"The real truth is that Dilke was too big a man to be an Under- Secretary in 1880, and the whole position was a false one. I fancy Lord Granville felt it to be so. One of his best points was his readiness to recognize ability. I think he desired Dilke's sphere in the Office to be as large as possible consistently with the general arrangements of the Office, but it is always difficult to make special arrangements work smoothly if they are based on a false principle.
"Dilke ought to have insisted on being in the Cabinet. It was very much to his honour that he did not do so."
Lord Fitzmaurice goes on to say that in the making of the Cabinet public opinion would have substituted Sir Charles Dilke for Mr. Dodson, who, in spite of his work as Chairman of Committees from 1868 to 1873, and afterwards as Secretary to the Treasury—("he would have made an excellent Speaker")—had done but little in the House for the party in the long period of Opposition from 1874 to 1880.
A mistake had, in fact, been made. The strong man should be put where his services can avowedly be best utilized. This statement is true of Chamberlain. He was, as the Times put it, "the Carnot of the moment, the organizer of Liberal victory." [Footnote: Neither Sir Charles Dilke nor Mr. Chamberlain would, however, have desired to underrate the great share in organizing the victory of Mr. Adam, the principal Liberal Whip in the House of Commons, whose services were generally considered to have been very insufficiently recognized by Mr. Gladstone.] Moreover, the confidence and friendship which led to constant consultations on every point between the two men guaranteed an added power to Sir Charles behind the scenes, and to him power, and not the appearance of power, was the essential thing. But Dilke's position also as a Parliamentarian, his acknowledged power and insight on questions both of Home and Foreign Affairs, his following inside and outside the House of Commons, had created a claim of long standing to Cabinet rank, and its abandonment made the "false position" to which Lord Fitzmaurice alludes. Although Mr. Disraeli was reported to have said, apropos of Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, that an Under- Secretary for Foreign Affairs with his chief in the House of Lords holds one of the most important positions in a Ministry, nevertheless the Under- Secretary is the subordinate of his chief, and Lord Granville's reputation as Foreign Minister was great.
That personal difficulties at least were overcome is shown by a note of Lord Granville, written when Sir Charles left the Foreign Office in 1882, but the note is in itself a commentary on the "false position":
"WALMER CASTLE, "December 27th, '82.
"MY DEAR DILKE,
"As this is the day you expect to go to the Local Government Board, I cannot help writing you one line. I will not dwell upon the immense loss you are to me and to the Office. You are aware of it, and I have no doubt will continue to help us both in the Cabinet and in the House, and will be ready to advise the Under-Secretary and myself. I must, however, say how deeply grateful I am for our pleasant relations, which might easily have been a little strained from the fact that it was a sort of fluke that you were my Under-Secretary instead of being my colleague in the Cabinet. As it is, nothing could be more satisfactory and more pleasant to me, and the knowledge we have obtained of one another will strengthen and cement our friendship.
"Yours,
"G."
III.
Sir Charles's acknowledged authority in foreign affairs made his appointment a matter of congratulation among foreign diplomatists. It was welcomed on the ground that it would correct Mr. Gladstone's presumed tenderness towards Russia, and, above all, would make a bond of union with France through his personal relations with Gambetta, who wrote on April 28th:
"CHER AMI,
"Merci pour votre lettre de ce matin. Je trouve votre détermination excellente, et si la dépêche de 4 heures qui annonce votre entrée dans le Cabinet, en qualité de sous secrétaire d'état aux Affaires Étrangères, est vraie, vous serez universellement approuvé.
"Pour ma part, je vous félicite bien cordialement de la victoire que vous venez de remporter, car je sais qu'avec des hommes tels que vous on peut être assuré que c'est une victoire féconde en résultats pour la civilisation occidentale et le droit européen.
"Votre présence au Foreign Office est bien décisive pour dissiper les dernières appréhensions et effacer jusqu'aux souvenirs les plus persistents.
"Mais vous devez avoir autre chose à faire qu'à lire des lettres inutiles.
"Je vous serre les mains,
"LÉON GAMBETTA."
The letter was 'couched in such terms as to make it desirable to answer him with some statement of the views of the Government,' and Sir Charles consulted Lord Granville about his reply, which would 'really be a despatch,' and must 'say something about 1870' and the period of Lord Granville's previous tenure of the Foreign Office. With recollections of that time in their minds, and of England's entry upon the Black Sea Conference without the presence of a French representative, French politicians had commented very jealously upon some references to Gambetta in a speech delivered by Lord Granville at Hanley in March of this year. Lord Granville accordingly sent Dilke a memorandum in his own hand, suggesting words for the reply. Gambetta was to be told that a speech "made before the election" had been interpreted by some of his supporters in the Press "as of a personal character against him," that Dilke knew this to have been "the reverse of the speaker's intention," and that he would be glad to have a talk with Gambetta on the subject of Lord Granville's policy during the war when he next had the opportunity of meeting him in Paris.
'But it was indeed difficult for Lord Granville to say anything about his policy during the war which would please the French.' Gambetta's official reply was, however, that, having read Lord Granville's speech, he found it "proper under the circumstances and impartial," and that, although "absurd ideas with regard to our recent elections had been ascribed to himself," he had "desired nothing in those elections" except Sir Charles's personal triumph. To this Lord Granville rejoined: "Please thank M. Gambetta for his friendly message. I presume you will not tell him that Lyons says his assertion about the elections is a tremendous cracker."
Sir Edward Malet, Resident at Cairo, [Footnote: Afterwards Ambassador at
Berlin.] wrote:
"We have had one Under-Secretary after another" (at the Foreign Office) "who knows nothing about these affairs, and who has therefore never been able to exert the legitimate influence to which his position entitled him. It will now be different, and I hope soon to recognize the thread of your thought in the texture of the Government policy."
M. Gennadius, the Greek Chargé d'Affaires, while the matter was still open, implored him not to decline. "All your Greek friends consider our country's cause as dependent on your acceptance. You have done much for us already. Make this further sacrifice."
Sir Charles entered upon his functions on Thursday, April 29th, when his colleague, the Permanent Under-Secretary, Lord Tenterden, took him round to be introduced to the heads of the various departments. For his private secretary he chose Mr. George Murray, [Footnote: Now the Right Hon. Sir G. Murray, G.C.B.] "an extraordinarily able man." But in a few weeks Mr. Murray was transferred to the Treasury, and afterwards became secretary to Mr. Gladstone, and, later, to Lord Rosebery when Prime Minister.
'I found' (from Bourke, his predecessor, who had written to him with great cordiality) 'that as Under-Secretary for the Foreign Office, I had the Cabinet key—or most secret key that at that time there was: another still more secret key being introduced after I was in the Cabinet, and confined to the Cabinet itself. I found in the Foreign Office that if I liked I might have got back the "Department" which Lord Derby took away from the Parliamentary Under-Secretary in 1874, leaving him only the Commercial Department. [Footnote: The "Department" assigned to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary before 1874 was 'control of' some branch of foreign affairs in its details. See also below, p. 349.] But I at once decided that I would not have it, as I wanted to concern myself with the Parliamentary business and with the important business, instead of doing detailed work at the head of one section of it.'
On the evening of his first day in office Sir Charles gave a dinner at
Sloane Street to several of his colleagues. There were present
'Fawcett, just appointed Postmaster-General, Lord Northbrook,
Childers, Forster, Hartington, and Goschen…. Chamberlain was at my
dinner, having taken up his quarters with me for a week….
'Hartington after dinner showed me Indian despatches which were very startling. Mr. Goschen told us that he had refused the Governor- Generalship of India and the Embassy at Constantinople, but he afterwards took Constantinople. He appeared at this moment to have made up his mind to stay in the House of Commons to oppose equalization of the franchise and redistribution of seats….
'Forster told us that he was starting for Ireland to see whether he could avoid some renewal of coercion; and Chamberlain and I told him that he must avoid it. This was the cloud no bigger than a man's hand.'
Sir Charles goes on to tell how he stayed for a time its development:
'On the night of May 13th, between one and two o'clock in the morning, I did a thing which many will say I ought not to have done—namely, went down to a newspaper office to suggest an article against the policy of another member of the Government. Under the circumstances, I think that I was justified. I was not a member of the Privy Council or of the Cabinet, and the interests of the party were at stake, as subsequent events well showed. There was no shade of private or personal interest in the matter. The effect of what I did was to stop the policy of which I disapproved for the year, and might easily have been to stop it for ever. I had found out in the course of the evening that Forster was in favour of a Coercion Bill, and that the Cabinet were likely to adopt it. I went down to the Daily News office, and told Hill, not even telling Chamberlain until two years afterwards what I had done. The result of it was that the Daily News had an article the next morning which smashed Forster's plan.'
IV.
Chamberlain had written on May 4th to Mrs. Pattison: "The charmed circle has been broken and a new departure made, which is an event in English political history." But although the circle was broken, only one man had found his way to the innermost ring; and in the composition of the Ministry the Radicals were overwhelmingly outnumbered. Such a situation did not lead to the stability of the Government, and by his reluctance in the admission of Radicalism to office Mr. Gladstone had created difficulties for himself. In the House his personal authority was overridden in a matter which came up at once.
'In the morning of May 3rd I received a note from Lord Frederick Cavendish, the Secretary of the Treasury, asking me to be at the House at two, as there would be trouble about Bradlaugh's application to affirm instead of take the oath. It had been decided by the Cabinet that "Freddy" Cavendish, [Footnote: Lord F. Cavendish was Financial Secretary to the Treasury.] who was leader of the House in the absence of the Ministers who had gone for re-election, should move for a Committee, and I spoke in support of that view.'
Sir Charles never took part again in any debate upon this once famous struggle. He supported Mr. Gladstone's view in favour of allowing affirmation, but he did so without heartiness, disliking 'the trade of living on blatant atheism,' and finding in himself tendencies which led him to fear that he was 'clerically minded.' He had always an extreme dislike of talk or writing that offended legitimate susceptibilities.
The completion of the Ministry inevitably left some personal claims unsettled.
'On May 1st I had John Morley to dinner to meet Chamberlain, who was still staying with me. We talked over the men who had been left out. Edmond Fitzmaurice was one, but Mr. Gladstone did not care about having brothers. [Footnote: Mr. Gladstone was believed in 1868 to have declined to have Lord Clarendon and his brother, Mr. Charles Villiers, both in the Cabinet. See Life of Granville, vol. i., p. 537. In the new Government Lord Lansdowne was Under-Secretary for India, but resigned in the course of the year on the Irish Land Question.] At Chamberlain's wish Courtney had been offered the Secretaryship of the Board of Trade, which, however, he declined. He would have taken the place of Judge Advocate General, but it was not offered to him. Chamberlain told us that the Cabinet were unanimous for getting rid of Layard, the Ambassador at Constantinople, but that the Queen was trying hard to keep him. The result of this difference of opinion ultimately was that Goschen went to Constantinople on a special embassy, without salary, and keeping his place in the House of Commons, and that Layard continued to draw the salary without doing any work.'
A large section of the Liberal Press was at this period very independent, and helped to frustrate Mr. Gladstone's determination to exclude Radicals from office.
Sir Charles's relations with Mr. Hill, then editor of the Daily News,
were close, as also was the alliance between the two Radical Ministers and
Mr. John Morley, who had just then become editor of the Pall Mall
Gazette.
'On May 14th John Morley asked me to see him to give him information
as to the general position of foreign affairs, and I consented to do
so. "It would be worth silver and gold and jewels," he said, "if I
could have ten minutes with you about three times a week."'
Chamberlain gave him the same privilege concerning domestic policy—a privilege 'which he used so well that no complaint ever arose in regard to it.' Chamberlain was much in touch with 'Escott of the Standard and the World.'
It was suggested at the dinner of May 1st that Mr. Courtney might succeed Sir H. Drummond Wolff on the Commission for Reforms, appointed under Article XXIII. of the Treaty of Berlin, for the European provinces of Turkey and Crete; but this too Mr. Courtney declined, and the place was eventually filled by Lord E. Fitzmaurice. Mr. Trevelyan was not included in the Ministry. [Footnote: See the Life of Goschen, by the Hon. Arthur Elliot, vol. i., pp. 215, 216; T. E. Holland, The European Concert in the Eastern Question, pp. 291, 292; also Turkey, No. 15 (1880). Lord E. Fitzmaurice was subsequently appointed British Plenipotentiary, under Articles LIV. and LV. of the Treaty of Berlin, to the Conference in regard to the navigation of the Danube. Both Mr. Courtney and Mr. Trevelyan joined the Ministry later.]
At the moment Conservative society was inclined to regard the new Ministry with suspicious wonder, and Sir Charles tells how, on May 5th, a week after taking office, when he and Chamberlain were dining with the Prince of Wales—
'most of the Cabinet were present with their wives; also the new Viceroy of India (Lord Ripon), and Rosebery and his wife. When the Duke of Cambridge came in, following the Prince and Princess, after shaking hands with those he knew, he stood staring about, whereupon Harcourt, nudging Chamberlain and myself, said, "He is looking for Bradlaugh."'
New men were coming to the front; a new political era had begun, and to the Radicals the situation was summed up by the House of Commons' jest which stated that B.C. now meant "Before Chamberlain," and A.D. "Anno Dilke."
The break with the past was real and important: 1880 is a marking date in the political history of Great Britain, and the change was due to the Radical combination.
CHAPTER XXI
AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE
I.
In "a memorandum of later years," quoted by his biographer, Mr. Gladstone defined his own understanding of "the special commission under which the Government had taken office" in 1880. "It related to the foreign policy of the country, the whole spirit and effect of which we were to reconstruct." Sir Charles's views as to the need for this had long been before the public, and he threw all his energies into the task of helping to achieve it.
'The Liberals, having come into office after violent denunciation of the whole foreign and colonial policy of their predecessors, had a general wish to reverse it in all parts of the world, and to dismiss the agents by whom it had been carried out. They were especially violent against Lytton in India, Layard at Constantinople, and Frere in South Africa.'
Questions of the Indian frontier and Africa lay outside the immediate sphere of the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, yet he was constantly consulted upon both of them, and had his full part in defending the reversal of Lord Lytton's policy by the new Viceroy, Lord Ripon, who restored, or perhaps established, the unity of Afghanistan.
In the matter of South Africa, the Boer leaders wrote at once to express their confidence that the new Government would consist of "men who look out for the honour and glory of England, not by acts of injustice and crushing force, but by the way of justice and good faith." They were answered by promises of local self-government, but such promises had been made to them before, and the retention of Sir Bartle Frere no doubt seemed a bad omen. So, at all events, it was regarded by the Radical party. On May 24th—
'I found that Courtney and my brother, with Dr. Cameron and Jesse Collings, were getting up an attempt to coerce the Colonial Office and Mr. Gladstone by preparing a list of between one and two hundred members who would vote with Wilfrid Lawson for a censure on the Government for not recalling Frere. Childers had found that it would be easy to recall him, for Frere had said that he would only go out for two years, and the two years were over. No doubt Frere, while blameworthy for the Zulu War, was not responsible for the Transvaal business, which had been done by Shepstone and Lord Carnarvon before he went out; but with our people he received the whole discredit for all that went wrong in South Africa, and it was impossible to wonder at this when one recalled the language that he habitually made use of….
'Frere was protected by Mr. Gladstone, and allowed to remain, a mistake for which we very gravely suffered. As this matter became of great importance in 1899, I ought to add that Lord Granville backed Mr. Gladstone in abstaining from rescinding the annexation of the Transvaal, on the ground that as we were retiring from Kandahar we had better not also retire from Pretoria.'
When, a few months later, the Boer rising followed, Dilke, with three other Radical Ministers, Bright, Chamberlain, and Courtney, refused to defend the Government's action even by a silent vote. 'Everything went as badly as possible in South Africa, and Lord Kimberley' (the Colonial Secretary) 'must share the blame with Mr. Gladstone.'
The third instance in which the recall of a man was demanded by Liberal opinion as essential to the reversal of a policy touched matters in whose development Sir Charles had a considerable part to play:
'May 20th.—One of our first troubles in debate was with regard to Layard's position at Constantinople, we being attacked by our own people on May 20th, who were more Gladstonian than Mr. Gladstone, as to the public insults which Layard had heaped upon him. Mr. Gladstone discussed with me what he was to say, and I have his note which, in addition to the statement about Layard, contains the curiously large one, "Statements made in Opposition not to be taken too literally when in office."'
Next day Mr. Gladstone wrote: "Thank you for the wonderful despatch you kindly made in obtaining for me the particulars about Layard's appointment."
The new Under-Secretary writes of these early days and first impressions:
'The general opinion of the party was that a Liberal policy was being pursued in foreign affairs, and that we had in the Foreign Office carried out that which the country intended us to do. We were able to bring about joint action on the part of Europe, and by means of it to settle the Greek and Montenegrin questions; and Goschen's presence at Constantinople was useful, inasmuch as he fully shared the views of the Liberal party upon foreign affairs, although he differed from them in domestic matters. On the other hand, the party were frightened about India, for, although Lord Lytton had been removed, the Government refused to make any sign as to the immediate evacuation of Kandahar, and, as a matter of fact, it was a long time before the Queen's resistance upon this point could be overcome. She no doubt felt more able to stand out against Hartington, whom she liked, than against Lord Granville.' [Footnote: See Life of Granville, vol. ii., p. 5.]
Lord Lytton's policy is thus described:
'The Allgemeine Zeitung for one of the last days of February contained a remarkable disclosure of the Government scheme for the settlement of Afghan affairs, which, so far as I know, did not appear in the English newspapers. It was quoted from some Indian paper, and revealed the fact that Persia was to occupy Herat, Kabul and Kandahar being capitals of two separate States. I did not at the time believe that it was possible that the Government should have absolutely reversed the past British policy by proposing the cession of Herat to Persia, but when I came into office at the end of April I made immediate inquiry into the subject, and found that it was true, and that they had done so. It was afterwards admitted.'
This proposal, however, had been declined by Persia. Before the fall of the Beaconsfield Ministry—
'The Amir of Afghanistan had written to tell us that he must be the friend of Russia, though he would be our friend too. We had replied (that is to say, the outgoing Government had replied) that Russia had sworn to us to have no dealings with Afghanistan, but that we should in any case evacuate his country in October without conditions, although he must respect our hold on Kandahar. Persia, it was clear from Lytton's despatches, had acted under Russian influence when declining Herat on our conditions.'
Under Lord Ripon, the policy of breaking up Afghanistan disappeared. But although there was a clear intention to abandon all claim to remain in Kandahar, yet the difficulty which attends any retrogressive movement in Central Asia was at this moment intensified, because Russia was threatening to advance on Merv, only 250 miles from Herat; and it seemed as if the Tsar's troops might occupy one Afghan stronghold at the moment when the Queen's forces withdrew from another.
'Lord Granville showed me, 15th May, some notes of language which he intended to hold to Russia as to Central Asia, very strong indeed upon the question of Merv; but the Cabinet afterwards took all this out, not a single man being found in the Cabinet to back up Lord Granville upon this question.'
In the succeeding months Sir Charles maintained a steady correspondence with the new Viceroy, Lord Ripon, who described his task as a hard one. "But I will do my best to perform it faithfully, and trust to you to back me up." In it appears the reason for Lord Ripon's unwilling acceptance of Abdurrahman, whom he called "the most Russian of the candidates" for the Afghan throne, but also the inevitable choice. If Lord Ripon broke with him, no hope appeared of establishing "even a semblance of order" before the Indian Government withdrew the troops, "as," said the Viceroy, "we must, because the service in Afghanistan, especially in winter, is so unpopular with the native troops as to be a serious difficulty if it should continue long. I hate the idea of leaving the Afghans a prey to anarchy, created to some extent, at all events, by our policy, and I shall do all I can to avoid it."
The Eastern Question was still dominant. The Treaty of Berlin had left three sources of discontent in the region affected by its provisions. In Bulgaria, Turkey complained that the Bulgarians had not fulfilled their promise to disarm and to raze fortifications. In Greece, evasive negotiations concerning the promised 'rectification of the frontier' were being deliberately spun out. On the Montenegrin border, territory surrendered and evacuated by the Turks had immediately been occupied by Mohammedan Albanians before the Montenegrin troops could reach it.
'On my first examination of the papers at the Foreign Office, I found that the black spot was Montenegro; the Roman Catholic Albanians on the frontier and the Mahomedan Albanians being equally determined not to become Montenegrin, and the Montenegrins insisting either on the line of the Treaty, which would give them some Mahomedan, or on the lines of the "Corti compromise," which would give them some Roman Catholic Albanian subjects.' [Footnote: The "Corti compromise" was so named after the Italian Ambassador at Constantinople, who advocated a frontier line more favourable to Turkey than those previously proposed (Sir Edward Hertslet's Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. iv.).]
Immediate steps were taken to remove the menace to European tranquillity which arose from what the Austrian Ambassador called "the Porte's long delays and tergiversation."
'May 1st.—Pressure at Constantinople had begun this day, the Cabinet having on the previous day approved an excellent and firm despatch from Lord Granville to Layard, really written from the first word to the last by Tenterden, containing the phrase, "While Her Majesty's Government wish to abstain from anything like menace, any intimation they give will be adhered to to the letter." The weak point about the despatch, however, was that the Russians had written us a despatch in the same sense, and that it might have been made to appear that we were only acting under Russian dictation. At the same time the despatch returned to the position of the circular bearing Lord Salisbury's name, which I have called the April 1st (1878) Circular, and set up that Concert of Europe which was destined to be kept together until the Greek and Montenegrin frontier questions had been settled….
'On May 3rd the Cabinet again considered our circular despatch (calling on the Powers to address an identic and simultaneous note to the Porte to fulfil its Treaty obligations as regards Greece, Montenegro, and Armenia) in its final form…. On May 4th I lunched with Lord Granville, and found that it was finally settled that Goschen would go as Ambassador to Constantinople and Edmond Fitzmaurice in Wolff's place.'
Meanwhile France was vigorously backing the new policy. Lord Granville was deeply engaged in trying to unite Germany with the Powers in carrying out concerted action, which was constantly evaded by Bismarck.
'May 7th.—On this day I had an opportunity of reading quietly a curious despatch of Odo Russell, dated April 29th, recounting the views of Prince Bismarck, who seemed to me to have been laughing at him. The Prince "is even more willing to give his support to any combined policy of England and France, as for instance in Egypt, because he looks upon an Anglo-French alliance as the basis of peace and order in Europe." [Footnote: This despatch is to be found in the Life of Granville, vol. ii., p. 211, where the date is given as May 1st.]
'On Sunday, May 9th, I had to dinner Léon Say, the new French Ambassador; Montebello, his first secretary, afterwards Ambassador at Constantinople; Lord Lyons and his secretary Sheffield; Lord Tenterden, my colleague at the Foreign Office; my secretary Murray; Harcourt, and C. E. D. Black, who the week afterwards became Harcourt's secretary on my recommendation. Léon Say brought with him from the French "bag" Gambetta's answer to my letter. Gambetta informed me that the French Government were unanimous in throwing over Waddington's compromise and giving Greece all that she had been intended to have; and Gambetta was in favour, and said that his Prime Minister' (M. de Freycinet) 'was in favour, of taking active steps to prevent further delay on the part of Turkey.' [Footnote:
"CHAMBRE DES DÉPUTÉS, "PARIS, "le 7 Mai, 1880.
"CHER AMI,
"Les dernières Élections Cantonales m'avaient si vivement absorbé que je n'ai pu trouver la minute de liberté nécessaire pour répondre à vos deux lettres.
"Permettez-moi d'ailleurs, après m'être excusé du retard, de vous dire que je ne partageais ni votre émotion ni votre point d'impatience. Je crois fermement que la solution grecque sera prochainement obtenue, en dépit des résistances et des tergiversations qui peuvent se produire chez les Turcs ou ailleurs. L'important est de maintenir le concert de l'Europe, de le manifester par l'action commune d'une démonstration navale; et d'après tout ce que je sais, j'ai confiance que le gouvernement de la République est resté dans la ligne de conduite et qu'il y persévérera.
"Quant à la Grèce, il convient qu'elle attende aussi, sans faire mesure, l'effet de cette démonstration. Je suis peut-être optimiste, mais je crois à une issue favorable.
"En ce qui touche le traité de Commerce votre lettre m'a fort surpris, et je ne peux m'expliquer une attitude si contraire aux préliminaires pris par M. L. Say: je vous prie de ne pas trop vous hâter de la porter à la connaissance du public. Je crois qu'il y a là quelque malentendu que je serai bien aise de faire disparaître, si vous voulez m'y donner le temps.
"Je vais demain à Cherbourg, où je verrai vos amis qui sont invités par la Ville, et au retour je vous manderai ce que j'aurai appris sur les négociations du traité de Commerce qu'il serait si bon de voir conclure.
"Bien cordialement,
"L. GAMBETTA."
"CHAMBRE DES DÉPUTÉS, "PARIS, "le 8 Mai, 1880.
"MON CHER AMI,
"Je profite de l'intermédiaire d'un jeune ami, M. Auguste Gérard, que vous avez déjà rencontré, pour vous envoyer quelques lignes de réponse a votre aimable dernière communication.
"J'ai vu le Président de notre cabinet au sujet de la question Grecque, et comme vous pensez, le gouvernement est unanime pour reprendre la question de Janina intégralement, en écartant définitivement la dernière proposition de Waddington; on accepte la formation de la commission internationale, chargée de reprendre le tracé au double point de vue diplomatique et technique. On y défendra le tracé qui englobe Janina. Ce qui importerait aujourd'hui serait d'agir promptement, et de concert. On commettrait une lourde faute en laissant la Porte atermoyer plus longtemps et épuiser toutes les forces des diverses nationalités auxquelles elle refuse de donner les maigres satisfactions fixées par le traité de Berlin.
"M. Léon Say doit avoir reçu d'ailleurs à ce sujet les instructions les plus nettes, et vous l'avez probablement déjà vu.
* * * * * * *
"A bientôt, je l'espère,
"Votre dévoué,
"LÉON GAMBETTA."]
Such a step had already been taken by Great Britain on May 8th, when the
Cabinet—
'wrote a despatch to the Courts proposing a Conference at Berlin or Paris as to the Greek frontier, which led, in fact, to the Conference summoned at Berlin to consider the fulfilment of the terms of the Treaty.'
On May 10th this activity was resented by the Sultan, who 'telegraphed his unwillingness to receive Goschen, and great pressure had to be brought to bear upon him during the next few days to induce him to consent.'
There was another matter arising out of the Russo-Turkish War which had occupied Sir Charles much while in Opposition—namely, the government of Cyprus. He did not think that the Foreign Office was the proper department to administer dependencies, and accordingly, within a few days of taking office, he raised the question whether there was any ground for keeping Cyprus under the Foreign Office, and suggested its transfer to the Colonial Office. In this Lord Granville concurred. But—
'Philip Currie, who as head of the Turkish department was managing the affairs of Cyprus, did not want to lose it, and asked to be allowed to prepare a memorandum in the opposite sense, and Lord Granville wrote, "I do not expect to be converted by Currie's memorandum. Do you? If not, the Colonial Office will have to bolt it." The Colonial Office did have to bolt it, for the island was soon handed over to them!'
By the close of the year, as has been seen, Sir Charles was able to report to his constituents "that, acting under the instructions of Lord Granville, he had secured a greatly improved administration for this island."
On May 21st—
'Egypt began to trouble me, and I was not to be clear of the embarrassment which it caused for several years. I wrote to Lord Granville to say that I had been sounded through Rivers Wilson as to how the Government would take the appointment of a Nubar Ministry with an English Finance Minister,' and Sir Charles again warned Lord Granville of dissensions between the English representatives in Egypt.
It became the most serious of all the embarrassments which involved Mr.
Gladstone's Government. On May 8th—
'I had to see Lord Ripon, who had appointed Colonel Gordon to be his private secretary, and to inform him privately that the Foreign Office feared that he would find him too excitable to be possible as a secretary, which, indeed, very speedily proved to be the case.'
Gordon resigned before Lord Ripon reached India, and on June 14th telegraphed to Sir Charles—
'to know whether we would let him take service again with the Chinese. I saw a friend of his in London, one of the Chinese Commissioners of Customs, and asked whether Gordon could be got to telegraph that he would refuse any military command in the event of war between China and Russia. He said he thought so, and I told Lord Granville, who wrote back, "I have told the Duke of Cambridge that on these conditions he might have leave."'
Lord Ripon wrote on his arrival:
"… So, you see, your warnings about Gordon came true. It is fortunate that the arrangement came to an end before I got here. As it is, there is no real harm done; we parted the best of friends, and I learned to my astonishment, after I left him at Bombay, that he was off for China."
So passes out of sight for the moment, but only for the moment, this fateful personality.
An immediate trouble, however, arose out of the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1878, by which Great Britain had been pledged to defend Turkey's possessions in Asia Minor on condition that necessary reforms in government were introduced. This pledge made England indirectly responsible for the character of Turkish rule in Armenia; and Sir Charles had repeatedly expressed the view that England was committed to more than she could perform, either as against Russia or on behalf of Armenia. On May 14th the Cabinet left in the draft of instructions to Mr. Goschen 'a passage of Tenterden's, in which we recognized the Asia Minor Convention of our predecessors…. But I induced Lord Granville to strike it out after the Cabinet on his own responsibility.'
On the other hand, since the Convention existed, Sir Charles held that by abrogating it they 'might appear to invite the Russians to invade Armenia, which Russia might proceed to do in the name of humanity.' So far as Turkey was concerned, it was considered likely that the Porte would wish to see the Convention annulled, because it could then sell Cyprus to Great Britain for cash instead of leasing it in return for the Asiatic guarantee; and Turkish Pashas would be free from any interference about reforms in Asia Minor. Ultimately the fear of letting Russia in outweighed the other considerations, and the Convention was recognized, leaving England with a heavy burden of moral responsibility for all that subsequently occurred in Armenia under the protection of what Mr. Gladstone himself had not unjustly called this "insane covenant."
Meanwhile, Musurus Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador, was complaining to Lord Granville that 'the Sultan had assented to the Convention under a false impression, not knowing that a portion of his dominions would be given over to Austrian control, an alienation not contemplated by the Treaty of San Stefano.' He complained, moreover, that the arrangement went, in reality, beyond temporary occupation of provinces. 'We (Lord Salisbury) had given Bosnia and Herzegovina secretly to Austria without reserve.'
The whole Eastern situation was ill-defined and full of difficulties. Mr. Goschen, before he left England on his mission, came to Dilke to 'bewail the unwillingness of Gladstone and of Lord Granville to make up their minds how far they were going in the direction of coercion of Turkey.' On May 26th—
'Looking about to see how Turkey was to be coerced with regard to the Greek and Montenegrin questions, I discovered that all reinforcements and officials were sent, and all money received by the Constantinople Government, by the sea route, so that a blockade of the Dardanelles would cut their Empire in two until they came to terms.'
Sir Charles's aim throughout all these frontier negotiations was to support the claims of Greece, left indefinite by the Berlin Treaty. At Great Britain's instance, the Greeks had refrained from attacking Turkey when Turkey was engaged with Russia; but the Treaty of Berlin had only promised to Greece in general terms "a rectification of frontier." On the other hand, the Treaty had awarded to Montenegro certain districts of Albania, which, as already stated; showed great repugnance to accept Montenegrin rule. Sir Charles now conceived a plan—
"for combining Albanian autonomy with personal union with Greece, finding that the Albanians were willing to accept the King of the Hellenes, provided they succeeded in obtaining securities or privileges for the Roman Catholic Church, to which great numbers of them belonged."
On May 28th he learnt from the Greek Chargé d'Affaires that proposals for such a personal union had been made to the King of Greece, directly and very secretly, "on the part of a Turkish statesman." The Southern Albanians, wrote M. Gennadius, are to all intents and purposes Greeks. But, the latter added, "the initiative ought to proceed from the Albanians." A few days later Mr. Goschen wrote from Constantinople that the proposed union would be a solution "very valuable for Europe," but that the Turks would struggle hard to outbid the Greeks, and the Albanians were very strong in the Palace, and were trusted all over the Empire. Still, autonomy, Mr. Goschen thought, the Albanians "would and must have in some shape." [Footnote: See also Life of Goschen, vol. ii., pp. 215, 216.]
In their attempt to reverse the Beaconsfield policy there was one influence steadily opposed to the Government.
'On June 11th there went out a despatch, which had been for several days on the stocks, as to the Anglo-Turkish Convention. It had come back on the 10th from the Queen, who had written by the side of our words: "The acquisition of Cyprus is, in their view, of no advantage to the country either in a military or political sense." "I do not in the least agree in this.—V.R.I." But we sent it, all the same.'
The King of Greece had come to London, and on June 4th Sir Charles went by his wish to Marlborough House, and had an hour's conversation, 'chiefly upon the question of personal union with Albania, but partly with regard to the past, as to which I received his thanks.' 'I thought him a very able man, an opinion which I have never changed.' All Europe confirmed this judgment when the King of the Hellenes was struck down more than thirty years later in the very achievement of his long-planned schemes. In 1880 the note of disparagement was widespread; but Sir Charles was not alone in his estimate:
'Dizzy was once, after this date, talking to me and the Duchess of Manchester about him, and the Duchess said to me: "How you Liberals have deceived that poor little King!" Whereupon Dizzy replied: "It would take a very clever Government to deceive that youth."'
Elsewhere Sir Charles wrote that the King was a "good talker, but academic," and, dining at Marlborough House on June 6th, he heard an estimate of him as the too industrious apprentice:
'A big aide-de-camp of the King of Greece took more champagne than was good for him, and was extremely funny. Pointing to his King, he said: "Now, there is my King. He is a good little King; but he is not what I call a fashionable King." And then, pointing to the Prince of Wales, he said: "Now, that is what I call a fashionable Prince—un Prince vraiment 'chic.' He goes to bed late, it is true, but he gets up— well, never. That is what I call a really fashionable Prince. My King gets up at six!"'
Sir Charles met the King repeatedly during the next fortnight, to follow out, with the maps, the military details of the proposed new frontier. As soon as the French and Austrian Governments had accepted the British proposal for a Conference at Berlin to settle the question of the frontiers, and Bismarck had consented to call it, Lord Odo Russell wrote that he would have to "act on the Greek Frontier Commission, in which Dilke was better versed than anyone," and begged Sir Charles to "lend him his lights," 'which,' says the Memoir, 'I had to proceed to do' by an exhaustive letter.
A naval demonstration in the Adriatic now followed, generally known as 'the Dulcigno demonstration,' carried out by ships of the concerted Powers, under command of the senior Admiral present, and acting under a protocole de désintéressement. It was imposing rather than formidable, since France and Italy both instructed their officers in no case to fire a shot. But it was powerfully reinforced by the threat of independent British action, on the lines which Sir Charles Dilke suggested, and, so helped, it did its work, so far as the Montenegrin question was concerned. The Greek question still remained for settlement.
Phases in the development of this situation are thus chronicled:
'On June 23rd I went to the State Ball, and had a good deal of talk with Musurus, to try and find out about a curious business which I noted in my diary as follows: "The Russians and Turks are working together. The Russians came yesterday to propose to send 20,000 Russian men in English ships to coerce Turkey, and the Turks tell us to-day that they will yield to an occupation by a European force, but not to a mere naval demonstration. Both want to raise the difficulties which this will cause, and to fish in troubled waters."
'On Wednesday, June 30th, at three o'clock, an interview took place between Lord Granville, Lord Northbrook' (First Lord of the Admiralty), 'Childers' (Secretary of State for War), 'Sir John Adye' (Childers' adviser), 'and myself at the Foreign Office as to the means of coercing Turkey. The War Office wished to place an army corps in Greece, which, if they were to send a full complement of guns, would take a month. I suggested the far cheaper plan of a naval occupation of the port of Smyrna, and the collection and stoppage of customs and dues. Mr. Gladstone came in a little late, and took up my idea. But, preferring his Montenegrins to my Greeks, he insisted that we should first deal by the fleet with the Montenegrin question at Dulcigno. Both ideas went forward. The Dulcigno demonstration took place, and produced the cession of territory to the Montenegrins; and we afterwards let out to the Turks our intentions with regard to Smyrna, and produced by this means the cession of territory to Greece. [Footnote: Life of Granville, vol. ii., p. 231.]
'On Thursday, July 1st, we had a further interview with the Admiralty to arrange our naval demonstrations. On this day there came to see me Professor Panariétoff, a secret agent of the Prince of Bulgaria. He informed me that his Government intended to press on a union between Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia. They did not see any reason why they should wait. It might suit the English Liberal Cabinet that they should wait; but from their point of view, why wait? At a party in the evening I met Borthwick, who playfully assured me that he knew that our policy was to send one army corps to Greece to support the Greeks against the Turks, and another to Eastern Roumelia to support the Turks in maintaining the Treaty of Berlin. The two, after each of them had accomplished its mission, would probably, he thought, come into hostilities with one another in Macedonia.'
On July 5th the Austrian Ambassador, Count Karolyi, told Sir Charles that the Turkish representative at Vienna had been solemnly warned to reckon no longer upon the possibility of disagreement among the Powers, and to consider 'the danger which would result if the Powers became convinced that the Porte had no respect either for their pledges or its own.' This Dilke hailed as 'a great step in advance on Austria's part,' and on July 7th he called at the Austrian Embassy, at the wish of the Ambassador, who explained the views of his Government:
'It would send two ships to meet two ships of each Power that chose to send any, to watch the Montenegro coast with a view to carrying out the Dulcigno proposal if the Porte would not give effect to the Corti compromise within three weeks.' Count Karolyi 'then went on to speak warmly in favour of the future of Greece, and to say that as regarded the Greek frontier Austria would be willing even to send troops.'
Public feeling in Austria, it appeared, was willing to sanction much stronger measures in support of Greece than it would tolerate on behalf of Montenegro. The British Foreign Office now proceeded to utilize the position of vantage which had been gained.
'On July 16th I noted that, Lord Granville having urged the Queen to write an autograph letter to the Sultan of a nature to induce him to give in, the Queen very naturally refused, on the ground that she dissented from every proposition in the draft sent her. She offered to write a mild word of advice or recommendation to him to yield without bloodshed, and this proposal was accepted by the Government. A telegram based on it was despatched on the 17th, and it asked in the name of united Europe for a complete fulfilment of the conditions of the Treaty of Berlin. The Sultan had at this moment despatched a secret agent, a French advocate at Constantinople, to Gambetta, who assured him that it was because France was interested in the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire that it was absolutely necessary to force Turkey to allow herself to be saved.
'The attitude of the French Government had begun to embarrass us a good deal. On July 28th I wrote to Gambetta that we could not understand the hesitations of the French Government, which was continually putting in reserves. All this was known at Constantinople, and augmented the resistance of the Porte; the Prime Minister's paper was attacking us, and Gambetta's paper (the République Française) giving us no support…. In his telegraphic reply Gambetta used words of encouragement with regard to the attitude of his Government, as to which, no doubt, he was himself finding a good deal of trouble. A little later he sent over one of his private secretaries with a fuller letter.'
A conversation with Gambetta would have been valuable to Sir Charles at this moment, and he regretted having to forgo an opportunity which offered. He had procured invitations for—
'the Brasseys and Samuelson to the Cherbourg banquet, [Footnote: This banquet was the occasion of Gambetta's famous Cherbourg speech, a passage from which is inscribed on his monument in Paris.] which was to be given to the President of the Republic and the Presidents of the two Chambers (that is, Grévy, Gambetta, and Léon Say). Brassey asked me to go with him in the Sunbeam. Although I should like to have gone, I was under engagements in London; and I spent the Sunday dismally … instead of at Cherbourg with Gambetta.'
But he sent him messages by Mr. Bernhard Samuelson [Footnote: M.P. for
Banbury; afterwards Sir Bernhard Samuelson.] which were quickly effective.
Also, although public opinion in Austria favoured Greece, Sir Charles had ground for believing that Italian Ministers kept the Turks perfectly informed, and that even while advising concession upon Montenegro, they did so with the suggestion that the Greek claims might be the more easily resisted. Austria's concern was, of course, with the northern part of the Illyrian coast; Italy's with the southern. As he noted later in the year, 'the European Concert was about as easy to manage as six horses to drive tandem.' Nevertheless, by the first week in August, 1880, he was able to write:
'A collective note had now been presented by the Powers to the Porte, so that we had carried the Powers with us as fully in our Montenegrin policy, represented by the collective note, as in our Greek policy, represented by the previous Identic note—a most considerable success, contrasting strongly with the failure which our foreign policy met with two or three years later.'
These impressions were shared by Lord Ripon, who followed European and domestic affairs keenly, from India. He wrote on August 17th:
"I rejoice to see that the F.O. seems to be distancing all competitors in the race of success, … which" (he added) "in regard to some parliamentary proceedings is not very high praise, you will be perhaps inclined to say."
II.
Even after the collective note had been presented, the European situation remained delicate and difficult through the mutual distrust of the Powers. On August 9th Lord Granville, who through all these negotiations was exerting his greatest diplomatic skill in keeping Germany in the Concert, expressed to Sir Charles his conviction that 'Bismarck had spies in the Queen's household, and knew everything that went on.' On the side of France matters improved. [Footnote: See Life of Granville, vol. ii., chapter vi.]
'On the 8th I received, at last, a reply from Gambetta to my letters— a reply in which he showed that he fully agreed with me, but that he was not as a fact all-powerful with the Prime Minister (Freycinet). The same post, however, brought me a letter from Lord Houghton, who was at Vichy, and who complained that it was an unhealthy state of things that Gambetta (who had talked freely to him while in Paris) "should exercise so much irresponsible power." … The result of my attempts to stir up Gambetta upon our side was seen in the report by Bernhard Samuelson of Gambetta's conversation with him at Cherbourg on Monday, August 9th, and in an article which appeared on Wednesday, August 11th, and another on Friday, the 13th, in Gambetta's paper on the coercion of the Turks. These articles were from the pen of Barrère, who had been over in the previous week to see me, and were written at the personal direction of Gambetta; and Adams (Secretary to the Embassy) wrote from Paris on the 13th that the tone of the French Government had correspondingly improved.'
But even while France assisted in one direction, she introduced fresh complications in another by her quickly maturing designs on Tunis—which had been mentioned to Sir Charles by the French Ambassador, M. Léon Say, as early as June 8th. French diplomatists claimed an authorization from Lord Salisbury. [Footnote: See Crispi's Memoirs, vol. ii., pp. 98-109 and 121; Life of Granville, vol. ii., pp. 215, 270, 436, as to Tunis and Tripoli.] "How can you," he was reported to have said, during the conversations which attended the Congress of Berlin, "leave Carthage to the barbarians?"
'It was on this day (June 8th, 1880) that I became fully aware of the terms of Lord Salisbury's offer of Tunis to France, as to which he misled the public, Lord Salisbury having, when reminded of the statement, said privately that it was "a private conversation," and publicly that there was "no foundation for the statement."'
Later Sir Charles made inquiries of M. Say, who gave the dates of the two conversations as July 21st and 26th, 1878.
'Lord Salisbury made a denial which is on record at the Foreign Office in his own handwriting in red ink, but this denial is dated July 16th —i.e., before the conversations.'
The trouble developed rapidly. By August 14th, 1880, Italy was threatening to withdraw her Ambassador from Paris, 'on account of the receipt of information showing that the French intended to occupy Tunis under Lord Salisbury's permission.'
At this moment Sir Charles's health broke down. Two notes from his chief, Lord Granville, are preserved, the first evidently sent across in the office:
"MY DEAR DILKE,
"Please don't be a d—d fool. Go home and do exactly what your doctor tells you.
"Yrs. G."
And again on August 18th Lord Granville wrote:
"I must formally request you not to leave the house till you send me the doctor's written statement that he has advised you to do so. I consider myself an honorary member of the gouty faction, and entitled to speak with weight on the folly of trying to bully the disorder."
To this friendly dictation the patient submitted till the 23rd, when he insisted on going to the House to answer questions, but returned to bed, and next morning underwent an operation. [Footnote: He worked hard during his enforced confinement to the house, and one of his visitors was M. Joseph Arnaud, one of Gambetta's secretaries, who was sent by his friend to reassure him as to the pressure he was using in the Frontier Question. It is of M. Arnaud that Sir Charles tells a Gambetta story: 'G. was jovial to-day, November 12th, 1880. Arnaud having said that all the people to whom tickets were given for the presidential tribune were grateful to Gambetta, and all who were angry were angry with him—Arnaud—the reply was: "Tu ne comprends donc pas que tu es institué pour ça?"'] In a few days he was again in Parliament, where the peace party, headed by Sir Wilfrid Lawson, had begun to denounce the naval demonstration against Turkey. In this they were backed by the Fourth Party, who spoke of it as "the combined filibustering." However, on September 7th, the general question was raised on the motion for adjournment of the House, and Sir Charles, 'replying to the peace party on the one hand, and on the other to Cowen, who attacked them in the name of Albanian nationality,' drew from Lord Granville this compliment:
"My mother once said that Clarendon—with a slight headache—was the pleasantest man she knew. I will not say that an operation makes you speak better, but it certainly does not prevent your speaking as well as usual."
The Fourth Party [Footnote: Dilke dates the birth of the Fourth Party at the beginning of the Gladstone Ministry, and says: 'Gorst was its real brain, the other two members (for Arthur Balfour hardly belonged to it) contributing "brass."'] were also busy in denunciation of the Government's policy in Afghanistan, which had been finally determined on August 7th, when—
'the Cabinet directed Lord Hartington and Lord Ripon to retire from Kandahar, although we had now heard of the intention of the Russians to occupy Merv, a step on their part which was certain to make our retirement from Kandahar unpopular with those who did not know its necessity.'
Another circumstance even more certain to add to the unpopularity of the retirement was not then known to the Home Government. On July 26th, Lord Ripon, writing to Sir Charles, complained of the "embarrassing engagements" with which "Lytton's reckless proceedings" had hampered him. One of these engagements bound him to maintain Shere Ali as Wali of Kandahar; and on July 27th, Ayub Khan, Shere Ali's rival, defeated at Maiwand the force under General Burrows which was supporting Great Britains' nominee. The policy of evacuation met with resistance in a quarter where such policies were always opposed. On September 7th Sir Charles left London to stay with Lord Granville at Walmer Castle, and Lord Hartington joined them on the 9th.
'The Queen had written for the second time to Hartington urging with great warmth that we should retain Kandahar, although, as Hartington said, this meant, to India, an expenditure of four millions sterling a year, on local troops, for no military return…. The Queen … at this moment was not only protesting strongly with regard to Kandahar, but also, in cipher telegrams, against the naval demonstration….
'On September 20th Lord Granville, just starting for Balmoral, came to see me. He told me that he thought of sending Dufferin to Constantinople at the end of Goschen's special mission, and Paget to Petersburg, and Layard to Rome if he could not get a pension out of the Treasury for Layard.'
The Queen conceived the interests of England as Lord Beaconsfield had presented them. But Mr. Gladstone did not conceive of English interests as bound up with Turkish success, and wrote on September 21st:
"If Turkey befools Europe at Dulcigno, we may as well shut up shop
altogether."
About the same time Chamberlain expressed his mind on questions of foreign policy in their bearing on party politics:
"Kandahar will have to be given up…. I only hope Hartington will have the pluck to do it at once and before we get into some fresh scrape. I observe the papers generally speak well of the session, the Government, and especially of the Radicals. So far so good. We have scored very well up to this time."
'In another letter Chamberlain added:
'"What about the Concert of Europe? Will it last through a bombardment of Dulcigno? I don't much like concerts. Our party of two, with Dillwyn as chorus, was about as numerous as is consistent with harmony, and I fear five great Powers are too many to make a happy family."'
In France the great ally of the Sultan's Fabian policy had fallen. M. de
Freycinet found himself forced to resign on September 19th:
'On September 9th I recorded that Gambetta means to turn out Freycinet. He foretold all this when Freycinet took office, and said to me at that time: "He will do well enough until he tries to fly. But one of these days he will set off flying." Gambetta turned out Freycinet on this occasion, but the day was to come when Freycinet would turn out Gambetta.'
On the 23rd Sir Charles 'heard from Paris that the fallen Minister "had been discovered to have been negotiating with the Vatican for months, without the knowledge even of his own colleagues."'
In the new Ministry, with Jules Ferry as Prime Minister, the Foreign Office fell to Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, [Footnote: M. Barthélemy Saint- Hilaire, born in 1805, the well-known philosophical writer and translator of Aristotle, was now seventy-five years of age. He entered the Chamber of Deputies in 1848 as a member of the Left, and became a member of the Senate in 1876. He was the first Secrétaire-Général de la Présidence de la République.] and Lord Houghton said: "Think of the old Aristotelian Barthélemy having the F.O.! Without pretension, I think at my age I am just as fit for the English one." This was a view in which Sir Charles inclined to agree, although M. Barrère wrote: "Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire's tendencies are excellent. He is in complete accord with us, and his views are wholly ours."
Lord Houghton also spoke of an interview with Moltke, who had told him that 'Russia was the cause of the necessity for the immense arming of Europe, not France, which at present might be trusted to keep quiet.'
'On September 28th I noted: "Cabinet suddenly and most unexpectedly summoned for Thursday to sit on Parnell, the Sultan, and the Queen, about Ireland, Dulcigno, and Kandahar respectively."… [Footnote: The decisions as to the Irish difficulties are dealt with in the first portion of Chapter XXII., pp. 343-348.]
'On September 30th Chamberlain, who was staying at Sloane Street, gave me a note of what passed at the Cabinet. With regard to Kandahar, the Generals whose names had been suggested by the Queen had been consulted, and had, of course, pronounced against giving it up. So the Queen had got her own way sufficiently for the matter to be left over till after Christmas. The Cabinet were evidently sorry that they had not more fully and more early adopted my suggestion of British coercion of the Turks at Smyrna. And on this occasion they agreed to try to induce the other Powers to agree upon (1) local action, or (2) the seizure of a material guarantee: (1) meaning a demonstration at the Dardanelles, and (2) meaning Crete.'
But the Eastern, unlike the Irish, trouble was now nearing a close, though—
'On October 1st Lord Granville came to sit with me, and was very gloomy. He thought that Mr. Gladstone was inclined to give in to the Turks rather than resort to coercion. Harcourt came in also—at one moment, "Whatever we do, we must not be snubbed," and the next, "After all, it will be no worse than Palmerston and Denmark."'
Sir Charles's plan for the seizure of Smyrna was now agreed to in principle by the Ministers in London, but while it still remained uncertain whether they could carry other Powers with them in this coup, Lord Lyons, British Ambassador at Paris, had written expressing a wish to see, Dilke concerning negotiations for a commercial treaty, 'and the Foreign Office also desired that I should deal with the Danube question later.' Sir Charles left London on October 11th.
'Before I left, Lord Granville showed me a letter from Hartington from Balmoral saying that the Queen had not named Kandahar to him, and had "agreed to the Smyrna seizure project," but was angry about Ireland. Hartington added that he had pledged Forster to put down Parnell. As to her not naming Kandahar, Lord Granville said that she never attacked the policy of a department to its chief.'
At Paris Sir Charles was warned by Lord Lyons that '"you will find the French Foreign Office in some confusion, as the new Under-Secretary of State is vigorously employed in 'purging' it of clericals and reactionaries."' On October 12th he went with Lord Lyons to see Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, and also Jules Ferry, the Prime Minister, and Tirard, the Minister of Commerce, with whom he would be principally brought into touch.
Lord Granville was in London with Mr. Gladstone, bewailing the unhappy
fate of those who have to wait for an Eastern Power to make up its mind.
But at last the Porte's decision to surrender Dulcigno was announced, and
Lord Granville wrote:
"MY DEAR DILKE,
"I accept your felicitations d'avance—the Turkish Note has got us out of a great mess. My liver feels better already. I hope you will improve the occasion by impressing upon all that it only requires firm language from all, such as was used by them on Saturday, to make the Turk yield.
"I wonder whether they will be keen about Turkish finance. It is rather in their line.
"How are we to help our poor friends the Greeks?"
The letter closed by a warning not to write by the post, "unless to say something which it is desirable the French Government should know." Caution as to danger of gossip about his frequent meetings with Gambetta was also urged. [Footnote: Sir Charles notes on 11th November: 'Having had a telegram from Lord Granville to caution me, I told Gambetta that I did not want my visits talked about because of the German newspapers. The result of it was that the Agence Havas stated that I had not seen Gambetta, and this was copied by Blowitz next day, so that the Times repeated the untrue statement!']
Acting on these suggestions, Sir Charles Dilke during the next four days discussed with the French Foreign Office and with Gambetta (who had written on September 28th to say, "Je reviendrai exprès de Suisse pour vous vous en causer à fond"), not only commercial negotiations, but also Turkish finance and the affairs of Greece. According to Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, the interests of Greece were at this time suffering because Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire was anxious to reconcile the Porte to those designs "which France was executing at Tunis and contemplating at Tripoli"; [Footnote: Life of Granville, vol. ii., pp. 215, 436.] and in Sir Charles's notes of these interviews there is repeated mention of Gambetta's references to what Lord Salisbury had promised or suggested in regard to Tunis. Gambetta himself was strongly Philhellene, but said to his friend on October 17th: "Mr. Gladstone has spoilt our European affairs by putting Montenegro first." He held, and M. de Courcel agreed with him, that the Concert was for the moment "used up," and that Greece must wait until it could be reinvigorated. The conclusion which Sir Charles drew and conveyed to Lord Granville was that 'France waited on Germany, and Germany on Austria, in regard to the Eastern Question, and consequently that, Austria being absolutely mistress of the situation, a confidential exchange of opinions at Vienna was essential.'