The Franco-German War of 1870-71

On this day the Corps of the IIIrd Army, consisting of 128 battalions, 102 squadrons, and 80 batteries, which had been assembled in bivouac behind the Klingsbach, crossed the French frontier, marching on a broad front to reach the Lauter between Weissenburg and Lauterburg. This stream affords an exceptionally strong defensive position, but on August 4th only one weak Division and a cavalry brigade of the Ist French Corps covered this point, the main body of that Corps being still on the march towards the Palatinate.

Early in the morning the Bavarians forming the right wing encountered a lively resistance before the walls of Weissenburg, which were too strong to be stormed. But very soon after the two Prussian Corps crossed the Lauter lower down. General von Bose led forward the XIth Corps (which he commanded) with intent to turn the French right flank on the Geisberg, while General von Kirchbach, with the Vth Corps (which he commanded) advanced against the enemy's front. Thirty field-guns were meanwhile massed against the railway station of Weissenburg. It and subsequently the town were taken, after a bloody struggle.

So early as ten o'clock General Douay had ordered a retreat, which was seriously threatened by the movement against the Geisburg; and the château of that name, a very defensible building, was most obstinately defended to enable the French to retire. The Grenadiers of the King's Regiment No. 7 in vain assailed it by storm, suffering heavy loss; nor did its defenders surrender until, with the greatest difficulty, artillery had been dragged up on to the height.

The French Division, which had been attacked by three German Corps, effected a retreat after an obstinate struggle, though in great disorder, having suffered much loss. Its gallant Commander had been killed. The Germans had to bewail a proportionately considerable loss; their casualties were 91 officers and 1460 men. General von Kirchbach had been wounded while fighting in the foremost rank.

The 4th Division of cavalry had met with much delay in the course of a nineteen miles' march by the crossing of the columns of infantry. It did not reach the scene of combat, and all touch of the enemy, now retiring to the westward, was lost.

Uncertain as to the direction whence fresh hostile forces might be approaching, the IIIrd Army advanced on the 5th of August by diverging roads in the direction of Hagenau and Reichshofen; yet not so far apart but that it should be possible for the Corps to reconcentrate in one short march. The Crown Prince intended to allow his troops a rest on the following day, so as to have them fresh for a renewed attack as soon as the situation was made clear.

But already, that same evening, the Bavarians on the right flank and the Vth Corps in the front had a sharp encounter with the enemy, who showed behind the Sauer in considerable strength. It was to be assumed that Marshal MacMahon had brought up the VIIth Corps from Strasburg, but it remained a question whether he intended to join Marshal Bazaine by way of Bitsch, or whether, having secured his line of retreat thither, he meant to accept battle at Wörth. Yet again there was the possibility that he might himself initiate the offensive. The Crown Prince, to make sure in any case of a preponderance of force, determined to concentrate his army in the neighbourhood of Sulz on August 6th. The IInd Bavarian Corps received separate instructions to watch the road from Bitsch with one Division; the other Division was to strike the hostile attack in flank on the western bank of the Sauer, in the event of artillery fire about Wörth being heard.

Marshal MacMahon was endeavouring with all his might to concentrate his three Corps, and he really had the intention to make an immediate attack on his invading foe. A Division of the VIIth Corps, which had but just been sent to Mülhausen to strengthen the defence of Alsace, was at once recalled to Hagenau, and early on the 6th formed the right wing of the strong position which the Ist Corps had taken up behind the Sauer, and in front of Fröschwiller, Elsasshausen, and Eberbach. On the left, Lespart's Division of the Vth Corps was expected from Bitsch, of which the other Divisions were only now on march from Saargemünd by way of Rohrbach. Meanwhile Ducrot's Division formed a refused flank on the French left.

Neither the German nor the French leaders expected the collision before the following day, but when, as in this case, the adversaries are in so close proximity, the conflict may break out at any moment, even against the wish of the higher commanders.

Battle of Wörth.

After a good deal of skirmishing between the respective outposts during the night, the Commander of the 20th German Brigade[1] thought it expedient to seize a passage over the Sauer, which flowed just in his front and constituted a serious obstacle. The bridge leading to Wörth had been destroyed, but the sharp-shooters waded through the river, and at seven o'clock pressed into the town, which the French had left unoccupied.

Soon enough they realized that before them was a numerous enemy in a strong position.

The broad meadows of the Sauer all lie within effective range of the commanding slopes on the right bank; and the long-ranging chassepôt fire could not but tell heavily. On the French side of the river the terrain was dotted with vineyards and hop-gardens, which afforded great advantages for defensive purposes.

The combat which had begun at Wörth was broken off after lasting half an hour, but the artillery of both sides had taken part in it, and the sound of cannon-fire had been the signal prescribed to Hartmann's IInd Bavarian Corps, acting on which it now advanced from Langensulzbach, and was soon engaged in a brisk fight with the left flank of the French. The latter on their side had advanced on their right to the attack of Gunstett, where they came in contact with the advancing XIth Prussian Corps.

The din of battle, rolling from the north and south alike, was heard by the Vth Corps in its position opposite to Wörth; and it seemed imperative that it should engage with vigour the enemy's centre in order to hinder him from throwing himself with all his strength on one or other of the German flanks.

The artillery was brought up, and by ten o'clock 108 guns were in action on the eastern slope of the Sauer valley.

Some infantry detachments waded breast-high through the river, but this dashing attempt, undertaken in inadequate strength, miscarried, and it was only by strenuous efforts that a foothold was maintained on the other side.

The Crown Prince sent orders that nothing was to be undertaken that would bring on a battle on that day. But by this time the Vth Corps was so seriously engaged that the fight could not be broken off without obvious disadvantage. General von Kirchbach therefore determined to continue the contest on his own responsibility.

The frontal attack was an undertaking of great difficulty, and could scarcely succeed unless with the co-operation of another on the flank. But at this juncture the Bavarians, who, in position as they were on the right, could have afforded this co-operation, obeyed the breaking off command, which had also reached them in the course of the fighting, and withdrew to Langensulzbach. There was, however, the XIth Corps in position on the left, eager to strike in. It seized the Albrechts-häuser farm, and pressed forward into the Niederwald.

In front of Wörth the battle hung, consisting of a succession of attacks renewed again and again on either side; each assailant in turn getting worsted, in consequence of the nature of the country. By degrees, however, the collective battalions, and finally the artillery of the Vth Corps, were brought over to the west bank of the Sauer; while the XIth Corps had already won there a firm point of support for further advance.

Just then, near Morsbronn, notwithstanding the evident unfavourable nature of the ground, two Cuirassier and one Lancer regiments of Michel's brigade hurled themselves with reckless daring on a body of German infantry taken in the act of wheeling to the right. But the 32nd Regiment, far from seeking cover, received in open order the charging mass of over 1000 horse with a steady fire which did great execution. The Cuirassiers especially suffered immense loss. Only a few horsemen broke through the firing line and gained the open ground; many were taken prisoners in the village, the remainder rode in wild gallop as far as Walburg. There they encountered the Prussian 13th Hussars, suffered further loss, and disappeared from the field.

It is true that the infantry of the French right wing succeeded in driving back the foremost detachments of the Germans about Albrechts-häuser farm, but the further advance of the former was shattered by the fire of newly-unmasked artillery.

When finally the last battalions had crossed the Sauer, the XIth Corps made its way through the Niederwald, fighting its way step by step. The northern edge of the forest was reached by 2.30, and there a junction was formed with the left flank of the Vth Corps. The burning village of Elsasshausen was carried by storm, and the little copse south of Fröschwiller was also won after a gallant defence.

Thus crowded together in a limited space, the French army was in a situation of imminent danger. Its left flank, it is true, still held out against the renewed attack of the Bavarians, who had re-entered the action, but its front and right flank were terribly hard pressed, and even its retreat was seriously threatened. Marshal MacMahon therefore tried to obtain a breathing space by a heavy counter-stroke to the south. The weak German detachments standing to the east of Elsasshausen, thrown into confusion by the vehement attack, were in part driven back into the Niederwald, but were quickly rallied and brought up again. Here the French cavalry strove once more to change the fortunes of the day. Bonnemain's Division, notwithstanding the unfavourable nature of the ground, threw itself on the dishevelled front of the enemy, suffered terrible losses, and was shattered without having been able effectively to charge home.

The Würtembergers now came up from the south, and the Bavarians from the north. General von Bose, though twice wounded, led what of his troops he could collect to the storm of the burning Fröschwiller, the enemy's last stronghold. The artillery moved up within case-shot range, and thus cleared the road for the infantry which was pushing forward from all sides. After maintaining to the utmost a resolute and gallant resistance until five o'clock, the French retreated in great disorder towards Reichshofen and Niederbronn.

At the Falkenstein stream, Lespart's Division, just arrived on the field, made a short stand, but these fresh troops offered only brief resistance, and were swept away in the general rout.

This victory of the IIIrd Army had been dearly paid for with the loss of 489 officers and 10,000 men. The loss on the French side is not exactly known, but of prisoners alone they left 200 officers and 9000 men, and in the German hands there remained 33 guns and 2000 horses.

The disintegration of the French army must have been so complete as to throw it altogether out of hand. Only one brigade of Lespart's Division took the road by Bitsch to join the French main army at St. Avold; all the rest of the army, following an infectious impulse, rolled unhaltingly in a south-western direction towards Saverne.

As in the Head-quarter of the IIIrd Army it had not been intended to fight on August 6th, the 4th Division of cavalry had not left its quarters in the rear, and was therefore not available to take up the pursuit; it did not reach Gunstett until nine o'clock in the evening. But, in order to be at hand at any rate for the next day, Prince Albert marched his command on during the night as far as Eberbach; after three hours' rest he started again, and after covering thirty-six miles,[2] came up in the evening with the rearguard of the enemy near Steinberg, at the foot of the Vosges. Without infantry it would have been impossible for the Division to push farther, but the sight of it gave the enemy a fresh impulse of flight. The Ist Corps stampeded again in the night and reached Saarburg, where it joined the Vth Corps. Thus the French had a start of twenty-three and a half miles, and continued their retreat on Lunéville, unmolested by the Germans.

Battle of Spicheren.

Let us now turn to the events which occurred, on this same 6th of August, in another part of the theatre of war.

The IInd Army, its southern (left) flank covered by the IIIrd Army, had been moving to the westward, while the Corps it still lacked were being brought up by railway. Its leading Corps, having traversed unmolested the long defiles of the forest-belt of Kaiserslautern, reached on the 5th the line Neunkirchen-Zweibrücken. The cavalry, scouting into French territory, reported that the enemy was retreating. Everything seemed to indicate that the French would await the attack of the Germans in a strong defensive position. The nearest position of the kind that offered was that on the farther bank of the Moselle, of which Metz protected one flank, Thionville the other. It was decided that if the French were found in that position, the Ist Army should hold the enemy in front, while the IInd made a circuit south of Metz, and so the enemy be forced either to retire or to fight. In case of disaster the IInd Army was to fall back on the IIIrd, now advancing over the Vosges.

The protrusion to the south-westward[3] of the Ist Army towards the Saar, which had not been intended by the supreme Command, had brought its left wing in upon the line of march laid down for the IInd, and detachments of the two armies had to cross each other at Saarbrücken on the 6th. Thus there was indeed no lack of strength at that point; but as a battle on that day was neither expected nor probable, the synchronous arrival of troops had not been pre-arranged, and so detachments could only come up by quite unprescribed routes and arrive one after the other at different hours.

The 14th Division of the VIIth Corps was the first to reach Saarbrücken, towards noon on the 6th.

General Frossard, considering his position there very hazardous, had left the night before, without waiting for permission, and had fallen back with the IInd Corps on Spicheren, where it had entrenched itself. The IIIrd, IVth, and Vth Corps were behind, at distances of from nine to nineteen miles, and the Imperial Guard was about twenty-three miles rearward. The Emperor, therefore, had it in his power to collect five Corps for a battle in the vicinity of Cocheren, or, on the other hand, to support Frossard with at least four Divisions, if that General were confident that his position was strong enough to hold.

The range of heights which upheaves itself immediately behind Saarbrücken is capable of affording a serious obstacle to a hostile passage of the Saar. It was known that the French had evacuated those heights, but General von Kameke thought it prudent to seize them at once, in order to secure the debouche of the columns following him. When, in the forenoon, two squadrons of the 5th Cavalry Division showed themselves on the drill-ground on the ridge above the farther bank, they were greeted with a hot fire from the Spicheren heights. But as it seemed highly probable, from the previous behaviour of the French, that the force seen there was only the rear-guard of the retiring enemy, General von Kameke (commanding 14th Infantry Division) ordered an immediate attack, since he had the promise of reinforcements. General von Zastrow (commanding VIIth Corps), as soon as he recognized that the 14th Division had involved itself in a serious engagement, allowed the 13th to go forward. General von Alvensleben (its commander) also ordered up to Saarbrücken all the available troops of the IIIrd Corps, and with equal promptitude General von Goeben (commanding VIIIth Corps) hurried thither the entire 16th Division. Generals von Döring (commanding 9th Infantry Brigade) and von Barnekow (commanding 16th Infantry Division), belonging respectively to these two Corps (IIIrd and VIIIth), had besides already struck forward from Tudweiler and Fischbach in the direction of the cannon-thunder, even before receiving orders to that effect.

The position occupied by the French was one of exceptional advantage. In the centre projected the Red Hill (der Rothe Berg), a precipitous and almost inaccessible cliff; and the steep slopes on either side were densely wooded. On the left the massive buildings of the Stiering-Wendel ironworks furnished a separate defensive position.

Had the strength of the enemy been fully known the attack would certainly have been delayed until the whole of the 14th Division had arrived. As a matter of fact, at the beginning of the fight, about noon, only von François' Brigade (27th) had come up, and this force, in the effort to facilitate an attack on the naturally strong position held by the enemy's front, assailed in the first instance both his flanks.

At first it succeeded in making progress. On the left the 39th Regiment drove the swarms of hostile skirmishers out of the wood of Gifert, but then became exposed to the bitter fire of a French battalion lining the farther side of a deep hollow. On the right flank its 3rd Battalion, together with the 74th Regiment, seized the wood of Stiering. But the enemy's superior strength soon displayed itself in violent counter-attacks, and when Von Woyna's[4] Brigade (28th) reached the field it had to furnish reinforcements to both flanks. Thus, at an early stage, intermingling of battalions and companies began, which increased with every subsequent rush, and made the control of the combat a matter of extraordinary difficulty. Added to this was the circumstance that three Commanding Generals in succession came up to the scene of the conflict, and one after the other took the chief control.

At about one o'clock, simultaneously with the flanks, the Fusilier Battalion of the 74th Regiment pushed forward in front, under a severe fire across the open ground towards the Red Hill, and, under such trivial cover as offered, established itself at the foot of the cliff. When at about three o'clock the Prussian artillery compelled the foe to move his guns farther up the hill, the Fusiliers, with General von François at their head, began to climb the cliff. The French Chasseurs, evidently taken by surprise, were driven from the most advanced entrenchments with clubbed rifles and at the point of the bayonet. The 9th company of the 39th Regiment followed close, and the gallant General, charging farther forward along with it, fell pierced by five bullets. Nothing daunted, the small body of Fusiliers made good its grip of the narrow spur of the cliff.

Nevertheless, a crisis was imminent. The 14th Division was extended over a distance of about three and a half miles, its left wing had been repulsed by greatly superior forces in the wood of Gifert, its right wing was hard pressed at Stiering. But now, at four o'clock, the heads of the 5th and 16th Divisions simultaneously struck in, shortly after their batteries, which had been sent on ahead, had come into action.

The left wing, strongly reinforced, now again pressed forward. General von Barnekow[5] led trusty succours up on to the Red Hill, where the Fusiliers had almost entirely exhausted their ammunition, and drove the French out from all their entrenchments. As the result of a fierce struggle the Germans also succeeded in taking possession of the western part of the wood of Gifert. The right wing with sharp fighting had pressed on to Alt Stiering and was approaching the enemy's line of retreat, the Forbach highway. General Frossard had, however, recognized the danger threatened at this point, and reinforced his left wing to the strength of a Division and a half. This force advanced to the attack at five o'clock. On the German side there was no formed force to oppose to it, so all the previously gained advantages were lost.

If the 13th Division[6] had here struck in with a resolute attack, the battle would have ended. This Division after, indeed, a march of nearly nineteen miles had reached Puttlingen at one o'clock, where it was little more than four miles distant from Stiering. When the fighting about Saarbrücken was heard it is true that at four p.m. the advanced guard moved forward to Rossel. It would seem that the roar of the cannon was not audible in that wooded region; the impression was that the combat was over, and the Division bivouacked at Völkingen, which place had been previously named as the end of its march by the Corps Commander at a time when he was, of course, unable to foresee the change in the situation.

The French offensive movement had meanwhile been brought to a stand by the seven batteries in position on the Folster height; the infantry then succeeded in making fresh progress, under the personal leadership of General von Zastrow.

The nature of the ground entirely prohibited the twenty-nine squadrons of cavalry which had arrived from all directions and were drawn up out of the range of fire, from taking part in the action. The Hussars tried in vain to ride up the Red Hill, but in spite of incredible difficulties Major von Lyncker finally gained the summit with eight guns, amid the loud cheering of the hard-pressed infantry. The guns, as each one came up, at once came into action against three French batteries; but quite half of the gunners were shot down by sheltered French tirailleurs, at a range of about 800 paces. A small strip of ground in front was indeed won, but the narrow space allowed of no deployment against the wide front of the enemy.

But effective assistance was coming from the right. General von Goeben had despatched all the battalions of the 16th Division not yet engaged, in the decisive direction toward Stiering. While one part of these troops made a frontal attack on the village, the rest climbed from the high-road up the defiles of the Spicheren woods, in a hand-to-hand encounter drove the French from the saddle leading to the Red Hill, and pushed them farther and farther back towards the Forbach height.

Even as late as seven o'clock on the French right wing Laveaucoupet's Division, supported by part of Bataille's, advanced to the attack and once more penetrated into the oft-contested Gifert wood, but the danger threatening the French left wing from the Spicheren wood paralyzed this effort. By nightfall the French were falling back over the whole plateau.

At nine o'clock, when their "Retreat" call was sounding from the heights, General von Schwerin (commanding 10th Infantry Brigade) made sure of night quarters by occupying Stiering, where resistance was only quelled, at many points, after a hand-to-hand fight. The advanced guard of the 13th Division advanced on Forbach, but did not occupy it, having allowed itself to be hoodwinked by some French Dragoons in possession.

Apart from this, General Frossard had abandoned the line of retreat by the so seriously threatened Forbach-St. Avold road, and fell back with all his three divisions on Oetingen. The darkness, and the impossibility of handling large bodies of cavalry in such a country, saved him from further pursuit.

General von Steinmetz ordered the reorganization of the dislocated bodies of troops that same night. Some of them had marched more than twenty-eight miles; two batteries, arriving from Königsberg by rail, had immediately set out for the battle-field. But it remains that the Germans at no time of the day attained the numerical strength of the enemy in this engagement, which had been begun with insufficient forces. Only thirteen batteries could be brought into action in the limited space, and the cavalry remained excluded from all participation. It was only natural, under the circumstances, that the losses of the assailants were greater than those of the defence. The Prussians lost 4871, the French 4078 men. The fact was significant that a considerable number of unwounded French prisoners were taken in this early action.

In strong contrast to the comradeship and mutual helpfulness displayed by the Prussian Generals, and the eagerness of their troops to hurry into the fight, was the strange vacillation of the Divisions in General Frossard's rear; of which three, indeed, were sent forward to his support, but only two came up, and that when the fight was already ended.

It has been vehemently asserted that the battle of Spicheren was fought in an ill-judged locality, and that it interfered with more important plans. It certainly had not been anticipated. But, generally speaking, a tactical victory rarely fails to fit in with a strategic design. Success in battle has always been thankfully accepted, and turned to account. By the battle of Spicheren the IInd French Corps was prevented from withdrawing unharmed; touch of the enemy's main force was obtained, and to the supreme Direction of the armies was afforded a basis for further resolutions.

Right Wheel of the German Army.

Marshal MacMahon in his retreat had taken a direction which entirely severed his touch with Marshal Bazaine.

As he was not pursued, he could have used the Lunéville-Metz railway to effect his union with the French main army; for up to the 9th it was still open. But rumour had it that the Prussians had already appeared in Pont à Mousson, and the state of his troops did not permit him thus early to risk another engagement.

His Ist Corps, therefore, marched southwards on Neufchâteau, whence Châlons could be reached by railway. The Vth Corps was being shifted to and fro by contradictory orders from the Emperor's head-quarters. First it was to proceed to Nancy, then to take an opposite direction towards Langres. On arriving at Charmes it was ordered to Toul, but from Chaumont it was finally directed to proceed to Châlons. General Trochu had there located the newly-formed XIIth Corps, and behind this gathering point the VIIth Corps also managed to get away from Alsace and reach Rheims by rail by way of Bar sur Aube and Paris.

Thus by August 22nd a Reserve Army was formed, consisting of four Corps and two Cavalry Divisions, under the command of Marshal MacMahon, who, however, at a distance, as he was, of about 120 miles, was unable to render timely assistance to Marshal Bazaine, who stood directly in the line of the advancing enemy.

When the news of the double disaster of August 6th reached the Imperial Head-quarter, the first impression there was that it would be necessary to retreat immediately on Châlons with Bazaine's army; and the VIth Corps, a portion of which was already being transported thence to Metz, was ordered to retrace its steps. But this resolution was presently retracted. The Emperor had not merely to consider the foreign enemy, but public opinion within his own realm. The sacrifice of entire provinces at the very beginning of a war which had been undertaken with such high anticipations, would have provoked the unbounded indignation of the French people. There were still 200,000 men who could be brought together in front of the Moselle, supported by a large fortress, and though the enemy would still have the superiority in numbers, his army was holding a line nearly sixty miles long. It had yet to cross the Moselle, and this would necessitate a dislocation which might create a weakness at the critical moment.

In the IIIrd German Army the disorderly condition of the defeated enemy was not known, nor even the direction of his retreat. It was expected that MacMahon's Army would be found rallied on the farther side of the Vosges for renewed resistance; and as it was impossible to cross the mountains except in detached columns, the German advance was very cautious, and by short marches only. Though the distance between Reichshofen and the Saar is not more than about twenty-eight miles in a straight line, that river was only reached in five days. Nothing was seen of the enemy, except in the fortified places, small indeed, but too strong to be taken by storm, which command the highways in the mountains. Bitsch had to be avoided by a fatiguing circuit, Lichtenberg was captured by surprise, Lützelstein had been abandoned by its garrison, the investment of Pfalzburg was handed over to the approaching VIth Corps, and Marsal capitulated after a short resistance.

The German left wing had no enemy before it, and could be brought into closer connection with the centre. To bring the three armies abreast of each other a wheel to the right was requisite. The advance of the Ist and IInd Armies had, however, to be delayed, as the IIIrd did not reach the Saar until August 12th. The whole movement was so arranged that the IIIrd Army was to use the roads by Saarunion and Dieuze, and to southward; the IInd those by St. Avold and Nomény and to southward; the Ist those by Saarlouis and Les Etangs, the last also taking the direction of Metz.

The cavalry Divisions which were reconnoitring far to the front, reported the enemy as retreating all along the line. They ranged close up to Metz, and across the Moselle both above and below the place, forcing the detachments of Canrobert's Corps, which had again been ordered up from Châlons, to return thither. All their information indicated that very large masses were encamped in front of Metz. From this it might equally be inferred that the enemy intended to retreat further, or, with his whole force concentrated, to strike hard at the right wing of the German Army, at the moment when the impending crossing of the Moselle should make its severance from the left wing unavoidable.

The chief Head-quarter restricted itself in ordinary course to issuing general directions, the execution of which was left in detail to the army commanders; but in this instance it was deemed necessary in the momentary circumstances to regulate the movements of each separate corps by specific orders. On August 11th the Head-quarter of his Majesty was therefore transferred to St. Avold, in the front line, and midway between the Ist and IInd Armies, so as, by being in the immediate vicinity, to be able to exercise timely authority to either hand. The three Corps of the Ist Army advanced towards the German Nied on August 12th, only to find that the French had evacuated that position. Three Corps of the IInd Army on the left of the Ist also moved forward in prolongation of the same front by Faulquemont and Morhange, while two others followed.

On the next day the IInd Army reached the Seille, without encountering the enemy, and occupied Pont à Mousson with infantry.

The strangely inactive attitude of the French made it seem quite probable that they might not make any stand in front of Metz, a probability strengthened by the reports of the German cavalry, which was scouting as far as Toul and on to the Verdun road. But there always loomed the possibility that the enemy would throw himself with 200 battalions on the Ist Army, now in his immediate front. The two Corps forming the right wing of the IInd Army were therefore ordered to halt for the present, a little to the south of Metz, ready to deliver a shattering blow on the flank of any such attack. If the enemy preferred to assail these Corps, then would devolve on the Ist Army on its part the prompt assumption of the offensive.

Meanwhile the other Corps of the IInd Army were pursuing the march towards the Moselle farther to the southward; if the enemy should attack them with superior forces after they had crossed the river, it would be possible for them, in case of need, to fall back on the IIIrd Army.

So much caution was not universally deemed essential; it was argued that the French seemed already committed to full retreat, they ought not to be allowed to get away without punishment, and it followed that the German Army should strike without delay. The French had, indeed, already committed themselves to a further retreat; but when in the afternoon (of the 14th) the VIIth Corps discerned their retrograde movement, a fight began on the hither side of the Moselle, which, by the voluntary intervention of the nearest bodies of troops, developed into a battle in the course of the evening.

Battle of Colombey—Nouilly.

The Commandant of Metz had declared his inability to hold that place for a fortnight, if left to his own resources; but the chosen and intrenched position on the Nied, taken up to cover the fortress, had been found locally defective, and the French Head-quarter hoped to find a more favourable defensive position in the vicinity of Verdun.

Military necessity outweighed even a politic regard for public opinion, and the Emperor, although he had transferred the command-in-chief to Marshal Bazaine, still remained with the army, for it would have been impossible for him to return to Paris in existing circumstances.

Very early in the morning of the 14th August the multitudinous trains were being withdrawn through the city, and towards noon the IInd, IVth, and VIth Corps got in motion, while the IIIrd Corps remained in position behind the deep valley of the Colombey brook, to cover the retirement.

When, at four in the afternoon, the break-up of the enemy was perceived, General von der Goltz (commanding 26th Infantry Brigade) with the advanced guard of the VIIth Corps struck him in the act, and wrenched from him Colombey and the Château d'Aubigny on his right flank. But, at the first cannon sound, the French columns immediately turned about, fully equipped for fighting, and eager, after their many previous disasters, to break the spell by a desperate effort. Castagny's Division threw itself in greatly superior force upon the weak German detachment in the isolated position of Colombey, which held its own only by the utmost exertion.

Already the advanced guard of the Ist Army Corps was approaching by both the high-roads from Saarbrücken and Saarlouis; and its batteries having pushed on ahead, at once took part in the engagement. Passing through Lauvallier, the infantry followed close, climbed the eastern slope of the plateau of Bellecroix, and farther to the right drove the enemy out of the wood east of Mey. But the presence at this point of the main body of the French IIIrd Corps gave pause to the German offensive for the time.

The 13th, 1st, and 2nd Divisions had meanwhile followed their respective advanced guards, the two latter having been held in full readiness by General von Manteuffel ever since his outposts had reported that the enemy was moving. General von Zastrow, too, arrived on the field, and took over the command of the left wing. Soon sixty field-pieces were in action against the enemy. General von Osten-Sacken hurried forward the 25th Brigade through the hollow of Coincy, and climbed on to the edge of the upland. The clump of fir-trees on the road to Bellecroix was taken by storm, was surrounded on three sides, was lost again in a bloody conflict, and was once more recaptured. Soon afterwards two batteries succeeded in establishing themselves above Planchette, whose fire drove the French back as far as Borny; yet still the conflict raged on both sides with the utmost fury.

But now there threatened the German right the danger of being out-flanked. General Ladmirault, on learning that Grenier's Division had been driven out of Mey, immediately set out to its support with his other two Divisions, retook the village, and pressed farther forward by the Bouzonville road. General von Manteuffel had meanwhile given the necessary orders for holding, at all hazards, the deep-cut trough of the Vallières brook which covered the flank. The 1st Brigade was posted behind Noisseville as general reserve, the 4th, and part of the artillery of the Ist Corps, marched by the Bouzonville road to confront General Ladmirault near Poix, while the remaining batteries from the southern slopes to the eastward of Nouilly enfiladed his advance. On the left, Glümer's Division (13th) had all this time been holding its ground at Colombey, and now, at seven o'clock in the evening, Woyna's Brigade came to its assistance, and took possession of the copses westward of Colombey. A very welcome reinforcement now arrived from the IInd Army remaining halted on the Seille.

The 18th Infantry Division, after a heavy march, had bivouacked near Buchy in the afternoon, but when General von Wrangel (its commander) was informed that fighting was audible from the locality of the Ist Army, he promptly set his Division in motion in that direction. He drove the enemy out of Peltre, and then in conjunction with Woyna's Brigade occupied Grigy, somewhat in rear of the French position in front of Borny.

On the right wing of the fighting line, the 2nd Division had also pushed on towards Mey, by way of Nouilly and through the adjacent vineyards; and, as darkness was setting in, that village and the adjoining woods were wrenched from the enemy. The French had not advanced beyond Villers L'Orme, and they now withdrew all along their line from that village to Grigy. The Prussians, as they followed up after dark, were molested only by the fire of the heavy guns of the forts, more especially Fort St. Julien.

The engagement of August 14th cost them the heavy loss of 5000 men, inclusive of 200 officers; while the French lost only 3600 men, their IIIrd Corps being the heaviest sufferer. The vicinity of a great fortress of course prevented the reaping of the fruits of victory by an immediate pursuit. It was for the same reason that a battle on the part of the Ist Army on that day had not been included in the concerted plan of action, though the possibility of such an occurrence had been foreseen. Although it was true that but one Division of the IInd Army (the 18th) had been able to hasten to the aid of the Ist, and that after the late opening of the fight, its assault on the left[7] flank of the enemy had not failed of its effect.

The manner in which the battle originated rendered unity of direction impossible.

It was but the advanced-guards of four Divisions which were the troops principally engaged; and the daring attacks made on greatly superior hostile forces by small bodies unfollowed by immediate supports occasioned many critical moments, which might have been dangerous if the enemy had pushed forward more energetically in closely concentrated strength. But while, for instance, his IIIrd Corps received no support from the Imperial Guard standing close behind it, the contrast presented itself that on the Prussian side, in this as in the previous battles, there shone forth, along with their ready acceptance of personal responsibility, the eager mutual helpfulness of all the commanders within reach of the battle-field.

An essential share of the success of the day must be attributed to the artillery. Hurrying along in front, leaving the responsibility of covering it to the advanced guards which reached forward before the main bodies of the Divisions had time to come up, it drove the French completely out of their positions before Metz, and back under the guns of the defences of the place.

The protection so afforded to the enemy rendered it impossible that the victory of Colombey-Nouilly should yield any trophies, but the supreme Command was quite content with the results obtained. The retreat of the enemy had been arrested, and a day had been gained for the crossing of the Moselle by the IInd and IIIrd Armies.

August 15th.—In the early morning of the 15th the cavalry had ridden forward to the outworks of Metz, but found none of the enemy on this side of the fortress. A few shells scared away the Imperial Head-quarter from Longeville on the further side of the Moselle.

As King William was riding over to visit the Ist Army, immense clouds of dust were observed rising on the further side of the fortress; and it was no longer doubtful that the French had begun their retreat, and that the IInd Army was henceforth free to follow across the Moselle with all its Corps.

The Ist Corps of the Ist Army was necessarily left at Courcelles, south of Metz, to protect the railway, the other two were brought up leftward towards the Seille; and they were also by-and-by to cross the Moselle higher up, so as to avoid interference from the fortress.

The French had started again on the retreat interrupted on the previous day, but proceeded little more than four miles[8] beyond Metz on August 15th. Their cavalry only went somewhat farther ahead, by both the roads to Verdun.

The IIIrd Corps of the German IInd Army crossed the Moselle at Novéant, by the bridge which was found intact, and by a flying pontoon bridge; its artillery, however, was forced to make a détour by Pont à Mousson.

It was not until late at night that the troops were all across and in bivouac close to the left bank. One Division of the Xth Corps remained at Pont à Mousson and the other advanced to Thiaucourt. The cavalry scouted farther forward towards the Metz-Verdun road, and struck in on the French cavalry near Mars la Tour. Several small engagements took place, but when early in the afternoon twenty-four Prussian squadrons had assembled, the French retired on Vionville. The Guard Corps and the IVth Corps crossed at Dieulouard and Marbache, higher up the river.

The IIIrd Army advanced to the line Nancy-Bayon. On this day an attempt to seize the fortress of Thionville by surprise proved a failure.