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The Greville Memoirs, Part 2 (of 3), Volume 1 (of 3) / A Journal of the Reign of Queen Victoria from 1837 to 1852

Chapter 124: March 12th, 1839
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About This Book

The journal presents a running diary of public and private affairs during the reign of the young queen from 1837 to 1852, blending daily entries, political gossip, and candid assessments of ministers, courtiers, and foreign sovereigns. It records Cabinet debates, court ceremonies, parliamentary struggles, and diplomatic incidents while noting social life, patronage, and institutional changes. The editor frames and annotates the manuscripts, preserving original phrasing while correcting typographical errors and supplying cross-references. Its observational voice combines factual reportage with personal judgment, offering contemporaneous detail about personalities, administrative practice, and the workings of government and court in a formative period.

[3] [I insert this passage on a painful transaction which had better be consigned to oblivion, because it contains nothing which is not to be found in the most ordinary books of reference; but I shall not enter further on this matter.]

At Court yesterday to appoint Ebrington Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland: they all looked busy and affairés, and the Queen seemed very grave.

March 8th, 1839

I went last night to the first representation of Bulwer’s play ‘Richelieu:’ a fine play, admirably got up, and very well acted by Macready, except the last scene, the conception of which was altogether bad. He turned Richelieu into an exaggerated Sixtus V., who completely lost sight of his dignity, and swaggered about the stage, taunting his foes, and hugging his friends with an exultation quite unbecoming and out of character. With this exception it was a fine performance; the success was unbounded, and the audience transported. After Macready had been called on, they found out Bulwer, who was in a small private box next the one I was in with Lady Blessington and D’Orsay, and were vociferous for his appearance to receive their applause. After a long delay, he bowed two or three times, and instantly retreated. Directly after he came into our box, looking very serious and rather agitated; while Lady Blessington burst into floods of tears at his success, which was certainly very brilliant.

March 12th, 1839

The Government have offered Canada to Lord Clarendon,[4] who is coming home to give his answer in person. They are resolved to make maison nette at the Colonial Office, and want to oust Stephen; but the publication of Sir Francis Head’s extraordinary book,[5]—in which he is denounced as a Republican, and as the author of all the mischievous policy by which our Colonial possessions have been endangered, and his dismissal is loudly demanded—makes it impossible for Stephen to retire, or for Government to invite him to do so. Stephen cannot vindicate himself, except by divulging official secrets which he considers it would be a grievous breach of trust and duty to do; but he declares to me that he has abundant means of vindication in his hands if he chose to avail himself of them. The world believes that each Secretary of State (Glenelg particularly) has been a mere puppet in his office, and that it is Stephen who has moved all the strings; but the fact is, there have been three parties—Stephen, Glenelg, and the Cabinet; and though the first may have exercised a great influence over the second, it has often happened, that both have been overruled by the last, and neither Head nor anybody else can do more than conjecture what has really been the secret history of our Colonial policy. Glenelg, however, was evidently feeble, and his faculties seem to have been entirely benumbed ever since the flagellations he got from Brougham in the beginning of last session. His terror of Brougham is so intense that he would submit to any humiliation rather than again expose his back to such a merciless scourge.[6]

[4] [Sir George Villiers, then Minister at Madrid, succeeded to the title of Earl of Clarendon on the 22nd of December, 1838. He shortly afterwards resigned his diplomatic appointment in Spain and returned to England.]

[5] [Whatever credit for discretion Sir Francis Bond Head might previously have enjoyed was more than effaced by the extraordinary indiscretion of ‘A Narrative of Recent Events in Canada,’ which he published at this time.]

[6] They became great friends again at a subsequent period. Brougham has been always throwing off and whistling back his friends.

March 25th, 1839

Laid up with the gout for these ten days, in which time the only occurrences of moment have been the great (and final) debate on the Corn Laws, and the hostile vote in the House of Lords,[7] followed by John Russell’s LORD NORMANBY’S IRISH ADMINISTRATION. declaration in the House of Commons, and appeal to that House from the vote of the Lords. The Corn debate was extremely long and dull, and the House more than usually clamorous and impotent. The only speech was Peel’s, said to have been exceedingly able; the division was better for the Cornites, and worse for their antagonists, than had been expected; the decision received with great indifference, and the question put on the shelf for some time.

[7] [On the 18th of March Mr. Charles Villiers’ motion for a Committee to take into consideration the duties on corn was defeated in the House of Commons by 342 to 195 votes. I know not why Mr. Greville styles it the ‘final’ debate, which it certainly was not.

On the 21st of March Lord Roden carried in the House of Lords, by a majority of five, a motion for a Committee to inquire into the state of Ireland since 1835. This motion was directed against Lord Normanby’s Administration. Shortly afterwards this motion was met by a resolution of Lord John Russell’s in the House of Commons approving the Irish policy of the Government, which was carried by 318 to 296.]

The other affair is much more interesting, because more personal, and involving the existence of the Government. There seems to have been an abundance of angry feeling and a great lack of discretion and judgement on all sides: first of all in the House of Lords thus lightly and somewhat loosely pressing this vote, and going the length of appointing a Committee; and why the Duke of Wellington consented to it is difficult to see, unless it be that his mind is a little enfeebled, and his strong sense no longer exercises the same sway. They hardly seem to have intended what they did, for they made no whip up, and Lord Wicklow went away without voting. As it was, Government had better have rested upon their old declaration, that as long as they were supported by the House of Commons they should disregard the opposition of the House of Lords; and so in fact they would have done, if the next day Normanby had not flared up so violently and insisted on resignation or reparation. At the Cabinet there was a long discussion whether they should resign or not, and the Speaker, Ellice, and others of their friends, were strongly for their taking this opportunity of retiring with all their strength, and upon a question which would have rendered it next to impossible for their successors to go on if they took their places. The result, however, was the declaration of John Russell, and their determination to try their strength in the House of Commons. If the Radicals support them they will get their usual majority of from fifteen to twenty; but it does not appear that they will gain much by that, for the Lords will go on with their Committee and put Normanby on his trial without caring for the vote of the Commons.

With regard to the merits of the case, Normanby’s Government was no doubt on the whole carried on in a very good spirit; but as it was in an Irish spirit, it was of course obnoxious to the old dominant party. There is not the slightest suspicion that in his exercise of the prerogative of mercy he was ever influenced by any improper motives or showed any partiality; though Lord Wellesley said, that ‘he dramatised royalty, and made mercy appear blind instead of justice.’ But the system is of very questionable propriety, and on some occasions he probably was rather too free with it, and went a little further than in strict prudence he ought to have done. Generally speaking, however, on this point as well as on the other grounds on which he has been attacked, he has defended himself with great vigour and success. The night after the debate, he gave Brougham a heavy fall, and exposed his glaring inconsistency and falseness. Brougham is said to have appeared more annoyed and crestfallen than ever he did before. He certainly made a very poor and inefficient reply.

Nothing would be more unfortunate than a change of Government as the result of this blow aimed by the House of Lords, and under the auspices of Roden, the leader of the Orangemen. Ireland is the great strength of the present Government as it is the weak point of the Tories; and if they went out, and Peel came in upon Ireland, and the principle on which he should govern that country, he would never keep his place, and nobody could tell what troubles might not ensue. It is Peel’s interest that Irish questions should assume such a shape, and make such a progress, before he returns to office, as should render their final adjustment inevitable. If things were left alone, and time and the hour permitted us to run through the present rough days, it would be impossible to prevent great changes taking place before long. The country is beset with difficulties on all sides, if WEAKNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT. not with danger; besides the ever rankling thorn of Ireland, there are the Chartists and the Anti-Corn Law agitators, to say nothing of minor reformers in England, and the whole of our Colonial Empire in a most unsettled, precarious, and difficult state, requiring the utmost wisdom and firmness in dealing with Colonial interests, and our relations with America demanding firmness, temper, and sagacity. But, while the country has thus urgent need of all the ability and experience which can be enlisted in her service, from the curious position of parties in the House of Commons, and the mode in which power is distributed, we have at once a Government miserably weak, unable to exercise a will of its own, bolstered up by the interested and uncertain support of men more inimical than friendly to them; while the most distinguished statesmen and the men who are admitted to be the fittest to govern, are effectually excluded from office. While we have a Cabinet in which there is not one man who inspires confidence, and in which, with the exception perhaps of John Russell (who is broken in health and spirits), there is not one deserving to be called a statesman,—to this Cabinet is committed the awful task of solving the many difficult questions of domestic, colonial, and foreign policy which surround and press upon us; while the Duke of Wellington and Peel are compelled ‘to stand like ciphers in the great account.’ The great characteristic of the present time is indifference: nobody appears to care for anything; nobody cares for the Queen, her popularity has sunk to zero, and loyalty is a dead letter; nobody cares for the Government, or for any man or set of men. If there was such a thing as a strong public opinion alive to national interests, intent upon national objects, and deeply sensible to the necessity of calling to the national councils all the wisdom and experience that the crisis demands, its voice would be heard, the two parties would cease to hold each other at bay, there would be either a great change or a fusion in some reasonable spirit of compromise, and we should see a Government with some energy, independence and power, and this is what we want. But Melbourne seems to hold office for no other purpose but that of dining at Buckingham House, and he is content to rub on from day to day, letting all things take their chance. Palmerston, the most enigmatical of Ministers, who is detested by the Corps Diplomatique, abhorred in his own office, unpopular in the House of Commons, liked by nobody, abused by everybody, still reigns in his little kingdom of the Foreign Office, and is impervious to any sense of shame from the obloquy that has been cast upon him, and apparently not troubling himself about the affairs of the Government generally, which he leaves to others to defend and uphold as they best may. The only man besides John Russell in the Cabinet who stands high in estimation is Morpeth, and it is remarkable that in this Government the young ones or subordinates are its chief strength. Morpeth, Labouchere, George Grey, and Francis Baring are better men than almost any in the Cabinet, which is certainly the most second-rate one this country ever saw.

March 28th, 1839

It is amusing to see the nervous consciousness on both the Tory and the Whig side of blunders having been committed by each in this demonstration of the Lords and retort of the Government. The Chancellor of the Exchequer came into my room yesterday, and told me that Lord Spencer had expressed his strenuous approbation of the course they had taken, just the right medium, neither too much nor too little; and this sanction he seemed to think very valuable, though in fact worth nothing, for Lord Spencer lives among oxen, and not among men. On the other hand, I met Graham, and said to him, ‘A pretty scrape you would have been in if Government had resigned upon this vote.’ He shrugged up his shoulders and said, ‘I own I am better pleased as it is.’ No great party should do things by halves and doubtingly: if the leaders thought the case was so grave as to call for the interference of the House, and that they were justified in taking this matter into their own hands, they ought to have brought down all their forces, and have given their vote all the authority it would derive from an imposing majority. No maxim is more clearly understood than that any party having generally a large majority, and DEFECTION OF THE MORNING CHRONICLE. only carrying some particular question by a very small one, suffers something like a defeat, because it implies that they have not the concurrence on such question of many of their usual supporters. This was, therefore, a false move one way or the other. The Government, however, have no doubt of carrying their point by as large a majority as they ever can have.

They are in a great rage, and in no small dismay at the same time, at the conduct of the ‘Morning Chronicle,’ which has turned half against them in a most extraordinary manner, that is, it is urging the Radicals to seize this opportunity of compelling the Government to go their lengths, and to make such compliance the condition of their support. Government are so indignant that they want to break off with the ‘Chronicle’ altogether; but then they will be left in the awkward predicament of having no morning paper whatever in their service. What nettles them the more is, that they made the ‘Chronicle’ what it is, and raised it by their exertions from the lowest ebb to its present very good circulation. Just before Peel’s hundred days it was for sale, and had then fallen to about a thousand a day. Easthope was persuaded by Ellice to buy it, which he did for 15,000ℓ. or 20,000ℓ. The Whigs set to work, and Hobhouse, Normanby, Poulett Thomson, Le Marchant, and several others, wrote day after day a succession of good articles which soon renovated the paper and set it on its legs. The circulation increased daily till it got up to three thousand, and now it has reached six thousand. Easthope makes a clear 10,000ℓ. a year by the speculation; but now, seeing (or thinking he sees) greater advantages to be got by floating down the Radical stream than by assisting in the defence of this Government, he forgets past favours and connexion, and is ready to abandon them to their fate. It is rather an ominous sign and marks strongly their falling estimation. They think it is Durham who has got hold of Easthope, and persuades him to take this course. He declares he is so beset with applications, advice, and threats, that he has no alternative, and must take the line he does, or ruin the sale of his paper.

Newmarket, March 29th, 1839

Poor De Ros[8] expired last night soon after twelve, after a confinement of two or three months from the time he returned to England. His end was enviably tranquil, and he bore his protracted sufferings (more from oppression and annoyance than acute pain) with astonishing fortitude and composure. Nothing ruffled his temper or disturbed his serenity. His faculties were unclouded, his memory retentive, his perceptions clear to the last; no murmur of impatience ever escaped him, no querulous word, no ebullition of anger or peevishness; he was uniformly patient, mild, indulgent, deeply sensible of kindness and attention, exacting nothing, considerate of others and apparently regardless of self, overflowing with affection and kindness of manner and language to all around him, and exerting all his moral and intellectual energies with a spirit and resolution that never flagged till within a few hours of his dissolution, when nature gave way and he sank into a tranquil unconsciousness in which life gently ebbed away. Whatever may have been the error of his life, he closed the scene with a philosophical dignity not unworthy of a sage, and with a serenity and sweetness of disposition of which Christianity itself could afford no more shining or delightful example. In him I have lost (half lost before) the last and greatest of the friends of my youth, and I am left a more solitary and a sadder man.

[8] [Henry William, 19th Baron de Ros, born 12th June 1792; died 29th March 1839.]

London, April 6th, 1839

I saw X. at Newmarket, and had a long conversation with him, in which he gave me an account of the state of affairs. The Government is at its last gasp; the result of the debate next week may possibly prolong its existence, as a cordial does that of a dying man, but it cannot go on. They are disunited, dissatisfied, and disgusted in the Cabinet—Lord John himself deeply so—considerably alarmed at the state of affairs, resolutely bent upon making no further concessions to Radicalism, and no sacrifices for mere party purposes. There is a violent faction in the Cabinet and in the Government, who are indignant LORD JOHN RUSSELL’S FINALITY. with him for his finality speech last year, to which they ascribe the ruin of their cause, and Duncannon at the time, or soon after, abused him openly and loudly for it. This reached Lord John’s ears, who complained of such conduct, and the more because he had summoned a special Cabinet for the purpose of announcing that it was his intention to make this declaration, therefore they were all apprised of it, whereas Duncannon had asserted that he did it without the knowledge of his colleagues. It turned out in the course of the explanation that Duncannon had been laid up at the time, and was not present at this Cabinet, but he could hardly have been ignorant of such an important circumstance, and this shows the animus there was among some of them. The principal object of the more radically-inclined was to let Ballot be an open question, and to this Melbourne had been persuaded to consent, though no doubt quite contrary to his own wishes and opinions. But Melbourne has no strong convictions or opinions founded on political principles deeply engraven on his mind; he is easy, insouciant, persuadable, averse to disputes, and preferring to sacrifice his own convictions to the pertinacity and violence of others, rather than manfully and consistently defend and maintain them; still he looks up to John Russell and defers to him more than to any of his colleagues, both on account of his respect for his character and the station he holds as leader of the House of Commons; and when any struggle occurs, and he must side with one or the other party, he goes with Lord John, and accordingly Ballot was not made an open question.

What Lord John says is this: That when the Reform Bill was introduced, the extent and sweeping character of the measure were hateful and alarming to many members of the Cabinet and supporters of the Government; that the ground on which he urged the adoption of the measure was the expediency of leaving nothing for future agitation, and of giving the country a measure so ample and satisfactory that it might and ought to be final. To this argument many who dreaded its consequences ended by yielding, though reluctantly, and he considers himself, therefore, bound in honour to resist any further changes, and to take his stand where we now are. Besides this he now (as I gather) is seriously alarmed at the state of the country, and deeply impressed with the necessity of opposing all the Radical measures and propositions, which he considers parts of a great system, and a comprehensive scheme of a revolutionary character. Then he is disgusted and mortified at the treatment he has personally experienced both in and out of the House of Commons, and at the clamour and abuse of which he has been the object on account of the firm determination he has evinced to go no further; and this clamour has not been confined to the regular avowed Radicals or the organs of their opinions, but there are old self-styled Whigs—his uncle, Lord William, for example—and others, who are groaning over his obstinacy as they deem it, and attributing to it the ruin of their party; all this superadded to his broken spirits[9] makes him heartily sick of his position; and, seeing the unpopularity and weakness of the Government, denuded of all sympathy and support, and left to be buffeted by the Tories on one side and the Radicals on the other, he is aware, and not sorry to be aware, that the last act is at hand. Of this approaching catastrophe probably all the others are as well aware as himself, but there are some among them who earnestly desire that it should be so brought about as to make it next to impossible for those who may succeed them to carry on the Government. This, however, is not the object of Lord John Russell, who, on the contrary, desires that the next Government may be so formed and so conducted as to enable him to support it, and to bring with him such strength in its aid as may place it beyond the reach of danger. Whether they get a majority or not on the 15th, he knows that they cannot go on much longer. The Queen will do whatever Melbourne advises her, and he will advise her to send for the Duke of Wellington, who, in his turn, LORD JOHN’S FRIENDLINESS TO PEEL. will desire her to send for Peel. Whether or no any attempt would be made towards a coalition, or a wide comprehension, on the formation of the Government, nothing would induce Lord John to take office, but he would be desirous of supporting Peel’s Government, if he could with honour, and if the circumstances attending the change should render it possible for him as well as for others disposed to follow his course, to do so. He thinks that it is of great consequence that there should be no dissolution, which would throw the country into a ferment, lead to violent manifestations and declarations, and to many people being obliged to pledge themselves to measures of a dangerous tendency. He wishes, therefore, to place Peel in such a situation as shall exonerate him from the necessity of a dissolution, by giving him a fair general though independent support; but the power to do this depends much upon the temper that is displayed, and upon the mode in which the change is effected; for if the Tories cannot be restrained from the exhibition of an insulting and triumphant demeanour, the exasperation and desire of revenge in the discomfited party will be too great and general to admit of his aiding the new Government with an imposing force, and he is therefore solicitous that prudence and moderation should govern the Conservative councils. I asked X. whether he thought that there were many others likely to take this view and to follow Lord John’s example and advice, and he said that there were.

[9] [Adelaide, daughter of Thomas Lister, Esquire, and widow of the second Lord Ribblesdale, was the first wife of Lord John Russell: she died on the 1st November 1838, to the great grief of the Minister.]

All this, which is a brief abstract of our two conversations, appeared to me of so much importance, and, above all, that it is so desirable that the sentiments of the Whig leader should be made known to the future Minister, that I asked X. whether there would be any objection to my making known as much as it was desirable to impart of our conversation without committing anybody, and carefully abstaining from giving what I might say the air of a communication between parties in any shape or way. He said that it certainly might be very useful that there should be some such knowledge of these sentiments conveyed to the proper quarter, but he did not think the time was yet come, and that for the present I had better say nothing; to which I replied that, as it might have an important effect upon their deliberations which would be held previously to the debate on the 15th, and upon the conduct of Peel and his party on that occasion, I thought that the sooner the communication took place the better, as there could be no doubt that the temper displayed and the conduct pursued by the different parties on that occasion would have a very material effect upon all future arrangements, and upon the condition, prospects, and necessities of the new administration. I told X. that there was nothing I had such a horror of as repeating things from one party to another, of retailing political gossip, and of the appearance of worming myself into the confidence of individuals of one side, and then betraying it to those of another; that I would not therefore make the slightest use of what he had told me without his entire permission, and whatever I might say, I should faithfully report to him. He, who knows me, was quite satisfied; but others might not be. Then I have the greatest doubt to whom I should speak. The only individuals I can think of are the Duke, Fitzgerald, Graham, Wharncliffe, or Peel himself. Peel himself would be the most direct, but he is so cold, dry, and unsatisfactory, I know not how he would take it, and he would very likely suspect me of some design, some arrière pensée, some purpose of founding on this service a title to his intimacy, or his patronage and assistance—in short, some selfish, personal object. Whereas I hope and believe that I am not actuated by any puerile vanity in this matter, or the ambition of acting a part, however humble and subordinate, but that I have no object but to render my personal position instrumental to a great and good purpose.

April 7th, 1839

I sent for Clarendon, and consulted him what I should do. He advised me to speak to Peel at once, but first to ascertain whether John Russell certainly remained in the same mind, because Ben Stanley reports to the Cabinet that they will have so certain a majority that their drooping spirits have been rather raised, and it will IMPORTANT COMMUNICATION TO GRAHAM. never do for me to run the risk of deceiving Peel in any way. I shall do nothing for the present, but turn it in my mind. There is a moral or religious precept of oriental origin which is applicable to politics as well as to morals and religion, and which should, I think, be ever present to the mind: ‘When you are in doubt whether an action is good or bad, abstain from it.’ I believe this is the safest and wisest maxim with reference to sayings and doings: if you have serious doubts whether it is advisable to do a particular thing, or to say a particular thing, neither do, nor say; do nothing, say nothing. Of course, if you must do or say something, and the only choice is what, it is another thing. I believe, when the mind is disturbed and is oscillating with doubts of this kind, it is that vanity is whispering at one ear and prudence at the other; but then prudence almost always takes the deaf ear, and so vanity persuades.

April 10th, 1839

I wrote to X. on Saturday last, and said that what I heard here of the confidence of Government about their majority made me hesitate about saying anything for fear Lord John should not be in the same mind. He replied that he had no reason to believe he had changed his mind, but that it might be better to say nothing for the present. I had therefore resolved to say nothing, but on Monday John Russell announced the terms of his motion,[10] and Peel gave notice that on Friday he would give out his amendment; therefore, if anything was to be done (as they were thus coming to close quarters), no time was to be lost; and accordingly, after much reflexion, I resolved to speak to Graham, with whom old intimacy enabled me to converse more freely than I could with Peel, whose coldness and reserve, and the doubt how he would take my communication, would certainly have embarrassed me. I called on Graham yesterday, and had a conversation of two hours with him. He began by saying that he could hold no communication with me upon any political subject without telling me that he should feel bound to impart everything to Peel, and I replied that such was my intention. I then told him, without mentioning names, or giving any authority, the reason I had for speaking to him, and the conviction in my own mind that there would be found (in the event of a change of Government) a disposition on the part of John Russell and others of the moderate Whigs to support Peel. I told him that I thought it of such vital importance that such a disposition should be fostered, and not checked or suppressed by any violence in the conduct or language of his party, such as might render it impossible for them to give that support hereafter; that I had resolved to make known to him, for his consideration and that of Peel, this my conviction; at the same time, he must fully understand, I had no authority for saying so, that I might be mistaken, and he must take it for just what he judged it to be worth. I went more at length into the subject, conveying to him much of the information which had been imparted to me.

[10] [This was the motion approving the Irish policy of the Government, above referred to.]

He replied that he was fully aware of the great importance of this communication, and did not doubt that I had very solid grounds for what I said; but at the same time he thought the motion of which John Russell had given notice was in itself a measure of such a violent character that it was inconsistent with the moderation which I ascribed to him, and he feared that, in the event of a change, he might be persuaded to put himself at the head of the Whigs and Radicals, and acquiesce for party purposes in those movement measures to which he was certainly not personally inclined; that as for himself, and Stanley also, they had old feelings of regard, and friendship for Lord John, which would always influence them; and that he had recently had a sort of reconciliation with him (the circumstance of which he detailed), after an alienation on account of his attack upon Lord John in his speech at Glasgow; but that Peel had no such amicable feelings towards him, and thought he had got him at a great disadvantage on the present occasion; that their amendment would be moderate in terms; but they intended to be very strong in debate, and it was a good deal to ask of them to emasculate their speeches for the prospective NEGOTIATION WITH GRAHAM AND PEEL. but uncertain advantage of Lord John’s future support. ‘You say,’ he continued, ‘that you are convinced, on what you deem good and certain ground, that John Russell is disposed to resist the movement, and, in order to do so, to support Peel, if he comes in; and you ask us to place such confidence in this impression of yours, as to shape our conduct in conformity with it. You ask us to adopt a tone so moderate as to give no offence to John Russell, a lower tone than would be naturally expected from us by our friends, who will, and can, know nothing of our reasons for foregoing the advantage which seems to be in our power, and for treating our opponents with such extraordinary and unaccountable lenity and forbearance. This is asking a great deal.’ I owned that it was; but I urged that the paramount importance of winning over the Whig leader, and a part of the Whig party, to a decided opposition to the movement, and the prospect it held out of separating the Whigs from the Radicals, fully justified the sacrifice of any such advantage as that to which he alluded. He said that, ‘supposing such were the views and feelings of John Russell himself, he doubted whether the great Whig families would follow him. He thought the Dukes of Sutherland, Devonshire, Bedford, and others, would throw their influence into the opposite scale, and that the majority of the Whigs would follow Morpeth, who, he believed, was prepared to go any lengths.’ I replied, that this might be so; that I could only speak of what I knew; that it had occurred to me to enquire whether he was likely to be followed by many others, and that to the question I had thus put, the answer had been ‘yes;’ but that I could not pretend to say I knew of any certain instances of support to be expected, though my own belief was, that they would not be wanting. After a long conversation, in which we discussed the state and aspect of affairs in all their bearings, he ended by saying, that what I had said to him had made a great impression upon him, and that he should consider what it would be most advisable to do. He thanked me for the confidence I had reposed in him, and appreciated my motives; he should communicate with Peel about it, but whether he should mention what I had said to him as the impression of his own mind only, or whether he should tell him upon what authority it rested (upon mine), he should hereafter determine. I told him I had rather avoid, but had no objection, if necessary, to have my name brought forward, and, above all things, he must understand and convey to Peel that I had no authority for what I had said, that nobody must be in the slightest degree committed, that my impressions might be mistaken and erroneous, and the event might not correspond with them; but that, such as they were, I had frankly communicated them to him in hopes that the communication might have a salutary effect.

April 13th, 1839

On Thursday morning I saw Graham again. He had spoken to Peel, and told him exactly what I intended him to say, neither more nor less, giving it as given to him by a friend of his own. Peel was not disposed to attach much weight to the communication, and finding how lightly he regarded it, he thought it necessary to inform him that it came from me. The mention of my name (he said) did make a considerable impression on Peel, though much less than the matter had made on Stanley and himself; the former eagerly grasping at the prospect it held out, and believing implicitly in Lord John’s disposition. Still Peel was shaken, but at the same time he was excessively annoyed and put out by it. This (which appeared extraordinary enough) Graham accounted for in this way: that Peel had arranged the whole course of his conduct and the tenour of his speech in his own mind; he thought he had got Lord John at a great disadvantage, and that the debate would afford him the opportunity of a signal triumph; and the notion of being obliged to forego this advantage and triumph, and the perplexity into which he was thrown between doubt whether it really was worth while, and fear of sacrificing a great and permanent, to an accidental and ephemeral interest, threw him into an uncertainty and embarrassment which disturbed his equanimity. It is at all events fortunate that I did not go to him myself, for I should have been met with a cold austerity of manner which would have disconcerted me, and COLD RECEPTION BY PEEL. I should have most certainly quitted him mortified and disappointed, and without having effected any good.

Peel said to Graham that he should express no opinion, make no promise, and would not say whether or how his conduct would be affected by what he had heard. I replied on this, that I did not desire or expect that he should, and that my object was attained when he was made aware of what I knew. I repeated that I had no authority, and he must attach as much or as little importance to my opinion as he thought it was worth. Graham said that, notwithstanding his annoyance, he was in fact fully sensible of the importance of the circumstances, and that he would look with the greatest solicitude for what fell from John Russell himself, considering that his speech would afford the test of the correctness of my impressions, and that if the tenour of that speech confirmed them, their speeches would be of a corresponding character; that he might defend the policy of the Government, and the administration of Ireland, as strenuously as he pleased; but if he attacked the House of Lords, or truckled to the Radicals, they must give a vent to the indignant feelings that such conduct would inevitably excite, and it would be impossible for them to satisfy their followers by a mere milk-and-water debate, and by abstaining from the use of their weapons when the other side were unscrupulous in the use of theirs. I said I did not desire that they should go into action with their swords in their scabbards, while their enemies were to have theirs drawn; that I admitted that this opening speech might be considered a fair test, and that all I desired was, that if they could be moderate they would, and always keep in sight the motives for moderation. This, he assured me, I might depend upon. Peel thinks the motion itself so violent, that it announces violent dispositions; and he says it is moving the Appropriation Clause over again.[11] The only individual to whom all this has been communicated, besides Peel and Stanley, is Arbuthnot, for the purpose of being conveyed to the Duke of Wellington, but without any mention of my name.

[11] [The terms of Lord John’s resolution were these: ‘That it is the opinion of this House that it is expedient to persevere in those principles which have guided the Executive Government of Ireland of late years, and which have tended to the effectual administration of the law and the general improvement of that part of the Kingdom.’ It is difficult to perceive any violence in this language.]

Yesterday I had a long letter from X., to whom I wrote an account of my interview with Graham, approving of what I had done, and I wrote Graham a note saying as much (but not mentioning X.’s name, as I have never done). This he considered of such importance that he showed it to Peel, and he told me that Peel was greatly more sensible of the value of the information, and more disposed to shape his conduct accordingly. He said to Stanley, ‘Why, I must go down to the House of Commons with two speeches.’

April 21st, 1839

At Newmarket all last week, and having heard from nobody, could judge of the debate only from reading the report. Lord John’s speech was admirable, and so skilful, that it satisfied his friends, his foes, and did not dissatisfy the Radicals. Peel was flat and laboured, and did not satisfy his own people, all of which may be attributed to the necessity he was under of making speech number two. The rest of the debate was very moderate, but the Government had an excellent case, nothing being proved against them; and the facts on which the Opposition relied being all explained or rebutted satisfactorily. The division was better, too, than they expected, and some accidents told in their favour; for example, a stupid Tory (Goddard), who was besieged with letters and notes to be present at the division, turned sulky and restive in consequence, and voted with the Government, much to the delight of the Ministerial, and the rage of the Opposition whippers-in, though to the amusement of both. But the moderation, which it was my object to enforce, was manifested on both sides, and nothing fell from John Russell offensive in a constitutional or even in a party sense, and the Opposition leader abstained from attacking him, with a forbearance which, if calculated, was very consistently maintained. Satisfactorily, however, as the whole thing appears to have terminated for the Government, they MODERATION OF THE DEBATE. do not consider it to have given them any permanent strength, or the prospect of a longer tenure of office; for the Radicals, while one and all supported them on this Irish vote, were not sparing of menace and invective, and plainly indicated that, unless concessions were speedily made for them, the Government should lose their support; and consequently, there are many who are hoping and expecting, and many more who are desiring, that concessions should be made, and by these means that the Government concern should be again bolstered up. Some of the Cabinet, more of the subordinates and hangers-on, and many of what are called the old Whigs, are earnestly pressing this, and they are very angry and very sorrowful because John Russell is inflexible on this point. He has to sustain the assaults, not only of the violent of his party, and of Ellice and the out-of-door advisers, monitors and critics, but of his own family, even of his father, who, after announcing that he had given up politics and quitted the stage, has been dragged forward and induced to try his parental rhetoric upon the conservative immobility of his son. To the letter which the Duke wrote him, Lord John merely replied that ‘he would shortly see his opinions in print;’ and to Ellice’s warm remonstrances and entreaties he only dryly said, ‘I have made up my mind.’ His nephew, Lord Russell,[12] who, from some extraordinary crotchet, has thought fit to embrace republican opinions, and is an ultra-movement man, but restrained in the manifestation of his opinions from personal deference to his father and his uncle, with whom he lives on excellent terms—said the other day to Lord Tavistock, ‘Lord John has undertaken a great task; he is endeavouring to arrest the progress of the movement, and if he succeeds he will be a very great man. He may succeed, and if he does it will be a great achievement.’ This Lord Tavistock told Lord John, who replied that ‘he was convinced of the danger which threatened the country from the movement, and of the necessity of opposing its progress; that he considered this duty paramount to all other considerations. He did not desire the dissolution of the Government to which he belonged; on the contrary, he wished to remain in office; but nevertheless he considered the promotion of party objects and the retention of office subordinate to the higher and more imperative duty of opposing principles fraught with danger to the State, and to that end he would devote his best energies.’ (It is impossible to give the exact words, and these are not the words, but it is the exact sense of what he said.)

[12] [William Russell, afterwards eighth Duke of Bedford, born 30th June 1809, died May 1872.]

April 22nd, 1839

The moderate Radicals are now very anxious to come to some amicable understanding with the Government, and, if possible, to prop up the concern. They are very angry with their more violent compeers (Grote, Leader, &c.), and Fonblanque told me last night that they would take the slightest concessions, the least thing that would satisfy their constituencies, but that something they must have, and that something he appeared to think they should get. I asked him what was the minimum of concession that would do, and he said the rate-paying clauses, which would be merely working out the original principle, the demolition of the boroughs under 300 electors, and Ballot an open question. I told him that I was persuaded these things were impossible; that Lord John Russell never would consent to begin again the work of disfranchisement, nor to make Ballot an open question; that he is alarmed, and determined to stop. Clarendon had told me much the same thing in the morning on the authority of his brother Charles,[13] who is a very leading man, and much looked to among them, probably (besides that he really is very clever) on account of that aristocratic origin and connexion which he himself affects to despise, and to consider prejudicial to him. Of course this anxiety on the part of the moderate Radicals to come to terms will increase the eagerness of the violent Whigs to strike a bargain; but Lord John will continue, I believe, to forbid the banns. These things would only be wedges, no sooner conceded than fresh demands THE RADICALS AND THE WHIGS. would be raised upon them; besides, they never could, without abandoning every principle of independence and losing all sense of honour, yield to contumely, menace and the most insulting language, what they have so long and pertinaciously refused to milder appeals and all the means of persuasion and remonstrance. The great body of the Conservatives certainly, and I believe the whole country, will make no distinction between different sections and shades of Radicals, but consider every concession made to one as made to all, and the consequence would be fresh taunts against the Government for being made of such squeezable materials, without its prolonging their Ministerial existence for a very long period. It would, however, prevent the split between the great masses of Whigs and Radicals, and secure a formidable Opposition, together with union at the election whenever it took place. Fonblanque told me that if the Government was broken up by the desertion of the Radicals, the latter would lose all their seats at the next election, for they are scarcely anywhere strong enough to come in without the assistance of the Whigs.