The five republics of Central America

The events of the last ten years have made it clear that the relations between the United States and Central America must inevitably be closer than our relations with countries whose well-being is of less vital importance to us. However much we may dislike interfering in the internal affairs of our neighbors, we cannot remain indifferent when disorder and misrule paralyze agriculture and commerce and threaten to provoke European intervention in a region where our political and economic interests are so great as they are in the republics bordering on the Caribbean Sea. Both for our own security and for the sake of helping neighbors with whom we are united by powerful ties of proximity and common interests, we must inevitably use our influence more and more to aid the Central American republics in developing stable political institutions which will insure their prosperity and their continued independence.

The interests of the United States in the Isthmus are far greater than those of any other foreign power. In the first place, like the other countries around the Caribbean Sea, the five republics are one of the most promising fields for the expansion of American commerce and the investment of American capital. While no one of them is an important customer of itself, together they make up a market which will one day be of very great value. Our exports to them have increased greatly in recent years and especially since the beginning of the European war, and our imports from them are growing steadily. Only a very small part of the food-producing possibilities of the tropics, moreover, has as yet been realized, and economists say that it is not improbable that the people of the temperate zone will be forced to rely upon their equatorial neighbors for an increasingly large proportion of their provisions in the not distant future. If this is so, the development of that part of the tropics which is naturally tributary to us commercially cannot be a matter of indifference. This development can only take place with the improvement of political conditions, and with the introduction of capital from wealthier countries which the establishment of peaceful government will make possible.

The establishment of peaceful government in the Isthmus is a matter in which we are deeply interested for political reasons. The Monroe Doctrine must always be a paramount principle of our foreign policy, at least in so far as it deals with the countries of the Caribbean, because the exercise of political influence in that region by a foreign power could not but be a constant menace to our peace and security. Several European nations, however, have extensive and legitimate interests in Central America, for many of their citizens reside and own property there and most of the foreign debt of each of the five republics is held in London or Paris. It is impossible to expect that they should remain inactive when these investments are made worthless by internal disorders or by the arbitrary action of irresponsible native rulers. Whatever one may think of the morality of the protection of foreign investments by intervention and the collection of public debts by force, this is the established practice of most civilized nations, and it is a practice which finds much justification in the conditions which exist in certain Central American countries. The landing of troops and the seizure of ports by a foreign power, so near our shores and in the immediate vicinity of the Panama Canal, can hardly fail to endanger the most vital interests of the United States, because of the manifold opportunities which such measures afford for exerting an influence over internal politics. The control of the policy of one of the Central American governments by a European chancellory or the grant of special economic privileges would of course be intolerable to the United States. That such consequences might follow even a simple intervention to enforce the payment of debts, is all too evident from events which have occurred in other parts of the world. The American government cannot, however, oppose measures adopted by European powers for the protection of the legitimate interests of their nationals without itself assuming a certain responsibility for the safeguarding of foreign life and property. Even supposing that it were sufficiently powerful to prevent other governments from intervening, it could hardly allow its protection to be made a cloak for the confiscation of foreign property and the repudiation of bonded debts by unscrupulous professional revolutionists like those who have at one time or another been in power in each of the Central American countries.

The United States has already gone very far in its attempts to assist its Central American neighbors to attain political and financial stability. At first it limited its efforts to friendly advice and mediation. By participating in the Washington Conference of 1907, however, it became in a measure responsible for the enforcement of the conventions drawn up by that body, in so far, at least, as they related to the discouragement of revolutions, the compulsory arbitration of disputes, and the neutralization of Honduras.[89] The continual violation of the provisions of the Washington Treaties by President Zelaya of Nicaragua led President Taft to break off relations with him in 1909 and to intervene in the revolution of that year in such a way that the fall of the Liberal administration was inevitable; and the financial and military assistance which it was necessary to render to Zelaya’s successors, in order to prevent the Republic from falling into a state of anarchy, imposed new and still greater responsibilities upon the United States. Since 1912, when a revolt against the established authorities was suppressed by American troops, the Conservative government at Managua has been kept in office by the presence of a force of American marines, and the State Department has become deeply involved in assisting the Republic to adjust its financial affairs. The United States has recently acquired new interests in the Isthmus by the treaty giving it the right to construct an interoceanic canal through Nicaragua and to establish a naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca. Meanwhile outbreaks of disorder have been discouraged in all parts of the Isthmus by the influence exerted by the authorities at Washington against violations of the 1907 conventions and by their refusal to recognize governments which came into power through revolution.

The policy of the United States has aroused strong antagonism in Central America. The people of the Isthmus are by no means convinced of the disinterestedness or the friendly intentions of their powerful neighbor, and it would be difficult to persuade them that the interference of the latter in their affairs will ultimately be for their own good. Their hostility is due partly to the inevitable opposition among a proud and sensitive people to foreign intervention in their domestic concerns, and partly to the failure of the American government to convince the Central Americans of the altruism of its aims. Our State Department has had no definite, well-understood, and energetically enforced policy, but has been forced from step to step by circumstances as they have arisen, and its course of action has not always been such as to inspire confidence in the purity of its motives. The attitude of the American government in the revolution of 1909-10 in Nicaragua, for example, was hardly consistent in view of its championship of the Washington Conventions, notwithstanding the excellent reasons which the United States as well as the Central American countries had for desiring President Zelaya’s fall. The “Dollar Diplomacy” of Mr. Taft’s administration was regarded throughout the Isthmus as the opening wedge for the political absorption of the five republics by the United States. This feeling caused the emphatic rejection of the proposed loan treaty by the Honduranean congress, and aroused a violent opposition to the financial policy of the Conservative government in Nicaragua,—an opposition which was greatly intensified by the fact that the authorities who signed the loan contracts and who turned over to American banking concerns the control of the customs houses, the currency system, and the national railways, were maintained in office by the armed forces of the United States. The steps taken more recently in connection with the canal treaty have been regarded by many Central Americans as final proof of the aggressive intentions of the American government.

The United States has nevertheless achieved one of its main objects, in that revolutions and international wars have been checked throughout the Isthmus. There has been no very serious disturbance of the peace since the suppression of Mena’s revolt in Nicaragua in 1912. This has been due partly to the efforts of the State Department to secure the strict observance of those provisions of the Washington Conventions which restrain the Central American republics from intervening in one another’s internal political affairs, and from allowing their territory to be made the base of operations against neighboring governments, but more to a fear on the part of native political leaders that a renewal of the disorderly conditions which formerly existed would lead to American intervention and to the domination of their affairs, as in Nicaragua, by an outside power. This apprehension has exerted a most valuable restraining influence on enemies of the established order in many countries which had hardly ever known five years of continuous peace before 1912. There were, it is true, small revolts in Nicaragua and Guatemala in 1915 and 1916, but they were easily suppressed by the authorities, and they hardly disturbed the tranquillity of the greater part of the territory of the republics in which they occurred. Their insignificance showed that no large or influential section of the opposition party had participated in them. As the result even of this short era of peace, there has been a marked improvement in economic and political conditions in many sections of the Isthmus.

The policy of refusing to recognize any forcible change of government, however, is a very difficult one to carry out consistently. It would be manifestly impossible to prevent all revolutions. An attempt to do so would involve continual armed intervention in the internal affairs of the Central American republics, which would be as burdensome and distasteful to the United States as it would be intolerable to the people of the Isthmus. It is often equally impossible, and sometimes exceedingly disastrous, to refuse to recognize a government which has sprung from a revolution. After one administration has fallen and its successor has established itself firmly in power, the refusal of the United States to recognize the new authorities only weakens them, and thus opens the way for a complete disintegration of the political organization, without advancing appreciably the cause of constitutional government. The restoration of the old regime is rarely either possible or desirable. The ousted authorities, if they themselves secured office, like almost all Central American administrations, as the result of a successful revolution or an election controlled by the government, can hardly lay claim to a higher degree of legality than their successors, and a president who has once lost his prestige and his following is not often able to re-establish a strong and efficient government, even with foreign support.

The prevention of chronic civil war is indeed the first great requisite for the improvement of political conditions in Central America, but even peace will be a doubtful blessing in the long run if it is secured by the maintenance in office by outside influence of presidents who are responsible to no one and who have nothing to fear from popular opposition. The mere discouragement of revolutions offers no solution for the most serious of Central America’s political problems, for it provides no guarantee of good government and no peaceful method of removing authorities whose rule may have become intolerable.

The responsibility resting upon the United States is the more serious, because the American government is not infrequently called upon actually to decide who shall be president of one or the other of the five republics. Even an intervention to protect foreign life and property often determines, as a matter of fact, the outcome of a civil war, and the influence upon internal politics is still greater when the United States uses diplomatic pressure or force to prevent a revolution or to bring about an agreement between the contending factions. In either case, the United States practically imposes upon the country affected the rule of one or the other political group. It is impossible to intervene merely to prevent disorder, and then leave to the people the choice of their own rulers, for elections, as we have seen, are nothing more than a form for putting into effect the choice of the government already in office. It would be foolish to attempt to force democratic institutions upon the less advanced republics of the Isthmus at the present time. No president of one of those countries, however sincere he might be in his purpose, could really hold a free election, and any attempt to do so would probably end in bloodshed and disaster. An election supervised by the United States, which was proposed as a solution of the recent presidential problem in Nicaragua, would be equally unsatisfactory as a means of establishing a new administration. Aside from the difficulty of ascertaining the wishes of a nation where the majority of the voters have no interest in political affairs, there are so many opportunities for fraud and for the exercise of pressure by the government and by the local officials at every stage of the campaign, as well as in the election itself, that it would be practically impossible to guarantee the opposition party a fair chance. An administration which has once obtained military control can perpetuate itself indefinitely under constitutional forms until its opponents become sufficiently strong to overthrow it by force of arms.

The United States, therefore, can hardly assist one party in securing and holding the control of the government, without assuring itself that the men whom it thus keeps in office are acceptable to the people under their rule, and that they administer the affairs of their country with at least a reasonable degree of honesty and efficiency. This can only be done by establishing an administration which fairly represents the best elements in the community. It should not be impossible to secure such an administration by an agreement between the party leaders, who for all practical purposes represent the country in political affairs. Compromise between the various factions, which is the only practicable means, except revolution, of changing the higher officials, is the end towards which the diplomatic efforts of the United States should be directed in cases where circumstances make a reorganization of the government inevitable. The more respectable and patriotic leaders of all parties would far prefer an adjustment of this kind to a continuation of civil war, and even those who might be unwilling to subordinate their own ambitions to the general welfare would probably accept it rather than incur the danger of armed intervention by the United States.

The friendly mediation of the United States would do much to improve the political conditions of the Isthmus if it were directed towards strengthening the influence of the better element in the educated class. Numerous intelligent and patriotic men of high political ideals are to be found in each country, but they have not hitherto had so large a share in the direction of affairs as they should because the revolutions have brought to the front military leaders and demagogues rather than statesmen. Even where men of the highest character have been at the head of the government, as has not infrequently been the case, they have found themselves forced to place corrupt or unworthy men in office for political reasons, because they have been unable to free themselves from dependence upon the support of the professional politicians. With the greater stability in the government which will necessarily result from the discouragement of revolutions, however, the less turbulent elements should become more and more prominent, especially if they are supported by the influence of the United States.

The United States can at the same time materially assist its Central American neighbors by aiding them in securing new loans for the reorganization of their finances and the development of their natural resources. The unenviable record of Central American bonds makes it unlikely that any bankers, whether American or European, would lend money to one of the five republics, unless it were on the most onerous terms, without an effective guarantee of the protection of their government in case of default. Considering the close relation between the solvency of the countries of the Isthmus and the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine, it is evident that the United States must eventually exert its good offices in cases where it has been impossible to reach an agreement with foreign creditors by any other means.

In Santo Domingo and Nicaragua, the service of loans made by American bankers has been guaranteed by placing the administration of the customs duties in the hands of officials appointed by or at least approved by the State Department. This is far from being an entirely satisfactory solution of the problem. The collectorships thus far established have provided a highly satisfactory guarantee for the foreign creditors, and have decidedly increased the efficiency of the customs service, but their existence has been very distasteful and of doubtful advantage to the native community. Graft is abolished in the customs houses themselves, but there is nothing to prevent that portion of the receipts which is not used for the service of the foreign debt from being misspent. Revolutions are not done away with, for revolutionists fight, not, as is sometimes said, for the possession of the customs houses, but rather for the control of the appointing power and of the revenues, which the customs officials must necessarily turn over to them when they become the de facto government. The chief result is the imposition upon the American government of a heavy burden of responsibility which forces it to intervene continually in the internal affairs of the native governments, and which often leads to friction with the officials and to a feeling of dislike towards the United States in the community at large. The acceptance of foreign financial control, moreover, inevitably involves a lessening of the sense of international responsibility and a certain loss of national self-respect which cannot but react unfavorably upon internal politics.

It may well be questioned whether the bondholders could not be satisfactorily protected by other methods. If, for instance, the foreign loan were secured by the hypothecation of the customs revenues or of some other easily collected source of revenue, with a promise of the protection of the State Department in realizing the guarantee of the loan in case of default, the interests of the creditor would be adequately protected, while the Central American governments, so long as they dealt honestly by the bondholders, would be spared the humiliation of having to place one of their principal functions in the hands of a foreign official who was in no way subject to their control. This is the basis upon which Costa Rica’s external debt rests at present, except that no foreign government participated officially in the arrangement. There would probably be little difficulty about maintaining the service of the loan under such conditions. The majority of the Central American governments have shown little regard for their credit in times past, but they would probably manifest little inclination to default if their debts were reorganized on a fair basis, and if they were aware that a failure to pay would involve the seizure of their customs houses.

It is highly desirable that the United States should exercise a measure of control over the operations not only of American bankers but of other American corporations which do business in the Isthmus. The economic development of the last twenty-five years has created a situation in which some of the five republics are almost powerless to protect themselves against the oppression and greed of foreign interests, for corporations like the great fruit companies and the railroad companies are able to bring to the support of their projects financial resources which far exceed those of the local government or of any group of natives. Some of these concerns, by the corruption of officials or by the unscrupulous use of their control of transportation facilities, have obtained special privileges which have been an obstacle to the legitimate business of other foreigners and to the development of the community as a whole. Moreover, serious international difficulties have not infrequently arisen when subsequent governments have attempted to annul or to modify these concessions. Only a more careful supervision of the contracts entered into by American concerns with native officials, who are not always above temptation and who are in any event rarely in a position to ascertain the financial responsibility of the concerns with which they are dealing or the ultimate effects of the privileges which are asked, can insure the United States against the possibility of being forced to use its power to protect unscrupulous speculators and predatory corporations in the exercise of rights which, even though legally acquired, are in many cases extremely unfair and injurious to the countries which have granted them.

The same interests which have obtained inequitable concessions by dishonest methods have too often sought to secure influence with the native governments by fomenting and assisting revolutions against presidents from whom they cannot obtain what they desire. In recent years influences of this kind have done even more to cause internal disorder in some of the republics than the intervention and intrigues of other Central American governments. Honduras has been the chief sufferer, for the numerous outbreaks which occurred in that Republic between 1907 and 1911 seem to have been financed in many cases by interests in New Orleans, and to have received valuable assistance from the foreign colony on the North Coast. In Nicaragua also the indiscriminate granting of concessions on the one hand and the dissatisfaction among the foreign interests which were injured by these grants of special privileges on the other was one of the primary causes of the revolution of 1909-10. If permanent peace is ever to be established in the Isthmus, the encouragement of revolutions from outside, whether it be for the satisfaction of the ambition or the jealousy of petty despots in neighboring republics or for the pecuniary profit of unprincipled foreigners, must be repressed by every possible means.

Much can be done to promote stable government in Central America by the consistent enforcement of the principles of the Washington conventions, for few revolutions, except those which originate in genuine popular discontent with the existing regime, would attain formidable proportions if they were not allowed to use neutral territory as a base and if they received no assistance from other Central American countries or from friends in the United States. If the American government exerts its influence to secure the observation of the 1907 treaties, and at the same time adopts effective means for restraining its own citizens from disturbing the peace of the Isthmus, the position of constituted governments throughout Central America will be greatly strengthened. To be effective, such a policy must be vigorously enforced, and its one end,—to prevent revolutions and international wars in Central America,—should be pursued in such a way that there can be no suspicion of selfish objects or ulterior political purposes.

Much depends upon the character and the ability of the men who are sent to represent the United States diplomatically in the Central American capitals. Unless they are fitted for their positions by disposition and by training, their relations with the native governments can never be entirely satisfactory. An acquaintance with the character of the people and a command of Spanish are of the first importance, for Central American political methods and the motives which govern the action of men and parties, incomprehensible at best to the average American, are entirely beyond the understanding of one who does not speak the language and is thus barred from association with any but a very small portion of the people. The cordiality of our relations with the republics of the Isthmus depends to a very great extent upon the capacity of our agents to win the confidence and friendship of their people; and the extremely important position occupied by the United States minister in these countries, where he is forced to play a part far more influential than that which falls to the lot of the average diplomat, makes it an act of injustice to the Central American countries themselves to send ministers who are not properly qualified for their position.

The influence and authority of the United States in Central America are very great, for there are few educated men in the Isthmus who do not realize that the future of their countries will be determined almost entirely by their relations with their northern neighbor. The people of the five republics have always admired our civilization and our institutions, and they have often turned to the American government, not only for protection against European powers, but also for aid in adjusting their domestic difficulties. They have bitterly resented the policy of the last five years, which they have regarded as a menace to their independence, but their hostility to American intervention would to a great extent disappear if they were convinced that it was actuated by a desire to assist them and not by any purpose of expansion. Even those elements which are most jealously opposed to foreign control at present would not object so strongly to the exercise of foreign influence if they themselves profited by it, and most of the more intelligent and patriotic political leaders avow that they would welcome the assistance of the American government in securing peace and stability in the Isthmus and in bringing about the Central American Union.

While their political and economic interests have become so closely interdependent, cultural ties between the United States and Central America have also grown far stronger in the last quarter century as a result of the increasing prosperity of the coffee-producing countries and the improvement in means of communication. The wealthier families of the Isthmus travel more and more in the United States, and a very large proportion of them send their children to be educated in our schools and colleges. English has taken the place formerly held by French as the most widely spoken foreign language, and North American news services and periodicals are the principal sources of information on events occurring in the outside world. The creation of ties of this kind will have more influence than treaties and diplomatic conferences in determining whether our relations with Central America shall be friendly and mutually profitable rather than characterized by dictation and compulsion on the one side and bitter resentment on the other.

The influence of North American civilization in the Isthmus, which is daily becoming stronger under present conditions, could be greatly increased if the missionary educational enterprise which has been so successful in the Orient could be turned in some measure to these countries at our own doors. The establishment by American philanthropic societies of institutions for higher education and for technical training in agriculture and engineering would perhaps do more than any other one factor could to improve both the economic and the political conditions of the Isthmus. Many of the governments have advanced far in the primary instruction of their people, but they have been prevented from making corresponding progress in higher education by the expense involved and by the lack of properly trained teachers. There is no form of assistance which the people of the Isthmus would appreciate more, and which would do more to convince them of the friendly intentions of their great neighbor.

The political stability and the prosperity of the Central American countries have been the one great object which the United States has sought in its relations with their governments. Modern conditions have made the maintenance of peace and the development of commerce and natural resources in the Isthmus far more important to the American people than ever before. It is inevitable, therefore, that the United States should exert a decided influence in the internal affairs of the five republics, so long as disorder and insolvency expose them to aggression by European powers. But it should never be forgotten that the ultimate purpose of the American policy is to enable the countries of the Isthmus to attain a position where they can manage their own affairs without outside interference. Careless talk about the ultimate absorption of these countries by the United States is as unwarranted as it is mischievous, for none of the measures thus far taken in any Central American state have had as their object or their logical outcome permanent political domination. If the efforts of our government to assist its weaker neighbors are to attain any measure of success, its sincerity and its freedom from any desire for territorial expansion must be placed beyond all doubt.

The present political condition of the Isthmus is a transitory one, which is changing rapidly with the economic development of the country and the spread of education among the common people. If they are given a fair chance, the five republics will work out their own salvation, but they will not be aided in doing so either by the establishment of foreign protectorates over them or by the attempt of a foreign government to impose upon their people responsibilities of self-government for which they are not as yet ready. The ultimate solution of their political problems must be sought in making a reality the democratic institutions which each of them already possesses on paper, by preparing their people for the intelligent exercise of the suffrage. When the people are fitted to take an active part in choosing their own officials, as they already do in Costa Rica, and when they have learned the respect for the constitution and for the will of the majority which can only come with experience in self-government, there will be no need for foreign intervention to protect life and property from destruction at the hands of revolutionary armies. To aid in bringing that time nearer should be one of the primary aims of the foreign policy of the United States.