7. Distribution of Salvage Award.—
The rule of the admiralty is that all who materially contribute to the rescue are entitled to share in the award. Thus the master and crew of the salving vessel are entitled to participate with the owner, according to their individual exertions and success. The owner should not appropriate the whole unless the crew were especially employed for the work. The court will frequently divide the amount between the owner and the crew and apportion the share of the latter in proportion to their wages. The principal element in determining the owner's share is the value of the ship and the risk to which it was exposed. Under special circumstances the cargo-owner may also participate.
Where the salving vessel is a steamer the owners' share of the salvage is larger and that of the crew proportionately smaller than if she were a sailing vessel or other craft because of the superior efficiency of a steamer in salvage work. Credit and compensation for the superior character of the salving vessel must go to her owners. In Transportation Co. v. Pearsall, 90 Fed. 435, there is a discussion of salvage distribution. In that case three tugs, all belonging to the same owner, had salved a steamer which had gone ashore. The owner of the tugs affected a settlement with the owners of the steamer and received $13,000 in full of all demands. A libel in personam against the master and owner of the tugs was brought by the engineer and fireman of the third, each claiming a share of the $13,000. The court decided that the owner of the tugs was entitled to two-thirds of the salvage award, and ordered the remaining one-third to be distributed among the masters and crews of the tugs proportionately, awarding the engineer $500 and the other libellants $200 apiece, these awards being in proportion to their wages. The court remarked that under the rule once prevailing in admiralty the owners of the salving vessel could not receive more than one-third of the award unless there were unusual circumstances of peril to the salving vessel, that that rule had been modified in the direction of greater liberality to steamships, citing cases in which the share of the salving vessel had been fixed at three-fourths and even four-fifths. The Court said:
An examination of the cases will show that there is no fixed rule with regard to the proportion in the salvage award allotted to the owners of the salving vessel. Most frequently salvage services are rendered upon a voyage, in the absence of the owners, and when the salving vessel is under the charge of, and is controlled by, the master and crew. As salvage is awarded for the encouragement of promptness, energy, efficiency, and heroic endeavor in saving life and property in peril, the claims of the master and crew who exhibited these qualities must meet the most favorable consideration. At the same time an allowance is made for the owners whose property has been imperiled. But when the owners direct the service, or when the peril encountered is chiefly that of the salving vessel, with no proportionate peril to the crew, an award to the owners is more liberal.
It was also said that the making of distribution in proportion to the wages is a "just and uniform rule in all ordinary cases."
Where salvage is performed by successive sets of salvors,—for instance, if one set of salvors gets a ship off a reef, and a second set takes her into port—the award is apportioned between the two sets, special consideration being shown to the first set of salvors because they made the work of the second possible.
8. Distribution of Liability for Payment.—
The vessel, cargo, and freight money saved are to contribute to the payment of the salvage award according to their relative values at the port of rescue. As between the ship and cargo, each is liable for its own proportion alone. The salvor cannot recover the entire salvage from either, but only the proportion for which respondent is liable. As was said by Justice Story in Stratton v. Jarvis, 8 Peters 4:
It is true that the salvage service was in one sense entire; but it certainly cannot be deemed entire for the purpose of founding a right against all the claimants jointly, so as to make them all jointly responsible for the whole salvage. On the contrary, each claimant is responsible only for the salvage properly due and chargeable on the gross proceeds or sales of his own property pro rata. It would otherwise follow that the property of one claimant might be made chargeable with the payment of the whole salvage, which would be against the clearest principles of law on this subject.
Where a ship is saved and unable to continue her voyage and carry out her contracts of affreightment, the freight is one of the things of value saved, but in determining the value of the freight saved for the purpose of assessing a salvage award against it, "the freight to be considered is only such proportion of the freight earned by the entire voyage as the distance at which the salvage service was rendered from the port of departure bears to the whole voyage." The Sandringham, 10 Fed. 556.
9. Statutory Regulations.—
By the Act of August 1, 1912, (7 U. S. Comp St. §§ 7990-7994) it is provided that the right to remuneration for salvage services shall not be affected by the fact that the same person owns both vessels; that the master must render assistance to every person found at sea who is in danger of being lost, so far as he can do so without serious danger to his own vessel, under penalty of not exceeding one thousand dollars or imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both; that salvors of human life are entitled to share in the award; that salvage suits must be brought within two years; and that nothing in the Act shall apply to ships of war or Government ships on public duty.
10. Instances of Salvage Services.—
Where a fishing schooner on the Atlantic picked up a floating body on which was a wallet containing a considerable sum of money and promptly delivered the treasure to the court, they were awarded one-half the amount, to be apportioned one-third to the owners of the fishing vessel, one-third to the master and one-third to the crew; the master's share was made somewhat larger because he had resisted the proposal of some of the crew to merely divide the coin and say nothing. The balance was turned over to the public administrator of Massachusetts to hold for the benefit of the unknown heirs, and, if they failed to appear, for further disposition according to law (Gardner v. Gold coins, 111 Fed. 552). The Egyptian obelisk, now in London and known as "Cleopatra's Needle," became the subject of salvage services in the Bay of Biscay, during its voyage from Alexandria and the award was two thousand pounds (see Dixon v. Whitworth, 4 Asp. M. L. C. 138, 327). In the Jefferson, 215 U. S. 130, the vessel was in a drydock and threatened by a conflagration on adjoining property; tugs stood by and played streams from their hose upon her until the danger was past. The court overruled the argument that the service could not be salvage because the vessel was not afloat and directed an award. Where, however, a steamer had been swept high and dry on the shore about a hundred feet above high-water mark and lay there five years, the court declined to consider as salvage the plan and work of floating her by dredging out a basin and canal for her flotation; she had ceased to be engaged in commerce and navigation and the contract was not maritime (Skinner, 248 Fed. 818). The doctrine of this case will probably not be extended beyond its own facts. In the Burlington, 73 Fed. 258, where the ship had been stranded to put out a fire and lay as a menace to navigation while the owner and underwriters were in dispute as to his right to abandon, and the salvor brought her safely into port, he was awarded the entire value as salvage; while in Murphy v. Dunham, 38 Fed. 503, where the salvor proceeded on the erroneous idea that the cargo-owner's title is extinguished when his property sinks, and salved it for his own use, he was only allowed his expenses and narrowly escaped being assessed for the full value. The Albany, 44 Fed. 431, is another instance of the persistence of the old notion that title is acquired by finding property lost at sea; the ship had stranded and the master was jettisoning a valuable cargo of package freight; the countryside swarmed with wagons and lighters to appropriate what could be obtained. The Court held the parties as for embezzlement and said there was a medieval flavor about their conduct which recalled to a student of maritime law the customs of the ancient Gauls, who not only appropriated the cargoes of vessels wrecked on their coasts but sold their crews into slavery or sacrificed them to their gods. The Court quoted the following succinct statement of the nature of salvage from Mr. Justice Story:
In cases of salvage, the party founds himself upon a meritorious service, and upon an implied understanding that he brings before the court, for its final award, all the property saved, with entire good faith, and he asks a compensation for the restitution of it uninjured and unembezzled by him. The merit is not in saving the property alone, but it is in saving and restoring it to the owners. However meritorious the act of saving may have been, if the property is subsequently lost, and never reaches the owner, no compensation can be claimed or decreed.
11. Distinction Between General and Particular Average.—
The former is a partial loss, voluntarily incurred for common safety, and recompensed by all benefited thereby; the latter is a partial loss involuntarily caused, which must be borne by the party on whom it falls. One of the most approved definitions of general average is,—"All loss which arises in consequence of extraordinary sacrifices made, or expenses, incurred, for the preservation of the ship and cargo, comes within general average, and must be borne proportionately by all who are interested."
In the case of Barnard v. Adams, 10 How. (U. S.) 270, the ingredients of general salvage were thus stated:
In order to constitute a case for general average, three things must concur:
1st. A common danger; a danger in which the ship, cargo and crew all participate; a danger imminent and apparently "inevitable," except by voluntarily incurring the loss of a portion of the whole to save the remainder.
2nd. There must be a voluntary jettison, jactus, or casting away, of some portion of the joint concern for the purpose of avoiding this imminent peril, periculi imminentis evitandi causa, or, in other words, a transfer of the peril from the whole to a particular portion of the whole.
3rd. This attempt to avoid the imminent common peril must be successful.
12. Essential Elements.—
The rule expresses the plainest principles of common justice but is confined to maritime law and within somewhat precise limitations. The sacrifice for which contribution is sought must be directed by the master of the ship or by his authority;[26] it must be voluntary and for the safety of the entire venture;[27] it must be necessary and successful;[28] and neither the party whose fault occasioned the loss nor any outside of the interests represented in the ship and cargo can have contribution.[29] Thus the scuttling of a ship by order of port authorities to extinguish a fire in the hold is not general average, although it would have been if done by order of the master. If the vessel is stranded by force of wind or current, there is no general average loss, while if the master deliberately puts her ashore, choosing the locality to escape a greater danger, it will be considered a case for general average by American law. Where the master threw overboard a quantity of coin, not to save the ship and cargo, but to prevent the money falling into enemy hands, it was not general average although it would have been if his purpose had been to lighten the ship in order to escape. Where the sacrifice is not necessary, in a pecuniary sense, for the common safety, it is not allowed, as where a vessel met a foundering emigrant ship and threw overboard part of its cargo in order to take the passengers on board; this was not a general average loss entitling the owner of the cargo to contribution. When the sacrifice is unsuccessful there is no general average, as where the master of a ship which was dragging her anchors cut away the masts to prevent the drifting, but she finally went ashore; and where the cause of the sacrifice is a fault of the ship or defect in the cargo, contribution is denied; so also when a tug cuts the towline of her barges in a storm to save herself from going ashore with them and thereby saves herself.
13. Instances of General Average.—
The classic example[30] is throwing overboard (or, as it was called, jettisoning) a part of the cargo in order to escape a storm. Thus if there is a ship worth $20,000, freight list, $10,000, and cargo $70,000, of which X owns $30,000, Y $20,000, and Z $20,000, and $10,000 of X's goods were jettisoned, each interest, including X, will bear 10 per cent of the sacrifice; the ship pays X $2,000; the freight list pays him $1,000; and Y and Z pay him $2,000 each; he receives $7,000 and stands $3,000 and so the sacrifice is equally borne by all. Cargo may be burnt as fuel, or lost by a sale or pledge to raise money to continue the voyage; a mast may be cut away to lighten the ship or the engines injured by overwork to escape disaster or expenses incurred by deviating to a port of refuge for repairs; cargo may be warehoused or transshipped; salvage expenses may be incurred in saving the venture from a stranding or sinking after a collision; and all the various and multiform forms of loss sustained and expenses incurred for common safety, within the definition, are made good by the contribution of all.
Ordinarily a jettison of cargo carried on deck does not give rise to general average, although deck cargo is not exempt from contributing its share of the average for other cargo jettisoned for its safety. But deck cargo will be entitled to participate in general average where the goods are of such character as it is customary in the trade to carry on deck; also where the other cargo-owners have expressly consented that it be carried on deck; also usually in coasting and river voyages. The cases excluding deck cargo from average have generally arisen out of sailing vessels and it may be that the rule should be confined to sailing vessels.
14. The Adjustment.—
This ascertains the amount of the claim and the respective shares of contribution. It is the duty of the master and shipowner to see that timely steps are taken for this purpose.
After a voluntary sacrifice of part of the adventure, and a consequent escape of the rest from imminent peril, the owner of the ship, or in his absence, the master as his agent, has the duty of having an adjustment made of the general average, and has a maritime lien on the interests saved, and remaining in his possession, for the amount due in contribution to the owner of the ship; and the owner of goods sacrificed has a corresponding lien on what is saved, for the amount due him (Ralli v. Troop, 157 U. S. 386).
The work is usually done by an adjuster and often requires a high degree of professional skill. He determines what losses are to be adjusted, what goods contribute, how the values of the receiving and contributory interest are estimated, and when and where the adjustment should be made. He must necessarily bring to this work a special acquaintance with maritime law and the current decisions of the courts on the subject as well as a practical acquaintance with the values involved and the methods of business which they represent. He is, however, merely an expert without any judicial authority and his work is subject to review by the parties in interest. In practice, the shipowner places in his hands the documents from which the necessary facts can be ascertained; the protest of the master and mariners showing the circumstances under which the sacrifice was made and the manifest of the cargo to show the goods involved will be essential; in addition there may be the report of surveyors as to the condition and value of the ship and other property involved and such other evidence as the adjuster requires to have before him, the valuations of hull, cargo, freight and all other items involved in the contribution, excepting the wages of the master and crew, their personal effects and the apparel, jewelry and baggage of the passengers.
[24] Teutonia v. Erlanger, 248 U. S. 521.
[25] See § 10, this title, infra.
[26] The reason is that the master "derives his authority from the implied consent of all concerned in the common adventure" (The Hornet, 17 How. 100). "The character of agent respecting the cargo is thrown upon the master by the policy of the law, acting on the necessity of the circumstances in which he is placed" (The Gratitudine, 3 C. Rob. Adm. 240).
[27] "Where the sacrifice, while for the general benefit of the whole adventure, was also for the particular benefit of the cargo, it was not a subject of general average" (The Mary, 1 Sprague 19).
[28] Expenses voluntarily and successfully incurred, or the necessary consequences of resolution voluntarily and successfully taken, by a person in charge of a sea adventure, for the safety of life, ship and cargo, under the pressure of a danger of total loss or destruction imminent and common to them, give, the ship being saved, a claim to general average contribution (Abbott on Shipping, 537, note).
[29] Thus where a tug abandoned her tow in order to save the tug; the owners of the tow were not entitled to general average contribution because it was not a part of the ship or cargo.
[30] Probably the earliest recorded case is that mentioned in Jonah 1, where cargo was jettisoned to lighten a ship in peril on a voyage from Joppa to Tarshish. The elements of general average were present, though it does not appear that an adjustment was made.
CHAPTER XIV
CRIMES COMMITTED AT SEA
1. Definition.—
A crime consists in the violation of a public law either forbidding or commanding an act to be done. One act may constitute several crimes against different jurisdictions, as against a State and the United States and a foreign country. Crimes are classified as treason, felonies and misdemeanors. Treason against the United States consists only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. Felonies are crimes punishable by death or imprisonment in a state prison; all other crimes are misdemeanors.
Crimes committed at sea are those accomplished upon the high seas or within the jurisdiction of the admiralty, which extends over all navigable waters. Such crimes are punishable by the United States so far as Congress legislates on the subject and otherwise by the particular sovereignty within whose jurisdiction the offense is committed.
2. Admiralty Criminal Jurisdiction.—
The constitutional grant embraces criminal as well as civil cases and no crime can escape punishment because committed on shipboard or on the high seas. The provisions of the Constitution in regard to the trial of crimes under the laws of the United States require the proceedings to be according to the practice of the common law, so that they are before a jury as in ordinary cases and the ordinary rules of criminal law are applied. These crimes are covered by the Criminal Code (10 U. S. Comp St. 1916, 10419-10444; 10445-10462; 10463-10483). There may also be other crimes according to the law of the place where the vessel may be or according to the laws of the State or country from which she hails. Merchant vessels are regarded for many purposes as floating portions of the country to which they belong and of the particular State of their home port. An American merchant vessel on the high seas will therefore continue under the appropriate laws both of the United States and of her own particular State, and while in foreign ports she will also be subject to local law. She will never be outside the scope of some law and although several jurisdictions may overlap, crimes committed on board will not escape punishment.
3. Place of Trial.—
Whenever an offense is committed on board of an American vessel, it is the duty of the master and crew to detain the offender and surrender him to the proper authorities for trial as soon as may be. If the offense is within the limits of a particular State, the trial must be in a Federal court therein; if committed on the high seas, then in a like court of the district wherein the offender is apprehended or into which he is first brought; if within a port of a foreign country, the local laws may prevail. The jurisdiction of every independent nation over the merchant vessels of other nations within its boundaries is absolute and exclusive and arrests may be made thereon and offenders removed for trial according to the laws of the locality. The right of local authorities to search a vessel in their ports for a person charged with crime is established unless modified by treaty. The master is bound to submit to the jurisdiction within which his vessel lies. In practice a distinction is made between offenses affecting the peace and dignity of the foreign country and those only involving the internal order and discipline of the ship. A certain comity preserves the latter from outside interference and local authorities will usually decline to act in such cases or interfere with the general authority of the master. It is frequently provided by treaty that disputes between the masters, officers and crews may be adjudicated by their consuls, provided that they do not disturb the peace or tranquillity of the port.
4. Offenses Not Consummated on Shipboard.—
Where the crime is committed on the high seas although not on shipboard, the admiralty jurisdiction as administered by the Federal courts will still be enforced. The case of Holmes, 1 Wall. Jr. 1; 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,383, is an unusual example. The American ship, William Brown, loaded with passengers and cargo, struck an iceberg in the North Atlantic and had to be abandoned. Nine of the crew and thirty-two passengers got into the longboat; Holmes was one of the crew and took charge of her in an attempt to reach Newfoundland, then about three hundred miles away. The longboat proved leaky and was so seriously overloaded by those on board as to fill with water in the sea which began to rise. In the face of urgent necessity and under Holmes' general directions, sufficient of the passengers were thrown overboard to enable the boat to float until picked up by a passing ship. Holmes was convicted of manslaughter in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
5. Penalties and Forfeitures.—
The ship herself may be a quasi-criminal under maritime law. All commercial nations find it necessary for the enforcement of their laws and regulations in regard to commerce by sea, to impose penalties upon the vessel by or through which violations occur. So a vessel which has engaged in any piratical aggression may be condemned and sold for the use of the United States. Violation of a blockade or carriage of contraband of war renders the ship liable to seizure and sale by the Government. A ship licensed for the coasting trade may be forfeited if she engages in any other, and many penalties may be inflicted upon the vessel for acts of which the owner is entirely innocent. Similarly a false oath made in order to obtain the registry of a vessel, or any other fraud for the purpose of obtaining registry, enrollment or licenses will result in her forfeiture, and so will a sale to an alien without complying with the provisions of the statutes (Chapter 11, § 10, supra). Forfeiture of a vessel will also result from an attempt to change her name, otherwise than by the method provided by law (Chapter 11, § 9, supra), or to deceive the public as to her true name and character by any contrivance, device or advertisement of law where the owner or the master is privy to the offense, as for example the importation of diseased cattle. The doctrine of the personality of the ship again appears in the criminal law of the admiralty which treats her like an individual for purposes of regulation and punishment. The principle was laid down by Justice Story in the brig Malek Adhel, 2 How. (U. S.) 210:
It is not an uncommon course in the admiralty, acting under the law of nations, to treat the vessel in which or by which, or by the master or crew thereof, a wrong or offense has been done as the offender, without any regard whatsoever to the personal misconduct or responsibility of the owner thereof.
*****
The acts of the master and crew, in cases of this sort, bind the interest of the owner of the ship, whether he be innocent or guilty; and he impliedly submits to whatever the law denounces as a forfeiture attached to the ship by reason of their unlawful or wanton wrongs.
Thus if a vessel fails to carry the wireless equipment prescribed by law a fine is imposed upon the master and is a lien upon the ship enforceable by law in admiralty. The statute governing the equipment of vessels with radio telegraph apparatus is given under § 11 infra. Innocent cargo is not involved in the forfeiture of a guilty vessel, and where the owner and master of a vessel is innocent she will not usually be forfeitable by reason of the guilt of the cargo.
The sending, or attempting to send to sea, of a vessel so unseaworthy as to be likely to endanger life, is a misdemeanor for which the person guilty is to be punished by fine or imprisonment, or both (Act of December 21, 1898, § 11), unless he is able to prove either that he used all reasonable means to insure her being sent to sea in a seaworthy state, or that her going to sea in an unseaworthy state was under circumstances reasonable and justifiable.
6. Federal Criminal Code.—
This was promulgated by the Act of March 4, 1909, and will be found in 10 Comp. St. 1916, commencing at page 12491. Maritime offenses are grouped in Chapter 11, "Offenses within the admiralty and maritime and the territorial jurisdiction of the United States," and Chapter 12, "Piracy and other offenses upon the Seas." Unlike the legislatures of the several States, which have an inherent power to define and punish any act as a crime, subject to constitutional limitations, Congress is confined to the powers enumerated in the Federal Constitution. In regard to offenses at sea, its power is derived from § 8 of Article 1, "To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations," and from Article III which provides that the judicial power shall be versed "in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish" and shall extend "to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." Chapter 11 provides for the punishment of murder, manslaughter, felonious and simple assaults, attempts to commit murder or manslaughter, rape, seduction, loss of life by misconduct of officers of vessels, maiming, robbery, maritime arson, larceny and receiving stolen goods, when committed upon the high seas, or any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, or within such admiralty jurisdiction on board of any vessel belonging in whole or in part to the United States, or any citizen thereof, or corporation created under its laws or those of any of its States, Territories or Districts; also, when committed upon any American vessel on a voyage on the Great Lakes, or upon any island, rock or key, containing deposits of guano and appertaining to the United States.
Chapter 12 provides for the punishment of piracy; maltreatment of crews; incitement of revolt or mutiny; seamen laying violent hands on commanders; abandonment of mariners in foreign ports; conspiracy to cast away vessels; plundering vessels in distress; holding false lights; attacking vessels with intent to plunder; breaking and entering vessels; destruction of vessels at sea; robbery on shore by pirates; arming vessel to cruise against citizens; piracy under color of foreign commission; piracy by aliens; voluntary surrender to pirates; plotting or corresponding with pirates and selling arms or intoxicants to any aborigines in Pacific Islands. The punishments provided for the offenses in these two chapters are generally severe but in harmony with what experience has shown to be appropriate for the crimes dealt with.
Besides these provisions, the Code, in Chapter 10, deals with the slave trade and peonage; in Chapter 2, with offenses against neutrality; and in Chapter 9, with offenses against foreign and interstate commerce, such as carrying explosives on passenger vessels.
Title LIII Merchant Seaman (7 Comp St. §§ 8380-8391) contains various provisions in respect of offenses and punishments of seamen; desertion; willful disobedience; assaults on officers; damaging the vessel; embezzlement of stores or cargo; smuggling; drunkenness; carrying sheath-knives; unlawful boarding; soliciting seamen as lodgers; and corporal punishment are there dealt with.
7. Concurrent Jurisdictions.—
There is no doubt that Congress has the power to make all crimes committed within the admiralty jurisdiction punishable in the federal courts but it has not done so and is not likely ever to so enact. Neither is it likely ever to assert an exclusive jurisdiction over all or any such crimes except as may be in violation of a purely federal enactment. Where this exclusive jurisdiction has not been asserted, either in terms or by necessary implication, state laws are not superseded by federal, and the same act may be punished as an offense against the United States and also as an offense against the State; it may thus be within the jurisdiction of both federal and state courts or the one may have jurisdiction of it under one aspect and the other under a different phase. The rule of comity is the same as in civil cases; where there is concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first obtains it, will continue to act to the exclusion of the other. Where the defendant obtains an acquittal in one court of concurrent jurisdiction, the judgment is a bar to a subsequent trial in the other, since he is not subject, for the same offense, to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.
8. Limitations of Prosecutions.—
The right of the government to prosecute for a crime is not barred by any lapse of time unless its statutes so expressly provide. In the federal courts, there must be an indictment within three years after the offense was committed, in most instances; for the slave trade, the term is five years; but these terms do not run while the offender is a fugitive from justice.
9. Piracy.—
While the majority of offenses under maritime law only differ from like offenses on land in respect of locality, piracy is confined to the water. Pirates are enemies of all mankind and the offense is against the universal laws of society. There is a piracy, therefore, by the law of nations and those guilty of it are subject to pursuit, seizure and punishment by the vessels of every nation. There is also a statutory piracy which is punishable only within the limits of the jurisdiction which defines it. The pirate by the law of nations is an outlaw whom any nation may capture and punish. He is one who, without legal authority from any state, attacks a ship with the intention to appropriate what belongs to it; in other words, his offense is that of depredation on the high seas without authority from any sovereign state. All private, unauthorized maritime warfare is piratical because it is incompatible with the peace and order of the high seas. It is not necessary that the motive be plunder or that the depredations be directed against the vessels of all nations indiscriminately; it is only essential that the spoliation, or intended spoliation be felonious, that is, done willfully and without legal authority or lawful excuse. In cases of this piracy by international law, it is of no importance, for purposes of jurisdiction, where or against whom, the offense is committed; such pirates may be tried and punished and the ship captured and condemned wherever found. Apart from international law, any government may declare offenses on its own vessels to be piracy and such offenses will be exclusively punishable by it like other crimes. St. Clair v. U. S., 154 U. S. 134, may be examined in regard to an instance of statutory piracy; while the Ambrose Light, 25 Fed. 408, is a very learned and authoritative opinion on the modern views of piracy under international law.
10. Barratry.—
This expression frequently appears in maritime law and includes any act done by the master or crew, with criminal intent, in violation of their duty to the shipowner and without his connivance. It is a general term applicable to many criminal acts and therefore not properly classifiable as a crime by itself. The most flagrant form is where the ship is burned, scuttled or stranded by the master or crew. In Marine Insurance it includes every wrongful act willfully committed by the master or crew to the prejudice of the owner, or, as the case may be, the charterer.
Inasmuch as barratry must be directed against or in fraud of the owner, it cannot be committed by a master who is a part owner of the ship, either generally or for the voyage. Thus in the old case of Marcadier v. Ins. Co., 8 Cranch 39, the master abandoned the voyage at an intermediate port for his own emolument and advantage, and, as a result, a quantity of cargo was spoiled. It was contended that he had been guilty of barratry. The Court found, however, that he was the owner of the ship and therefore incapable of committing the offense. In Ins. Co. v. Coulter, 3 Peters 222, it was held that gross negligence might be evidence of barratry:
And when it is considered how difficult it is to decide where gross negligence ends and ordinary negligence begins, and to distinguish between pure accident and accident from negligence, we cannot but think that the British courts have adopted the safe and legal rule in deciding, that where the policy covers the risk of barratry, and fire be the proximate cause, they will not sustain the defense that negligence was the remote cause.
This case contains a quaint quotation from the doctrine of Malynes "whose book unites the recommendations of antiquity, good sense and practical knowledge." The passage follows:
Barratrie of the master and mariners can hardly be avoided, but by a provident care to know them, or at least the master of the ship upon which the assurance is made. And if he be a careful man, the danger of fire above mentioned will be the less for the ship; boys must be looked unto every night and day. And in this case let us also consider the assurers; for it has oftentimes happened, that by a candle unadvisedly used by the boys, or otherwise, before the ships were unladen, they have been set on fire and burnt to the very keel, with all the goods in them, and the assurers have paid the sums of money by them assured. Nevertheless, herein the assurers might have been wronged, although they bear the adventure until the goods be landed; for it cometh to pass sometimes, that whole ships' ladings are sold on shipboard, and never discharged.
11. Failure to Equip with Radio Telegraph.—
By Act of Congress approved June 24, 1910, 36 St. at L. 629, it is provided that it shall be unlawful for any oceangoing steamer, whether American or foreign, carrying passengers and carrying fifty or more persons, including passengers and crew, to leave any port of the United States unless equipped with efficient apparatus for radio communication in good working order, capable of communicating over a distance of at least one hundred miles, night or day, and in charge of a competent operator. To be efficient the apparatus must be capable of exchanging messages with stations using other systems of radio communication. A fine of not more than $5,000 is assessed against the master or other person in charge for violation of the act and as has been said (§ 5 supra) the fine is a lien upon the ship. Regulations for the enforcement of the act are made by the Secretary of Commerce. The act does not apply to steamers plying between ports less than 200 miles apart.
12. Failure to Disclose Liens.—
By the Ship Mortgage Act, 1920 (see Appendix, Merchant Marine Act, Sec. 30), a mortgagor of a preferred mortgage is required, upon request of the mortgagee, to disclose the existence of any maritime lien, prior mortgage or other liability upon the vessel, known to the mortgagor, and to refrain, until the mortgagee has had an opportunity to record the mortgage, from incurring liens upon the vessel except for wages, general average and salvage. Disobedience to this injunction with intent to defraud is made a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 and imprisonment of not more than two years, or both, and the mortgage debt is to become due immediately.
13. Mutiny.—
This term is most often used with reference to an offense committed on shipboard, although technically it is not peculiar to shipping, but may be committed by soldiers and servants. Mutiny on shipboard is defined as follows: "A revolt or mutiny consists in attempts to usurp the command from the master or to deprive him of it for any purpose by violence or in resisting him in the free and lawful exercise of his authority; the overthrowing of the legal authority of the master, with an intent to remove him against his will and the like." Mere refusal of duty or disobedience by a seaman while liable to punishment by the master is not mutiny, and the conduct may be very aggravating and contumacious without amounting to mutiny. The Stach Clark, 54 Fed. 533.
CHAPTER XV
WRECKS AND DERELICTS
1. Definitions.—
In a legal sense, the word wreck includes ships and cargoes, or any parts thereof, which have been cast on shore by the sea, and derelict applies to similar property abandoned on the sea. The terms should be understood as limited to things of a maritime nature and as including the old subdivisions of flotsam, jetsam and ligan,—flotsam being the name for the goods which float when the ship is sunk, jetsam meaning those which are jettisoned or thrown overboard, and ligan those cast into the sea but tied to a buoy or marker so that they might be found again. Derelict is the term applied to a thing which is abandoned at sea by those who were in charge of it, without any hope of recovery or intention of return.
2. Wrecks under the Common Law.—
It is said in Murphy v. Dunham, 38 Fed. 503, that the disposition of wrecks and derelicts is usually a fair index of the degree of civilization of the people within whose domains such property is found. In primitive societies, wrecks are treated as the plunder of the finder, or lord of the soil, since title depends on possession and the owner's rights disappear when his goods are separated from him. The common law of England long exhibited this imperfect notion of property. Blackstone, writing about 1760, points out that by the ancient common law, wrecked goods belonged to the King since by the loss of the ship all property left the original owner. This harsh rule was modified by statutes which declared, in substance, that if a man, dog, or a cat escaped alive out of the disaster, it was no wreck but might be reclaimed by the owner within a year and a day. In this country, colonial laws and current statutes have alike repudiated these primitive notions, and reënacting appropriate provisions of Roman and medieval sea-law, provide for safely keeping the property for the space of a year, or other reasonable time, for the owner, and delivering it to him on the payment of reasonable salvage; only in the event of the total failure of the owner to appear, do the goods or their proceeds pass to the state. The Act of Congress (10 U. S. Comp. St. 1916, § 10470) provides that whoever plunders, steals, or destroys any money, goods, merchandise, or other effects, from or belonging to any vessel in distress, or wrecked, lost, stranded, or cast away, upon the sea, or upon any reef, shoal, bank, or rocks of the sea, or in any other place within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than ten years; and whoever willfully obstructs the escape of any person endeavoring to save his life from such vessel, or the wreck thereof; or whoever holds out or shows any false light, or extinguishes any true light, with intent to bring any vessel sailing upon the sea into danger, or distress, or shipwreck, shall be imprisoned not less than ten years and may be imprisoned for life.
It is interesting to note, in connection with this statute, two Articles of the Rooles of Oléron,—
Article XXV
If a ship or other vessel arriving at any place, and making in towards a port or harbour, set out her flag, or give any other sign to have a pilot come aboard, or a boat to tow her into the harbour, the wind or tide being contrary, and a contract be made for piloting the said vessel into the said harbour accordingly; but by reason of an unreasonable and accursed custom, in some places, that the third or fourth part of the ships that are lost, shall accrue to the lord of the place where such sad casualties happen, as also the like proportion to the salvors, and only the remainder to the master, merchant and mariners: the persons contracting for the pilotage of the said vessel, to ingratiate themselves with their lords, and to gain to themselves a part of the ship and lading, do like faithless and treacherous villains, sometimes even willingly, and out of design to ruin ship and goods, guide and bring her upon the rocks, and then feigning to aid, help and assist, the now distressed mariners, are the first in dismembering and pulling the ship to pieces; purloining and carrying away the lading thereof contrary to all reason and good conscience: and afterwards that they may be the more welcome to their lord, do with all speed post to his house with the sad narrative of this unhappy disaster; whereupon the said lord, with his retinue appearing at the places, takes his share; the salvors theirs; and what remains the merchant and mariners may have. But seeing this is contrary to the law of God, our edict and determination is, that notwithstanding any law or custom to the contrary, it is said and ordained, the said lord of that place, salvors, and all others that take away any of the said goods, shall be accursed and excommunicated, and punished as robbers and thieves, as formerly hath been declared. But all false and treacherous pilots shall be condemned to suffer a most rigorous and unmerciful death; and high gibbets shall be erected for them in the same place, or as nigh as conveniently may be, where they so guided and brought any ship or vessel to ruin as aforesaid, and thereon these accursed pilots are with ignominy and much shame to end their days; which said gibbets are to abide and remain to succeeding ages on that place, as a visible caution to other ships that shall afterwards sail thereby.
Article XXVI
If the lord of any place be so barbarous, as not only to permit such inhuman people, but also to maintain and assist them in such villanies, that he may have a share in such wrecks, the said lord shall be apprehended, and all his goods confiscated and sold, in order to make restitution to such as of right it appertaineth; and himself to be fastened to a post or stake in the midst of his own mansion house, which being fired at the four corners, all shall be burnt together, the walls thereof shall be demolished, the stones pulled down, and the place converted into a market place for the sale only of hogs and swine to all posterity.
The Act of Congress and the ancient articles are both occasioned by the persistent notion of loss of title by shipwreck and the right of people on shore to appropriate what they can of the property at risk.