Introduction.
The king, in Rabbi Jehudah ha-levi’s Cuzari, anxious to lead a good and religious life, was told by an angel who appeared to him in a dream that his heart was good, but his deeds were not acceptable. The purity and goodness of our heart certainly ennobles our deeds and gives them the stamp of sincerity and holiness, though they may not be marked by absolute perfection. But an inner voice, our conscience, does not allow us to be content with the goodness of the heart; we feel the necessity of seeking also perfection of words and deeds. We wish not only our heart but also our entire self to be good, so that our inner life and outer life, our feeling and thinking, our speaking and doing, may combine into one harmonious whole, which comes as near perfection as possible.
It has been shown above that one of the principles of faith which we confess is our belief in the Divine origin of the Torah, and in the obligatory character of its precepts. When we pray to God to make us understand the Torah we are not content with the mere knowledge of the words of the Law; we also seek God’s assistance to enable us “to obey, to observe, and to [234]perform” all that He has commanded us. Man’s nature is not the same in all individuals; one person finds special delight in the performance of this duty, another in the performance of that. Every one likes to devote his energies to that work for which he considers himself best qualified, and which promises to yield the best fruit. But this individual liking or aptitude must not mislead us into thinking that the Law is divided into important and unimportant precepts. So far as they represent the Will of the Almighty they are all alike, and equally demand our attention and our obedience. Thus the קבלת עול שמים,1 our unconditional submission to the Will of the Almighty as our King, is followed in our Service by קבלת עול מצות,1 the acknowledgment of the binding force of His precepts.
There are persons who question the wisdom and usefulness of the precepts; they call it legalism, and are opposed to the tendency of subjecting every act of ours to the control of the Law. They argue that legalism tends to weaken our regard for the Law, and trains hypocrites rather than true servants of the Lord. It is a bold assertion, but one that rests on imagination and prejudice. Is it possible that such a constant reminder of God’s presence as the Divine precepts supply should not have a beneficent influence over us, by making us feel encouraged by His presence when we are engaged in a good cause, and discouraged when we are about to do wrong? If persons are found who are [235]devout worshippers at one time and criminals at another, it only shows human weakness in the moment of trial in spite of good resolves and genuine devotion; and were it not for the effect of such devotion, the number of crimes would probably be far greater.
A truly pious man will never imagine that he may freely transgress one set of the precepts, if he strictly obeys another set; that he may, e.g., wrong his neighbour, and compensate for his sins by regular attendance at the place of worship, or by a strict observance of the dietary laws, or the laws of Sabbath and Festivals; or that he may freely break the latter, if only he is honest, just, and charitable. The precepts have all the same Divine origin; the all-wise and all-kind God, who has commanded us to walk in the way of justice and righteousness, has also ordained the Sabbath, given the dietary laws, and established the sacrificial service. He who selects some of the precepts and rejects the rest substitutes his own authority for that of the Almighty, and places his own wisdom above the wisdom of Him who gave us the Law.
“Be as zealous in the performance of an unimportant precept as of an important one,” is one of the maxims taught in the “Sayings of the Fathers.” A difference between precept and precept is here admitted, but only in so far as they seem to us more or less important, with regard to the good which their observance produces or the evil which is caused by their neglect. In case of a conflict of two duties we give the preference to that which seems to us more important. In times of religious persecution the question frequently arose how far resistance was necessary, and how far religious practice might [236]yield to physical force. The rule has been laid down, that when our life is threatened we may transgress any precept; but we must not allow ourselves, under any circumstances, to be forced to idolatry, murder, or adultery (עבודה זרה גלוי עריות ושפיכות דמים); we must prefer death to committing any of these sins. But in times of trouble and persecution the spirit of resistance is as a rule too strong to be kept within the strict lines of demarcation, and life is willingly and heroically sacrificed for any religious duty. This is not surprising, for every religious act which is chosen by the enemy as a test to prove the faithfulness or the faithlessness of the persecuted sect to its own religion, receives thereby the stamp of great importance.
Similar questions are also asked in times of peace, when some of our brethren reject the authority of the Oral Law, while others refuse even to recognise the authority of the Written Law, when some set aside the Divine precepts out of convenience, and others from principle, and still others from ignorance; when some limit their Judaism to the nominal membership of the Jewish race, and others to a negation of other creeds. Are all these Jews? Whatever the answer to this question may be from a practical, political, social, and communal point of view, the fact is that they are Jews. They may have forfeited certain privileges, they may be disqualified for certain religious offices, they may be dangerous to the religious peace of our family or community: they are notwithstanding Jews, and are bound to live in accordance with the Law which the Almighty has given to the Jews and for the Jews. Our Sages say: אף על פי שחטא ישראל הוא, “Although a man may have sinned, he [237]is an Israelite still.” No theologian, Rabbi, or teacher, or Beth-din, or Sanhedrin, has the power of granting absolution, or telling those who break or reject any portion of the Divine precepts that they are not doing wrong. No human being has the authority to abrogate laws revealed by God. Why then, some may ask, do prophets and moralists, the Rabbis of the Talmud not excluded, single out ethical principles for special recommendation to their fellow-men, generally observing silence about the rest of the Divine commands? The answer is simple. The ethical principles and the Divine commandments embodying them are different in kind from the rest of the commandments. The latter are distinct, well defined, and the punishment for their transgression is fixed; they are unchangeable, and not capable of expansion.
The dietary laws, e.g., are exactly the same now as they were in the days of Moses. So also the laws concerning Sabbath. What was then prohibited by the Sabbath is prohibited still. The ethical principles, however, are capable of development, and the moral standard rises with the progress of civilisation. Hence the constant dissatisfaction of prophets, preachers, and teachers with the moral principles of their followers. They have a higher standard of morality, and strive to raise the moral consciousness of their generations to their own height.
It is, therefore, no wonder that the prophet Isaiah exhorts his brethren: “Wash you, make you clean; put away the evil of your doings from before mine eyes; cease to do evil: learn to do well: seek judgment, relieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow” (i. 16, 17). “He that walketh righteously, [238]and speaketh uprightly; he that despiseth the gain of oppressions, that shaketh his hands from holding of bribes, that stoppeth his ears from hearing of blood, and shutteth his eyes from looking upon evil, he shall dwell on high,” &c. (Ibid. xxxiii. 15, 16). In the same sense the virtuous man is described by all prophets; also in Ps. xv. and Ps. xxiv.
R. Akiba says: “ ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself’ (Lev. xix. 18) is an important principle in the Torah,” but at the same time he shows what importance he ascribes to all other principles and precepts of the Law by most carefully examining the details of every one of them alike. The great Hillel told the Gentile who desired to become a Jew: “ ‘Do not to thy neighbour what is hateful to you;’ this is our whole religion;” but that he did not ignore the remainder of the Torah, or consider it as not essential, is proved by the additional words: “The rest is its explanation; go and learn” (Babyl. Talmud, Sabbath, 31a). Hillel only gave the proselyte a lesson which would lead him to obey all the words of the Almighty.
Rabbi Simlai (Yalkut on Micah vi. 8) said: “Six hundred and thirteen commandments were given to Moses on Mount Sinai; David reduced them to eleven (Ps. xv.); Isaiah reduced them to six (xxxiii. 16, 17); Micah (vi. 8) to three; then Isaiah reduced them again to two (lvi. 1); and Habakkuk to one—Faith (ii. 4).” This Rabbi does certainly not mean to say that Isaiah cancelled some of the eleven virtues mentioned by David, or that Habakkuk only demanded Faith, and did not consider it essential that man should be righteous, truthful, &c. Rabbi Simlai intended only [239]to point out that by training ourselves in the practice of certain virtues, the fulfilment of all Divine precepts will be greatly facilitated.
All the commandments of the holy Torah are equally Divine. Laws concerning justice and humanity, and laws concerning Sabbath and Holydays, are equally introduced by the declaration, “And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying.” The commandments, “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,” and “A garment of diverse kinds, of linen and wool, shall not come upon thee,” stand side by side in the same paragraph. The equality of all the precepts as the expression of the Will of the Almighty is clearly set forth in the Law, in the frequent exhortations that the Israelites should obey all the precepts, whatever their nature may be, whether they be of the class of “statutes” or of “judgments,” or of any other class of Divine commands. (Comp. Exod. xv. 25, 26; Lev. xxvi. 15, 43; Num. xv. 39, 40; Deut. iv. 1, 5, 8, &c.)
As to the various terms employed in the Pentateuch to designate the Divine precepts: words (דברים), commandments (מצוות), statutes (חקים), judgments (משפטים), and laws (תורות), they may be considered as synonyms signifying similar things. But even synonyms are as a rule distinguished from each other by a certain variation in their meaning, especially when the terms occur in one and the same sentence. A definition of these terms is not given in the Pentateuch or in the Bible; from the context, however, in which they occur the following distinction may be drawn:—
חק or חקה, “statute,” is applied to those laws which are absolute and do not depend on certain conditions, [240]whilst mishpat, “judgment,” is a law the performance of which varies according to circumstances. Thus the Paschal sacrifice is called chukkah, and must absolutely be performed, whilst the civil laws concerning slaves, damages, &c., are mishpatim, because cases of slavery or damages need not occur, and the respective precepts are then not carried into effect. In a similar manner Jewish theologians divide the Divine precepts into מצות שמעיות and מצות שכליות precepts which our duty of obedience to God makes us perform, and precepts which, without distinct Divine command, our own reason would impel us to do.—The other terms, mitsvah, “commandment,” and mishmereth, “charge,” are used in a general sense, the former in reference to the Giver of the law, and the latter in reference to those to whom it is addressed.
The division of the precepts into שמעיות and שכליות is a vague one, and the line of demarcation will be moved farther to the one side or the other, according to the judgment exercised by the interpreter. Of greater importance is the division into positive and negative precepts, commandments, and prohibitions, מצות עשה and מצות לא תעשה. The prohibitions are of two kinds: such as admit of amends being made for their transgression and such as do not admit: שיש בה קום עשה and שאין בה קום עשה.
The number of the commandments is, according to Rabbi Simlai, 613 (תר״יג), and in some editions of the Pentateuch the number of each commandment has been noted in the margin. Rabbi Moses ben Maimon, in the introduction to his Mishneh-torah, enumerates the 613 mitsvoth. They are also contained in liturgical [241]compositions, called אזהרות “exhortations,” or “precepts,” such as are met with in the Machzor for the Feast of Weeks.
Maimonides, in “The Guide” as well as in Mishneh-torah, treats of the precepts of the Torah under the following fourteen heads: (1) Fundamental principles of our faith;2 (2) Divine worship; (3) Sabbath and festivals; (4) Marriages; (5) Forbidden food and forbidden relations of the sexes; (6) Vows; (7) Agriculture; (8) The Temple and the regular sacrificial service; (9) Occasional sacrifices; (10) Cleanness and uncleanness; (11) Compensation for damages; (12) Transfer of property; (13) Contracts; (14) Administration of the law.
Another theologian, Rabbenu Jakob, divided the code of laws into four sections: (1) Divine worship, Sabbath, festivals, and fasts; (2) Things forbidden and things permitted in satisfying our bodily desires; (3) Marriages; (4) Civil laws.
The latter work was recast by Rabbi Joseph Caro, [242]and in the new form, with the new title Shulchan Aruch, it has become the standard work of Jewish law and life, and its authority has been recognised and upheld by Jews in the East and the West. Annotations (הגהות) were added by Rabbi Moses Isserles, but his opinion, when differing from that of Rabbi Joseph Caro, was only accepted by the Polish and German Congregations, not by the Sephardim.
Rabbi Joseph Caro, Rabbenu Jakob, and Maimonides appear, in their respective codes, not as legislators but as compilers. The Torah and the Talmud were the sources from which they all drew their laws. But laws, minhagim or customs, and institutions (תקנות) of a post-Talmudic date were not neglected. Questions arising in the course of time, through new and changed conditions of life, are, as a rule, discussed and decided in notes and commentaries on the Shulchan Aruch. There are also numerous special works on such occasional questions; they are called “Responsa” (תשובות “Answers,” or שאלות ותשובות “Questions and Answers”), and the importance attributed to them varies according to the reputation of the respective authors.
What is the object of the Divine laws? This is a question that naturally rises in the minds of those to whom they are addressed. But the question has been anticipated by Him “who knoweth the thoughts of the sons of man,” and the answer is found in clear and distinct words in the fountain of living waters, the Torah, that never fails to satisfy our thirst for truth: “Thou shalt keep his statutes and his commandments which I command thee this day, that it may be [243]well with thee and thy children after thee” (Deut. iv. 40). “And now, O Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but to fear the Lord thy God, to walk in all his ways and to love him, and to serve the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul: to keep the commandments of the Lord and his statutes which I command thee this day, for thy good” (ibid. x. 12, 13). It is for our benefit, for our well-being, that the laws were revealed to us; they serve to make us good and happy; they train us in the mastery over our appetites and desires, in the practice of charity and justice, and in the conception of noble, pure, and lofty ideas, and bring us nearer and nearer in perfection the Being in whose image and likeness we have been created.
What share each individual precept has in the attainment of this end we cannot state with certainty, because in the Torah the reason and purpose of each precept is, with very few exceptions, withheld from us. In many cases our reflection on the nature of a special law, or on the context in which it occurs in the Pentateuch, leads to a discovery of some reason for it. But, whatever reason we may thus discover, we must not lose sight of the fact that it is we who have found it, we whose knowledge is imperfect, and that we or others might in future discover a better reason. If we, e.g., find that certain dietary laws serve to train us in temperance, and see that the virtue of temperance is frequently recommended in the Bible, we may well obey these dietary laws, and strive to be temperate in every respect in accordance with the spirit we detect in them. It would, however, be a gross error if, believing [244]the training in temperance to be their only object, we assumed that we could neglect them, and attain the same object by substituting our own insufficient knowledge and imperfect reason for the Will and Wisdom of the most perfect Being. Moralists, our teachers and preachers of ancient and modern times, have found in these precepts an inexhaustible treasure of lessons exhorting to virtue and warning against vice, and the great variety of inferences thus drawn from the same source proves the error of those who imagine that their own exposition is the only right one. Whatever reason we assign to a religious precept, and whatever wholesome lesson we derive from it, our first duty towards the commandment, and towards Him who commanded it, is strict and unconditional obedience.
Maimonides, who may be considered as the representative of the school which seeks to establish a rational explanation for all precepts, admits that the reason we may assign to any of the commandments cannot affect their validity and immutability, and we are bound to obey them, although the supposed reason may be of a local or temporary character. According to Maimonides, the object of the Law is to promote the well-being of our body and the well-being of our soul; and every commandment has therefore some bearing upon one of the following three things: the regulation of our opinions, the removal of sin, or the teaching of good morals. He does not except the “statutes” from this rule, but confesses that in a few cases he is unable to show clearly the relation of the commandment to any of these objects. He also restricts the principle of rational interpretation to the main element in each commandment, [245]and does not apply it to its details; the latter, as a rule, do not demand an explanation. He says:—
“The general object of the Law is twofold: the well-being of the soul and the well-being of the body” (Guide, iii. 27). “I am prepared to tell you my explanations of all these commandments (the so-called chukkim or “statutes”), and to assign for them a true reason supported by proof, with the exception of some minor rules and of a few commandments. I will show that all these and similar laws must have some bearing upon one of the following three things, viz., the regulation of our opinions or the improvement of our social relations, which implies two things: the removal of wrong-doing and the teaching of good morals” (ibid. xxviii.). “The repeated assertion of our Sages that there are reasons for all commandments, and the tradition that Solomon knew them, refer to the general purpose of the commandments, and not to the object of every detail. This being the case, I find it convenient to divide the six hundred and thirteen precepts into classes; each class to include many precepts of the same kind. I will first explain the reason of each class of precepts, and show their common object, and then I shall discuss the individual commandments and expound their reasons. Only very few will be left unexplained, the reason for which I have been unable to trace unto this day. I have also been able to comprehend in some cases even the object of many of the conditions and details of the laws as far as it can be discovered” (ibid. xxvi.).
“It is also important to note that the Law does not take into account exceptional circumstances; it is not based on conditions which rarely occur.” “We must [246]therefore not be surprised when we find that the object of the Law does not fully appear in every individual case.” “From this consideration it follows that the Law cannot, like medicine, vary according to the different conditions of persons and times. Whilst the cure of a person depends on his particular constitution at the particular time, the Divine guidance contained in the Law must be certain and general, although it may be effective in some cases and ineffective in others. If the Law depended on the varying conditions of man, it would be imperfect in its totality, each precept being left indefinite. For this reason, it would not be right to make the fundamental principles of the Law dependent on a certain time or a certain place. On the contrary, the statutes and the judgments must be definite, unconditional, and general, in accordance with the Divine words: ‘As for the congregation, one ordinance shall be for you and for the stranger’ (Num. xv. 15). They are intended, as has been stated before, for all persons and for all times” (ibid. xxxiv.).
In the present treatise our religious duties will be expounded under the following seven heads:—
- 1. Exposition of the Decalogue.
- 2. General ethical principles—
- (a.) Duties towards God.
- (b.) Duties,, towards,, our fellow-men.
- (c.) Duties,, towards,, ourselves.
- 3. Outward reminders of God’s Presence.
- 4. Sabbath, Festivals, and Fasts.
- 5. Divine Worship.
- 6. Dietary Laws.
- 7. Jewish Life.
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