London, November 24th.—After his failure with Stanley, Palmerston applied to Sidney Herbert, who went to Broadlands, but, finding that he and Palmerston could not agree upon the subject of war and peace (the details of their disagreement I do not know), he declined the offer of the Colonial Office. Palmerston then sent for Labouchere, who accepted.[1] He called on me the day after and told me he had been to Broadlands, that Palmerston had told him everything about the state of affairs and his own views and opinions, and, as he could find nothing therein to object to, he had accepted the office. As Labouchere is certainly moderate, this would indicate more moderation on the part of Palmerston than Sidney Herbert found in him, unless Labouchere and Sidney Herbert take totally dissimilar views of affairs.
After this, a few days ago, I had a long conversation with George Lewis, who told me that France and Austria were endeavouring to bring about peace, and that communications were going on between France and our Government on the subject, and he said, moreover, that Palmerston was by no means so stiff and so bent on continuing the war as was generally supposed. This intelligence appeared to me to explain what I could not understand in his communications with Sidney Herbert and Labouchere; for, if the Emperor has really intimated to our Government his determination to try and make peace, Palmerston must needs come down from his very high horse and evince a disposition to go along with our Imperial ally, who has got the whole game in his own hands, and whom we must perforce follow when he is determined to take his own course. Then our warlike propensities may be probably restrained by the alarming prospect of financial difficulties which Lewis sees looming in the distance. He said to me, 'I am sure I do not know how I shall provide ways and means next year, for the enormously high prices will be a great blow to consumption, and the money market is in a very ticklish state.' I said, 'You will have to trust to a great loan, and ten per cent. income tax;' to which he assented. They have now patched up the Government, by getting Baines to take the Duchy of Lancaster with a seat in the Cabinet—a very respectable man, who cannot speak, and who will be of no use to them. Neither he nor Labouchere will add much to their strength, but they are both very unexceptionable appointments. I think that, in spite of the undiminished violence of the press, the prevailing opinion is that there is the beginning of a change in the public mind, and an incipient desire for peace; and I agree with Disraeli, who thinks that, when once the current has fairly turned, it will run with great rapidity the other way.
[1] [The Right Hon. Henry Labouchere, born in 1798, a highly respected member of the Whig party, who filled many offices in Liberal Governments. He was created Baron Taunton on his retirement from office in 1859, and died in July 1869.]
November 27th.—At length there really does appear to be a prospect of putting an end to this odious war, and my conjectures of a few days ago are assuming the shape of realities. Yesterday morning I met George Lewis in the Park and turned back and walked with him to the door of his office, when he told me the exact state of affairs. I had received a letter from the Duke of Bedford in the morning, who said that Charles Wood, who was at Woburn, had told him the statement in the 'Press' a week ago was so substantially accurate that they must, he thought, have received their information from some French official source. This was in itself confirmatory of all I had already inferred and believed. Lewis's story was this: The Austrians have framed a proposal for peace which they offer to send to Russia, and, if she refuses it, Austria engages to join the Allies and to declare war. The Emperor Napoleon agrees with Austria, and is resolved not to go on with the war if peace can be arranged on the Austrian terms. This resolution he has communicated to us, and invited us to accede thereto; Walewski's letters are not merely pressing, but even peremptory. It is in fact a second edition of the Vienna Conference and proposals, with this difference, that, while on the last occasion the Emperor knocked under to us and reluctantly agreed to go on with the war, he is now determined to go on with it no longer, and requires that we should defer to his wishes. Our Government are aware that they have no alternative, and that nothing is left for them but to acquiesce with a good grace and make the best case they can for themselves here, the case being that the Emperor is determined to make peace, and that we cannot carry on the war alone. This was the amount of Lewis' information, to which he added the expression of his disgust at the pitiful figure we cut in the affair, being obliged to obey the commands of Louis Napoleon, and, after our insolence, swagger, and bravado, to submit to terms of peace which we have already scornfully rejected; all which humiliation, he justly said, was the consequence of our plunging into war without any reason and in defiance of all prudence and sound policy. Afterwards I saw Charles Villiers and had a talk with him. He told me Clarendon had been sent for on Sunday to Windsor in a great hurry to meet Palmerston there. The Queen had received a letter from the Emperor, brought by the Duke of Cambridge, which no doubt contained in a private and friendly shape to her the communications which Walewski had already made officially to the Government and she wanted to know what answer she should send to it. Charles Villiers told me that Palmerston had already thrown out a feeler to the Cabinet to ascertain if they would be willing to carry on the war without France, but this was unanimously declined. I can hardly imagine that even Palmerston really contemplated such a desperate course.
November 29th.—I met Sidney Herbert last night. He seems to know what is going on and thinks we shall have peace; he only doubts whether the terms will be such as Russia will accept, for he is not convinced, as I am, that Austria has already settled that with Russia. He told me that, when Palmerston offered him office, he had not received the French communication, and was ignorant that it was coming.
December 4th.—At The Grange the last four days, where I found everybody in total ignorance of what is passing about peace, except Sidney Herbert, who told me that the plan is neutralisation. On coming back yesterday I met Lord Malmesbury just come from Paris; he is supposed to be the person who supplied all its information to the 'Press' paper, and I believe it was he. He confirmed the Emperor's desire for peace, but thought it very doubtful whether Russia would accept the terms of the Allies. He told me likewise that P?lissier has sent word he is in a fix, as he cannot advance or expel the Russians from their positions; and James Macdonald told me the Duke of Cambridge is going again to Paris to represent us at a grand council of war to be held there, to decide on future operations. If it were not that the Allies seem infallible and invincible, and the Russians unable to accomplish anything, offensive or defensive, I should augur very ill from this council of war, for nothing can be worse than to have a set of men at Paris forming plans to be executed by another set in the Crimea who have had no share in the deliberations.
This morning the Duke of Bedford writes me word that Westmorland tells him he has heard from Clarendon the state of affairs, and the answer we have sent to France, and he augurs ill of peace, as he thinks there can be no agreement with Russia on such terms; and the 'Morning Post,' which has long been quite silent about war or peace, has this morning an article which is evidently a regular Palmerstonian manifesto, decidedly adverse to any hope of peace, for it is certain that Russia will continue the war, co?te que co?te, rather than submit to such conditions as the 'Morning Post' says we are to impose on her. I am persuaded Palmerston and Clarendon will do all they can to prevent peace being made on any moderate terms, and the only hope is that the Emperor Napoleon may take the matter into his own hands and employ a douce violence to compel us to give way.
December 5th.—I met Charles Villiers last night, who told me a good deal of what is going on, and cleared up some matters. The Austrian proposal transmitted here by the Emperor Napoleon was considered by the Cabinet and sent back with amendments—that is, it was made more stringent. The Emperor consented to send it so amended to Vienna, and it remains to be seen what course Austria will take—whether she will send it in its present shape to Russia or adhere to her own edition, and whether, if she does send it, she will (supposing it to be rejected) join the Allies and declare war. The latter, I think, she will not do, nor be bound to do. Next is the question what the Emperor Napoleon will do if Austria declines to adopt the amended version, or if Russia should reply she would take the original proposal, but not our amendments. The Emperor is certainly very anxious to make peace, and when he is bent upon a thing he generally does it, and my own opinion and hope is that he will refuse to give way to us now as he did last May. It is universally admitted that every man in France desires peace ardently. There is, Charles Villiers tells me, great uneasiness amongst Palmerston's adherents, and some idea that, if peace cannot be had on the terms he has insisted on, he will be no party to making it, and if the majority of the Cabinet are for taking the original terms proposed, supposing the Emperor Napoleon again to press their acceptance, that he will resign, throw himself on the popular enthusiasm for the war, and leave his colleagues to make an unpopular peace. If Palmerston was forty instead of seventy he would probably do this; but he has not time to wait for fresh combinations and to speculate on distant chances, so he will probably consent to make peace if he is obliged by France to do so, and trust to fortune to enable him to reconcile Parliament and the country to it. This is rendered more likely by Disraeli having made a communication to the Government that he and Stanley will be ready to support any peace they may now make.
December 6th.—I saw George Lewis yesterday, who told me the state of affairs so far as he recollects it; but it is evident that he takes but a secondary interest in the details of diplomacy, however anxious he may be about the results, and what passed shows the extreme difficulty of keeping clear of mistakes, even when one's information is derived from the best sources. He said he did not think Russia would accept the offered terms, and Clarendon thought not also. The terms which it will be most difficult for her to swallow are the neutralisation of the Black Sea, which as worked out is evidently worse than limitation, for she is to have no fortress and no arsenal there, so that she will, in fact, be quite defenceless, while the other Powers can at any time collect fleets in the Bosphorus and attack her coasts when they please. Then she is to cede half Bessarabia to the Turks, including the fortress of Ismail, the famous conquest of Souvaroff when he wrote to the Empress Catherine, 'L'orgueilleuse Ismailoff est ? vos pieds;' and they are not to repair Bomarsund, or erect any fortress on the Aland Isles. The alterations we made in the scheme sent to us were not important, and what surprised me much was, the terms, instead of being tendered by Austria, were concocted at Paris by Walewski and the Emperor—at least so Walewski asserts, but there must I think be some incorrectness in this, for it is impossible to doubt that the Emperor and Austria really concerted them between themselves, though Walewski may have had a hand in the matter in some way. However, the terms are gone or going directly to St. Petersburg. I earnestly hope they may be accepted, be they what they may. Russia is to be asked whether she will take them Yes or No, and, upon the preliminaries being signed, hostilities will cease. I asked if Russia might not accept as a basis, and negotiate as to modification and details, but Lewis professed not to understand how this is, or whether her acceptance generally would or not bind her to all the conditions precisely as they are set forth. He knows nothing in fact of diplomacy and its niceties and operations.
Lord John Russell met Clarendon at Windsor Castle,[1] but refused to hear what Clarendon offered to tell him of the state of the negotiation; he thought he should compromise his own independent action if he did. He says, 'Were peace to be made on the four points newly explained and enlarged, I would do nothing but applaud and support.' The only men Lord John communicated with at Windsor were Cavour and Azeglio. He writes: 'I asked Cavour what was the language of the Emperor of the French; he said it was to this effect: France had made great efforts and sacrifices, she would not continue them for the sake of conquering the Crimea; the alternative was such a peace as can now be had by means of Austria, or an extension of the war for Poland,' etc. The Sardinians, Ministers and King, are openly and warmly for the latter course. I suspect Palmerston would wish the war to glide imperceptibly into a war of nationalities, as it is called, but would not like to profess it openly now. I am convinced such a war might suit Napoleon and the King of Sardinia, but would be very dangerous for us in many ways. Cavour says if peace is made without anything being done for Italy, there will be a revolution there. Clarendon is incredulous.
[1] [The King of Sardinia, Victor Emmanuel, arrived in England on the 30th November, accompanied by his Minister, M. de Cavour. Lord Clarendon and Lord John Russell were invited to Windsor to meet the King.]
London, December 11th.—I met Clarendon at the Travellers' on Friday evening, and had a talk with him. He did not seem inclined to enter much into the question of peace and war, but he told me that Buol declared most solemnly that he had had no communication with Russia about the terms, and that he had only slight hopes that peace might be made. Of the terms themselves Clarendon did not say a word. He talked a great deal about the King of Sardinia, and gave me an account of his conversations both with the King and Cavour. He thinks well of the King, and that he is intelligent, and he has a very high opinion indeed of Cavour, and was especially struck with his knowledge of England, and our Constitution and constitutional history. I was much amused, after all the praises that have been lavished on Sardinia for the noble part she has played and for taking up arms to vindicate a great principle in so unselfish a manner, that she has after all a keen view to her own interest, and wants some solid pudding as well as so much empty praise. The King asked Clarendon what the Allies meant to do for him, and whether he might not expect some territorial advantage in return for his services. Clarendon told him this was out of the question, and that, in the state of their relations with Austria, they could hold out no such expectation; and he put it to the King, supposing negotiations for peace were to take place, and he wished his pretensions to be put forward by us, what he would himself suggest that a British Minister could say for him; and the King had the candour to say he did not know what answer to give. Cavour urged the same thing, and said the war had already cost them forty millions of francs, instead of twenty-five which they had borrowed for it and was the original estimate, and they could only go on with it by another loan and fresh taxes, and he did not know how he should propose these to the Chambers without having something advantageous to offer to his own country, some Italian acquisition. They would ask for what object of their's the war was carried on, and what they had to gain for all their sacrifices and exertions. Clarendon said they must be satisfied with the glory they had acquired and the high honour their conduct had conferred on them; but Cavour, while he said he did not repent the part they had taken, thought his countrymen would be very little satisfied to have spent so much money and to continue to spend more without gaining some Italian object. They complained that Austria had, without any right, for a long time occupied a part of the Papal territory, and suggested she should be compelled to retire from it; but Clarendon reminded him that France had done the same, and that this was a very ticklish question to stir.
The King and his people are far better satisfied with their reception here than in France, where, under much external civility, there was very little cordiality, the Emperor's intimate relations with Austria rendering him little inclined towards the Piedmontese. Here the Queen was wonderfully cordial and attentive; she got up at four in the morning to see him depart. His Majesty appears to be frightful in person, but a great, strong, burly, athletic man, brusque in his manners, unrefined in his conversation, very loose in his conduct, and very eccentric in his habits. When he was at Paris his talk in society amused or terrified everybody, but here he seems to have been more guarded. It was amusing to see all the religious societies hastening with their addresses to him, totally forgetting that he is the most debauched and dissolute fellow in the world; but the fact of his being excommunicated by the Pope and his waging war with the ecclesiastical power in his own country covers every sin against morality, and he is a great hero with the Low Church people and Exeter Hall. My brother-in-law said that he looked at Windsor more like a chief of the Heruli or Longobardi than a modern Italian prince, and the Duchess of Sutherland declared that, of all the Knights of the Garter she had seen, he was the only one who seemed as if he would have the best of it with the Dragon.
My hopes of peace wax fainter. Everybody seems to think there is no chance of Russia accepting our terms, or of her proposing any that the Allies would accept. Lewis told me yesterday evening that he expected nothing, and that Russia had now made known (but in what way he did not say) that she was disposed to treat. Meanwhile Palmerston continues to put articles in the 'Morning Post' full of arrogance and jactance, and calculated to raise obstacles to peace. I told Lewis so, and he said it was very foolish, and that he held very different language in the Cabinet, but this is only like what he did in '41, when he used to agree to certain things with his colleagues and then put violent articles in the 'Morning Chronicle' totally at variance with the views and resolutions of the Cabinet. Labouchere told me that he thought the condition of the cession of Ismail ought never to have entered into the terms proposed to Russia.
December 14th.—My hopes of peace, never very sanguine, are now completely dashed, for Lewis told me last night that he thought the terms were at last pretty well agreed upon between England, France, and Austria. I was greatly surprised, for I thought they had been agreed upon long ago and must be by this time on their way to St. Petersburg. I said so; and he replied, 'Oh no, they are only just on the point of being settled.' It was quite extraordinary, he said, how eager Palmerston was for pursuing the war. I gathered from him that our Government has been vehemently urging that of France, through Cowley, to be firm in pressing the most stringent terms on Russia, and particularly not to consent to any negotiation, and to compel her to accept or refuse. I said this was not reasonable, and that we had no right to propose the terms as an ultimatum. That, he replied, was exactly what we were doing, that Cowley was very urgent with the Emperor, who appeared to be intimidated by him, and that he was evidently very much in awe of England and afraid of having any difference with us. I said I could not believe that the Emperor would not leave himself a loophole, and if, as was most probable, Russia declined the terms, but offered to negotiate, that he would agree to that course, which, however, Lewis clearly thought he would not do against our inclination. I was greatly surprised to hear this, because I had a strong impression that the Emperor, when he really desired anything very much (as I believe that he did this peace), would obstinately persevere in it; and it seems so obviously his interest to gratify his own people rather than to be led by this country, that I was persuaded he never would consent to this proposal being un dernier mot, and thus to ensure the failure of the attempt. Palmerston, who is the most obstinate man alive in pressing any object he has once set his mind upon, was sure to press the French Government with the utmost vehemence and pertinacity as soon as he found there was a chance of making them yield to his will.
December 17th.—This morning the two new volumes of Macaulay's History came forth. The circumstances of this publication are, I believe, unprecedented in literary history; 25,000 copies are given out, and the weight of the books is fifty-six tons. The interest and curiosity which it excites are prodigious, and they afford the most complete testimony to his immense popularity and the opinion entertained by the world of his works already published. His profits will be very great, and he will receive them in various shapes. But there is too much reason to apprehend that these may be the last volumes of his history that the world will see, still more that they are the last that will be read by me and people of my standing. Six years have elapsed since the appearance of the first volumes, and these two only advance about ten years. He announced at the outset that he meant to bring down the history of England to a period within the memory of persons still living, but his work has already so much expanded, and of course will do so still more from the accumulation of materials as he advances, that at his present rate of progress he must live much beyond the ordinary duration of human life, and retain all his faculties as long, to have any chance of accomplishing his original design; and he is now in such a precarious state of health that in all human probability he will not live many years. It is melancholy to think that so gifted an intellect should be arrested by premature decay, and such a magnificent undertaking should be overthrown by physical infirmities, and be limited to the proportions of a splendid fragment. He is going to quit Parliament and to reside in the neighbourhood of London.
This morning the 'Morning Post' has published the terms which are offered by the Allies and are now on their way from Vienna to St. Petersburg. They were already pretty well known, but it is the first time that Palmerston (for the article is evidently his own) has announced them so openly and distinctly, and they state totidem verbis that it is an Ultimatum which is sent to St. Petersburg. I believe this course to be unprecedented, and it is certainly unfair. If Russia had applied to the Allies and expressed a desire for peace, if she had asked them on what terms they would consent to terminate the war, it would have been quite fair and reasonable that they should have stated the precise conditions, adding if they pleased that they would consent to no others and to no change whatever in them, though it may be doubted if it would be wise to be thus peremptory. But to send to Russia and propose to her to make peace, and accompany the proposal with an Ultimatum and an announcement that they would listen to no remonstrances or suggestions, much less any alterations, and that she must say Yes or No at once, is a stretch of arrogance and dictation not justified by the events of the war and the relative conditions of the belligerents, or by any usage or precedent that I ever heard of.
Reports are very rife of the distressed state of Russia and of her inability to make head any longer against the Allies, but very little is really known of the condition of the country, of its remaining resources, and of the disposition of the people. Nobody can doubt that the terms are deeply humiliating to the pride of such a Power, which has been long accustomed to stand in so high a position and hold such lofty language; and if she consents to accept the offered terms, it must be that her enormous losses have really incapacitated her for going on with the war, and that her Government is conscious that the next campaign will be still more disastrous to her than the two preceding ones have been. I have very little doubt that Palmerston has hastened to publish these terms in hopes that they may find acceptance with a considerable part of the public here, and that they may the more tightly bind the Emperor Napoleon, and, in the event of Russia sending any conditional acceptance and proposing to treat, that he may be unable to enter into any negotiation whatever. It has surprised me that he should have so completely given way to Palmerston as he has done.
December 21st.—The poet Rogers died two days ago at the age of 93. I have known him all my life, and at times lived in a good deal of intimacy with him, but for some years past he had so great an aversion to me that I kept away from him and never saw anything of him.[1] He was an old man when I first made his acquaintance between thirty and forty years ago, or probably more. He was then very agreeable, though peculiar and eccentric; he was devoured by a morbid vanity, and could not endure any appearance of indifference or slight in society. He was extremely touchy, and always wanted to be flattered, but above all to be listened to, very angry and mortified when he was not the principal object in society, and provoked to death when the uproarious merriment of Sydney Smith or the voluminous talk of Macaulay overwhelmed him and engrossed the company; he had a great friendship nevertheless for Sydney Smith, but he never liked Macaulay. I never pretended, or could pretend, to be a rival to him, but I was not a patient and attentive listener to him, and that was what affronted him and caused his dislike to me as well as to anyone else of whom he had the same reason to complain. His voice was feeble, and it has been said that his bitterness and caustic remarks arose from the necessity of his attracting attention by the pungency of his conversation. He was undoubtedly a very clever and accomplished man, with a great deal of taste and knowledge of the world, in the best of which he had passed his life. He was hospitable, generous, and charitable, with some weaknesses, many merits, and large abilities, and he was the last survivor of the generation to which he belonged.
[1] [Samuel Rogers, the author of the Pleasures of Memory (which was published in 1792), was born at Stoke Newington in 1762. His father was a banker, and he remained a partner in the bank all his life. He died on December 18, 1855.]
The Grove, December 23rd.—Came here for Christmas. No other guests but the family. We have had some talk about the peace propositions and other odds and ends. Clarendon told me that Walewski and Persigny are bitter enemies, and their estrangement the greater because Walewski is a corrupt jobber and speculator, and Persigny an honest man. When Drouyn de Lhuys resigned the Foreign Office, much to the Emperor's annoyance and regret, he did not know where to find a man, and he determined to appoint Walewski because he knew not whom else to take. Not choosing to send the offer to him through Drouyn, he employed Cowley, and requested him to telegraph in cypher to Clarendon a request that Cowley would send for Walewski and communicate to him the Emperor's intentions. A curious shift to be reduced to, but throughout the Eastern Question Cowley has acted the part of Foreign Minister to the Emperor almost as much as that of Ambassador.
Lewis this morning recapitulated to me the exact circumstances of the overtures from France about peace. It arrived here on a Saturday; was submitted to the Queen on Sunday, who approved of it; on Monday (or Tuesday) it was read to the Cabinet, when no discussion took place, but Palmerston shortly said, without giving any reasons, that he thought we must agree to the proposal, which was generally concurred in. The next day there was another Cabinet, when they examined in detail all the articles and discussed them. A few alterations were made, none of which were of any importance except the Bomarsund question. The cession of Bessarabia and the neutralisation of the Black Sea both formed part of the original proposal, and the latter was particularly insisted upon, and reasoned out at considerable length by France, for it turns out that the Emperor has never had so much in view the object of making peace (not expecting, nor ever having expected, that these proposals would be accepted) as the object of securing the active cooperation of Austria, which he expects to do. Austria engages, if Russia refuses the conditions, to put an end to diplomatic relations between the two Empires, and Napoleon thinks this cannot fail to end in hostilities, and to this extension of the alliance he looks for bringing the war to a conclusion. He thinks, moreover, that, when Austria has declared war, Russia will attack her defenceless frontier, and that as any attack upon Austria will compel the whole of Germany to assist her and to take part in the war against Russia, this offer will lead to Prussia and the whole of the German States being engaged on the side of the Allies, and that such a confederacy cannot fail to bring the war to a successful issue, because Russia would be absolutely incapable of offering any resistance to it. This is a new view of the policy and motives of France, but I very much doubt if the whole of the Emperor's scheme will be realised. Even though Austria may take up arms, it is probable that Russia will act strictly on the defensive, and will avoid giving any cause to the German States to depart from their neutrality. We both agreed that the conduct of Austria is quite inexplicable, and that Russia will never forgive her for the part she has acted and is acting now.
The Grove, December 24th.—George Lewis and I have been walking and talking together all the morning. He is fully as pacific as I am, and entertains exactly the same thoughts that I do, of the egregious folly of the war, of the delusion under which the English nation is labouring, and of the wickedness of the press in practising upon the popular credulity in the way it has done. He seems to like to talk to me on this subject, because he can talk freely to me, which he could hardly do with any of his own colleagues, still less in any other society. This morning he again recurred to the circumstances of the negotiations now going on, and he gave me an account of the transaction which puts the whole thing in a very ridiculous light, which would be very comical if it were not so very tragical. 'Think,' he said, 'that this is a war carried on for the independence of Turkey, and we, the Allies, are bound to Turkey by mutual obligations not to make peace but by common consent and concurrence. Well, we have sent an offer of peace to Russia of which the following are among the terms: We propose that Turkey, who possesses one half of the Black Sea coast, shall have no ships, no ports, and no arsenals in that sea; and then there are conditions about the Christians who are subjects of Turkey, and others about the mouths of the Danube, to which part of the Turkish dominions are contiguous. Now in all these stipulations so intimately concerning Turkey, for whose independence we are fighting, Turkey is not allowed to have any voice whatever, nor has she ever been allowed to be made acquainted with what is going on, except through the newspapers, where the Turkish Ministers may have read what is passing, like other people. When the French and Austrian terms were discussed in the Cabinet, at the end of the discussion someone modestly asked whether it would not be proper to communicate to Musurus (the Turkish Ambassador in London) what was in agitation and what had been agreed upon, to which Clarendon said he saw no necessity for it whatever; and indeed that Musurus had recently called upon him, when he had abstained from giving him any information whatever of what was going on. Another time, somebody suggesting in the Cabinet that we were bound to Turkey by treaty not to make peace without her consent, Palmerston, who is a great stickler for Turkey, said very quietly that there would be no difficulty on that score; in point of fact, the Turk evidently
The Grove, December 26th.—Since I have been here Clarendon has resumed all his old habits of communication and confidence with me, has told me everything and shown me everything that is interesting and curious. I wish I could remember it all. Such fragments as have remained in my memory I will jot down here as they recur to me. Here are letters from Seymour at Vienna describing his good reception there, gracious from the Court, and cordially civil from the great society, especially from Metternich who seems to have given the mot d'ordre. Metternich talked much to Seymour of his past life and recollections, complimented him for his reports of conversations with the Emperor Nicholas, and said that many years ago the Emperor had talked to him (Metternich) about Turkey in the same strain, and used the same expression about 'le malade' and 'l'homme malade,' when Metternich asked him 'Est-ce que Votre Majest? en parle comme son m?decin ou comme son h?ritier?' Also letters from Bloomfield (Berlin) and from Buchanan (Copenhagen) with different opinions as to the probability of Russia accepting or refusing—the former for, the second against; some curious letters from Cowley, full of his indignation against Walewski; the quarrels of Persigny and Walewski; the perplexity of the Emperor, his desire for peace, his hopes that Russia may lend a favourable ear to the proposals; Cowley's suspicions of Walewski, and in a smaller degree of the Emperor himself, especially of His Majesty's communications with Seebach, the Saxon Minister, and not impossibly through him with St. Petersburg.
A curious anecdote showing the strange terms the parties concerned are on: One day Cowley was with Walewski (at the time the question of terms was going on between France and Austria) and the courier from Vienna was announced. Walewski begged Cowley, who took up his hat, not to go away, and said he should see what the courier brought. He opened the despatches and gave them to Cowley to read, begging him not to tell the Emperor he had seen them. In the afternoon Cowley saw the Emperor, who had then got the despatches; the Emperor also gave them to Cowley to read, desiring him not to let Walewski know he had shown them to him!
There has been a dreadful rixe between Walewski and Persigny. I have forgotten exactly the particular causes, but the other day Persigny went over to Paris partly to complain of Walewski to the Emperor. He would not go near Walewski, and told the Emperor he should not; the Emperor, however, made them both meet in his Cabinet the next day, when a violent scene took place between them, and Persigny said to Walewski before his face all that he had before said behind his back; and he had afterwards a very long conversation with the Emperor, in which he told him plainly what danger he was in from the corruption and bad character of his entourage, that he had never had anything about him but adventurers who were bent on making their own fortunes by every sort of infamous agiotage and speculation, by which the Imperial Crown was placed in imminent danger. 'I myself,' Persigny said, 'am nothing but an adventurer, who have passed through every sort of vicissitude; but at all events people have discovered that I have clean hands and do not bring disgrace on your Government, like so many others, by my profligate dishonesty.' 'Well,' said the Emperor, 'but what am I to do? What remedy is there for such a state of things?' Persigny replied that he had got the remedy in his head, but that the time was not come yet for revealing his ideas on the subject.
As we went to town, we talked over the terms proposed to Prussia. Clarendon said he could not understand the policy of Austria nor what she was driving at. She had entered very heartily into plans of a compulsory and hostile character against Russia, who would never forgive her, especially for proposing the cession of Bessarabia. I said I thought the most objectionable item of their propositions (and I believed the most unprecedented) was the starting by making it an Ultimatum. He replied that it was Austria who tendered the Ultimatum, and that it was not exactly so, the sharp edge having been rounded off by the mode to be adopted, which was as follows: Esterhazy was to communicate the project to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and say he had reason to believe that the Allies would be willing to make peace on those terms; he was then to wait nine days. If in that time the Russian Government replied by a positive negative, he was, as soon as he got this notification, to quit St. Petersburg with all his embassy; if no answer was returned at the end of nine days, he was to signify that his orders were to ask for an answer in ten days, and if at the end thereof the answer was in the negative, or there was no answer, he was to come away, so that there was to be no Ultimatum in the first instance. 'But,' I said, 'what if Russia proposed some middle course and offered to negotiate?' 'His instructions were not to agree to this.' 'Well,' said I, 'but when you abstain from calling this an Ultimatum, it is next to impossible that Russia should not propose to negotiate, and if she does beg that her proposal may be conveyed to the Allies before everything is closed, it will be very difficult to refuse this; and is it not probable that France and Austria will both vote for entering into pourparlers; and, if they do, can you refuse?' He seemed struck with this, and owned that it was very likely to occur, and that, if it did, we should be obliged to enter into negotiation. So probable does this contingency appear, that there has already been much discussion as to who shall go from hence to the Congress, if there is one. I said he had much better go himself. He expressed great dislike to the idea, but said the Queen and Prince wished him to go, and that Cowley urged him also, and was desirous of going with him. I see he has made up his mind to prevent any negotiation if he can, and, if it is unavoidable, to take it in hand.
This afternoon Persigny arrived from Paris and came directly to the Foreign Office. The Emperor had given him an account of his interview with M. de Seebach,[1] who had gone off directly afterwards vi? Berlin to St. Petersburg. The Emperor told him to do all he could to induce the Russian Government to consent to the terms, and to assure them that, if they did not, it would be long enough before they would have any other chance of making peace; that he wished for peace, but that above everything else he was desirous of maintaining unimpaired his alliance and friendship with England; that England had most fairly and in a very friendly spirit entered into his difficulties and his wishes; that she was a constitutional country with a Government responsible to Parliament, and that he was bound in honour to enter in like manner into the obligations and necessities of this Government. They had had some differences of opinion which were entirely reconciled; they were now agreed as one man, and no power on earth should induce him to separate himself from England or to take any other line than that to which he had bound himself in conjunction with her. This announcement, which the Emperor made with great energy, carried consternation to the mind of Seebach, and he resolved to lose no time in getting to St. Petersburg to make known the Emperor's intentions.
It is thus evident that the Emperor's mind is divided between his anxiety to make peace and his determination to have no difference with England; but his desire for peace must be great when, as Clarendon assures me, it was not without difficulty that he was deterred from ordering his army away from the Crimea. The feeling here towards the Emperor seems to be one of liking and reliance, not unaccompanied with doubt and suspicion. He is not exempt from the influence of his entourage, though he is well aware how corrupt that is, and he listens willingly to Cowley and to whatever the English Government and the Queen say to him, but his own people eternally din into his ears that we are urging him on to take a part injurious to his own and to French interests for our own purposes, and because our Government is itself under the influence of a profligate press and a deluded people; and although he knows that those who tell him this are themselves working for their own private interests, he knows also that there is a great deal of truth in what they say. His own position is very strange, insisting upon being his own Minister and directing everything, and at the same time from indolence and ignorance incapable of directing affairs himself, yet having no confidence in those he employs. The consequence is that a great deal is ill done, much not done at all, and a good deal done that he knows nothing about, and he is surrounded with quarrels, jealousies, and struggles for influence and power both between his own Ministers and between them and the foreign diplomatists at his Court.
We have had a good deal of talk about Palmerston. Clarendon says nothing can go on better than he and Palmerston do together. They seldom meet except in the Cabinet, and their communications go on by notes between Downing Street and Piccadilly. Palmerston, much more moderate and reasonable than he used to be, sometimes suggests things or expressions in despatches, which Clarendon always adopts or declines according to his own ideas, and Palmerston never insists. Palmerston is now on very good terms with the Queen, which is, though he does not know it, greatly attributable to Clarendon's constant endeavours to reconcile her to him, always telling her everything likely to ingratiate Palmerston with her, and showing her any letters or notes of his calculated to please her; but he says it is impossible to conceive the hatred with which he is regarded on the Continent, particularly all over Germany. An agent of his (Clarendon's) who, he says, has supplied him with much useful information, has reported to him that he finds the old feeling of antipathy to Palmerston as strong and as general as ever, and that it is as much on the part of the people as of the Governments, both thinking they have been deceived and thrown over by him.
[1] [M. de Seebach was the Saxon Minister in Paris, through whom many of these communications passed.]
END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.