Clausel entered Mascara December 6, 1835. A miserable crowd of Jews was all that remained of its population. They came out of their dens to crouch at the feet of the victorious French. All masters were alike to these exiles from the Land of Promise. The Mohammedans had disdained to allow them to accompany them in their flight. On the 7th, flames burst forth in various parts of the town, but were soon extinguished. The French were just beginning to repose from their fatigues, and were contemplating a permanent occupation, when, to their surprise and disgust, they got orders to prepare for leaving. On the 8th December, Mascara was evacuated.
The next day, a horseman appeared before its gates. It was Abdel Kader. Rumours of his presence spread rapidly. Some Arabs made their appearance before him; they looked abashed and mistrustful. El Aoura, Aga of the Hashems, was amongst the number. In the flight, he had carried off the royal parasol. He now produced it. “Keep it for yourself,” said Abdel Kader, with a sarcastic smile; “you may, one of these days, be Sultan.”
As the day wore on, some of the fugitive chiefs came dropping in. Abdel Kader eyed them contemptuously. At last, one ventured to ask him, if he had any orders to give them. “My orders!” he exclaimed. “Yes, my orders are, that you instantly relieve me from the burden you imposed upon me, and which the interests of religion alone have enabled me to support, up to this hour. Let the tribes make choice of my successor, and inform Il Hadj Djellali of the result. I am going with my family to Morocco.”
By a common impulse, chiefs and men prostrated themselves before him, kissed his hands, his feet, his burnous, imploring pardon and forgiveness for the past, and promising fidelity and constancy for the future. “He was their father, their Sultan, the chosen of God to lead on the Djehad; their lives were his; if he left them, they had nought to do but surrender to the infidels.” At these last words, Abdel Kader turned round abruptly. The blood mantled to his cheeks. They had struck the only chord to which his heart responded—the sense of duty. “God’s will be done,” he exclaimed; “but remember, I swear never to enter Mascara except to go to the Mosque, until you have avenged your ignominious defeat. I see traitors amongst you; Mamoor yonder is one; let him be hung.” The unfortunate culprit was seized and executed forthwith.
The master spirit had prevailed; confidence was restored. That night, from the royal tent, dispatches went forth to all the tribes, summoning them to renewed action. On the morrow, Abdel Kader, buoyant and cheerful as ever, towering above misfortune, mighty in disaster, dauntless where all desponded, arresting victory in her flight from the very depths of humiliation and defeat, sallied forth, sword in hand, at the head of 6,000 cavalry, to attack and harass the French column, as, wrapped in tempest, drenched with rain, and benumbed with cold, it pursued its incomprehensible retreat on Mostaganem.
CHAPTER VII.
1836.
Notwithstanding Clausel’s temporary occupation of Mascara, Abdel Kader had already regained his ascendancy. Everywhere he was in possession of the field. Several tribes who had shown an inclination to accept the rule of the French were punished, either by money levied, or cattle distrained. Moreover Clausel sued for peace.
To the proposition that he should acknowledge the sovereignty of France, Abdel Kader replied, that before acknowledging a suzerain he should like to know precisely the extent of power and territory which he was to hold, as well as the obligations he should be called on to fulfil. Miloud ibn Arasch was invited to come to Oran to discuss the negotiation. Clausel was, at this time, meditating an expedition against Tlemsen.
The presence of the French in the interim had encouraged their partisans. Mustapha ibn Ismail had promised Clausel the co-operation of more than one Arab tribe, if he advanced upon Tlemsen. The Beni Engad declared themselves his friends, and they were already drawing near the town in large force with the view of assisting him, and aiding the escape of the Kolouglis from the citadel, in which the latter were still blockaded.
Abdel Kader hearing of this combination, made a rapid descent on both parties. He caught Mustapha and the Kolouglis in the very act of making a sortie, and drove them back. Turning round on the Beni Engad, he completely routed them. The action was scarcely over, when Clausel and his column, 8,000 strong, were seen marching on the town. Abdel Kader had barely time to complete its evacuation. He withdrew with the whole population, unmolested, to Ouchda, on the frontiers of Morocco. Clausel entered Tlemsen January 13th, 1836.
Mustapha and the Kolouglis, followed by a miserable crowd of Jews, presented themselves before the Governor-General and his staff, overwhelming him with exuberant professions of loyalty and submission, and calling him their saviour and benefactor. He demanded from them 100,000 francs as a proof of their sincerity. In vain the astonished dupes pleaded their utter inability to raise such a sum, Clausel was inexorable. The screw was mercilessly applied. Threats and blows, and even torture, were used, and the contribution was finally paid, partly in coin, partly in diamonds and articles of jewellery.
This mode of treatment pursued by the French was as great an advantage to the cause of Abdel Kader as any victory would have been.
“If that is the way,” he exclaimed, “the French treat their friends, what are their enemies to expect?”
It was diligently spread abroad that a Jew had presided at the tying up and castigation of the Kolouglis. The Arabs were furious. Such an indignity put upon Mussulmans had never been heard of. The Beni Engad opened a correspondence with Abdel Kader. The Kolouglis sent him word privately that they only awaited the departure of the French to give him up the citadel.
It was the intention of Clausel, however, to occupy the town, as he was extremely anxious to establish a direct communication between Tlemsen and the sea-coast. The mouth of the Tafna was the nearest available point for this purpose, but the intervening ground was mountainous. He set out to accomplish his object, January 23rd. He soon found himself in presence of Abdel Kader, with his whole army.
For ten successive days the battle raged between them. The Arabs, burning to avenge their late defeat, were obstinately tenacious. Abdel Kader, moreover, had not attempted a regular formation. Hills, ravines, rocks, and rivers were seized and defended, according to the exigencies of the moment. Against such tactics, and in an unknown country, French courage and discipline were at fault. Clausel was defeated and driven back to Tlemsen with considerable loss. After placing a garrison in the citadel under the command of Captain Cavaignac, he returned with his column to Oran, harassed by Abdel Kader to its very gates.
On his arrival at Algiers, he consoled himself for all his futile expeditions by issuing a proclamation declaring the war to be finished. “Abdel Kader,” it stated, “utterly beaten and discomfited, has fled to the Sahara, there to conceal his treason and revolt.” In April, the Marshal embarked for France, leaving instructions to General d’Arlanges at Oran, to make a fortified camp on the Tafna, with the view of opening from thence the desired line of communication with Tlemsen.
General Perregaux about this time made an incursion on the tribes located in the valley of the Cheliff. Influenced by their chiefs, the sons of Sidi il Aribi, these tribes had continued, despite their repeated corrections, to waver in their obedience to the Sultan. They had not paid the tribute without considerable reluctance and complaints, and they had furnished their contingent of cavalry to his army with manifest repugnance. They now, under pretence of superior pressure, again entered into an alliance with the French.
Abdel Kader was too much occupied, for the moment, with the blockade of Tlemsen and the proceedings of D’Arlanges on the Tafna, to interrupt the military promenade of Perregaux. But the recreant Arabs, who had welcomed the French general, were soon made to feel the weight of the Sultan’s indignation. No sooner had the French withdrawn than he came down on them like an avalanche. Eighteen tribes were heavily fined, and their cattle distrained. The Borgia tribe, singled out to serve as a terrible example, was decimated, and then driven out of the district to find shelter where it could.
D’Arlanges had reached the Tafna, with great difficulty, on the 16th of April, with 3,000 infantry and eight pieces of artillery. Having completed an entrenched camp on the banks of the river, he marched out on the 21st, in conformity with his instructions, to open the road to Tlemsen. Abdel Kader, who from the central position of Nedroma, which commanded equally the road from the Tafna to Tlemsen and to Oran, was able to watch his enemy’s movements in either direction, rapidly descended to the encounter, enveloped the French column with masses of Kabyles and Arabs, and obliged it to retrace its steps.
He owed this success to his own unwearied exertions and commanding influence. So long as he could keep each separate French garrison in a state of isolation, the game was his own. But to effect so comprehensive a plan, he was obliged to keep the whole country constantly on the alert. With this view he had for weeks past been traversing the mountains of the Kabyles which spread around the Tafna. Through toilsome days and sleepless nights he had been summoning, preaching, and haranguing. His fiery eloquence had raised the enthusiasm of those fierce and ungovernable mountaineers to a pitch of frenzy. When the time for action came, and Abdel Kader once more led them in person against the foe, they rushed to the combat more like wild beasts than men, came at once to close quarters with the French infantry, grappled with them in single combat, swept through their ranks, and rushed up to the cannon’s mouth.
The French government, irritated by such prolonged and unexpected resistance, continued to pour in reinforcements. On the 6th of June, 1836, General Bugeaud landed at the mouth of the Tafna with three fresh regiments. The attempt to force a passage to Tlemsen was immediately renewed, and, at last, the point was carried with success. Abdel Kader fought a long and desperate battle with the invading force on the banks of the Sikkak, but on this occasion he was completely defeated.
This reverse had its usual effect on the tribes. Many of the cavalry contingents rode off and returned to their homes. The sudden abandonment to which Abdel Kader was sometimes exposed, after a defeat, would have prostrated the energies of a weaker mind, and paralysed a less iron-moulded will. But such oscillations had long ceased to affect him. He well knew that whenever Fortune smiled, a wave of his sword would at any hour bring both waverers and rebels crouching to his feet.
But when he was informed that a certain Sidi Ibrahim had so far calculated on his present emergency as to excite a revolt against him, and even to assume the title of sultan, he drew his sword from its scabbard, hung it to his saddle bow, and vowed never to sheathe it or descend from his horse till he had the traitor’s head. Appearing almost singly in the midst of the tribe Beni Amers, among whom he knew the traitor to be, he demanded his instant delivery. The tribe, startled and subdued by this act of bold decision, and dreading the charge of complicity, gave up the rebel Sidi Ibrahim. His head was at once taken off.
Abdel Kader, by the ceaseless activity of his movements in all directions, and by the untiring vigilance with which he superintended his system of blockade, had again reduced the French to the greatest extremities. They had established posts in the interior, but they could neither reach them nor communicate with them. Their letters were intercepted. The bearers of them, when seized, were invariably decapitated. No friendly tribes brought the French provisions.
Whether at Oran, or at the Tafna, they could only move out in large bodies, and on such occasions large supplies, beasts of burden, and means of transport were required. The Douairs and Zmelas, seeking shelter under the walls of Oran, lived upon the rations scantily doled out to them by their protectors. At Tlemsen, Cavaignac was buying cats for his table at 40 francs a head.
In the month of November, 1836, Clausel, who had returned to his post, undertook the siege of Constantine, the stronghold of Achmet Bey, the last representative of the Turkish power in Algeria. Abdel Kader abstained from taking any steps which might thwart the complete development of that design. Whether the French were successful in their design or not, he flattered himself that he should be the gainer in the end. He felt that if the Bey were vanquished, he should be delivered, without cost or trouble to himself, from a dangerous rival, and that the Arab tribes of the province of Constantine would then be free to join his standard. If he were triumphant, the French, wearied out by the difficulties of their general position in the country, might abandon it; in which case, a struggle between himself and the Bey for the mastery would neither be doubtful as to its issue, nor of long duration.
But when the expedition failed, he felt his hour was come. From his head-quarters at Medea, he issued orders for a simultaneous advance against all the French possessions between the Atlas and the sea-coast. In the province of Oran little remained to be effected. But the plain of the Metija was at his mercy. Thousands of Arabs and Kabyles, supported by the tribes of Tittery, descended like a torrent from the mountains, sacking and burning the French colonial establishments, slaying and capturing the colonists, and carrying terror and dismay into Algiers itself.
The state to which the French garrisons were now reduced was pitiable. The utmost ingenuity of their commissariat was daily and hourly taxed to avert the horrors of famine. Fortunately for the French, they were relieved from their painful predicament by the speculative genius of a Jew.
Durand, the Sultan’s wily and influential agent at Algiers, had long been feasting his imagination with the splendid harvest he should gather, could he only be constituted sole conductor of commercial transactions between the contending parties. To this end he had for months been labouring to convince Abdel Kader that the advantages, even in a military point of view, to be gained by feeding the French would far outweigh the value of any glory which might be gained by starving them.
Authorised to drive the best bargain he could, Durand hurried off to Oran, and opened a negotiation with General Broussard, who, at that period, was in command of the garrison.
“The French,” he said, “have need of corn and meat. The Sultan wants iron, lead, and sulphur. Let each party sell the other what it wants, and all will be satisfied. You need not fear that you will be in any degree compromised with the Sultan by such an arrangement. He will not appear in the matter at all. I will sell you corn and cattle; and you will sell me iron and sulphur. The Sultan will merely know, indirectly, that the former articles are for you, and the latter for him. The Sultan will even go so far as to allow you to re-victual Tlemsen; but as such a concession would undoubtedly exasperate and disgust the Arabs, to whom the presence of the French in that town is hateful, he can only take on himself the odium and responsibility of granting it, on the condition that all the prisoners taken at the battle of the Sikkak are set free and sent back to him.”
Broussard at once accepted the proposal. The French again enjoyed the long unaccustomed luxury of abundance. Abdel Kader, on his side quietly obtained from his enemies, reduced to assume the garb of friends, the materials of war, which were hereafter to be wielded against them.
Not only did this singular contract, as it turned out, give him the means of increasing his aggressive power, but, at the same time, it also raised his prestige. To the sneers of fanatics, who reproached him with his defeats, and the complaints of whole families, constantly demanding their lost ones, languishing in the prisons of the infidel, he could now reply by triumphantly pointing to prisoners arrested from the victor’s hands, restored to their homes, and able again to take part in the holy war. Such was the state of affairs when General Bugeaud arrived from France at Oran, with instructions either to make peace with Abdel Kader, or to conquer him.
Wishing to try, in the first place, to effect a negotiation, he sent him the following propositions as a basis of accommodation:—
1. Acknowledgment of the sovereignty of France.
2. Limitation of his territory to the river Cheliff.
3. Payment of tribute.
4. Delivery of hostages, as guarantee for, and the due execution of, any future treaty which might be agreed on.
Abdel Kader replied, through his agent Durand, that having never experienced any fatal check, and having amply compensated himself for any disasters which had temporarily befallen him, he could never consent to be placed in a position inferior to that which he enjoyed by the treaty of Desmichels; that Arabs would never hear of living under even the nominal dominion of Christians; and that if France endeavoured to place them under it by force she would be embarking in an endless war. He declared, moreover, that he had not entered the province of Tittery from any design of his own, but had been summoned thither by the voice of its inhabitants, and that neither his honour nor his religion would allow him to abandon those who had thrown themselves on his protection. He added, that in his opinion the real interest of France was not to seek an extension of sway over populations irreconcilably hostile to her, but rather to confine herself to commercial enterprise in the towns on the sea-coast.
By the voice of his agent, Abdel Kader admitted, however, that he would consent to allow the French to occupy the Metija, or Plain of Algiers, with the exception of Blidah, which belonged properly to the mountains, and that he was willing to yield them all the territory near Oran, comprised between the Bridia and the Macta. He was ready, moreover, as he declared, to renounce the monopoly granted him by Desmichels, to allow complete freedom of commerce, and to guarantee the security, and repair the losses, if any occurred, of all Frenchmen who chose to settle in the interior. He would pledge himself, finally, never to give up any sea-port which was ceded to him to a foreign power.
Bold and dictatorial as such language appeared to the General, he preferred, under all circumstances, to continue in the path of concession, rather than to make any resistance which might have precipitated hostilities. His Government had expressly warned him against granting Abdel Kader any further extension of territory. The latter had firmly stated that he would not give up an inch of what he held. The General yielded, and on his own responsibility, offered to give up to Abdel Kader the province of Tittery, with the stipulation, however, that he should consent to be the vassal of France.
The following ultimatum, embodying the terms of this important compromise, was now drawn up, and forwarded to Abdel Kader. The circumscribed limits, within which the military representative of the French Government therein offered to confine his countrymen in Algeria, constituted a point which was in itself a glorious testimony to the successful prowess of the great leader who had hitherto rendered barren all the expeditions which the French had directed against him, and thwarted all their schemes of conquest.
1. The Emir will recognise the sovereignty of France.
2. France reserves, in the province of Oran, a belt, from ten to twelve leagues in breadth, beginning at the Rio Salado, and terminating at the Cheliff. In the province of Algiers, he reserves Algiers, and all the province of that name. She cedes to the Emir the province of Tittery and that of Oran, excepting the belt afore-mentioned.
3. The Emir will pay an annual tribute in corn and cattle.
4. There shall be perfect freedom of commerce.
5. All the goods which the French have acquired, or may acquire, in the country will be guaranteed.
This ultimatum reached Abdel Kader at Medea, where he had already opened negotiations with General Damremont, the new Governor-General of Algeria, not without sanguine hopes of a satisfactory result. He now found himself engaged with two negotiators, both willing to treat with him on terms highly favourable to his views and expectations. Their zeal to conclude with him, indeed, amounted to rivalry.
Bugeaud had requested, as a particular favour from his Government, that to him alone should be reserved the glory of dealing with Abdel Kader. When, therefore, he learned that Damremont had entered into diplomatic relations with the Arab Sultan, his jealousy was aroused. He taxed his superior with exercising an unauthorised and unwarrantable intervention in a complication, the adjustment of which depended entirely on himself. A recriminating correspondence took place. Reference was made to the Minister of War, who decided that Bugeaud was to be left full liberty of action, without interference or supervision.
As soon as Abdel Kader heard of this decision, he returned to the province of Oran, and on the 12th of May sent the following propositions in reply to Bugeaud’s ultimatum:—
1. The Emir acknowledges the sovereignty of France.
2. All the Mussulmans who live outside the towns shall be under his jurisdiction.
3. The territory of the French to the west of Oran shall be confined to the country between Bridia and the sea, and extend as far as the Macta. On the side of Algiers, they will be allowed to hold the country between that town and the river Beni-Azza.
4. The Emir will give, for this year only, 20,000 measures of corn, 20,000 measures of barley, and 3,000 head of cattle.
5. The Emir shall be empowered to buy, in France, powder, sulphur, and arms.
6. The Kolouglis who choose to remain in Tlemsen, shall keep their properties, be under our power, and conform themselves to our land.
7. Those who leave the French territory, or the territory of the Emir, shall be reciprocally given up on the requisition of the one or the other party.
8. France cedes to the Emir, Rachgoun, Tlemsen, its citadel, and the mortars and cannons which anciently belonged to it. The Emir undertakes to transport the effects of the French garrison to Oran.
9. Commerce shall be free between the Arabs and the French.
10. The French shall be respected amongst the Arabs, as the Arabs amongst the French.
11. The farms and properties which the French may have acquired in the Metija shall be guaranteed. They shall enjoy them freely.
In the preceding stipulations, Abdel Kader made no allusion to the cession of Tittery and Oran. He looked on it as a matter of course, inasmuch as in the former province the French had not even the shadow of power; whilst in the latter they only traversed as birds of passage, flitting from town to town. But, bent on the consolidation of his power, and the strengthening of his lines of communication, he boldly insisted on the evacuation, by the French, of Tlemsen, and on their yielding up the port of Rachgoun.
But he went even still further. Feeling well his vantage-ground, and seeing the straits to which the French were reduced, he did not hesitate to require that all Mussulman residing on French territory should be under his exclusive jurisdiction. In this demand he endeavoured to carry out and enforce a principle which, in his eyes, was paramount to every earthly consideration, as based on the very essence of the Koran—the principle, that under no circumstances, if possible, should any Mussulman voluntarily acknowledge or submit to Christian rule.
At this period, Abdel Kader approached the zenith of his career.
CHAPTER VIII.
1837.
Nothing more loudly testifies to the immense superiority enjoyed by Abdel Kader, at this period, than the fact of his being in a position to advance such pretensions, and make such demands. Their real and evident meaning was, that he should be acknowledged Sultan of Algeria, whilst the French lived, as it were, under sufferance, on the outskirts of his empire, simply enjoying the advantage of trading with his subjects.
It must be borne in mind, at the same time, that Abdel Kader was perfectly aware of the state of public opinion in France. He subscribed regularly to the French journals. The debates in the Chambers, and the leading articles on Algerian affairs, were interpreted to him. He saw the liberal party cordially approving and supporting the principle laid down by their chief orator, M. Dupin, who denounced Algiers as a fatal legacy, bequeathed by the Restoration, which ought to be abandoned, “if,” as he exclaimed, “we would not see our last man, and our last sons, swallowed up.”
He gathered, from the general tenor of the passages which were read to him, that many of the principal politicians in France looked upon colonisation in Africa as a dream; that they considered all warlike operations there carried on as so much blood and treasure thrown away; and that they maintained the true policy of France to be, merely to hold a few places along the coast for the purpose of preventing piracy, and cultivating peaceable and honourable relations with the natives.
When, in addition to this, Abdel Kader saw the French Chambers making a practical comment on such sentiments, by refusing to vote more than 30,000 men for the colony, and learned, that after the disastrous retreat from Constantine, the opinion in favour of an immediate evacuation of the country began to prevail more than ever, it is not to be wondered at if he thought that, by a little pertinacity, and a little more perseverance, he should succeed in obtaining such terms as would enable him to realise his cherished idea of founding an independent Arab kingdom.
The propositions sent in by Abdel Kader seemed, to Bugeaud, so utterly incompatible with French interests, that he determined to carry out the second part of his programme,—an appeal to arms. In the beginning of May, 1837, he assembled his whole force, consisting of 12,000 men, in the camp of the Tafna, preparatory to offensive operations. When he came to review his resources, he found the transport service so utterly inadequate to the occasion, that he was obliged to suspend his march.
To procure animals from the interior was impossible. A supply from France was not expected. The summer heats, so fatal to soldiers in the field, were fast approaching. The time fixed for the second siege of Constantine was at hand, and he had engaged that a large portion of his little army should be sent round to take part in it. The home government had made its arrangements in full reliance on the fulfilment of this pledge. Peace with Abdel Kader, however humiliating, became a necessity. The latter was informed that the door was still open for negotiation. He asked leave for a few days’ consideration.
Various reasons conspired to make Abdel Kader anxious to base his action, in a measure of such importance as that of again making peace with the French, on an appeal to the wishes of the tribes at large. The fanatical party accused him of personal ambition, and of sacrificing the uncompromising principles of the Faith to his own selfish views of aggrandisement. The restless, the lawless—all, in fact, who preferred unbridled liberty to the solid advantages springing from a well-established central power, and who felt that the return of peace would hand them over unreservedly, and without the power of resistance, to the master-hand which would soon reduce them to implicit obedience—only wanted a pretext to assume the cloak of religion, and join the fanatics in their senseless cry.
With well-timed skill and foresight, Abdel Kader now resolved to cut the ground from under the feet of both these parties. The demand for peace, or, rather, the willingness to accept it, ought, he opined, to be looked on as a national act. A general assembly was summoned to meet on the banks of the Habra, May 25, 1837; and thither, according to invitation, came all the great Sheiks, the leaders of cavalry contingents, the venerable Marabouts, and the most distinguished warriors of the province of Oran.
The Sultan opened the deliberations in the following words:—“Let no one amongst you ever accuse me of wanting to make peace with the Christians. It is for you to decide the question of peace or war.” He then proceeded to explain the nature of the correspondence, which had taken place between himself and Bugeaud; the propositions and overtures which had been made to him, and those he had made in return. In conclusion, he commented carefully on each of the articles of his own ultimatum, sent in to the French general on the 12th May.
A long and stormy discussion ensued. The fanatics, and those secretly indisposed towards the Sultan, were violent in their cries for war. The Marabouts silenced them by the nicely-drawn discrimination between peace accepted and peace demanded. The Koran, they said, nowhere inculcated a useless shedding of blood, when the infidel had submitted, and craved that the sword might be sheathed. The French had submitted. They begged for peace. The Sultan had dictated his own terms.
This reasoning prevailed. It was decided by a large majority that the benefits which would accrue to the commonalty from a state of peace, justified the giving up of Blidah, and the plain of Algiers, to the French. A slight extension of the limits to which the Sultan originally intended to confine them would be no inconvenience to the Arabs, inasmuch as every Mussulman would be free to emigrate from the French possessions to the Sultan’s territory. The demand, however, of the French Government for tribute, was declared to be inadmissible.
Sidi Sekkal was shortly afterwards sent to the French head-quarters on the Tafna, with the following concessions:—
“1. Blidah abandoned.
“2. Renunciation of all authority over Mussulmans residing on French territory.
“3. A certain extension of the French boundaries.”
Sidi Sekkal was commissioned, at the same time, to enter into the nature of the limits proposed, and to give other necessary explanations. Bugeaud, convinced that further delay would not procure him better conditions, agreed to everything. Thereupon the following treaty, celebrated as the “Treaty of the Tafna,” was drawn up and signed by both parties, May 20th, 1837.
“The following Treaty has been agreed upon, between Lieutenant-General Bugeaud, commanding the French troops in the Province of Oran, and the Emir Abdel Kader.
“Art. 1. The Emir Abdel Kader acknowledges the sovereignty of France.
“Art. 2. France reserves to herself, in the province of Oran, Mostaganem, Mazagnan, and their territories, Oran, Arzew, and a territory limited in the following manner:—On the east, by the river Macta, and the marsh from whence it flows; on the south, by a line starting from the said marsh, passing by the shore on the south of the lake, and continuing its prolongation up the Wady Maleh, in the direction of Sidi Said; and from this river down to the sea, shall belong to the French. In the province of Algiers, Algiers, the Sahel, the plain of the Metija, bounded on the east by the Wady Khuddra, onwards; on the south, by the crest of the first chain of the lesser Atlas, as far as the Chiffa, including Blidah and its territory; on the west, by the Chiffa as far as the Mount of Mazagnan, and from thence, in a direct line to the sea, enclosing Coleah and its territory, shall be French territory.
“Art. 3. The Emir shall have the administration of the province of Oran, that of Tittery, and that part of the province of Algiers which is not comprised on the east, within the limits indicated by Article 2. He cannot enter any other part of the Regency.
“Art. 4. The Emir shall have no authority over Mussulmans who wish to reside on the territory reserved to France; but these shall be at liberty to go and reside on the territory under the Emir’s administration; in the same manner the inhabitants living under the Emir’s administration may establish themselves on French territory.
“Art. 5. The Arabs dwelling on French territory shall enjoy the free exercise of their religion. They may build mosques, and follow their religious discipline in every particular, under the authority of their spiritual chiefs.
“Art. 6. The Emir will give to the French army 30,000 measures of corn; 30,000 measures of barley; 5,000 head of oxen. The delivery of these provisions will be made at Oran, in three instalments; the first, on the 15th September, 1837, and the two others every successive two months.
“Art. 7. The Emir shall be empowered to buy in France, powder, sulphur, and the arms he requires.
“Art. 8. The Kolouglis who wish to remain in Tlemsen, or elsewhere, shall have free possession of their properties there, and shall be treated as citizens. Those who wish to withdraw to French territory, may sell or rent their properties freely.
“Art. 9. France cedes to the Emir, Rachgoun, Tlemsen, its citadel, and all the cannons which were anciently in it. The Emir engages to convey to Oran all the effects, as well as munitions of war, belonging to the garrison of Tlemsen.
“Art. 10. Commerce shall be free between the Arabs and the French. They may establish themselves reciprocally, on each other’s territory.
“Art. 11. The French shall be respected amongst the Arabs, as the Arabs amongst the French. The farms and properties which the French have acquired, or may acquire, on the Arab territory, shall be guaranteed them: they shall enjoy them freely, and the Emir engages to indemnify them for any damages the Arabs may cause them.
“Art. 12. The criminals on both territories shall be reciprocally given up.
“Art. 13. The Emir engages not to give up any part of the coast to any foreign power whatever, without the authorisation of France.
“Art. 14. The commerce of the Regency shall only be carried on in French ports.
“Art. 15. France shall maintain agents near the Emir, and in the towns under his jurisdiction, to act as intermediaries for French subjects, in any commercial disputes they may have with the Arabs.
“The Emir will have the same privilege in French towns and seaports.
“Tafna, May 30, 1837.
“The Lieutenant-General commanding at Oran.”
| (The Emir’s seal under the Arab text.) | (Bugeaud the General’s seal under the French text.) |
Bugeaud had been strictly enjoined by his Government to confine Abdel Kader to the province of Oran; on no account to cede him the province of Tittery, and to insist on his paying tribute.
In a letter to the Minister of War, he thus excused himself for having signed a treaty which violated such orders:—
“You may well suppose that it pained me greatly to be obliged to make up my mind not to follow your instructions, as regards the limits to be assigned to the Emir. But that was impossible. Be assured that the peace I have concluded is better, and is likely to be more durable than any I could have made by confining Abdel Kader between the Cheliff and Morocco.”
By this treaty, nevertheless, the French were substantially confined to a few towns on the sea-coast, with very circumscribed adjacent territories; whilst all the fortresses and strongholds in the interior were left in the hands of their triumphant and victorious adversary. In a word, Abdel Kader thereby possessed two-thirds of Algeria; and in addition to the immense accession which this splendid triumph had added to his influence and power, he now earned along with him the advantage of appearing before the world as the friend and ally of France.
The French generals, who had hitherto followed each other in rapid succession through the various phases of the war, had sought in vain for an interview with the illustrious Arab chief, who, whilst he sorely taxed their military talents, had excited in their breasts feelings of soldierly admiration. This favour was now vouchsafed to General Bugeaud.
On the 31st of May, 1837, the General, followed by six battalions, with all his artillery and cavalry, reached the appointed place of rendezvous. Abdel Kader had not yet arrived. Five hours were passed in expectation; still nobody appeared. At last, about two o’clock, several Arabs came up, one after another, bearing various kinds of excuses. The Sultan had been indisposed. He had set out late. He was thinking of asking to have the interview postponed till next day. He was not far off. He was close at hand.
A horseman now came up and begged the General to move on a little; he would soon meet the Sultan. It was getting late, and the General, who wished to get his troops back to their camp before dark, advanced. After marching for more than an hour, he at length came upon the Arab army, consisting of more than 15,000 cavalry, drawn up in tolerable order, on an undulating plain. At this moment, Bou Hamedi rode up to him, and pointed to the spot where the Sultan was surrounded by a large escort, on a hillock not far off.
In a few minutes more, Abdel Kader and his escort were seen advancing towards the General. It was an imposing sight. Nearly two hundred Arab chiefs, on prancing steeds, closed around their Sultan, whose simple apparel offered a striking contrast to their splendid appointments, glittering with highly-burnished arms, which flashed and sparkled in the noon-day sun. Abdel Kader rode a few paces in front, mounted on a magnificent black charger, which he handled with extraordinary dexterity, sometimes making it spring with all fours in the air, sometimes making it walk for several yards on its hind legs, and evidently seeking to make an impression by his superior horsemanship. Several Arabs ran by his side, holding his stirrups, and the ends of his burnous.
General Bugeaud now dashed forward at full gallop, and on reaching the Emir, shook hands with him. Both alighted, and seating themselves on the grass, entered into the following conversation.
Bugeaud.—“Do you know that there are very few generals who would have dared to make the treaty I have concluded with you? But I have not been afraid of aggrandising you, and adding to your power, because I felt assured that you would only employ the great existence which we give you in ameliorating the condition of the Arab nation, and in maintaining peace and a good understanding with France.”
Abdel Kader.—“I thank you for your good sentiments towards me. Please God, I will make the Arabs happy; and if the peace is ever broken, it will be no fault of mine.”
B.—“On this point, I am your security with the King of the French.”
A.—“You risk nothing in so doing: we have a religion which obliges us to keep our word. I have never been faithless to mine.”
B.—“I count on it; and it is in this conviction I offer you my personal friendship.”
A.—“I accept your friendship, but let the French beware of listening to intriguers.”
B.—“The French are never led by individuals, and it is not the acts of individuals which can break the peace: it is only the non-execution of the treaty, or some great act of hostility. As to the culpable acts of individuals, we will be on our guard against them, or punish them reciprocally.”
A.—“Very good. You have only to give me notice, and the guilty shall be punished.”
B.—“I recommend to your good offices the Kolouglis who may remain at Tlemsen.”
A.—“Be easy on that score; they shall be treated like citizens.”
B.—“You have promised me that you will locate the Douairs amongst the Hafras: the country will, perhaps, not be sufficient for them.”
A.—“They shall be located in such a manner as not to endanger the maintenance of peace.”
B.—“Have you ordered commercial relations at Algiers, and around the towns, to be resumed?”
A.—“Not yet; but I mean to do so, when you have put me in possession of Tlemsen.”
B.—“You must know, I cannot do so until the treaty has been approved of by the King.”
A.—“What, then, have not you the power to treat?”
B.—“Yes; but the treaty must be approved. That is necessary for you, as a guarantee; for if it was only made by me, any general who might replace me would be able to undo it; whereas, once approved by the King, my successor would be obliged to abide by it.”
A.—“If you do not give me back Tlemsen, in accordance with the stipulation in the treaty, I do not see the necessity of making peace: we shall only have a truce.”
B.—“That is true. But it is you who will be the gainer by the truce; for, while it lasts, I shall not destroy the crops.”
A.—“Destroy them, if you like: it will be all the same to me. I will give you my full permission, in writing, to destroy all you can. It will only be a very small quantity you can get at, and the Arabs will still have abundance of grain.”
B.—“I don’t think the Arabs are of the same opinion.”
Abdel Kadir now asked how long it would be before the confirmation of the treaty arrived from France.
B.—“About three weeks.”
A.—“That is rather long. At all events, we cannot reestablish our commercial relations until after the King’s approbation shall have arrived. Then the peace will be definitive.”
B.—“It is only your co-religionists who will be the sufferers; for you will be depriving them of a commerce of which they stand in need. As for us, we can get all we want by sea.”
The General, not wishing to prolong the interview, as it was getting late, rose to take leave. Abdel Kader remained sitting, and affected to be engaged with his interpreter, who was standing beside him. Bugeaud, suspecting his motive, took him familiarly by the hand, and pulled him up, saying at the same time, “Parbleu, when a French General rises, you may as well rise too—you!”
Thus ended this singular meeting, at which the French General had merely gratified an idle, though pardonable, curiosity; but which, from the premeditated delays and misunderstandings that immediately preceded it, gave Abdel Kader the immense advantage of appearing in the eyes of his countrymen as a grand personage, who kept even the leaders of the infidels awaiting his good pleasure and convenience. Abdel Kader, after shaking the General again by the hands, now vaulted into his saddle; and both armies moved off the ground to the strains of martial music, the Arabs shouting enthusiastically—“Long live our Sultan, Abdel Kader! may God ever make him victorious!”
CHAPTER IX.
1838.
The Treaty of the Tafna was warmly applauded by the French Government, who regarded it as a master-stroke of policy. The French people looked on it as a humiliation. The former boasted that Abdel Kader from being an enemy had been transformed into an ally. The latter saw in it the criminal surrender of a French province to a rival power. To Abdel Kader it was the corner-stone of the edifice he had so long been laboriously and perseveringly constructing.
For years a double duty had been imposed on him—on the one hand, that of moulding into shape and consistency the discordant materials which lay scattered around him, appeasing feuds, allaying discords, and quelling insurrections; on the other, that of boldly confronting the formidable attacks of an enemy, immeasurably his superior in all the means and appliances which raise war to the dignity of a science. Relieved from external pressure, he was enabled to grapple with his whole and undivided strength against internal difficulties.
He now stood face to face with a people who looked on their emancipation from a foreign yoke as the signal for unbounded licence, whose only idea of liberty was freedom from restraint, and who, while they recognised and even obeyed the genius which had risen up amongst them, when directed against their foes, shunned and dreaded it when brought to bear upon themselves. Whole tribes of Arabs, now freed from the harassing excitement, the heavy demands, the constant liabilities, the ever-recurring hazards and uncertainties of a state of war, seemed bent on resuming, each in its little sphere, a separate and independent existence.
Thinking only of their selfish and individual interests, and unable to comprehend that a continuance of their newly-acquired independence could only be upheld by a continuation of those sacrifices which had enabled them to achieve it, these little democracies could see no use or occasion for a central government, and grudged contributing towards the expenses necessary to support it.
The extensive organisation which Abdel Kader contemplated, which he was already carrying out, and which could alone consolidate a power capable of permanently resisting external attacks—and in his keen foresight he felt that they were only temporarily suspended—manifestly required the enforcement of certain imports throughout the vast extent of country now committed to his charge.
The short-sightedness and avarice of the Arabs prevented them from seeing any such necessity, and although Abdel Kader never in his life exacted from his subjects more than the ashur and the zekka (all other imports, including custom-house duties, being held in abomination by the Koran), yet the recusants had a line of argument always ready to exonerate themselves from the obligation of paying taxes.
“They wanted,” they said, “no legislature; they could manage their own concerns. If the war should break out again, then it would be time enough for the Sultan to call on them to pay their contributions, but why were they to pay them in time of peace? That the Turks should have been always craving for money was natural and comprehensible. The Turks had harems of a hundred women each, dancing girls, hybrid boys, and all sorts of combinations of profligate expenditure to maintain.”
“The name of a Turk,” they argued, “was, and is, and ever will be, as long as the pest exists, the synonym for villainy and corruption. But what did Abdel Kader want with money? He had only one wife. His days and nights, when not at war, were spent in study and prayer. His gardens at Cachero were more than enough to defray all his expenses.”
Abdel Kader made short work with such of these reasoners as were within his reach. Their doctrine of resistance was never permitted to be more than a grumbling theory. But in the distant provinces, which had lately been consigned to him, and over which he had hitherto only exercised the influence inherent to his great deeds, that doctrine had in many parts assumed shape and substance.
In the southern parts of the provinces of Tittery, his demands for the usual contributions were peremptorily rejected, and a league was formed to resist their payment, headed by one Ibn Mochtar, a chief from the Sahara, near Boghar; the Beni Mochtar, the Beni Nail, the Beni Mousa, the Beni Abid, the Zenekara, presented a formidable confederacy. Abdel Kader saw that he had not a moment to lose. He felt that he must at once crush the opposition, or resign his sceptre.
Summoning contingents from his faithful tribes in the province of Oran, so as to form an effective force of 8,000 cavalry and 1,000 infantry, he ordered Ibn Allal, his Khalifa at Miliana, to meet him in the country of the Zenakera, with all the regulars and irregulars under his command. The whole force when assembled constituted an array of 12,000 cavalry and 2,000 infantry, with some pieces of cannon.
On his way to the place of rendezvous, he passed by Mascara. His wife, who had not seen him for many months, sent messengers begging him to turn aside, though only for a day. He stoically replied, he was wedded to his country, and went on. Such was the intensity of his purpose and the all-absorbing influence of his devotion to his duty, that more than two years at one time elapsed without his allowing himself time to go and see his family.
Before resorting to force, Abdel Kader attempted persuasion. He wrote a letter to the disaffected tribes, in which he conjured them, in the name of the Prophet, to obey the law; to imitate the tribes of the north and west in their obedience, and to beware of the pernicious counsels of designing men. In the same document he promised to overlook the past, if, returning to better sentiments, they came and presented themselves before him with “horses of submission.” “Do not trust in the number of your warriors,” he concluded, “for were the number double I should overcome them; God is with me, and Him I obey. Do not flatter yourselves you can escape me. I swear you are no more to me than a glass of water in the hands of a thirsty man.”
The letter had no effect, and Abdel Kader advanced to the attack. The battle lasted for three days. Finally the rebels gave way, and dispersed. The Beni Antar held out for some days behind entrenchments which they had thrown up, over what they conceived to be impregnable heights, in the fastnesses near Boghar; but they also were ultimately reduced. Ibn Mochtar surrendered, and, coming in person, craved the Sultan’s mercy. Not only did he obtain grace, but, to his surprise, he was named the Sultan’s Khalifa over the subdued tribes. He was ever afterwards one of Abdel Kader’s most faithful adherents.
Success, as usual, was followed by fresh submissions. All the tribes along the southern frontiers of the province of Constantine sent deputies to the Sultan, inviting him to come amongst them. His moderation and good faith, as well as his loyal adhesion to the treaty of the Tafna, alone prevented him carrying his standards to the walls of Constantine itself.
Abdel Kader now returned to Medea. His entry was triumphal. For miles ere he reached the gates, the road was thronged with thousands who had flocked from all the villages round about to feast their eyes on the mighty chief whose fame had long been made familiar to their imaginations. Shouts of “Long live our victorious Sultan Abdel Kader!” resounded in the distance, and heralded from afar his approach to the city. There fresh tokens of enthusiasm awaited him. Garlands of flowers were strewn on his path, and perfumed waters sprinkled on his head. He rode straight to the mosque, entered, prayed, and preached. For weeks presents and offerings poured in from all parts. The great Sheiks, the Marabouts, the Cadis of Tittery, and several even from Oran, headed by the Khalifas of districts, came in state to offer their congratulations to the victorious Sultan. It was now considered by many that Abdel Kader had reached the pinnacle of greatness. He himself was seriously contemplating a retirement into private life. But much remained to be done before he could conscientiously resign the task he had sworn to accomplish.
His whole attention was now turned towards an obstacle which had long chafed and ruffled his soaring spirit. Far away to the south of the great Sahara, in the province of Laghouat, about two hundred miles from Oran, ranged ten powerful and numerous tribes, called the Beni Arasch. They had hitherto, amidst all the battle and turmoil which had been raging in the north, kept coolly aloof from the exciting contest in which their countrymen had been engaged. Abdel Kader had frequently summoned them to send their cavalry contingents, but in vain.
Their principal chief and Marabout, El Hadj Mohammed ibn Salem il Tejini, refused altogether to entertain the idea that there was to be an Arab Sultan in the land. He accordingly left all Abdel Kader’s letters unanswered, and disdained even to receive his orders for the delivery, to his agent, of the legal contributions; secure, as he thought, in his distance, his fortress, and his sands, he set Abdel Kader at defiance. His confidence, at the same time, was increased by his possession of a town, strongly fortified after the fashion of the Arabs, called Ain Maadi.
This place had been repeatedly besieged by the Turks, and with repeated failures. In 1826, the brother of Tejini had even attacked the Turks in their turn, and had menaced Mascara. Already had he gained a footing in the town, when Hassan Bey, of Oran, came to its relief. Tejini drew off his forces to the plain of Eghrees, and there gave his adversary battle, but was defeated and slain. Hassan advanced on Ain Maadi; but Hadj Mohammed, who had succeeded his brother in the command of the tribes, compelled him to retire. From that day, Mohammed Tejini had comported himself as a small independent sovereign.
Ain Maadi contained only three hundred houses; but it had its kasbah, or serail, and was surrounded by thick walls, flanked with towers. Gardens spread around it; and these, also, were capable of defence. The spring of Ain Maadi, from which the town took its name, though at some distance, poured its limpid stream, by means of a canal, into the kasbah. Wells of rain water supplied the wants of the inhabitants.
Abdel Kader was still at Medea, when a certain Hadj Aissa, of Laghouat, came, accompanied by several chiefs of the Beni Arasch, to offer him presents, and “horses of submission.” The Hadj announced, that owing to the influence he exercised over the majority of those tribes, they most of them desired to acknowledge Abdel Kader as their Sultan, and that he had only to show himself amongst them to be joyfully received. Abdel Kader, flattered by an adhesion which gave so satisfactory a testimony to the influence of his name in the province of Laghouat, appointed the Hadj his Khalifa over that oasis of the south, gave him proclamations for distribution, in which he called on the Beni Arasch to obey his lieutenants, and dismissed him with the assurance that he would shortly come in person to receive the proffered allegiance.
The time had now come when he could strike a blow at Tejini. On the 12th of June, 1838, he advanced towards Ain Maadi at the head of 6,000 cavalry, 3,000 infantry, six mortars, and three field-pieces. The place was reached after a tedious march of ten days over large sandy wastes. Tejini, taken by surprise, and having made no preparations for sustaining a siege, had barely time to shut the gates and, organise, as well as he could, the 600 Arabs who were at the moment within its walls.
For some time he attempted to defend the gardens with skirmishers led out at night, and able, by their knowledge of the localities, to harass the enemy in his approaches. These endeavours gradually failed. The besieged were confined within their ramparts. The Sultan ordered all the trees to be cut down. Batteries were erected in the spaces thus obtained; and the fire commenced. On the fourth day, the European engineer, who commanded this operation, declared the breach that had been made to be practicable. A storming party was told off; but on the morrow, the breach was found to have been repaired. Again and again the process of breaching and repairing was mutually effected.
On the fifteenth day, Abdel Kader challenged Tejini to come out and fight him in presence of both armies drawn up to witness the encounter; and proposed that the fate of the place should depend on the result. Tejini, though young and brave, prudently declined the test. Abdel Kader now commenced mining. The mine in due time reached the walls. Tejini made a countermine; and in these mines several serious encounters took place.
In this manner the siege was prolonged for months; the brave defenders, the while, were eking out their existence from their small stores of corn and barley, which now barely sufficed to keep them from starvation. The besiegers, on their side, were dependent for their supplies on the arrival of convoys from the north; and these convoys, even, were liable to be intercepted. More than 2,000 cavalry were constantly employed for their protection through the Sahara. Hadj Aissa was of no use whatever. He turned out to be an impostor.
Both sides were at last perishing from sheer exhaustion. Their ammunition was all but expended. The anxiety of Abdel Kader was intense. He had often before been in straits and difficulties; but never had he been engaged in a struggle which involved more important consequences. He well knew that if he acknowledged himself baffled by raising the siege, he should have all the Sahara on his hands; and he declared he would die on the spot, rather than give in.
At this critical juncture, Abdel Kader had the unexpected satisfaction of receiving some fresh supplies of ammunition, and three siege pieces, from his French allies. A diplomatic difficulty had arisen as to the right interpretation of a certain article in the treaty of the Tafna; and the Governor-General hoped to gain the Sultan’s compliance with his version of the disputed passage, by thus generously aiding him in his extremity. This opportune assistance turned the scales, which were still trembling in the balance.
Tejini surrendered. On the 17th of November, 1838, a treaty was signed between him and Mustapha ibn Taamy, the Sultan’s brother-in-law. By this treaty, the former engaged to evacuate the Ain Maadi in eight days, and to retire thence with his family and his immediate followers to Laghouat. His eldest son was to remain as a hostage in the Sultan’s camp. Abdel Kader, at the expiration of the term, rased the town to the ground. Two tribes of the Beni Arasch, in the immediate vicinity, at once sent in the ashur and the zekka. The other tribes still refused. A terrible retribution awaited them.
The following dispatch, announcing the success of Abdel Kader, was forwarded to Hadj il Taib, his agent at Oran:—
“God having given us the mission to watch over the welfare of Mussulmans, and to take on us the direction of all the people in this land, submissive to the law of our Lord Mohammed (prayer and salutation be to him), we marched into the Sahara—not to harm the true believers, not to humble and destroy them—but to awaken their faith, to consolidate them into a common bond of union, and to establish order.
“All listened to our voice, and obeyed as much as circumstances would permit. El Tejini alone refused. We found ourselves face to face with those who had been seduced by him. They were preparing to fight us. We conjured them, for the love of God and the Prophet, to come over to us. To this effect, we recalled to their minds several passages of the sacred writings. All was in vain. We despaired of their conversion. Yet we feared that if we were indulgent to them, we should miss the object we have solely in view. This object is, to rally all the Arabs round one common centre, to instruct the ignorant in the law of the Prophet, to prevent the spread of evil examples amongst them, to preserve them from the corrupting influences of certain towns, and to enable them, their wives, and children, to live in peace and security.
“Therefore, exercising our sovereign right, and moreover being the injured party, we ordered our victorious soldiers to fight them. Religion ordained it. They fled before our troops. Again we entreated them to listen to us. Again they refused. Tejini declared that he counted on the strength of his ramparts and the courage of his followers. Then the place was closely besieged. Our miners having reached the foot of the walls, the inhabitants, in consternation, prayed for pardon and deliverance. Although they had deceived us more than once, both were accorded them; for the Most High has said, ‘Pardon and forget.’ We hope that he will remember our conduct on this occasion, and have mercy upon us for the sake of the blood we have spared, and the women whose chastity we have protected.
“Pardon was granted to all the inhabitants on condition that they should leave the town and go and reside elsewhere, wherever they chose. All have left. Tejini, with his harem and children, have gone to Laghouat, but his eldest son remains a hostage in our hands. May God ever grant us the victory, and preserve us from misfortune.
“Oh Mussulmans, pray to God for your Sultan. He only labours for your welfare. Rejoice, and call on God to strengthen and confirm him. Trust in the Divine mercy. Read the chapter of the Koran, ‘Amran,’ and say, ‘Oh Thou that rulest the universes, Thou givest and takest away according to Thy will, and Thou choosest and Thou raisest up, at Thy good pleasure. In Thy hands is all good. Thou alone art all powerful. Thou changest the night into day, and the day into night. Thou bringest forth life from the midst of death. Without any effort, Thou prosperest whomsoever Thou wilt.’ Oh Mussulmans, seek not protectors from among the Infidel, only look for them amongst the true believers.”
Abdel Kader returned to Mascara. But the defiant attitude and hostile demonstrations of the Beni Arasch, who had already had the audacity to attack his convoys, preyed upon his mind. He had, moreover, indubitable proofs that they had been in correspondence with the French. By the rules of the Koran, they deserved death. After allowing his troops a few weeks’ repose, he announced an expedition; 5,000 cavalry, and cavalry alone, were ordered to hold themselves in readiness.
On the day appointed, they assembled on the plain of Eghrees. None knew or guessed what was to be the nature or direction of the expedition. It was the depth of winter. Each man had been ordered to supply himself with a bag of corn and a bag of barley, and no more. No mules nor tents were required. At sunset Abdel Kader appeared, mounted his horse, and led his forces at a brisk trot towards the north-west.
It soon became dark. Four men in advance carried lanterns affixed to the points of their spears. The lanterns were lighted, and muffled in front, but their rays streamed far away to the rear, over the cavalcade.
Suddenly a countermarch was directed, and the party bore off towards the south-east. The previous direction had been a feint. At midnight the troops of the expedition reached a rivulet. All dismounted. The horses were fed. Abdel Kader and his men ground their corn as well as they could, between stones, and making a paste of flour and water, partook of food. After a rest of three hours the troops were directed to remount. Again they rode on at a brisk trot, which occasionally broke into a canter, till mid-day. Then another short halt was made, and then again the expedition rode on as before till near midnight, and then only were food and rest once more taken. Thus they pursued their way for four days and nights.
As dawn broke on the morning of the fifth day, the vast encampments of the Beni Arasch burst upon their view, spreading away to the horizon. More than ten thousand tents covered the plains. The Arabs were sleeping. A wild and prolonged shout roused them from their slumbers. They rushed out to learn the cause, and saw to their dismay a crowd of cavalry swooping down upon them like a whirlwind.
Frantic cries of “Abdel Kader, Abdel Kader!” now filled the air. The women and children ran about screaming. The men, amazed and bewildered, appeared to have lost their senses. Some flew instinctively to their arms, others took to their horses. But before they could collect, form, or rally, the storm was on them. “Spare the harems,” cried Abdel Kader, as he led on the onslaught, “but as for those dogs, treat them as they deserve.”
Driving the Beni Arasch before them like a flock of sheep, charging and chasing them in all directions, Abdel Kader and his cavalry soon succeeded in securing the principal Sheiks. Moved by their piteous entreaties and solemn assurances of future good conduct, Abdel Kader mercifully refrained from inflicting capital punishment. The tribes, however, were compelled to pay up, on the spot, five years’ arrears of the ashur and the zekka, and to furnish a contribution of 4,000 camels and 30,000 sheep. Warned by this example, the Beni Arasch became ever after Abdel Kader’s most faithful adherents, and remained constant to him to the last.