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The Green Mountain Boys

Chapter 14: CHAPTER XI. PRIVATE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE BRITISH.
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A historical account traces settlement and geography of the New Hampshire Grants and explains how competing colonial land claims produced prolonged legal and physical conflict between new settlers and outside speculators. It recounts organized local resistance by frontier inhabitants, the imposition of rival jurisdictional laws, key military actions in the revolutionary period including border expeditions and sieges, diplomatic maneuvering with external authorities, and the eventual establishment of local civil institutions. The narrative emphasizes the settlers' endurance and the resolution of land disputes that secured their communal autonomy.

CHAPTER XI.
PRIVATE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE BRITISH.

Brilliant and signal as had been the feats of these Vermonters with the sword, not less so were their acts of diplomacy. One can but be impressed with the spectacle of a handful of men accomplishing by policy what they could never have done by power—for years keeping at bay an army of British troops 10,000 strong, hovering over and in readiness to swoop down and devastate their exposed and unprotected frontier, at the same time the people were permitted to go on unconcernedly about their harvest.

The claims to independence on the part of Vermont were still unacknowledged by Congress, and New York was still importunate and vexatious. The British generals in America endeavored to turn these circumstances to their own account, by detaching Vermont from the cause of the Colonies, and making it a British province. The first intimation that the people of Vermont had of this circumstance was conveyed in a letter from Colonel Beverly Robinson, dated New York, Mar. 30th, 1780, and delivered to Colonel Ethan Allen in the street at Arlington in July. Allen communicated the contents of the letter to Governor Chittenden and some others, but returned no answer.

Meantime, the village of Royalton had been sacked and burned by a party of three hundred Indians under a British officer, four of the inhabitants killed, and twenty-five taken prisoners. It was arranged that the Governor should address a communication to General Haldimand, then commanding in Canada, proposing a cartel for the exchange of prisoners,—the letter to be sent under a flag to the enemy’s lines. In October, the British appeared in great force on the lake; such was the alarm that the Legislature, then in session at Bennington, adjourned, many of the members taking arms and hastening to the frontiers.

In a few days Colonel Ethan Allen received a flag from Carleton, with an answer to Governor Chittenden’s letter respecting the cartel. With it was enclosed a proposition for a truce with Vermont. Allen agreed to the proposal on condition that the frontiers of Vermont should include the territory to the Hudson River. This truce, however, was not publicly known; the militia were immediately disbanded and allowed to return home. The militia of New York were also on their frontiers; not being in the secret, they were surprised to see the Vermont troops returning home, and still more to learn that the British were retiring to Canada.

In February, 1781, Colonel Robinson wrote again to Ethan Allen, enclosing a copy of the former letter. He was induced to make another trial, he said, “especially as I can now write with more authority, and assure you, that you may obtain the terms mentioned in the above letter, provided you and the people of Vermont take a decisive and active part with us.”

Allen returned no answer to either of these letters, but enclosed them both in a communication to Congress. In that letter he says: “I am confident that Congress will not dispute my sincere attachment to my country, though I do not hesitate to say I am fully grounded in opinion that Vermont has an indubitable right to agree on terms of a cessation of hostilities with Great Britain, provided the United States persist in rejecting her application for a union with them; for Vermont, of all people, would be most miserable, were she obliged to defend the independence of the United States, and they at the same time at full liberty to overturn and ruin the independence of Vermont. I am as resolutely determined to defend the independence of Vermont, as Congress that of the United States, and rather than fail, will retire with the hardy Green Mountain Boys into the desolate caverns of the mountains, and wage war with the devil, hell, and human nature at large.” This somewhat forcible language was excusable under the circumstances.

Early in that year, Vermont, by a vote of her Legislature, adopted the policy of the States of New York, Massachusetts and New Hampshire, that had been laying claim to the territory of the Grants, and put in her claim of jurisdiction over a large part of each of those States. Thus Vermont was turning the weapons of her antagonists upon themselves. Numbers of representatives from the annexed districts took their seats in the Vermont assembly. At the time of extending her claims, she passed an act of general amnesty; this liberal and wise act of lenity had the desired effect.

The State of Vermont was at this time in a forlorn condition; torn by intestine divisions and the intrigues of her enemies in Congress: all the cannons, nay, every spade and pickaxe taken by her valiant sons at Ticonderoga and Crown Point were removed out of the State to Fort George; Colonel Warner’s regiment, raised in and for the protection of Vermont, was put into Continental service, and stationed to defend the frontiers of New York, not half so much exposed as Vermont; at the same time New York had recalled her State troops from Skenesborough, while an enemy, by coming up Lake Champlain, might land within a day’s march of hundreds of inhabitants who were remaining on their farms. Congress had interfered with the internal policy of Vermont, by cutting off her ways and means of raising money and men for self defense by the following: “Resolved, unanimously, that in the opinion of this body, no unappropriated lands or estates, which are or may be adjudged forfeited, or confiscated, lying in said district [Vermont], ought, until the final decision of Congress in the premises, be granted or sold.” We transcribe, on this topic, the words of Ira Allen:

“Thus left, as she had reason to suppose, by the intrigues of those who claimed and coveted her fertile soil, to be a prey to the common enemy, similar to the fate of their brethren, descendants from Connecticut, who settled at Wyoming and Susquehanna, and were mostly killed by a party of Indians; their towns and villages burned, and their country depopulated (supposed to be through the intrigues of land-jobbers), which has since become a prey to the Pennsylvania claimants, a junto similar to the New York monopolists, who were then taking every measure that the malignancy and avarice of human nature could suggest, for the destruction of the people of Vermont.” That there was some foundation for this explanation of the Wyoming massacre, is made only too apparent by subsequent events.

In April, 1781, Colonel Ira Allen was commissioned to settle a cartel with the British in Canada for the exchange of prisoners, and also to procure an armistice between the British forces and Vermont. This was thought well-nigh impracticable, as the British troops numbered 10,000 effective men, which must remain inactive, not being able to annoy other States without first annoying Vermont, while the latter had only 7,000 men as an offset. But an armistice must be had, or the frontiers evacuated until assistance could come from the States whose influence had rendered Vermont defenseless.

Allen arrived at Isle Aux Noix in due time, and was accorded apartments by Major Dundas, the officer in charge. At a convenient time Allen observed that Congress was endeavoring to bring Vermont into subjection to New York, but that they, rather than yield, would see Congress subjected to the British government, provided that Vermont could be a distinct colony under the Crown on safe and honorable terms; and that the people were not disposed longer to assist a government which might subject them and their posterity to New York, under which they could never be safe in person or property.

The replication to these observations was, that the territory of Vermont could be a colony under the Crown, with privileges equal to those enjoyed by any other colony, and that those who assisted in effecting such an event, would be duly honored and rewarded. Much conversation passed on the subject, of which General Haldimand was duly informed. Nothing decisive was accomplished, but the negotiation caused the army to remain inactive, which was a matter of congratulation to Allen.

The cartel was completed, and a verbal agreement entered into that hostilities should cease between Great Britain and those under the jurisdiction of Vermont, until after the sitting of the Legislature of that state. On Colonel Allen’s return several influential people waited on him, desiring to be advised whether to remain or remove to the interior portions of the country. Allen told them to remain quiet on their farms, and not think it strange though they had no army to protect the frontier; and that should any event make it necessary, for the safety of their families, to move, they might depend on seasonable information. This immunity of Vermont from the aggressions of the British, led the people on the borders to be all the more anxious to be annexed to her territory, as a measure of safety to their families and to their property.

First Church in Vermont.

Grave suspicions having become rife that negotiations were being carried on between Vermont and the British in Canada, several men of discernment among the Whigs were sent from Vermont and the neighboring States to attend the sessions of the Legislature, to watch if there might be measures pursuing which would be eventually injurious to the common cause of the United States.

On the other hand, the British in Canada were anxious to know whether Allen and his friends would be faithful, and so conduct matters as to justify a cessation of hostilities. With these objects in view, their representatives attended the sessions; as the Assembly convened in the meeting house the spectators took seats in the galleries.

In a few days both houses joined in a committee to consider the subject of Ira Allen’s mission to Canada. The Governor proceeded to state the facts of the settlement of the cartel, and that if further particulars were desired, Colonel Allen was then present and could best inform them. On being requested to speak, Allen made his statement, which showed the British had exhibited great generosity in the transaction; and after stating sundry things, concluded with the remark that if any member, or auditor in the gallery, wished to ask further questions, he was ready to answer them.

Those who were in the interest of the United States paid their compliments to Allen for his open and candid conduct. In the evening he had a conference with the Canadian spectators, who seemed to be equally well pleased.

In July, Ethan Allen was informed by one of his neighbors that some of his friends from Canada wished to speak with him in the dusk of the evening of that day. At the time appointed, Allen, with only his cane in hand, cheerfully went to a British guard under arms, and received a packet. In the evening of the following day he met them again and returned an answer. This mode of correspondence was continued; and whenever dispatches came in this way, General Ethan Allen or Colonel Ira Allen (they lived in the same house) went and received them and returned an answer, not trusting the dispatches to any other person. It is worthy of remark that Sunderland, their place of residence, was more than sixty miles from the frontiers, yet a sergeant and guard frequently passed with their arms in 1781 and 1782, without being discovered by any one who would inform against them.

About this time there appeared in the newspapers of the day a letter from Lord George Germain to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Whitehall, Feb. 7th, 1781, which letter had been captured by the French and carried to Paris, from whence it had been forwarded to Congress, and by them ordered to be printed. It ran thus:

“The return of the people of Vermont to their allegiance is an event of the utmost importance to the King’s affairs; and at this time, if the French and Washington really meditate an irruption into Canada, may be considered as opposing an effectual barrier to the attempt. General Haldimand, who has the same instructions with you to draw over those people, and give them support, will, I doubt not, push up a body of troops to act in conjunction with them, to secure all the avenues through their country into Canada; and when the season admits, take possession of the upper parts of the Hudson and Connecticut Rivers, and cut off the communication between Albany and the Mohawk country. How far they may be able to extend themselves southward or eastward must depend on their numbers, and the disposition of the inhabitants.”

This letter had greater influence on Congress than all other considerations that had yet been brought to bear; and that body promptly directed that a committee be appointed to confer with a like committee from Vermont, “on what terms it may be proper to admit Vermont into a federal union of these States.”

Accordingly, Vermont sent on her committee; while they were in Philadelphia they procured a copy of a letter from the Governor of New Hampshire to the President of Congress, stating that his State could not furnish its quota of men or money in support of the war, as a third part of the State had revolted and joined Vermont. This draft Allen transmitted to the British Commissioners at Skenesborough, who laughed heartily with the Vermont committee.

Those who are disposed to regard this action of Allen and his associates as inimical to the cause of American Independence, will do well to consider that the effect was to neutralize the strength of 10,000 British troops as opposed to a like number from Vermont; the final result to the cause would be the same as though both forces took the field and slaughtered each other, with the advantage to Vermont that she was saved from being overrun by a devastating army.

Meanwhile the British Commissioners were becoming impatient. They stated as their instructions, which they were not at liberty to deviate from without putting an end to the armistice, that his Excellency, General Haldimand, in pursuance of full powers vested in him by his Majesty, should issue his proclamation offering to confirm Vermont as a colony under the Crown, provided the people would return to their allegiance; that an army should come up the Lake in October with said proclamation, and the Legislature must accept the same, and with the British take measures for their common defense.

This was a sore strait for perplexed Vermont diplomats. It was deemed best, however, to have the proclamations brought up the Lake rather than incur the risk of a discontinuance of the armistice, in the present defenseless state of the frontier.

The Legislature met at Charlestown early in October, and about the same time a powerful British army under St. Leger was landed at Ticonderoga. A skirmish having occurred between a party of Vermonters under command of Sergeant Tupper and a number of the enemy, the Sergeant was killed and his men retreated. St. Leger sent his clothes and effects, with an open letter, to General Enos, informing him of the fate of the Sergeant, and apologizing for his death. This dispatch and the apparel were publicly delivered to General Enos, which made no little noise among the troops.

The preceding negotiations were not known to more than a dozen men in Vermont. An express came in with letters for Governor Chittenden, announcing the arrival of the British at Ticonderoga, in which were blended public matters and private negotiations. The messenger had not failed to proclaim the extraordinary message of St. Leger, which occasioned large crowds to follow, to hear the news. On opening the letters the Governor saw it was not prudent to have them publicly read. At this confused moment Major Runnals came running in and demanded of Colonel Allen the reason why St. Leger was sorry the Sergeant was killed? Allen replied he could not tell. Runnals repeated the question, to which Allen then made an evasive answer. This enraged Runnals, who again loudly demanded what reasons could possibly induce a British general to be sorry when his enemies were killed? Allen retorted with some warmth by advising Runnals to go at the head of his regiment and demand of St. Leger the reasons for his sorrow, and not stay there eating up the country’s provisions and doing nothing while the frontiers were invaded. This manœuvre drew all attention, for the moment, from the letters. Meanwhile new ones were made out which were read in place of the originals for the satisfaction of the people.

The crisis is approaching, yet the leaders in the stirring drama are not dismayed. A communication from Allen to the British announces that matters are going on propitiously for their designs, but in view of unfavorable reports direct from the seat of war, suggested it would hardly be expedient to publish the proclamation just then. In less than an hour after this communication reached Ticonderoga, an express arrived there with the news of the capture of Cornwallis and his entire army. Before night the British had embarked all their troops and stores, and had set sail with all haste for Canada. Thus were the Vermont diplomatists relieved, at the last moment, from their embarrassment and danger; and thus were the frontiers of that State preserved from the horrors of war by the sagacity and daring of a few determined men.