes, is easier; because, by conversing in philosophy, a man may feign somewhat in nature like to the case in hand.
Examples, similitudes, and fables, where enthymemes are wanting, may serve us in the beginning of an oration for inductions; otherwise are to be alleged after enthymemes, for testimonies.
CHAPTER XXII.
A sentence is an universal proposition concerning those things which are to be desired or avoided in the actions or passions of the common life. As, A wise man will not suffer his children to be over-learned. And is to an enthymeme in rhetoric, as any proposition is to a syllogism in logic. And therefore a sentence, if the reason be rendered, becomes a conclusion; and both together make an enthymeme. As for example: To be over-learned, besides that it begets effeminacy, procures envy. Therefore he that is wise will not suffer his children to be over-learned.
Of sentences there be four sorts. For they either require proofs or not, that is, are manifest or not.
Such as are manifest, are either so as soon as they are uttered; as, Health is a great good. Or as soon as they are considered; as, Men use to hate whom they have hurt.
Such as are not manifest, are either conclusions of enthymemes; as, He that is wise will not suffer his children, &c. Or else are enthymematical; that is, have in themselves the force of an enthymeme; as Mortal men ought not to carry immortal anger.
A sentence not manifest, ought to be either inferred or confirmed. Inferred thus: It is not good to be effeminately minded, nor to be envied by one’s fellow-citizens. A wise man, therefore, will not have his children over-learned. Confirmed thus: A wise man will not have his children over-learned; seeing too much learning both softens a man’s mind, and procures him envy among his fellow-citizens.
If a reason be added to a manifest sentence, let it be short.
Sentences become not every man; but only old men, and such as be well-versed in business. For to hear a young man speak sentences, is ridiculous; and to hear an ignorant man speak sentences, is absurd.
Sentences generally received, when they are for our purpose, ought not to be neglected; because they pass for truths. And yet they may be denied, when any laudable custom or humour may thereby be made appear in the denier.
The commodities of sentences, are two. One proceeding from the vanity of the hearer, who takes for true universally affirmed, that which he has found for true only in some particular; and therefore a man ought to consider in every thing what opinion the hearer holds. Another is, that sentences do discover the manners and disposition of the speaker; so that if they be esteemed good sentences, he shall be esteemed a good man; and if evil, an evil man.
Thus much of sentences, what they be; of how many sorts; how to be used; whom they become; and what is their profit.
CHAPTER XXIII.
Seeing an enthymeme differs from a logical syllogism, in that it neither concludes out of every thing, nor out of remote principles; the places of it, from whence a man may argue, ought to be certain and determinate.
And because whosoever makes a syllogism, rhetorical or other, should know all or the most part of that which is in question; as, whosoever is to advise the Athenians in the question, whether they are to make war or no, must know what their revenues be, what and what kind of power they have: and he that will praise them, must know their acts at Salamis, Marathon, &c.: it will be necessary for a good speaker to have in readiness the choicest particulars of whatsoever he foresees he may speak of.
He that is to speak ex tempore, must comprehend in his speech as much as he can of what is most proper in the matter in hand.
Proper, I call those things which are least common to others: as, he that will praise Achilles, is not to declare such things as are common both to him and Diomedes; as that he was a prince, and warred against the Trojans: but such things as are proper only to Achilles; as that he killed Hector and Cygnus; went to the war young and voluntary.
Let this therefore be one general place; from that which is proper.
CHAPTER XXIV.
Forasmuch as enthymemes either infer truly, or seem only so to do; and they which do infer indeed, be either ostensive, or such as bring a man to some impossibility; we will first set down the places of enthymemes ostensive.
An ostensive enthymeme is, wherein a man concludes the question from somewhat granted.
That enthymeme which brings a man to an impossibility, is an enthymeme wherein from that which the adversary maintaineth, we conclude that which is manifestly impossible.
All places have been already set down in a manner in the precedent propositions of good, evil, just, unjust, honourable, and dishonourable: namely, they have been set down as applied to particular subjects, or in concrete. Here they are to be set down in another manner; namely in the abstract or universal.
The first place, then, let be from contraries; which in the concrete or particulars is exemplified thus. If intemperance be hurtful, temperance is profitable: and if intemperance be not hurtful, neither is temperance profitable.
Another place may be from cognomination, or affinity of words: as in this particular. If what is just, be good; then what is justly, is well: but justly to die, is not well: therefore not all that is just, is good.
A third from relatives; as, This man has justly done, therefore the other has justly suffered. But this place sometimes deceives; for a man may suffer justly, yet not from him.
A fourth from comparison, three ways.
From the great to the less; as, He has stricken his father; and therefore this man.
From the less to the greater: as, The Gods know not all things; much less man.
From equality: as, If captains be not always the worse esteemed for losing a victory; why should sophisters?
Another from the time: as Philip to the Thebans: If I had required to pass through your country with my army, before I had aided you against the Phocæans, there is no doubt but you would have promised it me. It is absurd therefore to deny it me now, after I have trusted you.
A sixth from what the adversary says of himself: as, Iphicrates asked Aristophon, whether he would take a bribe to betray the army; and he answering no; What, says he, is it likely that Iphicrates would betray the army, and Aristophon not?
This place would be ridiculous, where the defendant were not in much more estimation than the accuser.
A seventh from the definition; as that of Socrates; A spirit is either God, or the creature of God; and therefore he denies not that there is a God, that confesses there are spirits.
An eighth from the distinction of an ambiguous word.
A ninth from division: as, If all men do what they do for one of three causes, whereof two are impossible; and the accuser charge not the defendant with the third; it follows that he has not done it.
A tenth from induction: as, At Athens, at Thebes, at Sparta, &c.; and therefore every where.
An eleventh from authority, or precedent sentence; as that of Sappho, that Death is evil; for that the gods have judged it so, in excepting themselves from mortality.
A twelfth from the consequence; as, It is not good to be envied; therefore neither to be learned. It is good to be wise, therefore also to be instructed.
A thirteenth from two contrary consequences; as, It is not good to be an orator; because if he speak the truth, he shall displease men, if he speak falsely, he shall displease God.
Here is to be noted, that sometimes this argument may be retorted: as thus, If you speak truth, you shall please God; if you speak untruth, you shall please men; therefore by all means be an orator.
A fourteenth from the quality that men have to praise one thing and approve another: as, We ought not to war against the Athenians upon no precedent injury; for all men discommend injustice. Again, We ought to war against the Athenians; for otherwise our liberty is at their mercy, that is, is no liberty: but the preservation of liberty is a thing that all men will approve.
A fifteenth from proportion: as, Seeing we naturalize strangers for their virtues, why should we not banish this stranger for his vices?
A sixteenth from the similitude of consequents: as He that denies the immortality of the gods, is no worse than he that has written the generation of the gods: for the same consequence follows of both, that sometimes there are none.
A seventeenth from that, that men change their mind: as, If when we were in banishment, we fought to recover our country, why should we not fight now to retain it?
An eighteenth from a feigned end: as that Diomedes chose Ulysses to go with him, not as more valiant than another, but as one that would partake less of the glory.
A nineteenth from the cause; as if he would infer he did it from this, that he had cause to do it.
A twentieth from that which is incredible, but true: as that laws may need a law to mend them, as well as fish bred in the salt water may need salting.
CHAPTER XXV.
IMPOSSIBILITY.
Let the first place be from inspection of times, actions, or words, either of the adversary, or of the speaker, or both. Of the adversary: as, He says he loves the people, and yet he was in the conspiracy of the Thirty. Of the speaker; as, He says I am contentious, and yet I never began suit. Of both; as, He never conferred any thing to the benefit of the commonwealth; whereas I have ransomed divers citizens with mine own money.
A second is from shewing the cause which seemed amiss, and serves for men of good reputation that are accused; as, The mother that was accused of incest for being seen embracing her son, was absolved as soon as she made appear that she embraced him upon his arrival from far by way of salutation.
A third, from rendering of the cause; as, Leodamas, to whom it was objected, that he had, under the thirty tyrants, defaced the inscription, which the people had set up in a pillar, of his ignominy; answered, He had not done it; because it would have been more to his commodity to let it stand; thereby to endear himself to the tyrants by the testimony of the people’s hatred.
A fourth from better counsel; as He might have done better for himself, therefore he did not this. But this place deceives, when the better counsel comes to mind after the fact.
A fifth from the incompatibility of the things to be done; as, They that did deliberate whether they should both mourn and sacrifice at the funeral of Leucothea, were told that, if they thought her a goddess, they ought not to mourn; and if they thought her a mortal, they ought not to sacrifice.
A sixth (which is proper to judicial orations) from an inference of error; as, If he did it not, he was not wise; therefore he did it.
Enthymemes that lead to impossibility, please more than ostensive. For they compare and put contraries together, whereby they are the better set off and more conspicuous to the auditor.
Of all enthymemes, they be best which we assent to as soon as hear. For such consent pleaseth us, and makes us favourable to the speaker.
CHAPTER XXVI.
Of seeming enthymemes, one place may be from the form of speaking. As when a man has repeated divers sentences, he brings in his conclusion as if it followed necessarily, though it do not.
A second from an ambiguous word.
A third from that which is true, divided, to that which is false, joined; as that of Orestes, It was justice that I should revenge my father’s death, and it was justice my mother should die for killing my father: therefore I justly killed my mother. Or from that which is true, joined, to that which is false, divided; as, one cup of wine, and one cup of wine, are hurtful; therefore one cup of wine is hurtful.
A fourth, from amplification of the crime. For neither is the defendant likely to have committed the crime he amplifies; nor does the accuser seem, when he is passionate, to want ground for his accusation.
A fifth from signs; as, when a man concludes the doing of the fact from the manner of his life.
A sixth from that which comes by chance. As if from this, that the tyranny of Hipparchus came to be overthrown from the love of Aristogeiton to Harmodius, a man should conclude that in a free commonwealth loving of boys were profitable.
A seventh from the consequence; as, Banishment is to be desired, because a banished man has choice of places to dwell in.
An eighth from making that the cause which is not; as, In Demosthenes' government the war began; therefore Demosthenes governed well. With the Peloponnesian war began the plague, therefore Pericles, that persuaded that war, did ill.
A ninth from the omission of some circumstance; as, Helen did what was lawful when she ran away with Paris, because she had her father’s consent to choose her own husband; which was true only during the time that she had not chosen.
A tenth from that which is probable, in some case, to that which is probable simply; as, It is probable he foresaw that if he did it he should be suspected; therefore it is probable he did it not. From this place one may infer both ways that he did it not. For if he be not likely to do it, it may be thought he did it not: again, if he were likely to do it, it may be thought he did it not, for this, that he knew he should be suspected.
Upon this place was grounded the art which was so much detested in Protagoras, of making the better cause seem the worse, and the worse the better.
CHAPTER XXVII.
An argument is answered by an opposite syllogism, or by an objection.
The places of opposite syllogisms are the same with the places of syllogisms, or enthymemes; for a rhetorical syllogism is an enthymeme.
The places of objections are four.
First, from the same. As, to the adversary that proves love to be good by an enthymeme, may be objected, that, No want is good, and yet love is want; or particularly thus, The love of Myrrha to her father was not good.
The second from contraries. As, if the adversary say, A good man does good to his friends, an objection might be made, that then an evil man will do also evil to his friends.
The third from similitude. As thus, if the adversary say, all men that are injured do hate those that have injured them, it may be objected, that then all men that had received benefits should love their benefactors, that is to say, be grateful.
The fourth from the authority of famous men. As when a man shall say, that drunken men ought to be pardoned those acts they do in their drunkenness, because they know not what they do; the objection may be, that Pittacus was of another mind, that appointed for such acts a double punishment; one for the act, another for the drunkenness.
And forasmuch as all enthymemes are drawn from probability, or example, or from a sign fallible, or from a sign infallible: an enthymeme from probability may be confuted really, by showing that for the most part it falls out otherwise; but apparently or sophistically, by showing only that it does not fall out so always; whereupon the judge thinks the probability not sufficient to ground his sentence upon. The reason whereof is this, that the judge, while he hears the fact proved probable, conceives it as true. For the understanding has no object but truth. And therefore, by-and-by, when he shall hear an instance to the contrary, and thereby find that he had no necessity to think it true, presently changes his opinion, and thinks it false, and consequently not so much as probable. For he cannot at one time think the same thing both probable and false; and he that says a thing is probable, the meaning is, he thinks it true, but finds not arguments enough to prove it.
An enthymeme, from a fallible sign, is answered by showing the sign to be fallible.
An enthymeme from an example, is answered as an enthymeme from probability; really by showing more examples to the contrary; apparently, if he bring examples enough to make it seem not necessary.
If the adversary have more examples than we, we must make it appear that they are not applicable to the case.
An enthymeme from an infallible sign, if the proposition be true, is unanswerable.
CHAPTER XXVIII.
AMPLIFICATION AND EXTENUATION ARE NOT COMMON PLACES. ENTHYMEMES, BY WHICH ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED, ARE THE SAME WITH THOSE BY WHICH THE MATTER IN QUESTION IS PROVED OR DISPROVED. OBJECTIONS ARE NOT ENTHYMEMES.
The first, that amplification and extenuation are not common places, appears by this, that amplification and extenuation do prove a fact to be great or little; and are therefore enthymemes to be drawn from common places, and therefore are not the places themselves.
The second, that enthymemes, by which arguments are answered, are of the same kind with those by which the matter in question is proved, is manifest by this, that these infer the opposite of what was proved by the other.
The third, that an objection is no enthymeme, is apparent by this, that an objection is no more but an opinion, example, or other instance, produced to make appear that the adversary’s argument does not conclude.
Thus much of examples, sentences, enthymemes, and generally of all things that belong to argumentation; from what places they may be drawn or answered.
There remain elocution and disposition to be spoken of in the next book.
BOOK III.
CHAPTER I.
Three things being necessary to an oration, namely proof, elocution, and disposition; we have done with the first, and shall speak of the other two in that which follows.
As for action or pronunciation, so much as is necessary for an orator may be fetched out of the book of the Art of Poetry, in which we have treated of the action of the stage. For tragedians were the first that invented such action, and that but of late; and it consisteth in governing well the magnitude, tone, and measure of the voice; a thing less subject to art, than is either proof or elocution.
And yet there have been rules delivered concerning it, as far forth as serve for poetry. But oratorical action has not been hitherto reduced to art. And orators in the beginning, when they saw that the poets in barren and feigned arguments nevertheless attained great reputation; supposing it had proceeded from the choice or connexion of words, fell into a style, by imitation of them, approaching to verse, and made choice of words. But when the poets changed their style, and laid by all words that were not in common use, the orators did the same, and lighted at last upon words and a government of the voice and measures proper to themselves.
Seeing therefore pronunciation or action are in some degree necessary also for an orator, the precepts thereof are to be fetched from the Art of Poetry.
In the meantime this may be one general rule. If the words, tone, greatness of the voice, gesture of the body and countenance, seem to proceed all from one passion, then it is well pronounced. Otherwise not. For when there appear more passions than one at once, the mind of the speaker appears unnatural and distracted. Otherwise, as the mind of the speaker, so the mind of the hearer always.
CHAPTER II.
The virtues of a word are two; the first, that it be perspicuous; the second, that it be decent, that is, neither above nor below the thing signified, or, neither too humble nor too fine.
Perspicuous are all words that be proper.
Fine words are those, that are borrowed, or translated from other significations; of which in the Art of Poetry.
The reason why borrowed words please, is this. Men are affected with words, as they are with men; admiring in both that which is foreign and new.
To make a poem graceful, many things help; but few an oration. For to a poet it sufficeth, with what words he can, to set out his poem. But an orator must not only do that, but also seem not to do it: for else he will be thought to speak unnaturally, and not as he thinks; and thereby be the less believed; whereas belief is the scope of his oration.
The words that an orator ought to use are of three sorts; proper, such as are received, and metaphors.
Words taken from foreign languages, words compounded, and words new coined, are seldom to be used.
Synonymes belong to poets, and equivocal words to sophisters.
An orator if he use proper words, and received and good metaphors, shall both make his oration beautiful, and not seem to intend it; and shall speak perspicuously. For in a metaphor alone there is perspicuity, novity, and sweetness.
Concerning metaphors the rules are these:
1. He that will make the best of a thing, let him draw his metaphor from somewhat that is better. As for example, let him call a crime an error. On the other side, when he would make the worst of it, let him draw his metaphor from somewhat worse; as, calling error, crime.
2. A metaphor ought not to be so far-fetched, as that the similitude may not easily appear.
3. A metaphor ought to be drawn from the noblest things; as the poets do, that choose rather to say rosy-fingered, than red-fingered Aurora.
In like manner the rule of epithets is, that he that will adorn, should use those of the better sort; and he that will disgrace, should use those of the worse. As Simonides being to write an ode in honour of the victory gotten in a course by certain mules, being not well paid, called them by their name, Ἡμιόνους, that signifies their propinquity to asses: but having received a greater reward, styles them the sons of swift-footed coursers.
CHAPTER III.
The things that make an oration flat or insipid, are four:
1. Words compounded. And yet a man may compound a word, when the composition is necessary for want of a simple word, and easy, and seldom used.
2. Foreign words. As for example, such as are newly derived from the Latin; which though they were proper among them whose tongue it is, are foreign in another language: and yet these may be used, so it be moderately.
3. Long, impertinent, and often epithets.
4. Metaphors indecent and obscure. Obscure they are, when they are far-fetched. Indecent, when they are ridiculous, as in comedies; or too grave, as in tragedies.
CHAPTER IV.
A similitude differs from a metaphor only by such particles of comparison as these; as; even as; so; even so, &c.
A similitude therefore is a metaphor dilated; and a metaphor is a similitude contracted into one word.
A similitude does well in an oration, so it be not too frequent; for it is poetical.
An example of the similitude, is this of Pericles, that said in his oration, that the Bœotians were like so many oaks in a wood, that did nothing but beat one another.
CHAPTER V.
Four things are necessary to make language pure.
1. The right rendering of those particles, which some antecedent particle does require; as to a not only, a not also; and then they are rendered right, when they are not suspended too long.
2. The use of proper words, rather than circumlocutions; unless there be motive to make one do it of purpose.
3. That there be nothing of double construction, unless there be cause to do it of purpose; as the prophets of the heathen, who speak in general terms, to the end they may the better maintain the truth of their prophecies; which is easier maintained in generals, than in particulars. For it is easier to divine whether a number be even or odd, than how many; and that a thing will be, than what it will be.
4. Concordance of gender, number, and person; as not to say him for her, man for men, hath for have.
In sum, a man’s language ought to be easy for another to read, pronounce, and point.
Besides, to divers antecedents, let divers relatives, or one common to them all, be correspondent; as, he saw the colour, he heard the sound; or he perceived both colour and sound: but by no means, he heard or saw both.
Lastly, that which is to be interposed by parenthesis, let it be done quickly: as, I purposed, having spoken to him (to this, and to this purpose), afterward to be gone. For to put it off thus; I resolved, after I had spoken to him, to be gone; but the subject of my speech was to this and this purpose; is vicious.