July 31st.—Having been at Goodwood the last week, I have not troubled myself with politics, either home or foreign, nor have any events occurred to excite interest. The most important matter here has been the division in the House of Lords on Monday last on the Succession Duties Bill, on which the Opposition were signally defeated. For a long time the Government were very doubtful of obtaining a majority, but their whippers-in were more sanguine at last. Great exertions were made on both sides, the Derbyites whipped up all the men they could lay their hands on, and the Government fetched their ministers from Paris and Brussels, and the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. The majority was greater than either side expected, and Derby and his crew were exceedingly disconcerted, and Derby himself much out of humour. When Bessborough went over to him after the division, and said 'Lord Aberdeen wants to know if you will object to the Bill being read a third time on Thursday next,' he pettishly replied, 'The Bill may go to the devil for all I care; I shall take no further trouble about it.'
August 1st.—I saw Clarendon as usual yesterday (Sunday), when he read to me a letter from Sir Hamilton Seymour, giving an account of his delivering to Nesselrode the Convention which Clarendon sent over, as well as reading to him Clarendon's private letter, which was a stinging one, but very good. Nesselrode said of all the projects he liked that the best, and if it was tendered to them from Vienna, he thought it might do as the basis of an arrangement, but he could give no positive answer till he had submitted it to the Emperor. At the Cabinet on Saturday Clarendon read Seymour's letter, when his colleagues begged they might see the private letter of his which was alluded to, and he produced and read that likewise. It was generally approved of, but the next day Palmerston wrote a note to Clarendon, in which he expressed the warmest approbation of his note, and added that he had only refrained from saying all he thought of it at the Cabinet lest his approval might make others think it was too strong. He added that he rejoiced that the management of our foreign affairs was in such able hands, and that, in fact, he (Clarendon) could do and say what Palmerston himself could not have done. It was a very handsome letter, very satisfactory both to Clarendon personally and as showing that there is no disagreement on the Eastern Question in the Cabinet, or at least between Palmerston and Clarendon, which is the essential point. Their union and friendship are remarkable when we recollect their past antagonism and Palmerston's jealousy of Clarendon, and the persuasion of both himself and Lady Palmerston that Clarendon was always waiting to trip up his heels and get his place. All these jealousies and suspicions were, however, dissipated when Clarendon refused the Foreign Office last year, since which time they have been the best of friends, and Palmerston was quite satisfied at his having the Foreign Office. With regard to the chances of a pacific settlement, the assurances from St. Petersburg are all very favourable, but the acts of the Russian generals in the Principalities are quite inconsistent with them, and between these conflicting manifestations Clarendon is in no small doubt and apprehension as to the result.
London, August 8th.—Ever since last Monday, when Clarendon made a speech in the House of Lords on which a bad interpretation was put in reference to the question of peace or war, there has been a sort of panic, and the public mind, which refused at first to admit the possibility of war, suddenly rushed to the opposite conclusion, and everybody became persuaded that war was inevitable. The consequence was a great fall in the funds, and the depreciation of every sort of security. So matters remained till the end of the week. On Saturday afternoon I met Walewski, who told me he had that day received a letter from Castelbajac (the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg), informing him that the Emperor had signified his willingness to accept the proposal which was then expected from Vienna, and last night fresh news came that the proposal had arrived, and he had said he would take it, if the Turks would send an ambassador with it, exactly as it had been submitted to him. This I heard late last night, and Granville considered it conclusive of an immediate settlement. But this morning I went to Clarendon and found him not so sure, and not regarding the pacific solution as so indubitable; there still remain some important matters of detail to be settled, though certainly the affair wears a much more favourable aspect, and there is every reason to hope it will all end well. But while this proposal was concocted at Vienna, the Cabinet here (last Saturday week) made some small verbal alterations in it, so that ultimately it will not be presented for the Emperor's formal acceptance word for word the same, and if he wants a pretext to back out of his present engagement, he can therein find one, as he only agreed to take it if it was word for word the same. Then it has not yet been submitted to the Turks, and it is by no means sure they may not make difficulties, or that Stratford Canning may not raise obstacles instead of using all his influence to procure their agreement, so that Clarendon does not consider that we are out of the wood, though he expects on the whole that it will end well. If it does it will be the triumph of diplomacy, and a signal proof of the wisdom of moderation and patience. Granville says it will be principally owing to Aberdeen, who has been very staunch and bold in defying public clamour, abuse, and taunts, and in resisting the wishes and advice of Palmerston, who would have adopted a more stringent and uncompromising course.
August 9th.—At Court yesterday Aberdeen was quite confident of the settlement of the Eastern affair, and Brunnow, who was there with the Duchess of Leuchtenberg to see the Queen, very smiling. Clanricarde interrupted Clarendon in the House of Lords, and made a violent speech. Clarendon answered very well, without committing himself. The Government are in high spirits at the prospect of winding up this prosperous Session with the settlement of the Eastern Question: nothing else is wanting to their success.
August 11th.—I saw Clarendon yesterday. Nothing new, but he said he fully expected Stratford Canning would play some trick at Constantinople, and throw obstacles in the way of settlement. This seems to me hardly possible, unless he behaves foolishly as well as dishonestly, and it can hardly be believed that his temper and Russian antipathies will betray him into such extravagant conduct. It is, however, impossible to consider the affair as 'settled.'
Yesterday all the world went to the great naval review at Portsmouth, except myself. It appears to have been a fine but tedious sight, for Granville set off at 5.30 A.M., and only got back at one in the morning.
August 27th.—Since the 11th I have been absent from town, at Grimstone for York races, then at Hatchford, and since that gouty. While at York the Session closed with ?clat by a speech of Palmerston's in his most flashy and successful style. John Russell gave a night at last for the discussion of the Turkish question, and made a sort of explanation, which was tame, meagre, and unsatisfactory. After some speeches expressive of disappointment and disapprobation, Cobden made an oration in favour of peace at any price, and this drew up Palmerston, who fell upon him with great vigour and success. The discussion would have ended languidly and ill for the Government but for this brilliant improvisation, which carried the House entirely with it. It was not, however, if analysed and calmly considered, of much use to the Government as to their foreign policy, for it was only an answer to Cobden, and Palmerston did not say one word in defence of the policy which has been adopted, nor identify himself with it, as he might as well have done. Though there was nothing in it positively indicative of dissent and dissatisfaction, any one might not unfairly draw the inference that, if Palmerston had had his own way, he would have taken a more stringent and less patient course. However, nothing has been made of this, and on the whole his speech did good, because it closed the discussion handsomely, and left the impression of Palmerston's having cast his lot for good and all with his present colleagues, as is really the case.
The Session ended with a very flourishing and prosperous speech from the Throne, and nothing was wanting to the complete success of the Government but the settlement of the Turkish question, which, however, seems destined to be delayed some time longer; for the Turks have refused to accept the Vienna note, except with some modifications, though these are said to be so immaterial that we hope the Emperor will not object to them. But all this is vexatious, because it reopens the whole question, causes delay and uncertainty, and keeps the world in suspense and apprehension. Granville told me that what had occurred showed how much more sagacious Aberdeen had been as to this affair than Palmerston, the former having always maintained that there would be no difficulty with the Emperor, but if any arose it would be from the Turks; whereas Palmerston was always sure the Turks would make none, but that the Emperor would refuse all arrangements.
August 28th.—It seems the Turks, after a delay of ten days from receiving the proposition, sent it back to Vienna, asking for some not important alterations; but immediately afterwards they required a stipulation for the evacuation of the Principalities, and guarantees that they should not be occupied again. It is very improbable that the Emperor will listen to such conditions. Nesselrode has all along told Seymour that they (the Russians) mean in fulfilment of their pledges to evacuate the Principalities, as soon as they have got the required satisfaction, but that it must not be made a condition, and entreated him to abstain from any demand which might give an air of compulsion to the act, much in the same way as we have told Nesselrode he must not attempt to make any stipulation about the withdrawal of our fleet. Clarendon thinks that the Emperor is certain to reject the Turkish terms, and that the Turks are very capable of declaring war thereupon; for in their last communication they said that they were prepared for 'toutes les ?ventualit?s,' and he suspects that Stratford has not bon? fide striven to induce them to accept the proffered terms. Their rejection is the more unreasonable because the proposal is a hash-up of Menschikoff's original Note, and that which the Turks proposed in lieu of it, but in which the Turkish element preponderates, so that not only are their honour and dignity consulted, but in refusing they recede from their own original proposal.
The Queen is gone to Ireland, and Lord Granville with her, who is afterwards to attend her to Balmoral. This is new, because hitherto she has always had with her either the Premier or a Secretary of State. Granville is to be relieved when circumstances admit, but at present there is no other arrangement feasible. Aberdeen and Clarendon are both kept in town till the question is settled. Newcastle got leave to go to Clumber for his boys' holidays, and Her Majesty does not desire to have the Home Secretary.
But Charles Villiers told me last night that Lord Palmerston's influence and popularity in the House of Commons are greater than ever, and if this Government should be broken up by internal dissension, he would have no difficulty in forming another, and gathering round him a party to support him. This is what the Tories are anxiously looking to, desiring no better than to serve under him, and flattering themselves that in his heart he personally dislikes his colleagues, and in political matters agrees with themselves. They pay him every sort of court, never attack him, and not only defer to him on all occasions, but make all the difference they can between him and the rest of the Government; nor does he discourage or reject these civilities, though he does not invite them, or say or do anything inconsistent with his present position, but he probably thinks the disposition towards him of that large political party enhances his value to his own friends and increases his power, besides affording to him a good alternative in case anything should happen to break up the present Government or separate him from it.
September 2nd.—For the last week the settlement of this tedious Turkish question has appeared more remote than ever, and Clarendon was almost in despair when I saw him a few days ago, and the more so because he suspected that Lord Stratford was at the bottom of the difficulties raised by the Divan. However, according to the last accounts it would seem that Stratford was not to blame, and had done what he could to get the Turks to comply with the terms of the Conference. At this moment the affair wears rather a better aspect, and my own belief is that it will be settled. It is a great bore that it drags on in this way, creating alarm and uncertainty, shaking the funds, and affecting commerce.
The Duke of Bedford, of whom I have seen nothing for a long time, called on me a few days ago, and talked over the present state of affairs, and the position of Lord John Russell. He said Lord John was now quite satisfied with it, and rejoiced at his own comparative freedom, and his immunity from the constant attacks of which he used to be the object; and he is now conscious that, by the part he has acted in waiving his own pretensions, he has not only not degraded himself, but has greatly raised himself in public estimation and acquired much credit and popularity, besides rendering the country a great service. He is very well with his colleagues, and gratified at the deference shown him, and the consideration he enjoys in the House of Commons. There, however, I know from other sources, all the popularity is engrossed by Palmerston and by Gladstone, and Lord John has foolishly suffered Palmerston to take his place as leader very often, because he chose to stay away at Richmond, and not come near the House.
The Duke took this opportunity of telling me what is now a very old story, but which he said he thought he had never told me before, and I am not sure whether he did or not. It was what happened to him at the time of the formation of this Government last year, of which he was evidently very proud. Just before the Derby Government broke down, and before that reunion at Woburn of which so much was said, the Prince gave him to understand that they should look to him for advice if anything occurred, which they were every day expecting. The Duke was at Woburn, and one morning when the hounds met there and half the county was at breakfast in the great hall, word was brought him that a messenger had come from Osborne with a letter for him. He found it was a letter from the Prince, in which he informed him that this was despatched by a safe and trustworthy hand, and nobody was to know of its being sent; that the Derby Government was at an end, and the Queen and Prince were anxious for his opinion on the state of affairs, the dispositions of public men, and what course they had better take. The Duke had recently been in personal communication with all the leaders, with Aberdeen and Lord John, Newcastle, Clarendon, Lansdowne, Palmerston, and others, and he was therefore apprised of all their sentiments and in a condition to give very full information to the Court. He sat himself down and with the greatest rapidity (his horse at the door to go hunting) wrote four or five sheets of paper containing the amplest details of the sentiments and views of these different statesmen, and ended by advising that the Queen should send for Lords Lansdowne and Aberdeen—as she did. Lord John had already told him he did not wish to be sent for. After this of course he could not resent the advice the Duke gave; and happily Lord John was firm in resisting the advice of some of those about him, and acted on the dictates of his own conscientious judgement and the sound advice of his friends.
September 3rd.—I dined last night t?te-?-t?te with Clarendon and heard all the details of the state of the Turkish question, and read the interesting correspondence of Cowley, with his accounts of his conversations with the Emperor, and many other things. Clarendon is very uneasy because he thinks the Emperor Nicholas' pride will not let him accept the Note as modified by the Turks, though he would have accepted the same Note if it had been presented originally by the Conference. This is one danger. The next is one at Constantinople, where there is a strong bigoted violent party for war, disposed to dethrone the Sultan and replace him by his brother. This brother (of whom I never heard before) is a man of more energy than the Sultan, and is connected with the fanatical party. The Sultan himself is enervated by early debauchery and continual drunkenness, and therefore in great danger should he by any unpopular measures provoke an outbreak from the violent faction. Clarendon thinks that Stratford has encouraged the resistance of the Divan to the proposals of the Conference, and that he might have persuaded the Turks to accept the terms if he had chosen to do so and set about it in a proper manner; but Clarendon says that he has lived there so long, and is animated with such a personal hatred of the Emperor, that he is full of the Turkish spirit; and this and his temper together have made him take a part directly contrary to the wishes and instructions of his Government. He thinks he wishes to be recalled that he may make a grievance of it, and come home to do all the mischief he can. Westmorland wrote word the other day that Stratford's language was very hostile to his Government and the Ministers of all the other Powers at Constantinople, thought he had actually resigned, and reported the fact to Vienna.
The most important question now pending is what to do with the fleets. They cannot remain much longer in Besika Bay, and must either retire to Vourla or enter the Dardanelles. The Emperor Napoleon wishes they should enter the Dardanelles, but only a little way, and not go on to Constantinople; and Clarendon takes the same view, proposing a mezzo termine. The Emperor professes an earnest desire for a peaceful solution, and the strongest determination to act in concert with England to the end, and his views seem very sensible and proper. But, notwithstanding this disposition, in which he probably is sincere, there is reason to believe that he is all the time keeping up a sort of secret and underhand communication with Russia, and the evidence of this is rather curious. It appears that he has recently written a letter to the Duchess of Hamilton, in which he says that he believes the Russians will not evacuate the Principalities, and that he does not care if they stay there. This letter the Duchess showed to Brunnow, and he imparted it to Aberdeen, who told Clarendon, but none of the other Ministers know anything of it. Clarendon wrote word of this to Cowley, and told him to make what use of it he thought fit. In the first instance he said something to Drouyn de Lhuys of the Emperor's entertaining views different from our's, which Drouyn repeated to the Emperor, who spoke to Cowley about it, and protested that he had no separate or different objects, when Cowley, without mentioning names, told him what he had heard of his having written. The Emperor made an evasive answer to this, but gave many assurances of his determination to act with us heartily and sincerely. This incident seems to have made a great impression both on Cowley and Clarendon, particularly as both know something more. Cowley says he knows that the Emperor has a private correspondence with Castelbajac, of which Drouyn de Lhuys is ignorant, and Seymour writes to Clarendon that he has observed for some time past a great lukewarmness on the part of the French Minister in pressing the Russian Government, and an evident leaning to them. As the Duchess of Hamilton has no intimacy with Brunnow, it appears very extraordinary that she should communicate to him a letter of the Emperor's, and such a letter, which would be a great indiscretion unless he had secretly desired her to do so; and all these circumstances taken together look very like a little intrigue between the Emperor and the Russian Court, which would also be very consistent with his secret, false, and clandestine mode of conducting his affairs. It is probable enough that he may wish to keep on good terms with Russia and at the same time maintain his intimate connexion with England. That he is bent on avoiding war there can be no doubt, and for very good reasons, for France is threatened with a scarcity, and he is above all things bent on keeping the people supplied with food at low prices; and for this object the French Government is straining every nerve and prepared to make any amount of pecuniary sacrifice; but the necessity for this, which absorbs all their means, renders it at the same time particularly desirable to maintain peace in Europe.
There never was a case so involved in difficulties and complications of different sorts, all the particulars of which I heard last night; but the affair is so tangled, that it is impossible to weave it into an intelligible and consistent narrative, and I can only jot down fragments, which may hereafter serve to explain circumstances connected with the d?nouement, whenever it takes place. John Russell and Palmerston are both come to town, so that a little Cabinet will discuss this matter. Palmerston is extremely reasonable, does not take the part of the Turks, but on the contrary blames them severely for making difficulties he thinks absurd and useless, but is still for not letting them be crushed. He is on the best terms with Clarendon, and goes along with him very cordially in his policy on this question. Both Palmerston and Lord John seem to agree with Clarendon on the question of the disposal of the fleet better than Aberdeen, who is always for trusting the Emperor, maintaining peace, and would be quite contented to send the fleet to Vourla or Tenedos, and would see with regret the more energetic course of entering the Dardanelles. However, there is no chance of any material difference on this score, and I have no doubt, if the question is not settled before the end of the month, the fleets will anchor within the Straits and there remain.
I was glad to find that the Queen has consented to let Palmerston take his turn at Balmoral, and Aberdeen has informed him that he is to go there. It was done by Aberdeen speaking to the Prince at Osborne, who said he thought there would be no difficulty. The Queen acquiesced with the good sense she generally shows on such occasions, being always open to reason, and ready to consent to whatever can be proved to her to be right or expedient.
September 4th.—I went to Winchester yesterday, and fell in with Graham in the train, so we went together and had a great deal of talk, mostly on the Eastern Question. He thinks the Emperor of Russia will not accept the Turkish alterations, and he is very hot against Stratford, to whom he attributes all the difficulties. He has heard that Stratford has held language hostile to the Government, and he is inclined to think not only that he has acted treacherously towards his employers, but that proofs of his treachery might be obtained, and he is all for getting the evidence if possible, and acting upon it at once, by recalling him; he thinks the proofs might be obtained through the Turkish Ministers, and if they can be, he would not stop to enquire who might be displeased, or what the effect might be, but do it at once. He acknowledges, however, that it would not do to act on surmises or reports, and that nothing but clear proofs of Stratford's misconduct, such as will satisfy Parliament, would render such a step justifiable or safe. With regard to the fleets, he says there is no reason why they should not remain in Besika Bay, and it is a mistake to suppose they could not, and he is very decidedly against their entering the Dardanelles in any case, because it would be contrary to treaty and afford the Emperor of Russia a just casus belli; and he maintains that his having (contrary to treaties and international rights) occupied the Principalities affords no reason why we should infringe them in another direction. When this question comes to be discussed, his voice will evidently be for not entering the Dardanelles, though he acknowledges that we cannot retreat while the Russians remain where they are. He talked a great deal about Palmerston, of whom he has some distrust, and fancied he has been in communication with Stratford, and that he would concur with him in his proceedings, and he expressed great satisfaction when I told him that Palmerston and Clarendon were on the most cordial and confidential terms, and that the former entirely disapproved of the conduct of the Turks (which is that of Stratford) in regard to the Note. He thinks Palmerston looks to being Prime Minister, if anything happened to Aberdeen, but that neither he nor John Russell could hold the office, as neither would consent to the elevation of the other. On the whole, he inclines to the opinion that Palmerston has made up his mind to go on with this Government and his present colleagues, that he means to act fairly and honestly with and by them, and has no arri?re pens?e towards the Tories, though he is not sorry to have them always looking to him, and paying him, as they do, excessive court. It ensures him great support and an easy life in the House of Commons, where, however, he says Palmerston has done very little this year, and he does not seem much impressed with the idea of his having gained very considerably there, or obtained a better position than he had before.
September 8th.—I saw Clarendon on Sunday. There is nothing new, but he said he would lay two to one the Emperor does not accept the modified Note; it will be a contest between his pride and his interest, for his army is in such a state of disease and distress that he is in no condition to make war; on the other hand, he cannot without extreme humiliation accept the Turkish Note. What will happen, if he refuses, nobody can possibly divine. The four Ministers met to discuss the matter, and were very harmonious; Palmerston not at all for violent measures, and Clarendon said he himself was the most warlike of the four. I told him of my journey with Graham and all that he had said. He replied that he knew Graham was very violent against Stratford, but that it would be impossible to make out any case against him, as he certainly had read to the Turkish Minister all his (Clarendon's) despatches and instructions, and he gave the most positive assurances, which it would be difficult to gainsay, that he had done everything in his power to induce the Turkish Government to give way to the advice of the Conference, and whatever his secret wishes and opinions might be, there was no official evidence to be had that he had failed in doing his duty fairly by his own Government; therefore it would be out of the question to recall him.
September 20th.—At Doncaster all last week; I found Clarendon yesterday very much alarmed at the prospect in the East. He thinks it will be impossible to restrain the Turkish war party; he told me that the Conference at Vienna had imparted their Note to the Turkish Ambassador there, and both he and his dragoman had expressed their entire approbation of it. They had considered this to afford a strong presumption that it would not be unpalateable at Constantinople, but it was not sent there because this would have occasioned so much delay, and it was desirable to get the Russians out of the Principalities as speedily as possible. The Russian generals had actually received orders to prepare for the evacuation, which the Emperor would have commanded the instant he heard that the Turks were willing to send the Vienna Note. The Emperor Napoleon has again given the strongest assurances of his determination in no case whatever to separate his policy from ours, his resolution to adhere to the English alliance, and to maintain peace ? tout prix, which he frankly owns to be indispensably necessary to the interests of his country. The Austrians are already beginning to hang back from taking any decided part in opposition to Russia, and while still ready to join in making every exertion to maintain peace, they are evidently determined if war breaks out to take no part against Russia, and this disposition is sure to be improved by the interview which is about to take place between the Emperors of Russia and Austria.
September 26th.—I have been at Hatchford all last week. I saw Clarendon on Thursday before I went there, and heard that two ships of each fleet were gone up the Dardanelles,[1] and that the rest would probably soon follow, as the French were now urging that measure. He was then going to Aberdeen to propose calling the Cabinet together, the state of affairs becoming more critical every hour, and apparently no chance of averting war. The prospect was not the brighter from the probability of a good deal of difference of opinion when they do meet. He showed me a letter from Palmerston, in which he spoke very coolly of such a contingency as war with Russia and Austria, and with his usual confidence and flippancy of the great blows that might be inflicted on both Powers, particularly alluding to the possible expulsion of the Austrians from Italy, an object of which he has probably never lost sight. Meanwhile the violence and scurrility of the press here exceeds all belief. Day after day the Radical and Tory papers, animated by very different sentiments and motives, pour forth the most virulent abuse of the Emperor of Russia, of Austria, and of this Government, especially of Aberdeen.
[1] [The British vessels were steamers, the 'Retribution' and another. There was at that time only one line-of-battle ship in each fleet having steam power; all the other vessels of the line were sailing ships.]
CHAPTER IV.
The Conference at Olm?tz—The Turks declare War—Lord Palmerston's Views—Lord Palmerston lauded by the Radicals and the Tories—Failure of the Pacific Policy—Lord Aberdeen desires to resign—Lord John to be Prime Minister—Obstacles to Lord John's Pretensions—Danger of breaking up the Government—Lord John's Wilfulness and Unpopularity—Alliance of the Northern Powers defeated by Manteuffel—Conflict of the two Policies—Meeting of Parliament discussed—French Refugees in Belgium—General Baraguay d'Hilliers sent to Constantinople—Mr. Reeve returns from the East—Lord John's Reform Bill—The Emperor of Russia writes to the Queen—Sir James Graham's Views on Reform, &c.—Opponents of the Reform Scheme—Abortive Attempts at Negotiation—The Four Powers agree to a Protocol—Lord Palmerston threatens to secede—Lord Palmerston resigns on the Reform Scheme—Lord Palmerston opposed to Reform—Effects of Lord Palmerston's Resignation—Conciliatory Overtures—Lord Lansdowne's Position—Lord Aberdeen's Account—Lady Palmerston makes up the Dispute—Lord Palmerston withdraws his Resignation—Baraguay d'Hilliers refuses to enter the Black Sea—War resolved on—Review of the Transaction.
October 4th.—I went to The Grove on Saturday, and spent great part of the afternoon on Sunday reading the Eastern Question despatches, printed in a Blue Book to be laid by-and-by before Parliament. On Sunday came Westmorland's account of his interviews with the Emperor of Russia and Nesselrode at Olm?tz, which sounded very satisfactory, for the Emperor was very gracious and pacific, and Nesselrode in his name disclaimed in the most positive terms any intention of aggrandising himself at the expense of Turkey or of claiming any protectorate, or asserting any claims inconsistent with the sovereignty and independence of the Sultan, and moreover signified his willingness to make a declaration to that effect in such form and manner as might be hereafter agreed upon. All this was very well, and served to confirm the notion that, if some sensible men, really desirous of settling the question, could be brought together, the accomplishment would not be difficult; but the distance which separates the negotiating parties from each other, and the necessity of circulating every proposition through so many remote capitals, and the consequent loss of time, have rendered all conferences and pacific projects unavailing.
Yesterday morning a messenger arrived, bringing the telegraphic despatch from Vienna, which announced the determination of the Turks to go to war, and that a grand Council was to be assembled to decide on the declaration, news which precluded all hope of adjustment;[1] and yesterday afternoon the further account of the decision of the Council was received. Such of the Ministers as are in town met in the afternoon, and it was decided that all the rest should be summoned, and a Cabinet held on Friday next.
It will be no easy matter to determine what part we shall take, and how far we shall mix ourselves up in the quarrel as belligerents. It will be very fortunate if the Cabinet should be unanimous on this question. Palmerston has hitherto acted very frankly and cordially with Clarendon, but the old instincts are still strong in him, and they are all likely to urge him to recommend strong measures and an active interference. Granville told me last night he thought Palmerston was not at all displeased at the decision of the Turks, and as he still clings to the idea that Turkey is powerful and full of energy, and he is quite indifferent to the danger to which Austria may be exposed, and would rejoice at her being plunged in fresh difficulties and threatened with fresh rebellions and revolutions, he will rather rejoice than not at the breaking out of hostilities. He will not dare to avow his real propensities, but he will cloak them under other pretences and pretexts, and give effect to them as much as he can. He has been speechifying in Scotland, where, though he spoke very handsomely of Clarendon, he did not say one word in defence of Aberdeen, or anything calculated to put an end to the notion and repeated assertions that he and Aberdeen had been at variance on the Eastern Question. I find Aberdeen feels this omission very much, and it would certainly have been more generous, as well as more just, if he had taken the opportunity of correcting the popular error as to Aberdeen, after having been reaping a great harvest of popularity at his expense.
Palmerston's position is curious. He is certainly very popular, and there is a high idea of his diplomatic skill and vigour. He is lauded to the skies by all the Radicals who are the admirers of Kossuth and Mazzini, who want to renew the scenes and attempts of 1848, and who fancy that, if Palmerston were at the head of the Government, he would play into their hands. On the other hand, he is equally an object of the flattery and praise of the Tories, who cannot get over their being succeeded by a Peelite Prime Minister, and they cling to the belief that there can be no real cordiality, and must be complete difference of opinion, between Aberdeen and Palmerston, and they look forward to the prospect of their disunion to break up this odious Government, and a return to office with Palmerston at their head. These are the political chimeras with which their brains are filled, and which make them take (for very different reasons) the same part as the Radicals on the Eastern Question. My own conviction is that both parties reckon without their host. Palmerston is sixty-nine years old, and it is too late for him to look out for fresh political combinations and other connexions, nor would any object of ambition repay him for the dissolution of all his personal and social ties. He will, therefore, go on as he does now, accepting such popularity as is offered him as a means of enhancing his own importance in this Cabinet; and, in the event of any accident happening to it, of making his own pretensions available.
[1] [The declaration of the Turkish Council or Divan, held on October 3, was to the effect that, if the Principalities were not evacuated in fifteen days, a state of war would ensue. To this the Emperor of Russia responded on October 18 by a formal declaration of war. War being declared, the Straits were opened, and, at the request of the Sultan, the allied fleets entered the Dardanelles on October 22.]
October 6th.—Delane was sent for by Lord Aberdeen the night before last, when they had a long conversation on the state of affairs, and Aberdeen told him that he was resolved to be no party to a war with Russia on such grounds as the present, and he was prepared to resign rather than incur such responsibility. This was the marrow of what he said, and very important, because not unlikely to lead to some difference in the Cabinet, and possibly to its dissolution.
October 7th.—Clanricarde called here yesterday morning; he is very strong against the Government and their policy, and maintains that if we had joined France and sent the fleet up when she did, the Emperor of Russia would then have receded, as his obstinacy was entirely caused by his conviction that France and England would never remain united, and that nothing would induce the latter to make war on Russia. He said this idea had been confirmed by the language of Aberdeen, who had continually spoken of his determination to avoid war to Brunnow and others, and in his letters to Madame de Lieven—la paix ? tout prix. Clanricarde, however, himself said he would not declare war against Russia, and we might defend Turkey without going that length. I went and told Clarendon all he had said (in greater detail), and he owned that it was more than probable that Aberdeen had held some such language as was attributed to him; indeed, he had more than once had occasion to remonstrate with him upon it. Clarendon was very uneasy at the prospect of the discussion about to take place, and contemplates as extremely probable the breaking-up of the Government on the question of war. Palmerston has been very reserved, but always on the same friendly terms with his colleagues, and Clarendon in particular; but Lady Palmerston as usual talks ? qui veut l'entendre of the misconduct of the whole affair, and affirms that, if Palmerston had had the management of it, all would have been settled long ago. As matters have turned out, it is impossible not to regret that we were perhaps too moderate and patient at first; for as the course we have adopted has not been successful, it seems unfortunate we did not try another, which might have been more so. But this is judging apr?s coup, and nothing is so easy as to affirm that, if something had been done, which was not done, success would have attended it.
October 8th.—The Cabinet went off very well yesterday, no serious difference of opinion about anything, and a good concurrence both as to what had been done and what ought to be done hereafter. Lord Aberdeen is well pleased.
Newmarket, October 12th.—This morning I met the Duke of Bedford on the heath, who told me he wanted very much to speak to me about certain communications he had received which made him extremely uneasy, and full of apprehension of coming difficulties, threatening the very existence of the Government. It seems that a short time ago Lord Aberdeen imparted to John Russell his wish to resign, and to place the Government in his hands. He said that he had only taken his present post because his doing so was indispensable to the formation of the Government, and had always contemplated Lord John's eventually succeeding him, and he thought the time was now come when he might very properly do so. He did not anticipate any insurmountable opposition in any quarter, and he should himself speak to Gladstone about it, who was the most important person to be consulted, and he was in fact only prevented doing so, as he had intended, by not being able to go to Scotland, where he had expected to meet Gladstone. Whether Aberdeen had spoken to Gladstone since his return to London, the Duke of Bedford did not know. No steps appear to have been taken with regard to Palmerston, nor does it appear that any progress was made in accomplishing this change. The Queen had been apprised of Aberdeen's intentions. Such was the state of things when a short time ago the Duke received a letter from Lord John, in which he said that matters could not go on as they were, and that there must be some changes; and that very soon he could no longer act without being primarily responsible for the policy of the Government—in other words, without resuming his post of Prime Minister. This is all the Duke knows, as Lord John entered into no explanations or details, and he is in total ignorance of the grounds of his brusque determination, and of what can have occurred to produce it. He sees, however, all the difficulties and embarrassments that in consequence of it are looming in the distance, and how very possible it is that the Government may be broken up. All this we very fully discussed, but without either of us being able to guess what it all means, or what the result will be of Lord John's putting his intentions into execution.
October 16th.—I came to town yesterday morning, and in the afternoon went to the Foreign Office, and saw Clarendon, to whom I imparted what the Duke of Bedford had told me. He said he knew it all, Aberdeen having told him what had passed between John Russell and himself; but having made Clarendon give his word of honour that he would not say a word of it to anybody, so he said, 'I would not mention it even to you, to whom I tell everything.' He then, however, went into the whole question, and told me what had passed, which did not exactly agree with the Duke's story. According to Clarendon, Lord John went to Lord Aberdeen before Parliament was up, and told him he could not consent to go on in his present position, to which Aberdeen replied, 'Very well, you only meet my own wishes, and you know I always told you that I should be at any time ready to resign my place to you.'
Nothing more seems to have taken place at that time, nor till lately, when Lord John went again to Aberdeen, and repeated his determination not to go on; but this time the communication does not seem to have been received by Aberdeen with the same ready acquiescence in the proposed change, and some plain speaking took place between them. I infer, but as Clarendon did not expressly say so I put it dubiously, that Aberdeen had spoken to Gladstone and ascertained that he would by no means agree to the substitution of John Russell, and should go with Aberdeen if he retired. At all events, while Aberdeen told him that he was prepared, if he wished it, to broach the matter to his colleagues, he intimated to him that it was evident he wanted to turn him out, and put himself in his place, but that he (Aberdeen) could not agree to retire at this moment, and before Parliament met, and that Lord John had better well consider the step he was about to take, as it would in all probability break up the Government, and asked him if he was prepared to encounter the odium of doing so, more especially as he must remember that he had only consented to form this Government on Lord John's own assurance to him that he was himself unable to form one. He asked him if he was secure of Palmerston's concurrence in the change he proposed, and he replied that he did not expect to find any difficulty in that quarter. This was the substance of what passed between them, Aberdeen being evidently a good deal nettled, and thinking Lord John is behaving very ill. This is Clarendon's opinion also, and he thinks, if Lord John persists, the Government will be inevitably broken up, for a considerable part of the Cabinet will certainly not consent to have Lord John again placed at the head of the Government. Clarendon does not believe a word of Palmerston's being a party to it, and he knows that both Gladstone and Newcastle would resign. Graham he is not sure of, but inclines to think he would retire with Aberdeen, especially if Aberdeen has any compulsion or ill-usage to complain of. For the moment, however, this storm has blown over, as Lord John has signified to Aberdeen that he does not mean to press the matter again for the present. The Queen, when it was mentioned to her, was anything but approving of or consenting to the change.
In all this matter there is little doubt that Lord John has been instigated by his connexions, and they none of them, Lord John himself included, have sense enough to see that the course he is adopting is quite suicidal, and would be not less fatal to his own reputation and popularity than to the Government he belongs to. He failed as Prime Minister, and no credit attended his Administration, and no regret his fall. The popularity he lost, he in good measure regained by his conduct on the formation of this Government, when he waived his own pretensions, and for the public good consented, after having held the first place, to accept the second; but the world does not know how reluctantly and grudgingly he did this, and how sorely his pride and vanity suffered on that occasion. The position he occupied of leader of the House of Commons without an office was anomalous, and many thought it objectionable, but he himself insisted on it, and it proved successful. The House of Commons not only accepted it, but were pleased to see a man so eminent eschewing office with its functions and emoluments, and gratuitously devoting himself to the service and the business of Parliament. He became popular again in the House, and would have been more so if he had not chosen to quit the Treasury Bench early every afternoon, and go down to Richmond, leaving Palmerston to do his work, and ingratiate himself with the House. Aberdeen reminded Lord John that this position, which he now found intolerable, was one he had chosen to make for himself; that he had not only declared he could not form a Government, but that every office had been at his disposal, and he had been invited to take the greatest offices, or, if he preferred it, any smaller one, but that he had insisted on holding none. Aberdeen is quite right not to resign now, or before Parliament meets, where he must appear as Minister to defend his own policy.
I expect that Lord John will not renew his demands for some time, if at all; but if he does, this is what will probably take place. The Government will be broken up, Lord John will try to form one and will fail, and the Government will again be constituted minus Lord John. Nobody would, I think, go out with him. This is supposing (which I think certain) that Palmerston would not make common cause with him, but prefer to remain with the rest. There would then remain the great difficulty of the lead of the House of Commons and the part Palmerston would play; but, dangerous as it would be, it would probably be found necessary to trust him with the lead, most distasteful though it would be both to Aberdeen and to the Queen.
October 18th.—The Emperor of Russia moved heaven and earth to bring about a new Holy Alliance between himself, Austria, and Prussia, in which he would have succeeded if it had not been for the wisdom and firmness of Manteuffel,[1] who was proof against all his seductions. Austria consented, but only on condition that Prussia did likewise. The King of Prussia would have given way with his characteristic weakness, but Manteuffel would not hear of it, and contrived to keep his master straight. In an interview of two hours between the Emperor and Manteuffel t?te-?-t?te, the Emperor employed all the means he could think of to prevail on the Prussian Minister, but all in vain; he refused positively to allow Prussia to depart from her neutrality. This had the effect of keeping Austria neutral also, and that of making the Emperor more inclined to peace; but the Turkish declaration of war and peremptory summons to him to quit the Principalities leave him no alternative but that of taking up the gauntlet thus thrown down.