THE MISSION OF
COLONEL SIR CHARLES WILSON,
R.E., K.C.M.G.
Very severe criticisms have been made upon the manner in which Sir Charles Wilson carried out the duties that had been entrusted to him, with regard to communicating with General Gordon at Kartoum.
The charges made against him may be with advantage restricted to two:—
First—The delay in not proceeding to Kartoum at the latest on the morning of the 22nd; and
Second—In not having pushed on to Kartoum itself in order to ascertain General Gordon’s fate beyond a doubt.
Sir Charles Wilson left England in order to assume the position of Head of the Intelligence Department, and also with the tacit understanding that he was to be specially employed in order to open direct communication with General Gordon.
Having this special object in view, Sir Charles Wilson accompanied Sir Herbert Stewart’s force towards the Nile; and, when that gallant and highly-distinguished officer was wounded on the 19th January, he found himself in command.
Now this force, which did not equal a British battalion upon its war strength, was hampered with a number of wounded officers and men, some of whom were with it, while others—the bulk—were in a zereba constructed at some distance in its rear.
Sir Charles Wilson, however, advanced to the Nile, where he bivouacked for the night; and on the morning of the 20th he returned to the zereba, and brought back with him to Gubat the wounded who had been left behind.
Early in the morning of the 21st, General Gordon’s steamers appeared, and landed their soldiers, who took part in the operations of that day.
Reports now reached Sir Charles Wilson that, exclusive of the Arabs in Metemma, large numbers were advancing from the North and from the South. It therefore became imperatively necessary for him to secure the safety of those who were under his orders before he could proceed upon his mission.
Accordingly, on the morning of the 22nd, he made a reconnaissance towards the North, and, finding no enemy, he turned his attention to the South.
The whole of the 23rd was occupied in making arrangements for the proper protection of his force, and he could not have left before the morning of the 24th.
It may here be observed, in confirmation of the report of the Arabs advancing from the south, that Sir Charles Wilson, on his road to Kartoum, saw a body of men at a place on the left bank of the Nile, about twelve miles south of Gubat.
It is really beyond the question to consider what General Gordon’s position at this time was at Kartoum. When General Gordon sent down his last journal, on the 14th December, he stated he could not hold out for more than ten days, and he was in daily expectation that the Fort at Omdurman would fall; while even then, with that Fort in his possession, he considered it would be very hazardous for any steamer to attempt to come up to Kartoum. On the 28th November he says: “I hope the officer in command will clear Halfeyeh before he pushes on to this, for he may get a shell from the works at Omdurman (not the Fort) into one of his steamers. I do not like to risk sending the Bordeen steamer down to give the warning. If the steamers do come up, and have not the sense to stop at Halfeyeh, I shall endeavour to warn them. The danger is at the Ras or nose, on the junction of the Blue and White Niles. The proper thing to do would be to clear Halfeyeh camp of the Arabs before coming on here. You could then communicate with Kartoum by land, and avoid running the gauntlet of Arab guns in penny steamboats.”
Now if General Gordon so expressed himself on the 28th November, two months before Sir Charles Wilson got to Kartoum, and when the fort at Omdurman and the island of Tuti were both in the General’s hands, what must have been the state of affairs when both those positions had fallen and were in the possession of the Arabs?
Returning to Sir Charles Wilson’s progress with his detachment of only twenty men, when he got to the point of danger, as pointed out by General Gordon, he found himself under a cross fire of artillery and musketry from all points of the compass, including Kartoum itself. Under such circumstances he had no alternative but to retire, since, had he continued his journey, he could never have secured his retreat.
Consequently I cannot but express my feeling that on neither head of charge does any blame attach to Sir Charles Wilson.
H. W. Gordon.