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The Imperial Japanese Navy

Chapter 42: INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT
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About This Book

The author surveys the development of Japanese naval forces from their earliest origins through rapid modern expansion, recounting earlier conflicts and the fleet’s contemporary organization. The narrative interleaves historical episodes with technical and institutional analysis: shipbuilding programmes, dockyards and harbours, armament and engineering (guns, torpedoes, armour, engines and boilers), and detailed descriptions of individual warships. Personnel matters receive extended treatment, including entry, training, pay, uniforms, mess arrangements, and character of officers and ratings. Numerous illustrations and appendices compile official reports, ship lists, and explanatory glossaries, while comparative observations relate foreign practices to domestic naval policy and capabilities.

XIII
THE JAPANESE ADMIRALTY

The Japanese Admiralty is modelled closely on the British one.

The supreme command is vested in the Emperor.

The Minister of Marine—the present holder of this office (1904) is Admiral Yamamoto Gombey—is a member of the Cabinet, and superintends administration. He is selected from the admirals on the active list, and responsible under the Emperor for everything.

The coast is divided into four naval districts:—

Yokosuka.   Sassebo.
Kuré.   Maitzuru.

A fifth district, that of Muroran, is in process of formation.

Each district has its headquarters at the arsenal from which it takes its name, and barracks, etc., are at each of these places.

The men belonging to any district wear the name of that on their cap ribbons, not the name of the ship in which they serve.

ADMIRAL GOMBEY.

INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT

The Japanese Naval Intelligence Department is, in my opinion, the best in the world. In the popular view this is the characteristic of the Russian one; but the Russian Intelligence Department hardly lives up to its reputation. For the collection of immaterial facts it is unrivalled, but the little it really gleaned of Japanese war preparation was amply evidenced in February, 1904.

The Japanese, on the other hand, manage to find out nearly everything. They have to a marked degree men eminently qualified for the task. Where other nations employ agents, Japanese naval officers have always been found ready to serve in the most menial capacities. Both at Port Arthur and Vladivostok officers served as coolies, or as “native servants,” being Japanese, Chinese, or Koreans, as it suited their book. Whether any one man secured really valuable information is doubtful; the benefits were secured rather by the patient sifting of everything at Tokio.

It is said that the Japanese torpedo craft reached the Russian battleships on February 8th by using Russian signals that they had stolen the secret of. Far more probable is it that they had learned them by long and patient observation.

FINANCE

The expenditure upon the Japanese Navy for the years preceding the war with Russia was—

  Yen.
1900-1   17,513,354
1901-2   20,161,010
1902-3   28,425,630

In 1903 the new programme was authorised, to spread over a series of years.

The Chinese war indemnity paid for most of the ships of the after-the-war programme. The war with China cost £3,595,400 for the Navy, while the Army part totalled to £16,455,200.

Japan is not a wealthy country, and, but for the probability of war with Russia, it is quite possible that the new naval programme would never have been authorised—at any rate, on so extended a scale as now.