No parallel instances can be cited from the war of 1778, although the old monarchy did not cover the movements of its fleets with the secrecy enforced by the stern military despotism of the Empire. In both epochs England stood on the defensive; but in the earlier war she gave up the first line of the defence, off the hostile ports, and tried to protect all parts of her scattered empire by dividing the fleet among them. It has been attempted to show the weakness of the one policy, while admitting the difficulties and dangers of the other. The latter aims at shortening and deciding the war by either shutting up or forcing battle upon the hostile navy, recognizing that this is the key of the situation, when the sea at once unites and separates the different parts of the theatre of war. It requires a navy equal in number and superior in efficiency, to which it assigns a limited field of action, narrowed to the conditions which admit of mutual support among the squadrons occupying it. Thus distributed, it relies upon skill and watchfulness to intercept or overtake any division of the enemy which gets to sea. It defends remote possessions and trade by offensive action against the fleet, in which it sees their real enemy and its own principal objective. Being near the home ports, the relief and renewal of ships needing repairs are accomplished with the least loss of time, while the demands upon the scantier resources of the bases abroad are lessened. The other policy, to be effective, calls for superior numbers, because the different divisions are too far apart for mutual support. Each must therefore be equal to any probable combination against it, which implies superiority everywhere to the force of the enemy actually opposed, as the latter may be unexpectedly reinforced. How impossible and dangerous such a defensive strategy is, when not superior in force, is shown by the frequent inferiority of the English abroad, as well as in Europe, despite the effort to be everywhere equal. Howe at New York in 1778, Byron at Grenada in 1779, Graves off the Chesapeake in 1781, Hood at Martinique in 1781 and at St. Kitt's in 1782, all were inferior, at the same time that the allied fleet in Europe overwhelmingly outnumbered the English. In consequence, unseaworthy ships were retained, to the danger of their crews and their own increasing injury, rather than diminish the force by sending them home; for the deficiencies of the colonial dock-yards did not allow extensive repairs without crossing the Atlantic. As regards the comparative expense of the two strategies, the question is not only which would cost the more in the same time, but which would most tend to shorten the war by the effectiveness of its action.
The military policy of the allies is open to severer condemnation than that of England, by so much as the party assuming the offensive has by that very fact an advantage over the defensive. When the initial difficulty of combining their forces was overcome,—and it has been seen that at no time did Great Britain seriously embarrass their junction,—the allies had the choice open to them where, when, and how to strike with their superior numbers. How did they avail themselves of this recognized enormous advantage? By nibbling at the outskirts of the British Empire, and knocking their heads against the Rock of Gibraltar. The most serious military effort made by France, in sending to the United States a squadron and division of troops intended to be double the number of those which actually reached their destination, resulted, in little over a year, in opening the eyes of England to the hopelessness of the contest with the colonies and thus put an end to a diversion of her strength which had been most beneficial to her opponents. In the West Indies one petty island after another was reduced, generally in the absence of the English fleet, with an ease which showed how completely the whole question would have been solved by a decisive victory over that fleet; but the French, though favored with many opportunities, never sought to slip the knot by the simple method of attacking the force upon which all depended. Spain went her own way in the Floridas, and with an overwhelming force obtained successes of no military value. In Europe the plan adopted by the English government left its naval force hopelessly inferior in numbers year after year; yet the operations planned by the allies seem in no case seriously to have contemplated the destruction of that force. In the crucial instance, when Derby's squadron of thirty sail-of-the-line was hemmed in the open roadstead of Torbay by the allied forty-nine, the conclusion of the council of war not to fight only epitomized the character of the action of the combined navies. To further embarrass their exertions in Europe, Spain, during long periods, obstinately persisted in tying down her fleet to the neighborhood of Gibraltar; but there was at no time practical recognition of the fact that a severe blow to the English navy in the Straits, or in the English Channel, or on the open sea, was the surest road to reduce the fortress, brought more than once within measurable distance of starvation.
In the conduct of their offensive war the allied courts suffered from the divergent counsels and jealousies which have hampered the movements of most naval coalitions. The conduct of Spain appears to have been selfish almost to disloyalty, that of France more faithful, and therefore also militarily sounder; for hearty co-operation and concerted action against a common objective, wisely chosen, would have better forwarded the objects of both. It must be admitted, too, that the indications point to inefficient administration and preparation on the part of the allies, of Spain especially; and that the quality of the personnel[244] was inferior to that of England. Questions of preparation and administration, however, though of deep military interest and importance, are very different from the strategic plan or method adopted by the allied courts in selecting and attacking their objectives, and so compassing the objects of the war; and their examination would not only extend this discussion unreasonably, but would also obscure the strategic question by heaping up unnecessary details foreign to its subject.
As regards the strategic question, it may be said pithily that the phrase "ulterior objects" embodies the cardinal fault of the naval policy. Ulterior objects brought to nought the hopes of the allies, because, by fastening their eyes upon them, they thoughtlessly passed the road which led to them. Desire eagerly directed upon the ends in view—or rather upon the partial, though great, advantages which they constituted their ends—blinded them to the means by which alone they could be surely attained; hence, as the result of the war, everywhere failure to attain them. To quote again the summary before given, their object was "to avenge their respective injuries, and to put an end to that tyrannical empire which England claims to maintain upon the ocean." The revenge they had obtained was barren of benefit to themselves. They had, so that generation thought, injured England by liberating America; but they had not righted their wrongs in Gibraltar and Jamaica, the English fleet had not received any such treatment as would lessen its haughty self-reliance, the armed neutrality of the northern powers had been allowed to pass fruitlessly away, and the English empire over the seas soon became as tyrannical and more absolute than before.
Barring questions of preparation and administration, of the fighting quality of the allied fleets as compared with the English, and looking only to the indisputable fact of largely superior numbers, it must be noted as the supreme factor in the military conduct of the war, that, while the allied powers were on the offensive and England on the defensive, the attitude of the allied fleets in presence of the English navy was habitually defensive. Neither in the greater strategic combinations, nor upon the battlefield, does there appear any serious purpose of using superior numbers to crush fractions of the enemy's fleet, to make the disparity of numbers yet greater, to put an end to the empire of the seas by the destruction of the organized force which sustained it. With the single brilliant exception of Suffren, the allied navies avoided or accepted action; they never imposed it. Yet so long as the English navy was permitted thus with impunity to range the seas, not only was there no security that it would not frustrate the ulterior objects of the campaign, as it did again and again, but there was always the possibility that by some happy chance it would, by winning an important victory, restore the balance of strength. That it did not do so is to be imputed as a fault to the English ministry; but if England was wrong in permitting her European fleet to fall so far below that of the allies, the latter were yet more to blame for their failure to profit by the mistake. The stronger party, assuming the offensive, cannot plead the perplexities which account for, though they do not justify, the undue dispersal of forces by the defence anxious about many points.
The national bias of the French, which found expression in the line of action here again and for the last time criticised, appears to have been shared by both the government and the naval officers of the day. It is the key to the course of the French navy, and, in the opinion of the author, to its failure to achieve more substantial results to France from this war. It is instructive, as showing how strong a hold tradition has over the minds of men, that a body of highly accomplished and gallant seamen should have accepted, apparently without a murmur, so inferior a rôle for their noble profession. It carries also a warning, if these criticisms are correct, that current opinions and plausible impressions should always be thoroughly tested; for if erroneous they work sure failure, and perhaps disaster.
There was such an impression largely held by French officers of that day, and yet more widely spread in the United States now, of the efficacy of commerce-destroying as a main reliance in war, especially when directed against a commercial country like Great Britain. "The surest means in my opinion," wrote a distinguished officer, Lamotte-Picquet, "to conquer the English is to attack them in their commerce." The harassment and distress caused to a country by serious interference with its commerce will be conceded by all. It is doubtless a most important secondary operation of naval war, and is not likely to be abandoned till war itself shall cease; but regarded as a primary and fundamental measure, sufficient in itself to crush an enemy, it is probably a delusion, and a most dangerous delusion, when presented in the fascinating garb of cheapness to the representatives of a people. Especially is it misleading when the nation against whom it is to be directed possesses, as Great Britain did and does, the two requisites of a strong sea power,—a wide-spread healthy commerce and a powerful navy. Where the revenues and industries of a country can be concentrated into a few treasure-ships, like the flota of Spanish galleons, the sinew of war may perhaps be cut by a stroke; but when its wealth is scattered in thousands of going and coming ships, when the roots of the system spread wide and far, and strike deep, it can stand many a cruel shock and lose many a goodly bough without the life being touched. Only by military command of the sea by prolonged control of the strategic centres of commerce, can such an attack be fatal;[245] and such control can be wrung from a powerful navy only by fighting and overcoming it. For two hundred years England has been the great commercial nation of the world. More than any other her wealth has been intrusted to the sea in war as in peace; yet of all nations she has ever been most reluctant to concede the immunities of commerce and the rights of neutrals. Regarded not as a matter of right, but of policy, history has justified the refusal; and if she maintain her navy in full strength, the future will doubtless repeat the lesson of the past.
The preliminaries of the peace between Great Britain and the allied courts, which brought to an end this great war, were signed at Versailles, January 20, 1783, an arrangement having been concluded between Great Britain and the American Commissioners two months before, by which the independence of the United States was conceded. This was the great outcome of the war. As between the European belligerents, Great Britain received back from France all the West India Islands she had lost, except Tobago, and gave up Sta. Lucia. The French stations in India were restored; and Trincomalee being in the possession of the enemy, England could not dispute its return to Holland, but she refused to cede Negapatam. To Spain, England surrendered the two Floridas and Minorca, the latter a serious loss had the naval power of Spain been sufficient to maintain possession of it; as it was, it again fell into the hands of Great Britain in the next war. Some unimportant redistribution of trading-posts on the west coast of Africa was also made.
Trivial in themselves, there is but one comment that need be made upon these arrangements. In any coming war their permanency would depend wholly upon the balance of sea power, upon that empire of the seas concerning which nothing conclusive had been established by the war.
The definitive treaties of peace were signed at Versailles, September 3, 1783.
FOOTNOTES:
[231] Jurien de la Gravière: Guerres Maritimes, vol. ii. p. 255.
[232] See map of the Atlantic Ocean, p. 532.
[233] It may be said here in passing, that the key to the English possessions in what was then called West Florida was at Pensacola and Mobile, which depended upon Jamaica for support; the conditions of the country, of navigation, and of the general continental war forbidding assistance from the Atlantic. The English force, military and naval, at Jamaica was only adequate to the defence of the island and of trade, and could not afford sufficient relief to Florida. The capture of the latter and of the Bahamas was effected with little difficulty by overwhelming Spanish forces, as many as fifteen ships-of-the-line and seven thousand troops having been employed against Pensacola. These events will receive no other mention. Their only bearing upon the general war was the diversion of this imposing force from joint operations with the French, Spain here, as at Gibraltar, pursuing her own aims instead of concentrating upon the common enemy,—a policy as shortsighted as it was selfish.
[234] In other words, having considered the objects for which the belligerents were at war and the proper objectives upon which their military efforts should have been directed to compass the objects, the discussion now considers how the military forces should have been handled; by what means and at what point the objective, being mobile, should have been assailed.
[235] Orders of Admiral Villeneuve to the captains of his fleet, Dec. 20, 1804.
[236] Letter of Villeneuve, January, 1805.
[237] Letters and Despatches of Lord Nelson.
[238] Life and Letters of Lord Collingwood.
[239] Burrows: Life of Lord Hawke.
[240] Of this Rodney said: "The evacuating Rhode Island was the most fatal measure that could possibly be adopted. It gave up the best and noblest harbor in America, from whence squadrons, in forty-eight hours, could blockade the three capital cities of America, namely, Boston, New York, and Philadelphia." The whole letter, private to the First Lord of the Admiralty, is worth reading. (Life of Rodney, vol. ii. p. 429.)
[241] The loss of Sta. Lucia does not militate against this statement, being due to happy audacity and skill on the part of the English admiral, and the professional incapacity of the commander of the greatly superior French fleet.
[242] The plan of campaign traced by the Directory for Bruix became impossible of execution; the delay in the junction of the French and Spanish squadrons having permitted England to concentrate sixty ships in the Mediterranean.—Troude, vol. iii. p. 158.
[243] The combined squadrons of France and Spain, under Bruix, reached Brest on their return only twenty-four hours before Lord Keith, who had followed them from the Mediterranean. (James: Naval History of Great Britain.)
[244] The high professional attainments of many of the French officers is not overlooked in this statement. The quality of the personnel was diluted by an inferior element, owing to the insufficient number of good men. "The personnel of our crews had been seriously affected by the events of the campaign of 1779. At the beginning of 1780 it was necessary either to disarm some ships, or to increase the proportion of soldiers entering into the composition of the crews. The minister adopted the latter alternative. New regiments, drawn from the land army, were put at the disposal of the navy. The corps of officers, far from numerous at the beginning of hostilities, had become completely inadequate. Rear-Admiral de Guichen met the greatest difficulty in forming the complements, both officers and crews, for his squadron. He took the sea, February 3, with ships 'badly manned,' as he wrote to the minister." (Chevalier: Hist. de la Marine Française, p. 184.) "During the last war [of 1778] we had met the greatest difficulty in supplying officers to our ships. If it had been easy to name admirals, commodores, and captains, it had been impossible to fill the vacancies caused by death, sickness, or promotion among officers of the rank of lieutenant and ensign." (Chevalier: Marine Française sous la République, p. 20.)
[245] The vital centre of English commerce is in the waters surrounding the British Islands; and as the United Kingdom now depends largely upon external sources of food-supply, it follows that France is the nation most favourably situated to harass it by commerce-destroying, on account of her nearness and her possession of ports both on the Atlantic and the North Sea. From these issued the privateers which in the past preyed upon English shipping. The position is stronger now than formerly, Cherbourg presenting a good Channel port which France lacked in the old wars. On the other hand steam and railroads have made the ports on the northern coasts of the United Kingdom more available, and British shipping need not, as formerly, focus about the Channel.
Much importance has been attached to the captures made during the late summer manœuvres (1888) by cruisers in and near the English Channel. The United States must remember that such cruisers were near their home ports. Their line of coal-supply may have been two hundred miles; it would be a very different thing to maintain them in activity three thousand miles from home. The furnishing of coal, or of such facilities as cleaning the bottom or necessary repairs, in such a case, would be so unfriendly to Great Britain, that it may well be doubted if any neighboring neutral nation would allow them.
Commerce-destroying by independent cruisers depends upon wide dissemination of force. Commerce-destroying through control of a strategic centre by a great fleet depends upon concentration of force. Regarded as a primary, not as a secondary, operation, the former is condemned, the latter justified, by the experience of centuries.
INDEX.ToC
- Alberoni, Cardinal, minister to Philip V. of Spain, 233;
- Anson, British Admiral, expedition to the Pacific, 261;
- captures a French squadron, 271.
- Arbuthnot, British Admiral, engagement with French fleet off the Chesapeake, 385-387.
- Armed Neutrality, the, of the Baltic powers, 405.
- Arnold, Benedict, treason of, 382;
- expedition to James River, 385.
- Barbadoes, strategic value of, 348, 393, 518;
- ineffectual attempt of the French against, 469.
- Barrington, British Admiral, energy of, 365;
- Battles, Land, Austerlitz, 24, 47;
- Battles, Naval (the list of the principal naval battles, with plans, will be found on pp. xxiii, xxiv),
- Actium, 13;
- Agosta, 165;
- Boscawen and De la Clue, 299;
- Byng off Minorca, 286,
- plan 265;
- Cape Passaro, 63, 237;
- Chesapeake. 372-374, 389, 391;
- Copenhagen, 361;
- La Hougue, 189-191,
- plan 183;
- Lepanto, 13, 50;
- Lowestoft, 108;
- Malaga, 110, 211, 229;
- Mobile, 287, 354, 355, 361;
- Navarino, 13 (note);
- New Orleans, 354-356;
- Nile, 10, 11, 80, 81, 358, 361, 366, 533;
- Pocock and D'Aché, 307-310,
- plan 162;
- Port Hudson, 355, 361;
- Rio de Janeiro, expedition against, 230;
- Rodney and Langara, 404, 500 (and note);
- Schoneveldt 152;
- Sta. Lucia, 366, 425, 478;
- St Vincent, 11, 356, 358, 476 (note),
- plan 146;
- Suffren and Hughes, fifth action, 463;
- Trafalgar, 9, 11, 12, 23 (note), 24, 47, 85, 353, 354, 357, 438;
- Vigo galleons, 207.
- Benbow, British Admiral,
- Bickerton, British Admiral,
- Blane, Sir Gilbert, physician to British fleet, letters of, 497, 499, 500(note), 501.
- Blockade,
- of French ports by English fleets, 23 (note), 30, 210, 296, 297, 383, 387, 402 (and note), 413, 525-527, 532, 533;
- of Southern coast of United States, 43, 44, 87 (note);
- Napoleon forces England to, 81;
- with consequent effect on American privateering, 137;
- definition of efficient, 85;
- dangers to United States from, 86, 87;
- offensive and defensive use of, 87 (note);
- declaration of the Armed Neutrality concerning, 405;
- position taken off an enemy's port not necessarily a blockade in strict sense of the word, 532.
- Boscawen, British Admiral,
- Burgoyne, British General,
- Bussy, French General,
- Byng, Sir George, British Admiral,
- Byng, John, British Admiral,
- Byron, British Admiral,
- commander-in-chief at Battle of Grenada, 367-371.
- Cape of Good Hope,
- Carlos III.,
- King of the Two Sicilies, 248, 249;
- enters into Bourbon Family Compact, 249;
- forced to withdraw his troops by a British commodore, 252, 264, 304;
- succeeds to the Spanish throne, 304;
- enters into secret alliance with France, 312, 313;
- losses in Seven Years' War, 315, 317;
- again enters alliance with France against England, 401, 402.
- Charles, Archduke,
- claimant to Spanish throne as Carlos III., 206;
- lands at Lisbon, 208;
- lands in Catalonia and takes Barcelona, 213;
- takes and loses Madrid, 214;
- antipathy of Spaniards to, 214, 216;
- inherits empire of Austria and elected Emperor Charles VI. of Germany, 217;
- makes, as king of Spain, secret commercial treaty with England, 221;
- discontented with Treaty of Utrecht, 222, 234;
- renounces claim to Spanish throne, 235;
- joins Quadruple Alliance, 236;
- obtains Naples and Sicily, 239;
- loses Naples and Sicily, 248;
- dies, leaving no son, 262;
- succeeded by Maria Theresa, 262.
- Charles II., naval policy of, 60, 61;
- Choiseul, minister to Louis XV., 297;
- Clerk, John,
- Clinton, Sir Henry, British General,
- Clive, Robert, afterward Lord,
- Colbert
- Collingwood, British Admiral,
- Colonies:
- origin of, 27;
- character of, 28;
- effect on England of, 29, 82, 83, 255, 326-328, 392-394, 396, 414;
- weakness of Spain through, 30, 41, 42, 202, 261, 312, 327, 345, 346;
- effect of national character on, 55-58, 255, 256;
- growth of English colonial system, 60, 62, 64, 217, 220, 228, 251, 291, 305-307, 310, 321, 327;
- Colbert's policy, 70, 71, 106;
- navy essential to security of, 41, 42, 74, 75, 82, 329, 367, 373, 401, 416, 424, 434, 511, 529, 541;
- support to sea power by, 83, 212, 329, 415, 510, 511, 514, 520, 521;
- Dutch, 96, 97, 258;
- New York and New Jersey seized by English, 107, 132;
- loss of French colonies, 219, 291, 294, 295, 304, 314, 321, 322;
- loss of Spanish colonies, 219, 315-317, 321;
- French colonial policy, 242, 254, 255, 257, 258, 273-278, 282, 283, 306;
- Spanish colonial policy, 245-247, 250;
- colonial expansion the characteristic motive of the wars from 1739 to 1783, 254, 281-284, 291, 508-510;
- value of smaller West India islands, 256, 374, 512, 513;
- the English in India, 257, 282, 305, 307, 348, 349, 419, 420, 459;
- Vernon's and Anson's expedition against Spanish, 261;
- Florida and the Bahamas recovered by Spain, 517 (note).
- British North American, character of, 255, 283;
- extension over all the continent east of the Mississippi, 65, 321;
- quarrel with mother-country, 334, 341;
- military situation of, 341-344;
- alliance with France, 350;
- effect of sea power upon their struggle, 397, 524;
- object of, 507, 508;
- policy of France in their struggle, 359, 511, 512;
- distribution of colonial possessions at peace of 1783, 540.
- Commander-in-chief,
- Commerce,
- attempts to control by force, 1, 62, 63, 100, 101, 107, 245, 247;
- trade routes, 25, 32, 33, 37, 38, 141, 142;
- water carriage easier and cheaper than land, 25;
- advantages of rivers and inlets to, 25, 35, 36;
- secure seaports and a navy necessary to security of, 26-28, 74-76, 82, 83, 134, 135;
- the basis of a healthy navy, 28, 45, 46, 82;
- war upon (see commerce-destroying);
- influence of Baltic trade upon sea power, 32, 62, 239, 240, 405;
- effect of Central American Canal on, 33, 325;
- effect of physical conditions on, 36-39;
- decay of Spanish, 41, 50-52;
- effect of national character on, 50-55;
- solicitude of English government concerning, 60, 62, 63, 65, 66, 143, 206, 218, 220, 240, 241, 247, 269, 270;
- the Navigation Act, 60;
- influence of the wealth of England on history, 64, 187, 197, 216, 218, 227, 279, 295;
- commercial spirit of the Dutch, 49, 52, 55, 57, 68, 69, 98;
- Colbert's policy for developing, 70, 71, 101, 102, 105, 106, 169;
- decay of French, under Louis XIV., 73, 107, 167, 169, 170, 198, 199, 219, 226-228;
- improvement of French, under Louis XV., 74, 242, 243;
- government influence on, 70, 71, 82, 101, 105, 106;
- dangers to United States, by blockades, 84-87;
- commercial policy of United States, 84, 88;
- French, in 1660, 93;
- Dutch, in 1660, 95-97, 131;
- rivalry of English and Dutch, 100, 107;
- Leibnitz's proposition to Louis XIV. to seize Egypt, 141, 142;
- influence of Dutch wealth, 167, 176, 187, 197, 270, 279;
- sufferings of Dutch, 38, 160, 167, 168;
- gains to English, by policy of Louis XIV. 167, 170;
- effect of injury to, in hastening war, 176, 177;
- bearing of, upon War of Spanish Succession, 201-204, 207, 209;
- Methuen Treaty of, with Portugal, 206, 228;
- concession to England of the Asiento, or slave trade, 217, 220, 245;
- growth of English, during eighteenth century, 220, 223-226, 228, 229, 233, 241, 245, 319, 323, 328;
- secret treaty of, made with England by claimant to Spanish throne, 221;
- decay of Dutch, in early part of eighteenth century, 69, 220-222, 224;
- English, contraband with Spanish America, 240, 241, 245-247;
- sufferings of, 1740-1748, 279, 280;
- sufferings of, 1756-1763, 311, 312, 317-319;
- prosperity of English commerce, 1756-1763, 297, 318, 319, 323;
- effect of commercial interests on the results at Yorktown, 392;
- great centre of English, 539 (note);
- policy of Great Britain as to neutral, 540.
- Commerce-Destroying (Cruising Warfare),
- a strategic question, 8;
- dependence on geographical position, 31;
- diffusion of effort, 31;
- disadvantageous position of United States, 31, 540 (note);
- Spanish treasure-ships, 41, 51, 207, 262, 313, 316;
- English and Dutch commerce defy, 51, 133, 134, 135, 206, 229, 297, 317, 318, 319, 539, 540;
- Charles II. resorts to it as a substitute for great fleets, 131;
- disastrous results, 132;
- discussion of, as a principal mode of warfare, 132-136;
- dependent upon a near base or upon powerful fleets, 132, 196, 230, 314;
- illustrations, 1652-1783, 133-136;
- injurious reaction on the nation relying upon it, 136;
- illustrations, 136-138;
- mistaken conclusions drawn from American privateering in 1812, and from the Confederate cruisers, 137, 138;
- effect of great navies, 138;
- illustrations, after battle of Solebay, 148;
- after battle of Texel, 154;
- decline of Dutch navy, 160,
- and consequent increase of commerce-destroying by French privateers, 167;
- in the war of 1689-1697, discussion, 193-196;
- in the war of 1702-1713, 228-230;
- in war of 1739-1748, 280;
- in Seven Years' War, 295, 297, 311, 314, 316, 317-319 (discussion), 329 (note);
- in American Revolution, 344, 382, 392, 400, 404, 408 (and note), 409, 443, 445, 452, 460, 530, 539, 540 (and note);
- French privateering, 133, 135, 167, 195, 196, 229, 280, 314, 317-319;
- peculiar character of French privateering, 1689-1713, 194-196, 229, 230.
- Conflans, French Admiral,
- Cornwallis, British General,
- Cornwallis, Captain British navy,
- gallant conduct in Hood's action at St. Christopher, 472.
- Corsica,
- Cromwell, Oliver,
- naval policy of, 60;
- issues Navigation Act, 60;
- condition of navy under, 60, 61, 101, 127;
- takes Jamaica, 60;
- takes Dunkirk, 105.
- D'Aché, French Commodore,
- De Barras, French Commodore,
- commands French squadron at Newport, and takes part in operations against Cornwallis, 389-392.
- De la Clue, French Commodore,
- D'Estaing, French Admiral,
- transferred from the army to the navy, 371;
- long passage from Toulon to the Delaware, 359;
- fails to attack the British fleet in New York, 361;
- runs British batteries at Newport, 361;
- sails in pursuit of Howe's fleet, and receives injuries in a gale, 362;
- goes to Boston, 363;
- foiled by Howe on all points, 363, 364;
- goes to West Indies, 365;
- failure at Sta. Lucia, 366;
- capture of St. Vincent and Grenada, 367;
- action with Byron's fleet, 367-371;
- professional character, 371, 375;
- ineffectual assault on Savannah, 376;
- return to France, 376.
- D'Estrées, French Admiral,
- De Grasse, French Admiral,
- sails from Brest for West Indies, 383;
- partial action with Hood off Martinique, 383, 384;
- takes Tobago, and goes thence to San Domingo, 384;
- determines to go to Chesapeake Bay, 388;
- thoroughness of his action, 388, 392;
- anchors in Lynnhaven Bay, 388;
- skilful management when opposed by Graves, 389;
- share in results at Yorktown, 399;
- declines to remain longer in the United States, 400, 418, 469;
- return to West Indies, and expedition against St. Kitt's Island, 469;
- outgeneralled by Hood, 470-476;
- criticisms upon his actions, 392, 476-478, 483, 489, 494;
- return to Martinique, 479;
- in command of combined fleet in expedition against Jamaica, 479;
- sails from Martinique, 480;
- partial action of April 9, 1782, 481-483;
- battle of the Saints, 486-490;
- surrenders with his flag-ship, 489;
- later career and death, 501-503;
- findings of the court-martial on, 503.
- De Guichen, French Admiral,
- wary tactics of, 7, 413, 433;
- takes command in West Indies, 376;
- actions with Rodney, 378-381;
- returns to France, 381, 405;
- chief command of allied fleets in Europe, 407, 408;
- abortive action at Torbay, 408 (and note);
- injuries to convoy under his care, 408;
- Rodney's opinion of, 499;
- difficulty in manning his fleet, 536 (note).
- D'Orvilliers, French Admiral,
- De Rions, d'Albert, Captain in French navy,
- De Ternay, French Commodore,
- De Vaudreuil, French Commodore,
- Derby, British Admiral,
- Destouches, French Commodore,
- engagement with English fleet off the Chesapeake, 385-387.
- Douglas, Sir Charles, Captain British navy,
- Dubois, Cardinal,
- Duguay-Trouin, French privateer,
- expedition against Rio de Janeiro, 230.
- Dupleix,
- advances the power of France in India, 243;
- his ambition and policy, 258, 274, 282;
- problem before him in India, 275;
- foiled by lack of sea power, 276, 278;
- quarrel with La Bourdonnais, 276;
- seizes Madras, 276;
- successful defence of Pondicherry, 277;
- extends his power in the peninsula, 282;
- is recalled to France, 282.
- Duquesne, French Admiral,
- compares French and Dutch officers, 129;
- commands at battle of Stromboli, 160-162;
- tactics of, 163-165;
- commands at battle of Agosta, 165.
- Egypt,
- Elliott, British General,
- commands at Gibraltar during the great siege, 411.
- England, See under Colonies, Commerce, Commerce-Destroying, Geographical Position, Government, Inhabitants, character and number of, Naval Policy, Naval Tactics, Sea Power, Strategy.
- Extent of Territory,
- its effect upon the sea power of a country, 42-44.
- Falkland Islands,
- dispute concerning, 335.
- Farragut, American Admiral,
- Fleuri, Cardinal,
- minister of Louis XV., 241;
- peace policy, 241, 243, 253;
- commercial expansion of France under, 242, 248;
- accord with Walpole, 241, 244, 252;
- policy, continental rather than maritime, 243, 244, 251, 253;
- supports claimant to Polish throne, 247;
- arranges Bourbon Family Compact with Spain, 244, 248;
- acquires Bar and Lorraine for France, 249;
- allows the navy to decay, 244, 249, 252, 253;
- death, 253.
- France.
- See under Colonies, Commerce, Commerce-Destroying, Geographical Position, Government, Inhabitants, character and number of Naval Policy, Naval Tactics, Sea-Power, Strategy.
- Frederick, King of Prussia,
- seizes Silesia, 262;
- Silesia ceded to, 278;
- opens Seven Years' War, 292;
- desperate struggle of, 295, 305;
- losses in the war, 324;
- results of the war to, 324;
- partition of Poland, 336.
- Gardiner's Bay, Long Island,
- Geographical Position,
- its effect upon the sea power of countries, 29-35.
- Gibraltar,
- Government,
- Graves, British Admiral,
- Graves, British Captain, afterward admiral,
- Great Britain. See England.
- Hannibal. See Second Punic War, 13-21.
- Havana,
- Hawke, Sir Edward, afterward Lord, British Admiral,
- Henry IV., of France,
- Herbert, British Admiral,
- commands allied English and Dutch fleets at battle of Beachy Head, 182.
- Holland. See under Colonies, Commerce, Commerce-Destroying,
- Geographical Position, Government, Inhabitants, character and number
- of, Naval Policy, Naval Tactics (Ruyter's), Sea Power, Strategy.
- Hood, Sir Samuel, afterward Lord, British Admiral,
- trait of subordination in, 356 (note);
- action with De Grasse off Martinique, 383;
- sent by Rodney to America with fourteen ships, 389, 390;
- second in command in action off Chesapeake, 391;
- temporary chief command in West Indies, 469;
- brilliant action at St. Christopher's Island, 470-476;
- junction with Rodney, 479;
- partial action of April 9, 1782, 481-483;
- at battle of the Saints, 486-490, 491-493;
- De Grasse's flag-ship strikes to his, 489;
- opinion as to Rodney's failure to pursue his advantage, 496;
- captures four French ships, 498;
- later career and death, 504.
- Hoste, Paul,
- Howe, Lord, British Admiral,
- Howe, Sir William, British General,
- Hughes, Sir Edward, British Admiral,
- arrives in India, 349;
- takes Negapatam and Trincomalee, 349;
- first meeting with Suffren, 427;
- task in India, 428;
- first battle with Suffren's squadron, 430-434;
- second battle with Suffren, 437-441;
- contemporary criticisms on, 442;
- third battle with Suffren, 446-448;
- tactics of, 431, 449, 453, 456, 462:
- slowness of, loses Trincomalee, 450, 451;
- fourth battle with Suffren, 453-455;
- praise bestowed by, upon his captains, 456;
- goes to Bombay from Coromandel coast, 458;
- returns to Madras, 461;
- supports English siege of Cuddalore, 462;
- fifth battle with Suffren, 463;
- abandons the field, 463;
- death, 467.
- Hyder Ali, Sultan of Mysore, 419;
- war upon the English, 420;
- denied the aid of the French squadron, 421;
- Suffren communicates with, 443;
- visited by Suffren, 450;
- negotiations of Suffren with, 459, 460;
- death of, 461.
- Inhabitants, character of,
- effect upon the sea power of a country, 50-58.
- Inhabitants, number of,
- effect upon the sea power of a country, reserve strength, 44-49.
- Italy,
- geographical position of, 32;
- physical conformation of, 39, 40;
- necessity for a navy, 40;
- Sicilian revolt against Spain, 1674, 159;
- Spanish possessions in, 1700, 201;
- Sardinia taken by allied fleets, 215;
- disposition of Spanish provinces in, at peace of 1713, 219;
- Sicily transferred to Austria, and Sardinia to House of Savoy, 1719, 239;
- Spanish expedition into, 248;
- foundation of Bourbon Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, 248;
- Spanish operations against Austria, 1741, 263, 264;
- King of Naples forced to withdraw troops from Spanish army by English fleet, 263;
- disposition of provinces of, at peace of 1748, 278;
- transfer of Corsica to France by Genoa, 292, 334;
- acquisition of Malta by England, 327.
- Jamaica,
- James II.,
- a seaman by profession, 61, 115;
- commands at battle of Lowestoft, as Duke of York, 109;
- commands at the battle of Solebay, 147;
- deprived of the command, 151;
- succeeds to the throne, 175;
- interest in the navy, 175, 177, 178;
- flight from England, 178;
- lands in Ireland, 179;
- defeated at the Boyne, 186;
- at Cape La Hougue, 188;
- death, 205.
- Jenkins,
- captain of a merchant brig, the story of his ears, 250.
- Jervis, Sir John, afterward Earl St. Vincent, British Admiral,
- Johnstone, British Commodore,
- sails for Cape of Good Hope, 421;
- commissioner to American Congress, 421 (note);
- attacked by Suffren at the Cape Verde Islands, 421-425;
- anticipated by Suffren at the Cape, 427;
- returns unsuccessful to England, 427.
- Kempenfeldt, British Admiral,
- Keppel, Lord, British Admiral,
- King, British Commodore,
- La Bourdonnais,
- L'Étenduère, French commodore,
- brilliant defence of, 272.
- Lafayette, Marquis de,
- La Galissonière, French Admiral,
- Lally, French governor of India,
- Langara, Spanish Admiral,
- Leibnitz,
- Louis XIV.,
- growth of French navy under, 72;
- enmity to Holland, 73;
- policy of, 73, 103-105, 140, 143, 205;
- naval policy of, 72, 74, 107, 133, 141-143, 155, 159, 166, 174, 178-181, 194-196;
- assumes personal government, 90;
- initiates general wars, 91;
- condition of France at accession of, 93;
- commercial policy of, 54, 105, 167, 169, 170, 176;
- aggressions of, 139, 173;
- declares war against Holland, 144;
- campaign in Holland, 149-151;
- evacuates Holland, 158;
- Sicilian episode, 159-166;
- peace with Holland, 168;
- declares war against Germany, 177;
- against Holland, 178;
- supports invasion of Ireland, 179-186;
- plans invasion of England, 188-191;
- concessions by, at peace of Ryswick, 197;
- effect of policy of, on sea-power, 198-200;
- accepts bequest of Spanish throne to his grandson, 203;
- reduced to extremities in War of Spanish Succession, 215, 216;
- humiliating concessions at peace of Utrecht, 219-221;
- exhaustion of France under, 227;
- privateering under, 133, 134, 195, 230;
- death of, 232.
- Louis XV.,
- ascends throne, 232;
- condition of French commerce under, 74, 242-244, 279, 280, 311, 318;
- condition of French navy, 74-77, 244, 252-254, 259, 276, 279, 280, 288, 291, 311;
- restoration of the navy, 76, 331-333;
- defensive alliance with Spain, 248, 263-268;
- offensive alliance with Spain, 313, 333;
- death, 336.
- Louis XVI.,
- Louisburg, Cape Breton Island,
- strategic importance of, 28, 294, 328;
- retained by France at Peace of Utrecht, 219;
- taken by New England colonists, 269;
- restored to France at peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, 277;
- taken by Boscawen, 294.
- Madras,
- capital of a British presidency in India, 257;
- taken by French, 276;
- exchanged for Louisburg at peace of 1748, 277;
- besieged by French in 1759, 310;
- danger from Hyder Ali in 1780, 420;
- principal British naval station during the struggle, 1781-1783, 429, 437, 444, 450, 451;
- danger of roadstead, in northeast monsoon. 458, 518, 519.
- Mahrattas, the,
- Maria Theresa,
- Martinique, French West India Island,
- Matthews, British Admiral,
- Mazarin, Cardinal,
- Mediterranean Sea,
- control of, influence on Second Punic war, 14-21;
- strategic points in, 13, 20, 22, 23, 32, 62, 63, 82, 141, 142, 202, 203, 215, 220, 285, 298, 327, 328, 335, 393, 515;
- advantage of strategic study of, 33;
- analogy to Caribbean Sea, 33;
- increase of English power in, 206, 210, 212, 215, 219, 220, 229, 235, 239, 263, 322, 327, 328;
- Austria established in, 239;
- Sardinia given to House of Savoy, 239;
- foundation of Bourbon Kingdom of Two Sicilies, 248,
- strengthens France in, 249;
- English navy in, 193, 206, 208, 210-216, 263-268, 286-291, 296, 298, 412, 515, 532, 533;
- France acquires Corsica, 334, 335;
- England loses Minorca in American Revolution, 409, 540.
- Monk, British General and Admiral,
- Morogues, Bigot de,
- Napoleon I.,
- Naval Policy,
- value of reserve force, 48;
- colonial, 56,
- in peace, 82;
- in war, 82;
- soldiers commanding ships, 127;
- commerce-destroying and privateering (see Commerce-destroying) Bourbon Family compact, 248, 313;
- significance of the wars from 1739 to 1783, 254;
- Dutch, 67-69, 95-99, 108, 109, 126, 174, 201-204, 217, 218, 222, 406;
- English, 59-67, 78, 100, 101, 105, 107, 131, 140, 143, 174, 175, 192-196, 201-204, 206, 224, 225, 229, 238-241, 244, 245, 264, 293, 326-328, 406, 417, 442, 451, 452, 505, 540;
- French, 29, 54, 69-81, 93, 104, 105-107, 166, 167-170, 177, 187, 197, 199, 212, 226, 238, 242-244, 252, 282, 287-290, 291, 309, 311, 322, 331-334, 337, 340, 359, 382, 408 (and note), 451, 452, 459, 460, 506, 510, 511;
- maritime inscription, 45;
- Leibnitz's proposition to Louis XIV., 141, 142;
- Italian, 39, 40;
- Spanish, 41, 51, 94, 156, 246, 312, 333, 348, 401, 407, 510, 517 (note), 535, 536;
- United States, 26, 33, 34, 38, 39, 42, 49, 83-88, 325, 326, 539, 540 (note).
- Naval Tactics,
- unsettled condition of modern, 2;
- qualities of galleys, steamers, and sailing-ships, 3-5;
- windward and leeward positions, 6,
- change of, from age to age, 9, 10, 22, 130, 506;
- fireships, 109, 110, 113, 114;
- torpedo-cruisers, 111;
- group formation, 112;
- close-hauled line-of-battle, 115;
- breaking the line, 124, 147, 265, 268, 286, 380, 381, 488, 491;
- refusing the van, 148, 152, 157, 183, 190, 266, 432, 434;
- concentration by defiling, 308, 387, 470, 492;
- concentration by doubling, 125, 147, 183, 272, 378, 379, 432, 433, 438-441;
- general chase with mêlée, 3, 4, 184, 237, 271, 299, 302, 303, 367-369, 404, 481, 482, 486;
- French, in eighteenth century, 79, 80, 114, 163, 164, 287-290, 338, 340, 351, 372, 383, 425, 426, 431, 474 (and note), 476, 478, 482, 483, 486-488, 494, 538;
- English, in eighteenth century, 127-129, 163, 211, 237, 265, 268, 271, 286, 287, 299, 303, 307, 350, 352, 369, 377-381, 386, 389, 391, 404, 412, 442, 447, 449, 453-455, 462, 463, 470-473, 476 (and note), 486-490;
- Monk's, 121;
- Ruyter's, 145, 147, 148, 152, 154, 157, 161;
- Duquesne's, 161-163, 165;
- Herbert's, 182;
- Tourville's, 182, 184, 185, 187, 189;
- Rooke's, 211;
- Byng's, 286;
- Hawke's, 271, 272, 303;
- Keppel's and D'Orvilliers, 351;
- Barrington's, 366;
- Byron's, 367-369;
- D'Estaing's, 369, 370;
- Rodney's, 377-379, 404, 488, 491;
- De Grasse's, 383, 389, 471-474, 481-483, 485-489;
- Arbuthnot and Destouches's, 386;
- Graves's, 389, 391;
- Suffren's, 425, 426, 432, 433, 439, 455, 465;
- Hood's, 472, 473;
- Clerk's work on, 77, 163, 211;
- Hoste's work on, 77;
- Morogues' work on, 77;
- position of commander-in-chief in battle, 353-358;
- effect on, of changes in naval material, 2-5, 9, 10, 22, 109, 116, 384 (note), 386 (note), 493-495.
- Navies, condition of:
- British, under Cromwell, 62;
- under Charles II., 61, 101;
- character of vessels, 1660, 101;
- qualities of officers, 1660, 126-129;
- decline of, under Charles II., 174;
- improvement of, by James II., 175;
- numbers in 1691, 187;
- deterioration under William III., 192;
- improvement under Anne, 209, 220, 224, 225, 229;
- numbers and condition of, in 1727, 1734, and 1744, 259, 260;
- inefficiency of officers, 1744, 265-269;
- numbers of, 1756-1763, 291;
- numbers of, in 1778, 337, 341;
- professional skill of officers in American Revolution, 379 (and note), 401, 412, 449, 456, 497;
- administration of, 417, 452, 523, 527.
- Dutch, prior to 1660, 68, 98, 99;
- French, 53;
- numbers in 1661, 70;
- numbers in 1666, 72;
- numbers, 1683-1690, 72, 178, 179, 180;
- administration of, 1660-1695, 72;
- condition of, at end of Louis XIV.'s reign, 74, 191;
- character of vessels in 1660, 101,
- professional qualities of officers in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 129, 161, 170-172, 185;
- decay in number and condition, 1713-1760, 74-76, 209, 216, 244, 252, 259, 260, 279, 280, 288, 291, 311, 312;
- revival of, 1760, 76-78, 331;
- numbers of, in 1761 and 1770, 331;
- discipline during war of 1778, 332, 333;
- numbers in 1778, 45, 337;
- superior to British in size and batteries of ships, 338, 493, 494;
- professional skill of officers, 365, 412, 435, 436, 447, 457, 484, 497, 527, 536 (note);
- administration of, 402 (and note), 403, 452, 536, 537;
- numbers of, in 1791, 338;
- numbers of, in 1814, 81.
- Spanish, condition of, anterior to 1660, 41, 50, 94, 95;
- in 1675, 160, 165;
- restoration by Alberoni, 234;
- destruction of ships at Cape Passaro and of dock-yards, 237, 238;
- numbers of, 1747, 259;
- numbers of, 1756, 291;
- numbers of, in 1761, 331;
- numbers of, in 1779, 337;
- superior to British in size and batteries of ships, 338;
- administration of, 402 (and note), 403, 536;
- character of the personnel, 527.
- British, under Cromwell, 62;
- Nelson, Horatio, afterward Lord, British Admiral,
- tactics at the battle of the Nile, 10;
- Trafalgar campaign, 11, 23 (note), 527, 532, 533;
- tactics at Trafalgar, 12, 354, 459;
- enforces Navigation Act, 60, 251;
- orders at Trafalgar, 112, 434;
- at battle of Cape St. Vincent, 157, 355, 368;
- celebrated sayings of, 185, 362, 435, 525, 527, 532;
- attachment of subordinates to, 267;
- position assumed by him in battle, 353-358.
- Nile, Battle of the,
- Opdam, Dutch Admiral,
- Orleans, Philippe d',
- Regent of France during minority of Louis XV., 74, 232;
- insecurity of position, 232;
- concessions to England, 233;
- policy of, 235;
- alliance with England against Spain, 235-238;
- death, 241.
- Peace:
- Philip, Duke of Anjou, afterward Philip V. of Spain,
- Spanish throne bequeathed to, 202;
- war declared against, by England, Holland, and Germany, 205;
- loses Gibraltar, 210;
- besieges Gibraltar, 212;
- loses Barcelona and Catalonia, 213;
- driven from Madrid, 214;
- recovers all Spain, except Catalonia, 214;
- acknowledged King of Spain by Treaty of Utrecht, 219;
- deprived of Netherlands and Italian dependencies, 219;
- enmity to the regent Orleans, 232;
- seizes Sardinia, 235;
- attacks Sicily, 236;
- brought to terms by France and the Sea Powers, 239;
- makes alliance with the Emperor Charles VI., 244;
- attacks Gibraltar, 245.
- Physical Conformation,
- its effect upon the sea power of countries, 35-42.
- Pitt, William,
- dislike of George II. to, 270;
- becomes prime minister, 293;
- policy of, 295, 296;
- prosperity of commerce under, 297;
- offers to restore Gibraltar to Spain, 298;
- respect for Portuguese neutrality, 299, 300;
- declines mediation of Spain, 304;
- waning of his influence, 305;
- purposes war against Spain, 313;
- resigns his office, 313;
- his plans adopted by successors, 314, 317;
- opposes the peace of Paris, 322;
- effect of his policy on the history of England, 326.
- Pocock, British Admiral,
- Port Mahon and Minorca,
- lost to Spain frequently through maritime weakness, 42, 215, 541;
- ceded to England in 1713, 62, 219;
- strategic importance of, 62, 220, 393, 515;
- French expedition against, 285;
- Byng defeated in his attempt to relieve, 286-288;
- surrender of, to France, 291;
- Pitt's offer to exchange Gibraltar for, 298;
- restored to England at peace of 1763, 322;
- taken from England in 1782, 407, 409;
- ceded to Spain in 1783, 540;
- again taken by England, 541.
- Portugal,
- decay in sea power and wealth, 52;
- cedes Bombay and Tangiers to England, 104;
- dependence on England, 105, 208, 315, 320, 321;
- Methuen treaty, 206;
- alliance with England and Holland, 1704, 208;
- advantage of, to England, 208, 213-215, 220, 228;
- French and Spaniards invade, 315, 316, 321;
- England repels the invasion, 316;
- benevolent neutrality of colonial ports to England, 520, 521.
- Ramatuelle,
- Rhode Island,
- Richelieu, Cardinal,
- Rochambeau, French General,
- Rodney, Sir George B., afterward Lord, British Admiral,
- commands squadron in reduction of Martinique, 314;
- commander-in-chief in West Indies, 377;
- takes or disperses a Spanish squadron, 377, 404, 500 (and note);
- personal and military character, 377, 378, 380, 397, 498-500;
- actions with De Guichen, 378-381;
- divides his fleet and goes to New York, 382;
- seizes Dutch West India islands, 382;
- sends Hood with fourteen ships to New York, and returns to England, 389;
- returns to West Indies, 479;
- sails in chase of De Grasse, 480;
- action of April 9, 1782, 481-483;
- battle of April 12, 1782, 485-490;
- criticism upon his tactics, 490-493;
- criticism upon his failure to pursue the beaten enemy, 496, 497;
- his successes, 500;
- rewards and death, 503;
- opinion as to evacuation of Rhode Island, 530 (note).
- Rooke, Sir George, British Admiral,
- Rupert, Prince,
- Russell, British Admiral,
- Ruyter, Dutch Admiral,
- greatest naval officer of seventeenth century, 117;
- commands at battle of the Four Days, 117-126;
- badly supported by his officers, 122, 126, 127;
- tactics of, 130, 144-148, 152, 157, 161, 164;
- destroys English shipping in the Thames, 132;
- strategy of, 144, 151, 152;
- commands at the battles of Solebay, 146,
- military character, 157;
- sent to Mediterranean with inadequate force, 160;
- commands at battle of Stromboli, 160-162;
- killed at battle of Agosta, 166.
- Sea Power,
- a history of conflicts, 1;
- elements of, 25.
- Affected by geographical position of countries, 29-35;
- by physical conformation, 35-42;
- by extent of territory, 42-44;
- by number of population, 44-50;
- by national character, 50-58;
- by policy of government, 58.
- Policy of England as to, 58-67;
- policy of Holland, 67-69;
- of France, 69-81.
- Influence of colonies on, 82 (see also Colonies);
- weakness of the United States in, 83;
- dependent upon commerce, 87, 225 (see also Commerce);
- strategic bearing, 88 (see also Strategy);
- policy of Richelieu, 93;
- Spanish, in 1660, 94;
- Dutch, in 1660, 95;
- English, in 1860, 101;
- mistakes of Louis XIV., 104;
- Colbert's measures, 70, 105;
- effects of commerce-destroying on, 132, 179, 193, 229, 317, 344, 400, 408 (note), 539.
- (See also Commerce-destroying.)
- Influence of, upon Napoleon's expedition to Egypt, 10;
- upon Second Punic War, 14;
- upon Third Anglo-Dutch War, 148, 154;
- upon English Revolution, 177, 178, 180, 181, 191, 197;
- upon France, 198, 199;
- upon War of Spanish Succession, 203, 206, 209, 213, 214, 223-229;
- upon Alberoni's ambitions, 237, 239;
- upon Peter the Great, 239;
- in India, 243, 258, 273-278, 306, 309, 310, 316, 328, 349, 424, 428, 445, 452, 459-464, 466, 513, 520, 521;
- upon War of Austrian Succession, 263, 264, 279, 280;
- upon Seven Years' War, 291, 293-295, 304, 311, 314-317;
- upon Portugal, 320, 321;
- at Peace of Paris, 321;
- in remote and disordered countries, 324-326;
- upon British policy since 1763, 326-328.
- Washington's opinions as to, 397-400;
- American Revolution, 347, 468;
- influence of, upon conditions of peace, 1783, 498.
- Spain,
- geographical position, 32;
- results of maritime weakness of, 41, 42, 193, 313-317, 327, 345, 346, 541;
- dependence of finances upon treasure-ships, 41, 244, 313, 346, 539;
- effect of national character upon sea power, 50-52, 54;
- unity of aim with Austria, 91, 92;
- policy of Richelieu toward, 93;
- condition of, in 1660, 94, 95;
- condition of navy, in 1660, 94;
- aggressions of Louis XIV. on, 104, 139;
- failure of the Austrian line of kings, 140, 201, 202;
- alliance with Holland and Germany against France, 158;
- revolt of Sicily against, 159;
- territory lost at Peace of Nimeguen, 168;
- joins League of Augsburg, 176;
- dependence upon Dutch and English fleets, 193;
- possessions in year 1700, 201;
- throne of, bequeathed to Philip, Duke of Anjou, 202;
- war of the succession, 201-231;
- Bourbon line of kings established, 219;
- losses of territory at peace of 1713, 219;
- Alberoni's ministry in, 233-239;
- grievances against England, 1720-1739, 240, 241, 244-251;
- conquers the Two Sicilies in War of Polish Succession, 248;
- Family Compact with France, 248, 311, 313;
- war with England, 250;
- possessions in 1739, 256;
- Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, 278;
- lack of results from war with England, 278;
- enters Seven Years' War as the ally of France against England, 313;
- loss of colonies and treasures, 314-317;
- loss of possessions by Peace of Paris, 1763, 321, 322;
- political relations with France, 333;
- dispute with England over Falkland Islands, 335;
- objects in the war of 1779-1782, 347, 348, 509, 510, 513;
- rupture with England and alliance with France, 401;
- inefficiency of navy, 402 (and note), 407-409, 411, 412, 506, 527;
- policy in war of 1779, 517 (note), 535-538;
- territorial gains by peace of 1783.
- (See also Colonies, Commerce, Naval Policy.)
- Sta. Lucia, West India Island,
- taken by English, 314;
- ceded to France at Peace of Paris, 321;
- strong harbor and strategic position, 348, 366, 377, 393, 415, 513, 516, 518, 523;
- taken by Admiral Barrington, 348, 365, 366, 512, 531 (note);
- Rodney watches De Grasse from, 479, 480;
- an advanced strategic position, 518, 528;
- restored to France at peace of 1783, 540.
- Strategy,
- permanence of its principles, 7-9, 88, 89;
- illustrations, 10-22;
- definition of naval, 22;
- Trafalgar campaign, 23 (note);
- bearing of geographical position on, 29-33;
- Mediterranean and Caribbean Seas, 33-35;
- bearing of physical conformation of coast on, 35-42;
- blockade of coast of Confederate States, 43, 44;
- value of commerce-destroying (see Commerce-destroying);
- word "defence" two distinct ideas, 87 (note);
- naval, of the British, 6, 9, 22, 24, 30, 118, 125, 136, 143, 182, 206, 208, 210, 212, 224, 229, 239, 260, 269, 284, 285, 296, 314-317, 320, 326-328, 339, 342, 343, 363, 375, 376, 385, 390-397, 412-417, 428-430, 468, 523-535;
- naval, of the Dutch, 144, 145, 151, 154;
- naval, of the French, 6, 12, 23 (note), 179-181, 191, 347, 371-374, 383, 388, 392, 401, 433, 459, 460, 476, 483, 535-539;
- features of War of Spanish Succession, 201-206;
- silent action of sea power, 209;
- general military situation, in 1740, 255;
- England in Seven Years' War, 296;
- mutual dependence of seaports and fleets, 31, 83, 132, 212, 329, 430, 453, 529;
- value of colonies, 27, 28, 65, 83, 135, 136, 510, 511;
- importance of coal, 31, 329 (note), 540 (note);
- military situation in America in 1777, 341-343;
- general strategic situation in 1778, 347-349;
- British difficulties in American Revolution, 392-397, 412-419, 522-533;
- Suffren's naval, 424, 425, 433, 450, 465;
- situation in India, 349, 428-430;
- Hood's naval, 476;
- Rodney's naval, 381, 392, 496-498, 523;
- influence of trade-winds and monsoons, 315, 458, 517, 518;
- elements essential to all naval wars, 514;
- difficulty of procuring information at sea, 521;
- general discussion of war of 1778, 505-540.
- (See also Naval Policy and Sea Power.)
- Suffren, French Admiral,
- criticism on D'Estaing's conduct at Sta. Lucia, 366, 426, 478;
- commands leading French ship in D'Estaing's battle off Grenada, 371;
- criticism on D'Estaing's conduct in the battle, 371;
- sails from Brest in company with De Grasse's fleet, 383, 421;
- parts company, off the Azores, for India, 383, 407, 421;
- orders to secure Cape of Good Hope, 421;
- action, with British squadron at the Cape Verde Islands, 422, 423;
- military discussion of his conduct, 423-425;
- arrival in India, 427;
- lack of seaports on which to base operations, 349, 429;
- first battle with squadron of Sir Edward Hughes, 430-432;
- tactics in the action, 432-435;
- estimate of the strategic situation in India, 424, 433, 444, 445, 464, 466;
- second battle with Hughes, 437-439;
- tactics in it, 439-441;
- strategic action, 443, 445, 446, 450-453, 458-460, 462-464, 466, 522;
- military character, 445, 446, 450, 456, 465, 466;
- third battle with Hughes, 446-448;
- takes Trincomalee, 450;
- activity of, 450, 451, 456, 462, 466;
- fourth battle with Hughes, 453-456;
- wreck of two of squadron, 457;
- goes to Sumatra, 460;
- returns to Trincomalee, 461;
- relieves Cuddalore besieged by the English, 462;
- fifth battle with Hughes, 463;
- conclusion of peace, 464;
- return to France, 465;
- rewards, 465;
- later career and death, 466.
- Tourville, French Admiral,
- commands at the battle of Beachy Head, 181;
- sluggish pursuit of the enemy, 184;
- military character, 185;
- celebrated cruise in 1691, 187;
- commands at battle of La Hougue, 189;
- tactics and brilliant defence at La Hougue, 190;
- destruction of French ships, 190;
- supports the army in Catalonia, 193;
- destroys or disperses a great English convoy, 194;
- death, 210.
- Trafalgar, Battle of,
- Trincomalee,
- in Ceylon, Dutch influence in, 97;
- passes into the hands of the English, 349, 428;
- effect upon the contest in India, 349, 427 (note), 429, 430 (note), 433, 437, 442, 451, 453, 458, 462;
- strategic value of, 428, 429, 436, 444, 451, 458, 518, 519, 520;
- taken by Suffren, 450;
- restored to Holland at peace of 1783, 540.
- Two Sicilies, the,
- acquired by Austria, 239;
- foundation of Bourbon Kingdom of, 248;
- forced by British fleet to withdraw troops from Spanish army, 264, 304.
- United Provinces. See Holland.
- Vernon, British Admiral,
- takes Porto Bello, is repulsed from Cartagena and Santiago de Cuba, 261.
- Villeneuve, French Admiral, Trafalgar,
- Walpole, Sir Robert,
- prime minister of England, 239, 241;
- peace policy of, 241, 243, 244;
- naval demonstrations, 244;
- struggle with the war party in England, 247, 249, 250;
- neutrality causes Austria to lose the two Sicilies, 248;
- forced into war with Spain, 250;
- accord with Fleuri, 241, 243, 244;
- confidence betrayed by Fleuri, 248;
- driven from office, 253, 262;
- death, 253.
- War, Second Punic,
- influence of sea power upon, 13-21.
- Wars,
- American Revolution, 341—397;
- Anglo-Dutch, second, 107-132;
- Anglo-Dutch, third, England in alliance with France, 144-158;
- Austrian Succession, 262-277;
- France against Holland, Germany, and Spain, 1674-1678, 158-168;
- Great Britain against Spain, 250-277;
- League of Augsburg, 176-197;
- Maritime war of 1778, 350-540;
- Polish Succession, 247;
- Russia and Sweden, 231;
- Seven Years', 291-321;
- Spanish Succession, 1702-1713, 205-218.
- Washington, George,
- at Pittsburg and in Braddock's expedition, 284;
- opinion as to the line of the Hudson, 342 (note);
- comments on D'Estaing's cruise, 364 (note);
- despatches to De Grasse, 384;
- meeting with Rochambeau, 387;
- result of their deliberations, 388;
- marches from New York to Virginia, 389;
- opinions as to the influence of sea power on the American Revolution, 397-400.
- William III.,