FOOTNOTES:
[1] See, for instance, his letter to Lady Hamilton, Oct. 3, 1798 (Disp., vol. iii. p. 140), which is but one of many similar expressions in his correspondence.
[2] Nels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 177.
[3] In an entirely open country, without natural obstacles, there are few or none of those strategic points, by occupying which in a central position an inferior force is able to multiply its action against the divided masses of the enemy. On the other hand, in a very broken country, such as Switzerland, the number of important strategic points, passes, heads of valleys, bridges, etc., are so multiplied, that either some must be left unoccupied, or the defenders lose, by dissemination, the advantage which concentration upon one or two controlling centres usually confers.
[5] It is said that the old marshal on receiving these orders cried: "This is the way armies are ruined."
[6] Jomini, Guerres de la Rév. Fran., livre xv. p. 124. Martin, Hist. de France depuis 1789, vol. iii. p. 50. It was just at this moment that Nelson sent a division to the Gulf of Genoa to co-operate with Suwarrow. (Nels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 431.)
[7] The phrase is that of Thiers. Hist. de la Rév., vol. x. p. 353.
[8] A curious evidence of the insecurity of the highways is afforded by an ordinance issued by Bonaparte a year after he became First Consul (Jan. 7, 1801), that no regular diligence should travel without carrying a corporal and four privates, with muskets and twenty rounds, and in addition, at night, two mounted gendarmes. If specie to the value of over 50,000 francs were carried, there must be four gendarmes by day and night. (Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. p. 697.)
[9] See post, Chapter XVII.
[10] Speech of February 18, 1801.
[11] Thiers, Cons. et Empire, vol. i., p. 332.
[12] See ante, p, 251.
[13] Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. p. 410.
[14] Ibid., vol. vi. p. 497.
[15] "Voyant bien," says M. Thiers, Bonaparte's panegyrist, "que Malta ne pouvait pas tenir longtemps." (Cons. et Emp., vol. ii. p. 92.)
[16] Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. p. 498.
[17] Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. p. 520.
[18] See vol. i. pp. 249, 256.
[19] Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. p. 738, Jan. 21, 1801.
[20] Contrast Bonaparte's reliance upon the aggregate numbers of Baltic navies with Nelson's professional opinion when about to fight them. "During the Council of War (March 31, 1801) certain difficulties were started by some of the members relative to each of the three Powers we should have to engage, either in succession or united, in those seas. The number of the Russians was in particular represented as formidable. Lord Nelson kept pacing the cabin, mortified at everything which savored either of alarm or irresolution. When the above remark was applied to the Swedes, he sharply observed, 'The more numerous the better;' and when to the Russians, he repeatedly said, 'So much the better; I wish they were twice as many,—the easier the victory, depend on it.' He alluded, as he afterwards explained in private, to the total want of tactique among the Northern fleets." (Col. Stewart's Narrative; Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iv. p. 301.)
James, who was a careful investigator, estimates the allied Russian, Swedish, and Danish navies in the Baltic at fifty-two sail, of which not over forty-one were in condition for service, instead of eighty-eight as represented by some writers. "It must have been a very happy combination of circumstances," he adds, "that could have assembled in one spot twenty-five of those forty-one; and against that twenty-five of three different nations, all mere novices in naval tactics, eighteen, or, with Nelson to command, fifteen British sail were more than a match." (Nav. Hist., vol. iii. p. 43; ed. 1878.)
[21] Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. p. 747. To Talleyrand, Jan. 27, 1801.
[22] Nelson's Letters and Dispatches, vol. iv. p. 295.
[23] While this work was going through the press, the author was gratified to find in the life of the late distinguished admiral Sir William Parker an anecdote of Nelson, which, as showing the military ideas of that great sea-officer, is worth a dozen of the "go straight at them" stories which pass current as embodying his precepts. "Throughout the month of October, 1804, Toulon was frequently reconnoitred, and the frigates 'Phoebe' and 'Amazon' were ordered to cruise together. Previous to their going away Lord Nelson gave to Captains Capel and Parker several injunctions, in case they should get an opportunity of attacking two of the French frigates, which now got under weigh more frequently. The principal one was that they should not each single out and attack an opponent, but 'that both should endeavor together to take one frigate; if successful, chase the other; but, if you do not take the second, still you have won a victory and your country will gain a frigate.' Then half laughing, and half snappishly, he said kindly to them as he wished them good-by, 'I daresay you consider yourselves a couple of fine fellows, and when you get away from me will do nothing of the sort, but think yourselves wiser than I am!'" ("The Last of Nelson's Captains," by Admiral Sir Augustus Phillimore, K. C. B., London, 1891, p. 122.)
[24] Nels. Disp., vol. iv. p. 355. See also a very emphatic statement of his views on the campaign, in a letter to Mr. Vansittart, p. 367.
[25] Nelson's Disp., April 9, 1801, vol. iv. pp. 339 and 341.
[26] The Danes were moored with their heads to the southward.
[27] If Nelson had an arrière pensée in sending the flag, he never admitted it, before or after, to friend or foe. "Many of my friends," he wrote a month after the battle, "thought it a ruse de guerre and not quite justifiable. Very few attribute it to the cause that I felt, and which I trust in God I shall retain to the last moment,—humanity." He then enlarges upon the situation, and says that the wounded Danes in the prizes were receiving half the shot fired by the shore batteries. (Nels. Disp., vol. iv., p. 360.)
[28] April 20, 1801. Nels. Disp., vol. iv. p. 355, note.
[29] Jurien de la Gravière, Guerres Maritimes, vol. ii. p. 43, 1st edition.
[30] Having destroyed Copenhagen, we had done our worst, and not much nearer being friends.—Nels. Disp., vol. iv. p. 361.
[31] The second embargo was laid on Nov. 7, 1800, for the sole purpose of enforcing the surrender of Malta to Russia. (Annual Register, 1800; State Papers, p. 253.) It antedated by six weeks the declaration of Armed Neutrality, by which the other powers, on the plea of neutral rights, agreed to arm. (Ibid., p. 260.) In fact, the other powers urged upon Great Britain that the Russian sequestration being on account of Malta, they had no share in it, and so were not subjects for retaliation; ignoring that they had chosen that moment to come to Russia's support.
[32] Annual Register, 1801; State Papers, p. 246.
[33] Nels. Disp., vol. iv., pp. 349, 352.
[34] Ibid., p. 349; also see p. 379.
[35] Ibid., vol. iv. p. 416.
[36] Nels. Disp., vol. iv. p. 373.
[37] For the important bearings of this stipulation, which was made as an additional and explanatory declaration to the main convention (Annual Register, 1801; State Papers, p. 217), see post, Chapter XVI. It was a matter in which Russia, not being a carrier, had no interest.
[38] For instance, Thiers, H. Martin, and Lanfrey.
[39] Corr. de Nap. vol. vii. p. 25.
[40] Corr. de Nap. vol. vii. p. 47.
[41] For full particulars of Bonaparte's views for the ships in Brest, which then contained the large body of Spaniards brought back by Bruix the previous August, see Corr. de Nap. vol. vi. pp. 181, 186. It must be remembered that there was then practically no French line-of-battle force in the Mediterranean.
[42] Corr. de Nap., vol. vi. pp. 262, 263.
[43] The advantage of the close watch is also shown by the perplexity arising when an enemy's squadron did escape. In this case, seven ships-of-the-line were detached from the Channel fleet in chase of Ganteaume, but "owing to lack of information" they were sent to the West Indies instead of the Mediterranean. (James, vol. iii. p. 73.) The latter was sufficiently controlled by Keith with seven sail-of-the-line in the Levant, and Warren with five before Cadiz, to which he joined two more at Minorca.
[44] See ante, vol. i. p. 68, for particulars.
[45] In the above the attempt has been merely to summarize the rapid succession of events, and the orders issuing from Bonaparte's intensely active mind to meet the varying situations. Reference may be made by the student to his correspondence, vol. vi. pp. 719, 729, 745; vol. vii. pp. 4, 24-26, 69-73, 125, 144, 164, 197, 198.
[46] This ship, the "St. Antoine," was one of those ceded to France by Spain.
[47] Ross's Life of Saumarez, vol. ii. p. 21.
[48] March 2, 1801. Corr. de Nap., vol. vii. p. 72.
[49] The treaty was signed June 6, and ratified June 16. (Ann. Reg. 1801; State Papers, p. 351.) Bonaparte received his copy June 15. (Corr. de Nap., vol. vii. p. 215.)
[50] Corr. de Nap., vol. vii. p. 256.
[51] Ibid., p. 266.
[53] Ann. Reg. 1801; State Papers, p. 257.
[54] Paul I. had particularly held to the preservation of Naples and the restitution of Piedmont to the king of Sardinia. On April 12 the first consul heard of Paul's death, and the same day issued an order making Piedmont a military division of France. This was purposely antedated to April 2. (Corr. de Nap., vol. vii. p. 147.) Talleyrand was notified that this was a first, though tentative, step to incorporation. If the Prussian minister remonstrated, he was to reply that France had not discussed the affairs of Italy with the king of Prussia. (Ibid., p. 153.) Alexander was civilly told that Paul's interest in the Italian princes was considered to be personal, not political. (Ibid., p. 169.) The Russian ambassador, however, a month later haughtily reminded Talleyrand that his mission depended upon the "kings of Sardinia and the Two Sicilies being again put in possession of the states which they possessed before the irruption of the French troops into Italy." (Ann. Reg., 1801; State Papers, pp. 340-342) Liguria (Genoa) was also made a military division of France by order dated April 18. (Corr. de Nap., vol. vii. p. 162.)
[55] While refusing this in his instructions to the French negotiator, the latter was informed he might yield it, if necessary. (Corr. de Nap., vol. vii., pp. 255-258.)
[56] Corr. de Nap., vol. vii. p. 323.
[57] Parliamentary History, vol. xxxvi. p. 47.
[58] Commentaires de Napoléon, vol. iii. p. 377.
[59] Hist. de France depuis 1789, vol. i. p. 396.
[60] Speech of Nov. 3, 1801.
[61] Annual Register 1801, p. 280.
[63] Am. State Papers, vol. ii. pp. 509, 511.
[64] Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 511.
[65] The slightest delay under these circumstances is very prejudicial, and may be of great consequence to our squadrons and naval expeditions.—Corr. de Nap., March 11, 1802.
[66] Corr. de Nap., March 12, 1802, vol. vii. p. 522.
[67] Ibid., April 3, 1802, vol. vii. p. 543.
[68] Corr. de Nap., July 1, 1802, vol. vii. p. 641.
[69] Ibid., April 13, 1801, vol. vii. p. 153.
[70] Ibid., April 18, 1801, vol. vii. p. 162.
[71] Corr. de Nap., August 2, 1802, vol. vii. p. 696.
[72] Ibid., vol. vii. pp. 528, 544.
[73] Ibid., vol. vii. p. 578.
[74] Decree of Nov. 19, 1792.
[75] Thiers, Cons. et Emp., livre xv. p. 38.
[76] Ibid., livre xv. pp. 50, 51.
[77] Ibid., xvi. p. 234.
[78] Note Verbale. Remonstrance addressed to the French government. (Ann. Reg. 1802; State Papers, p. 675.)
[79] Lord Hawkesbury's speech; Parl. Hist., vol. xxxvi. p. 971.
[80] Parl. Hist., vol. xxxvi. p. 1380.
[81] Annual Register, 1803, p. 681.
[82] Secret Instructions to Lord Whitworth; Yonge's Life of Lord Liverpool, vol. i. p. 93.
[83] Adams, Hist. of the United States, 1801-1817, vol. ii. pp. 13-21.
[84] The San Domingo expedition cost the lives of over twenty-five thousand French soldiers.
[85] The British ambassador in Paris reached the same conclusion from the instructions sent by Talleyrand to the French envoy in London. "It appears from this note that this government is not desirous to proceed to extremities; that is to say, it is not prepared to do so." (March 18; Parl. Hist., vol. xxxvi. p. 1315.) The United States minister in Paris also wrote, March 24, "Here there is an earnest and sincere desire to avoid war, as well in the government as the people." (Am. State Papers, ii. 549.)
[86] Instructions to Duroc, March 12, 1803, Corr. de Nap., vol. viii. pp. 307-311. It is noteworthy that these instructions were issued the same day that was received in Paris information of the king's message to Parliament of March 8, that "in consequence of military preparations in the ports of France and Holland he had adopted additional measures of precaution." Two days later the militia was called out.
[87] Corr. de Nap., vol. viii. p. 308.
[88] Parl. Hist., vol. xxxvi. p. 1293.
[89] Speech of May 23, 1803.
[90] Naval Chronicle, vol. ix. pp. 243, 247, 329, 330, 332, 491.
[91] Am. State Papers, vol. ii. p. 553.
[92] Ibid.
[93] In case of war, it was the purpose of the British government to send an expedition to occupy New Orleans, as it did afterwards in 1814. (Am. State papers, vol. ii. pp. 551, 557.)
[94] Napoleon to Talleyrand; Corr. de Nap., May 13, 1803.
[95] Thiers, Consulat et Empire, livre xx. p. 182.
[96] The French republic had devoured under the form of assignats an immense amount of national property.—Thiers: Cons. et Emp., livre xvii. p. 377.
[97] "Holland," says Thiers, "would have wished to remain neutral; but the first consul had taken a resolution, whose justice cannot be denied, to make every maritime nation aid in our strife against Great Britain." (Cons. et Emp., livre xvii. p. 383.)
[98] Metternich's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 48, note.
[99] Chénier's Vie du Maréchal Davout, Paris, 1866.
[100] See Naval Chronicle, vol. x. pp. 508, 510; vol. xi. p. 81. Nelson's Dispatches, vol. v. p. 438.
[101] Pellew's Life of Lord Sidmouth, vol. ii. p. 237.
[102] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iv. p. 452.
[103] Parl. Debates, March 15, 1804.
[104] Mémoires du Duc de Raguse, vol. ii. p. 212.
[105] Nelson's Disp. and Letters, vol. iv pp. 444-447.
[106] Nelson's Disp., vol. iv. p 500.
[107] James, Nav. Hist., vol. iii. p. 212 (ed. 1878).
[108] See Cobbett's Reg., vol. v. pp. 442, 443, for some very sensible remarks on Pitt's attack, written by Cobbett himself.
[109] Stanhope's Pitt, vol. iv. p. 94.
[110] Parl. Debates, 1804, p. 892.
[111] Nels. Disp., vol. v. p. 283.
[112] Ibid., p. 306.
[113] Ibid., p. 174. The following references also show conditions of Nelson's ships: vol. v. pp. 179, 211, 306, 307, 319, 334; vol. vi. pp. 38, 84, 99, 100, 103, 134, 158.
[114] Corr. de Nap., vol. viii. p. 657.
[115] Corr. de Nap., vol. ix. p. 168.
[116] Nels. Disp., vol. v. pp. 115, 136.
[117] "It is at best but a guess," to use his own words, "and the world attaches wisdom to him that guesses right." (Nels. Disp., vol. vi. p. 193.)
[118] See Nels. Disp., vol. v. pp. 179, 185, 247, 309, 374.
[119] Nels. Disp., vol. v. p. 309.
[120] Ibid., p. 374.
[121] Ibid., p. 388.
[122] Ibid., pp. 405, 411.
[123] Ibid., p. 498.
[124] Ibid., p. 411.
[125] Ibid., p. 300.
[126] Nels. Disp., vol. v. p. 306.
[127] Ibid., pp. 253, 254.
[128] Ibid., p. 438.
[129] Ibid., p. 388.
[130] Ibid., p. 395.
[131] See Nels. Disp., vol. v. pp. 145, 162, 413; vol. vi. pp. 84, 328, 329.
[132] Corr. de. Nap., vol. ix. p. 226.
[133] Corr. de Nap., vol. ix. p. 475.
[134] Ibid., p 513.
[135] Ibid., Sept. 12, 1804.
[136] Corr. de Nap., vol. ix. p. 700, Sept. 29, 1804.
[137] The former Spanish part of the island was still in the hands of France.
[138] Corr. de Nap., Sept. 27 and 29, 1804.
[139] For Bonaparte's attitude toward Spain, see two letters to Talleyrand, Aug. 14 and 16, 1803; Corr. de Nap. vol. viii. pp. 580-585.
[140] Signed Oct. 19, 1803. (Combate Naval de Trafalgar, by D. José? de Couto, p. 79.)
[141] Parl. Debates, 1805, vol. iii. p. 70.
[142] Parl. Debates, 1805, vol. iii. p. 72.