[Footnote A: First Principles (Spencer) pp. 40-44. Limits of Religions Thoughts, lecture II, first American edition, 1875.]
After thus running to absurdity the prevalent conceptions of the "Infinite," the "Absolute," the "Uncaused," Mr. V.'s "Most simple or not compound" "Being," the churchman does what all orthodox Christians do, he commits a violence against all human understanding and good sense—he arbitrarily declares, in the face of his own inexorable logic and its inevitable deductions, that, "it is our duty to think of God as personal; and it is our duty to believe that he is infinite;" that is, it is our duty to think of the infinite as at once limited and unlimited; as finite and infinite—"which," to use a phrase dear to Mr. Van Der Donckt, "is absurd," and therefore not to be entertained. At this point, the philosopher and the churchman reach the parting of the ways, and this is the exception, in the conclusion of the two, noted a few pages back.[A]
[Footnote A: Page 105.]
Some do indeed allege [says Mr. Spencer] that though the Ultimate Cause of things cannot really be thought of by us as having specified attributes, it is yet incumbent upon us to assert these attributes. Though the forms of our consciousness are such that the Absolute cannot, in any manner or degree, be brought within them, we are nevertheless told that we must represent the Absolute to ourselves under these forms! * * * That this is not the conclusion here adopted, needs hardly be said. If there be any meaning in the foregoing arguments, duty requires us neither to affirm nor deny personality. Our duty is to submit ourselves with all humility to the established limits of our intelligence, and not perversely to rebel against them. Let those who can, believe there is eternal war between our intellectual faculties and our moral obligations. I, for one, admit no such radical vice in the constitution of things.[A]
[Footnote A: First Principles, p. 110.]
Yet Mr. Mansel, in the inconsistent and illogical course he pursues, is not more inconsistent, illogical, and unphilosophical than all orthodox Christians. The postulates of their creeds concerning the nature of God leads them to affirm what they call his "Spirituality," "Infinite Being," "Simplicity," etc. (which are but the equivalents of the philosopher's "absolute," "infinite," and the "uncaused"); and yet the necessities of their faith in revelation make it imperative that they regard him as existing in some relation to the universe and to man, which destroys his alleged "simplicity." To ascribe to him attributes is to destroy that simplicity[A] which orthodox creeds affirm, and for which Mr. Van Der Donckt so stoutly argues. Nor does it help matters when it is said that these attributes are existences—the attitude of Mr. V., for he says: "Every perfection [goodness, mercy, justice, etc.—attributes of God] is some existence, something that is." If this be granted, then it follows that God must be the sum of all these existences, therefore a compound, not "simple." And not only does orthodox belief in revelation compel those who follow it to concede the existence of attributes in God, but personality also. But if God be conceived as a personality, his "simplicity" or "spirituality," as held by Mr. V., vanishes, because, when recognized as personality, God is no longer "being"—but a being.
[Footnote A: "The rational conception of God is that he is, nothing more. To give him an attribute is to make him a relative God. * * * We cannot attribute to him any quality, for qualities are inconceivable apart from matter." "Origin and Development of Religious Beliefs—Christianity."—(S. Baring-Gould, p. 112.) It was held by well nigh the whole medieval school of theologians that God was unknowable because "the absolute simplicity of the divine essence was incompatible with the existence of distinctions therein." (See art. "Theism," Ency. Brit., and the references there given.)]
Mr. Van Der Donckt himself says: "Something is limited, not because it is [i. e. exists]: but because it is this or that; for instance, a stone, a plant, a man"—or a person, I suggest. For if God has personality, he is a person, a some-thing, and hence limited, according to Mr. V.'s philosophy; if limited, as he must be when conceived of as this or that, as a person, for instance, then of course not infinite being; and thus my friend's doctrine of God's "simplicity" is destroyed the moment he ascribes personality to Deity. Nor does the difficulties of Mr. Van Der Donckt and all orthodox Christians end here. Not only does revelation as they view it demand belief in the personality of God, but it demands the belief that in God are three persons—the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. This further complicates the matter, and removes orthodox Christians still further from the postulate of "simplicity" they affirm of God; for if there are three persons in God, by no intellectual contortions whatsoever can this conception of "three" be harmonized with the orthodox Christian postulate of God's "simplicity." For the Son, if he exists at all, must exist in virtue of some distinction from the Father; so also the Holy Ghost must exist in virtue of some distinction from both the Father and the Son. Each must have something distinct from the other; must be what the other is not, in some particular;* and if each one has something the other has not, and each lacks something which the other has, how can it be said that each of these persons is God, and each infinite as he must be in order to be God, under Mr. V.'s doctrine?
[Footnote A: "Distinction is necessarily limitation; for, if one object is to be distinguished from another, it must possess some form of existence which the other has not, or it must not possess some form which the other has." Dean Mansel, "Limits of Religious Thoughts."]
If the three be conceived as one God—yet each with that about him which distinguishes him from the other—how can God be regarded as "simple," "not compound?" The orthodox creeds of Christendom, moreover, require us to believe that while the Father is a person, the Son a person, and the Holy Ghost a person, yet there are not three persons, but one person. So with each being eternal and almighty. So with each being God: "The Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Ghost is God: and yet there are not three Gods but one God"[A] No wonder the whole conception is given up as "incomprehensible." "Their mode of subsistence [i. e., the subsistence of the three persons] in the one substance," says the Commentary on the Confession of Faith, "must ever continue to us a profound mystery, as it transcends all analogy."[B] So the Douay Catechism (Catholic), ch. i:
[Footnote A: See the creed of St. Athanasius, a copy is published in the History of the Church, vol. I, Introduction, p. 87.]
[Footnote B: This Commentary is by Rev. A. A. Hodges, D.D., LL.D., p. 58.]
Q. In what do faith and law of Christ consist? A. In two principal mysteries, namely, the Unity and Trinity of God, and the incarnation and death of our Savior.
"To think that God is, as we think him to be, is blasphemy," is the lofty assertion behind which some of the orthodox hide when hard pressed with the inconsistency of their creed; and if I mistake not, "A God understood is a God dethroned," has long been an aphorism of the Church of which Mr. Van Der Donckt is a priest.
But what is the sum of my argument thus far on Mr. Van Der Donckt's premise of God's absolute "simplicity" or "spirituality?" Only this:
First, his premise is proven to be unphilosophical and untenable, when coupled with his creed, which ascribes qualities, attributes and personality to God. Either the gentleman must cease to think of God as "infinite being," "most simple," "not compound," or he must surrender the God of his creed, who is represented by it to be three persons in one substance; and, moreover, persons possessed of attributes and qualities which bring God into relations with men and the universe, a mode of being which destroys "simplicity." Either one or the other of these beliefs must be given up; they cannot consistently be held simultaneously, as they destroy each other. If Mr. V. holds to the God of his creed, what becomes of all his "philosophy?" If he holds to his "philosophy," what becomes of the God of his creed.
Second, as affecting this discussion, the matter at this point stands thus: Since the gentleman's premise of God's absolute simplicity is proved to be illogical and unphilosophical, it affords no sound basis of argument against the Latter-day Saints' views of Deity, wherein they hold him to be something different from absolute "being"—more than a mere, and, I may say, bare and barren "existence," a metaphysical abstraction. Mr. V.'s premise of absolute simplicity affords no consistent basis of argument against our view that God is a person in the sense of being an individual, in form like man, and possessed of attributes which bring him within the nearest and dearest relations to men that it is possible to conceive.
Of the Doctrine of God's "Simplicity" Being of Pagan Rather than of Christian Origin.
The next step in my argument is to prove that this doctrine of God being "most simple," "not compound," "pure being"—without body (i. e., not material), parts or passions—hence, without attributes, is not a doctrine of the Christian scriptures, but comes from the old Pagan philosophies.
Clearly the data for this doctrine of God's absolute "simplicity" did not come from the Old Testament, for that teaches the plainest anthropomorphic ideas respecting God. It ascribes to him a human form, and many qualities and attributes possessed by man, which, in the minds of philosophers of Mr. V.'s school, limit him who must be, to their thinking, without any limit whatsoever; and ascribes relativity to him who must not be relative but absolute.
The data for the doctrine of God's absolute "simplicity"—contended for by Mr. V.—does not come from the New Testament, for the writers of that volume of scripture accept the doctrine of the Old Testament respecting God, and even emphasize its anthropomorphic ideas, by representing that the man Christ Jesus was in the "express image" of God, the Father's, person; was, in fact, God manifest in the flesh (I Tim. 3:16); "the image of the invisible God" (Col. 1:5); "God, the Word, who was made flesh, and dwelt among men, who beheld his glory" (St. John 1:1-14). Hence Mr. Van Der Donckt's doctrine of God's "simplicity" cannot claim the warrant of New Testament authority.
Plato, in his Timaeus, (Jowett's translation, page 530,) incidentally referring to God, in connection with the creation of the universe, says:
We say indeed that "he was," "he is," "he will be;" but the truth is that "he is" alone truly expresses him, and that "was" and "will be" are only to be spoken of generation in time.
Here, then, is Mr. V.'s "pure being," "most simple," "not compound." Again:
We must acknowledge that there is one kind of being which is always the same, uncreated and indestructible, never receiving anything into itself from without, nor itself giving out to any other, but invisible and imperceptible by any sense, and of which the sight is granted to intelligence only (Ibid. p. 454).
Here Mr. V. may find his God, "who cannot change with regard to his existence, nor with regard to his mode of existence." Also his God who can only be seen with the "soul's intellectual perception, elevated by a supernatural influx from God." Dr. Mosheim, in his account of Plato's idea of God, says: "He considered the Deity, to whom he gave the supreme governance of the universe, as a being of the highest wisdom and power, and totally unconnected with any material substance."[A]
[Footnote A: Mosheim's "Historical Commentaries on the State of Christianity, During the First Three Hundred Years", vol. 1. p. 37.]
To the same effect, also, Justin Martyr (second Christian century) generalizes and accepts as doctrine what may be gathered from the sixth book of Plato's "Republic," with reference to God. To the Jew, Trypho, Justin remarks:
The Deity, father, is not to be viewed by the organs of sight, like other creatures, but he is to be comprehended by the mind alone, as Plato declares, and I believe him. * * * * Plato tells us that the eye of the mind is of such a nature, and was given Us to such an end, as to enable us to see with it by itself, when pure, that Being who is the source of whatever is an object of the mind itself, who has neither color, nor shape, nor size, nor anything which the eye can see, but who is above all essence, who is ineffable, and undefinable, who is alone beautiful and good, and who is at once implanted into those souls who are naturally well born, through their relationship to and desire of seeing him.
Athanasius (third Christian century) quotes the same definition (Contra Gentes, ch. 2), almost verbatim. Turning again to the Timaeus of Plato, this question is asked:
What is that which always is and has no becoming; and what is that which is always becoming and has never any being? That which is apprehended by reflection and reason [God] always is; and is the same; that on the other hand which is conceived by opinion, with the help of sensation without reason [the material universe], is in a process of becoming and perishing but never really is. * * * Was the world [universe], always in existence and without beginning? or created and having a beginning? Created, I reply.
In this, the orthodox Christians and Mr. V. may find their God of pure "being," that never is "becoming," but always is; also the creation of the universe out of nothing. The fact is that orthodox Christian views of God are Pagan rather than Christian.
In his great work on the "History of Christian Doctrine," Mr. William G. T. Shedd says:[A] "The early Fathers, in their defenses of Christianity against their pagan opponents, contend that the better pagan writers themselves agree with the new religion in teaching that their is one Supreme Being. Lactantius (Institutiones, 1, 5), after quoting the Orphic poets, Hesiod, Virgil, and Ovid, in proof that the heathen poets taught the unity of the supreme deity, affirms that the better pagan philosophers agree with them in this. 'Aristotle,' he says, 'although he disagrees with himself, and says many things that are self-contradictory, yet testifies that one supreme mind rules over the world. Plato, who is regarded as the wisest philosopher of them all, plainly and openly defends the doctrine of a divine monarchy, and denominates the supreme being, not ether, nor reason, nor nature, but as he is, God; and asserts that by him this perfect and admirable world was made. And Cicero follows Plato, frequently confessing the deity, and calls him the supreme being, in his Treatise on the Laws.'"
[Footnote A: Vol 1, p 56.]
It is conceded by Christian writers that the Christian doctrine of God is not expressed in New Testament terms, but in the terms of Greek and Roman metaphysics, as witness the following from the very able article in the Encyclopedia Britannica on Theism, by the Rev. Dr. Flint, Professor of Divinity, University of Edinburgh: "The proposition constitutive of the dogma of the Trinity—the propositions in the symbols of Nice, Constantinople and Toledo, relative to the immanent distinctions and relations in the Godhead—were not drawn directly from the New Testament, and could not be expressed in New Testament terms. They were the product of reason speculating on a revelation to faith—the New Testament representation of God as a Father, a Redeemer and a Sanctifier—with a view to conserve and vindicate, explain and comprehend it. They were only formed through centuries of effort, only elaborated by the aid of the conceptions, and formulated in the terms of Greek and Roman metaphysics." The same authority says: "The massive defense of theism, erected by the Cambridge school of philosophy, against atheism, fatalism, and the denial of moral distinctions, was avowedly built on a Platonic foundation."
In method of thought also, no less than in conclusions, the most influential of the Christian fathers on these subjects followed the Greek philosophers rather than the writers of the New Testament.[A] "Platonism, and Aristotelianism," says the author of the History of Christian Doctrine, "exerted more influence upon the intellectual methods of men, taking in the whole time since their appearance, than all other systems combined. They certainly influenced the Greek mind, and Grecian culture, more than all the other philosophical systems. They re-appear in Roman philosophy—so far as Rome had any philosophy. We shall see that Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, exerted more influence than all other philosophical minds united, upon the greatest of the Christian Fathers: upon the greatest of the Schoolmen; and upon the theologians of the Reformation, Calvin and Melanchthon. And if we look at European philosophy as it has been unfolded in England, Germany and France, we shall perceive that all the modern theistic schools have discussed the standing problems of human reason, in very much the same manner in which the reason of Plato and Aristotle discussed them twenty-two centuries ago. Bacon, Des Cartes, Leibniz, and Kant, so far as the first principles of intellectual and moral philosophy are concerned, agree with their Grecian predecessors. A student who has mastered the two systems of the Academy and Lyceum will find in modern philosophy (with the exception of the department of natural science) very little that is true, that may not be, found for substance, and germinally, in the Greek theism."[B]
[Footnote A: Especially compare Plato's methods of arising from the conception of the finite and variable, to the infinite and unchangeable; from the relatively beautiful and good, to the absolutely beautiful and good, in the sixth and seventh books of the "Republic," with St. Augustine's manner of arriving at the conception of "That which is"—God.—Confessions St. Augustine, book seven.]
[Footnote B: History of Christian Doctrine, by William G. T. Shedd; Vol. I, p. 52.]
It is hoped that enough is said here to establish the fact that the conception of God as "pure being," "immaterial," "without form," "or parts or passions," as held by orthodox Christianity, has its origin in Pagan philosophy, not in Jewish nor Christian revelation.
Of Jesus Christ Being Both Premise and Argument against Mr. Van Der Donckt's "Philosophical Argument."
And now as to the whole question of God being "existence," "pure being," "most simple," "not compound;" also his "immutability," as set forth in Mr. Van Der Donckt's "philosophical argument." What of it? This of it: Whatever "simplicity," "immutability," or other quality that is ascribed to God, must be in harmony with what Jesus Christ is: I meet Mr. V.'s "philosophical argument" as I meet his scriptural argument. I appeal to the being and nature of Jesus Christ, as a refutation of his philosophical conclusions. Is Jesus Christ God? "Yes," must be my friend's answer. Very well, this is my premise. Jesus is God in his own right and person, and he is a revelation of what God the Father is. He is not only a revelation of the being of God, but of the kind of being God is. And now I test Mr. V.'s argument by the revelation of what God is, as revealed in the person and nature of the Son of God. While I am doing so, let it be remembered that Jesus is now and will ever be what he was at the time of his glorious ascension from the midst of his disciples on Mount Olivet—God, possessed of all power in heaven and in earth, a glorious personage of flesh and bone and spirit. And now, is Jesus Christ without form? No; he is in form like man. Is Jesus Christ illimitable? Not as to his glorious body; that has limitations, dimensions, proportions. Is Jesus Christ without parts? Not as to his person; his body is made up of limbs, trunk, head; and parenthetically I may remark, a whole without parts is inconceivable. Then it follows that God's "infinity," so far as it is spoken of in scripture, does not refer to his person, but evidently to the attributes of his mind—to his intelligence, wisdom, power, patience, mercy, and whatsoever other qualities of mind or spirit he may possess. If it is argued that it is illogical and unphilosophical to regard God in his person as finite, but infinite in faculties, that is finite in one respect and infinite in another, my answer is that it is a conception of God made necessary by what the divine wisdom has revealed concerning himself, and it is becoming in man to accept with humility what God has been pleased to reveal concerning his own nature, being assured that in God's infinite knowledge he knows himself, and that which he reveals concerning himself is to be trusted far beyond man's philosophical conception of him.
But to resume our inquiry: Is Jesus Christ immutable, unchangeable? Is he Plato's "that which always is and has no becoming?" or Mr. Van Der Donckt's "necessary Being * * * that cannot change with regard to his existence, nor can he change with regard to his mode of existence," and therefore could never be anything other than he was from eternity? It is inconceivable how any being can be a son and not have a beginning as such. Whatever of eternity may be ascribed to the existence of the Lord Jesus, he must have had a beginning as a son; that term implies a relation, let it be brought about how it may, and that relation must have had a beginning. While there may never have been a time when Jesus was not in respect of his existence as an Intelligence, there must have been a time when he was not as "Son." So that he doubtless became "Son," hence changed his relation from not Son to Son; hence changed in his relations, in his mode of existence. We know there was a time when he was not man, that is, not man of flesh and bone made of the materials of this world; and he became man; another change. There was a time when he was mortal man, by which I mean, man subject to death; and he became, and is now, immortal man; another change. There was a time when all power in heaven and in earth was "given" to him; (Matt. 28:18) hence, there must have been a time when he did not possess it; hence another change, a change from the condition of holding some power to that of possessing all power. These facts attested by Holy Writ are against Mr. V.'s doctrine of God's "immutability," so far at least as relates to the impossibility of changing his mode of existence. And if Mr. V.'s doctrine of the "immutability" of God means that God cannot change in his relations, then I put these facts in the career of the Lord Jesus against his argument, and say that not only did Jesus pass through these changes of conditions and relations, but that God the Father could, and very likely did, pass through similar relations and changes. Else of what significance are the following passages?
The Son can do nothing of himself, but what he seeth the Father do; for what things soever he doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise (St. John 5:19).
The Prophet Joseph Smith quoting the substance of St. John 5:26, also says:
"As the Father hath power in himself, even so hath the Son power"—to do what? Why, what the Father did. The answer is obvious—in a manner to lay down his body and take it up again. "Jesus, what are you going to do?" "To lay down my body as my Father did, and take it up again." Do you believe it? If you do not believe it, you do not believe the Bible.[A]
[Footnote A: Millennial Star, Vol. 23: p. 247.]
It is the accepted doctrine of the orthodox Christian creeds that Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is as the Father is—(Creed of St. Athanasius) that is, of the same nature and essence. Very well, then; as God, the Father, begot Jesus, the Son, may not the Son in time also beget a son or sons? Or, after ascribing to the Son the same nature and the same power as is ascribed to the Father, will our orthodox friends insist upon limiting the Son by denying him productive virtue, and contend that Jesus must endure without the exercise of it? If the existence of the Son was essential to the perfection of God, the Father—and it cannot be thought of in any other light—may it not be, since the Son is of the same nature as the Father, that the fact of fatherhood is necessary to the perfection of the Son? To deny him the power of attaining it would be to limit his power, which may not be done even according to orthodox Christian doctrine. Is it not likely, nay, would it not be so? that the same cause or impulse, or necessity, or what influence or consideration soever it was that led God, the Father, to beget a Son, create a world, and provide for its redemption, would impel the Son, since he is of the same nature as the Father, to do these same things? And where was the beginning of such proceedings? and where will be the end of them?
But now, to resume again our measuring of Mr. V.'s philosophy by Jesus Christ as God.
Is Jesus Christ without passions? No; his deathless love for his friends, so beautifully manifested by word and deed throughout his mortal life, together with his love for mankind, which led him to give his life for the world, as also his explicitly declared hatred of that which is sin and evil, forbid us thinking of him as without passions.[A] As in him dwelt "all the fulness of the Godhead bodily," so in him necessarily are gathered all these qualities, attributes and perfections that go to the making of God. Does possession of these qualities, together with Messiah's mode of existence in the form and person of Jesus Christ, come in conflict with the notion of God's "simplicity," "immutability," and "eternity," as conceived by philosophers? So much the worse, then, for the faulty and merely human conceptions of those qualities, as relating to God. Better mistrust the accuracy of metaphysical reasoning; better throw aside Plato and his philosophy as untrustworthy, than to be moved ever so slightly from the great truth of revelation that Jesus, the Messiah, is God; and that such as he is, God is, as to essence, attributes, existence, and the mode of existence. Jesus Christ, then, once accepted as God, and the manifestation of God to men, is a complete answer to Mr. Van Der Donckt's philosophical argument for the absolute "simplicity" or "spirituality" or "immutability" of God.
[Footnote A: God is angry with the wicked every day (Ps 7:11.)]
More of Mr. Van Der Donckt's "Philosophy."
I must not neglect Mr. Van Der Donckt's "philosophy" that forbids us believing that "several finite things" can "produce an infinite, or an illimitable, as there would always be a first and last." Also his "finite parts could not belong to the infinite essence, else they would communicate their limitations to God." Also, his "many infinite beings are inconceivable; for, if there were several, they would have to differ from each other by some perfection." And his "from the moment one would have a perfection, the other one lacks, the latter would not be infinite. Therefore, God cannot be a compound of infinite parts."
Can any one, can Mr. Van Der Donckt himself, be quite sure of all this? Who knows how the infinite is constituted? When men speak of the infinite, are they not treating of that which is beyond the comprehension of the mind of man, at least in his present state of limited intellectual powers; for whatever may be the heights to which the mind of man may rise, when freed from his present earth-bound conditions, here and now he must recognize his intellectual limitations: for, as in Christ's humiliation (i. e. in his earth-life) his judgement was taken away (Acts 8:33), that is, his divine, supreme, intellectual and spiritual powers were veiled—so with man, in this same world of trial and limitations. Whatever his power as an eternal Intelligence may have been, or what it may be hereafter, he is now compelled to admit that he sees but as through a glass darkly, and therefore imperfectly. Men, I hold, though they be philosophers, cannot comprehend the infinite, much less say how it is constituted. But let us reflect a little upon the several propositions Mr. V. submits to us:
1—"Several finite beings cannot produce the infinite."
So far as it is possible for the human intellect to conceive the infinite, the material universe is infinite, eternal, without beginning and without end. It is inconceivable that the universe could have had a beginning, could have been produced from nothing. "All the apparent proofs," remarks Herbert Spencer, "that something can come out of nothing, a wider knowledge has one by one cancelled. The comet that is suddenly discovered in the heavens and nightly waxes larger, is proved not to be a newly created body, but a body that was until lately beyond the range of vision. The cloud which in course of a few minutes forms in the sky, consists not of substance that has just begun to be, but of substance that previously existed in a more diffused and transparent form. And similarly with a crystal or precipitate in relation to the fluid depositing it" (First Prin., p. 177.) Mr. Spencer holds it "impossible to think of nothing becoming something," for the reason that "nothing" cannot become an object of consciousness (Ibid pp. 161-2.) In like manner, he holds that matter is indestructible, and hence, that the universe cannot be annihilated. "The doctrine that matter is indestructible has become a common-place," he remarks. "The seeming annihilations of matter turn out, on close observation, to be only changes of state. It is found that the evaporated water, though it has become invisible, may be brought by condensations to its original shape." The indestructibility of matter, Mr. Spencer holds to be a datum of consciousness, which he thus illustrates:
Conceive the space before you to be cleared of all bodies save one. Now imagine the remaining one not to be removed from its place, but to lapse into nothing while standing in that place. You fail. The place that was solid you cannot conceive becoming empty, save by the transfer of that which made it solid * * * However small the bulk to which we conceive a piece of matter reduced, it is impossible to conceive it reduced into nothing. While we can represent to ourselves the parts the matter as approximated, we cannot represent to ourselves the quantity of matter as made less. To do this would be to imagine some of the constituent parts compressed into nothing; which is no more possible than to imagine compression of the whole into nothing. Our inability to conceive matter becoming non-existent, is immediately consequent on the nature of thought. Thought consists in the establishment of relations. There can be no relation established, and therefore no thought framed, when one of the related terms is absent from consciousness. Hence, it is impossible to think of something becoming nothing, for the same reason that it is impossible to think of nothing becoming something. (First Prin., p. 181.)
The material universe, then, is eternal, it always existed, and how many changes soever it may pass through, it will never be annihilated. Not one atom can be added to the sum total of its substance, nor one blotted out of existence—it is everywhere existing, and, so far as the mind of man can conceive "infinity," it is infinite. Yet we know that this whole is made up of a great variety of substances and objects which are finite; and our philosophers, for the most part, hold that matter is divisible into ultimate atoms. Not that such a fact has been demonstrated or is demonstrable; but granted the existence of matter, its existence as an aggregation of such ultimate things as atoms seems to be a necessary truth. I say necessary truth, because the mind of man cannot conceive to the contrary, and hence, science assumes matter to be composed of atoms. But atoms are things—material things; and in the mind must necessarily be thought of as having dimensions—an upper and lower part, also a hither and thither side; or if spherical then a circumference and diameter; in other words, atoms are finite, material things, and in the aggregate constitute the material universe, which, so far as the wit of man can conceive, is infinite; and hence, we may say the infinite universe is composed of finite atoms; or, several finite things—Mr. V.'s philosophy to the contrary notwithstanding—produce the infinite.
2—"Many infinite beings are inconceivable; for if there were several, they would have to differ from each other by some perfection. Now, the moment one would have a perfection the other one lacks, the latter would not be infinite."
That may be true in relation to absolute "infinity." But we have already seen that God cannot be considered as absolutely infinite, because we are taught by the facts of revelation that absolute infinity cannot hold as to God; as a person, God has limitations, and that which has limitations is not absolutely infinite. If God is conceived of as absolutely infinite, in his substance as in his attributes, then all idea of personality respecting him must be given up; for personality implies limitations. If the idea of personality in respect of God be retained, then the idea of absolute infinity regarding him must be abandoned. That "infinite" which does not include all things and all qualities is not absolutely infinite. The only persons who consistently hold to the absolute infinity of God are those who identify God with the universe—regarding God and the universe as one and the same. So long as orthodox Christians regard God as distinct from what they call the "material universe," that long they teach but a modified infinity respecting God. They really mean that God is only infinite "after his kind." One of Spinoza's definitions may help us here. He says a thing is finite after its kind "when it can be limited by another thing or the same nature," as one body is limited by another (Ethics Def. ii.) is not a thing infinite after its kind, then, when it is not limited by anything of the same nature? Is not this the necessary corollary of Spinoza's definition of the "finite after its kind?" and do not those who regard God as distinct from the universe, and at the same time ascribe infinity to him, mean only that he is infinite "after his kind?" There may be, then, many infinites after their kind; and this view is sustained by the fact that such infinites do exist. Duration or time is infinite after its kind, because not limited by anything of the same nature. Space is infinite after its kind, for the same reason; so, too, are force and matter. If there may be two or four things infinite after their kind, because not limited by anything of the same nature, are many infinites inconceivable? Moreover, when infinity is thus understood—and it can be understood when relating to God in no other way—the difficulty raised by the latter part of Mr. V.'s proposition, viz., that, if there were several infinite beings, they would differ from each other by some perfection, and when one would have a perfection that the other lacked, the latter would not be infinite, etc.—disappears; for when beings are infinite after their kind, they are only limited by things of a different nature, and therefore the perfections possessed by those beings of a different nature will constitute no limitation to their infinity.
3—"If one is infinite nothing can be added to it."
This maybe true of the absolutely infinite; for that which is absolutely infinite must be the sum total of all existence. To say, therefore, that something existed in addition to this sum total, and could be added to it, would be illogical. But infinity in this conception cannot be ascribed to God; for we have seen that God is only infinite in faculties and power, not in person, hence not absolutely infinite; therefore, this statement in the gentleman's philosophy can have no bearing on the controversy in which we are engaged.
4—"Finite parts could not belong to the infinite essence, else they would communicate their limitations to God."
When the Son of God, Jesus, took on a human body of flesh and bone, was not that which is finite, his body, added to the infinite in Jesus Christ? Did the finite body, taken on by the spirit of Jesus, communicate its limitations to God? And is Jesus, now in his resurrected, immortal body of flesh and bones, less "infinite" than before his spirit was united to his body? If one accepts Mr. V.'s doctrine of the absolute infinity of God, then one must believe that Jesus "the Word," who "was in the beginning with God," who "was God"—was not "made flesh;" that is, did not take on a body of flesh and bone; for the body of Jesus was finite; it had, in fact, all the limitations of a man's body, and Mr. V.'s doctrine tells us that "if one is infinite, nothing can be added to it"—therefore the "Word," who "was God," could not have been made flesh. If, on the other hand, one accepts the fact, so well attested by holy scriptures, viz., that Jesus, "the Word," "who was God," was made flesh, did take on a body that was flesh and bones, even though that body was finite, then one must reject the philosophy of Mr. V., which says the infinite may not take on finite parts, for the reason that they would communicate their limitations to the infinite, and thus destroy its infinity.
It is not difficult to see that something is wrong with the philosophy of Mr. Van Der Donckt, which thus constantly brings us in conflict with the revelations of God in the scriptures, and especially in the revelation of God in Jesus Christ.
In what state do these considerations leave the argument? Mr. Van Der Donckt reaches the conclusion, from the premise that several finite things cannot produce the infinite, that God cannot be a compound of finite parts. Yet we have seen that what is called the material universe, so far as it is possible for the mind of man to apprehend infinity, answers to his conception of the infinite; and we know that the universe is made up of finite parts; and that in its last analysis, it is but the aggregation of finite atoms.
From the premise that many infinite beings are inconceivable, Mr. V. reaches the conclusion that God cannot be a compound of infinite parts. But upon principles of sound reason, we have seen that things are infinite after their kind when not limited by anything of the same nature; and his premise of a number of infinites being inconceivable is destroyed by the actual existence of a number of infinites after their kind, such as duration, space, matter, spirit, and hence the absolute infinite, if existing at all, must be composed of an aggregation of infinities after their kind.
From the premise that if one is infinite nothing can be added to it, the gentleman implies the conclusion that God is infinite and therefore nothing can be added to him. Still, since Jesus was the Word, and the Word was and is God, we have seen that something was added to whatever of infinity there was in God, the Word, viz., what orthodox Christians call his "humanity"—that is, the pre-existent, divine spirit of Jesus took on a tabernacle of flesh—something finite was added to the infinite of God, the Word, and that, too, let me say, without communicating any limitations to the infinity possessed of God.
On these several premises, Mr. Van Der Donckt bases his general conclusion:—
Therefore, the infinite Being is not composite, but simple or spiritual. Therefore, he is not, nor ever was, a man, who is a composite being.
But since the premises themselves have been shown to be utterly untenable, as relating to God, as revealed in the scriptures, and in the person and nature of Jesus Christ, the conclusions are wrong; and the facts established are that while God in mind, faculties and in power is doubtless infinite, in person he is finite; and as his spirit is united to a body, he is composite, not simple; and as Jesus Christ was God manifested in the flesh, the express image of God the Father's person, the counterpart of his nature, and yet at the same time was a man—it is neither unscriptural, nor unphilosophical to hold that God, even the Father, is also a perfected, exalted man.
III.
MR. VAN DER DONCKT'S CONTRASTS BETWEEN MAN AND GOD.
Of the Intellectual Powers of Man.
Mr. Van Der Donckt insists that man can never become a God, because he "is finite or limited in everything; ever changeable and changing, ever susceptible of improvement." Granting that man is ever susceptible of improvement, ought not the gentleman to proceed with some caution before dogmatically asserting that there are to be limitations to man's enlargement, to his progress, and to his attainments? Given the susceptibility to improve, never ending duration through which the processes of improvement shall continue, and God to direct such processes, who can dogmatize upon the limitations of the Intelligences now known as men? It is not enough to say in reply to this that the "finite can never become infinite;" nor to argue that if God were an exalted man he would possess contradictory attributes, such as being both finite and infinite, compound and simple. We have already seen that when one undertakes to treat of the infinite, he is dealing with the unknown, dealing with terms that stand for the names of things of which the mind can form no adequate or satisfactory conception. But so far as the Father and the Son are concerned—personages held out to us in the scriptures as Gods—we have seen that absolute infinity may not be predicted of them. In person, form and the general nature of their physical being, they have limitations; and whatever of infinity or simplicity is ascribed to them must be ascribed to mind and attributes, not to personality. Seeing then, that the revelation of God in the scriptures, and especially in the revelation of God in the person and character of Jesus Christ, forces upon us a conception of God that represents him as concrete rather than abstract, finite in some respects, and infinite in others; and as compound rather than simple—it follows that urging the apparent absurdity of such characteristics in Deity as these is of no avail against the facts in the revelations God has given of himself. And now, as the limitations found in man, as to his physical person, nature, etc.,—and which are supposed by Mr. V. to forever bar man from attaining divinity—are found also in God the Father and in God the Son, it is quite clear that these physical limitations may not be urged as insuperable obstacles to man attaining divinity. As for the spirit of man—the mind—who can say what its metes and bounds are, much less what they shall be? Who comprehends its powers? Who dare say that it is not potentially infinite? and shall be hereafter actually infinite after its kind? I have already called attention to the fact that it is said of Messiah that in his humiliation, his judgment was taken away, which doubtless means that in his earth-life his intellectual and spiritual powers were somewhat veiled; and with man doubtless it is the same; in his earth-life that intellectual excellence which he enjoyed as a spirit in the mansions of the Father is veiled; but veiled as it is, there is of its manifestations sufficient to inspire one with awe, and make him hesitate ere pronouncing dogmatically upon its nature or its limitations. To illustrate my thought: I am this moment sitting at my desk, and am enclosed by the four walls of my room—limited as to my personal presence to this spot. But by the mere act of my will, I find I have the power to project myself in thought to any part of the world. Instantly I can be in the crowded streets of the world's metropolis. I walk through its well remembered thoroughfares, I hear the rush and roar of its busy multitudes, the rumble of vehicles, the huckster's cries, the cab-man's calls, sharp exclamations and quick retorts in the jostling throngs, the beggar's piping cry, the sailor's song, fragments of conversation, broken strains of music, the blare of trumpets, the neighing of horses, ear-piercing whistles, ringing of bells, shouts, responses, rushing trains and all that mingled din and soul-stirring roar that rises in clamor above the great town's traffic.
At will, I leave all this and stand alone on mountain tops in Syria, India, or overlooking old Nile's valley, wrapped in the awful grandeur of solemn silence. Here I may bid fallen empires rise and pass in grand procession before my mental vision and live again their little lives: fight once more their battles; begin again each petty struggle for place, for power, for control of the world's affairs; revive their customs: live again their loves and hates, and preach once more their religions and their philosophies—all this the mind may do, and that as easily and as quickly as in thought it may leave this room, cross the street to a neighbor's home, and there take note of the familiar objects within his habitation. Nor does this begin to indicate all the power of the mind in these respects. Though the sun is ninety-two millions of miles away, on the instant, in thought, one may stand upon it within its resplendent atmosphere. In the same manner and with equal ease, one may project himself to the Pole Star, though it is so distant that it requires forty years for a ray of light to pass through the intervening space between that star and our earth, and still light travels at the rate of one hundred and eighty-six thousand miles per second! Nor is the end yet. In like manner and with equal ease one may instantly project himself in thought from within the four walls of his room to those more distant constellations of stars known to exist out in the depths of space, whence it would require a ray of light a million years to reach our earth; yet standing there in a world so distant from ours, one would find himself still centered in the universe, and out beyond him, in a straight line from the earth whence he has traveled, would extend other realms in splendor no less magnificent. From the vasty deep of these realms, he could call up other worlds, and people them with creatures of his thought, as one may call up empires to pass in mighty procession before him in the Nile or in the Ganges valley.
Distance, then, to the mind of man, is as nothing. The infinity of extension, and of duration also, is matched by the infiniteness of man's mind, though that mind has a local habitation and a name within a tabernacle of flesh and bone. This is but a glimpse at the infinite powers of the mind of man in one direction, and under circumstances that somewhat veil the splendor of his intellectual and spiritual glory; what those powers may be in all particulars when man shall be made free from the restricting and depressing environment of the present earth-life, no one may say; but enough may be seen from what is here pointed out to establish the firm belief that, as the intellectual powers in man rise to match the infinitudes of extension and duration, as indicated, so, too, in all other respects shall the mind of man, when free, rise to the harmony of all the infinities that make up the universe. And it is not inconceivable (in view of the great spiritual and intellectual powers even now discernible in him) that the time will come when man will not only be able to project himself in thought to any part of the universe, no matter how distant, but in his future immeasurably exalted state he may project both thought and consciousness equally to all points of the universe at once, steadfastly maintain them there, and thus be all-knowing, everywhere present in thought, in consciousness—in spirit in fact—as God now is; and if, as it is reasonable to believe will be the case, his power equals his knowledge; and his freedom of volition equals his knowledge and his power—then, indeed, will man be a spiritual and intellectual force immanent in the universe, both to will and to do, even as God.
Jesus prayed that his disciples might be one with each other even as he and the Father are one (St. John 17:11); that they all might be one; and as the Father was in Christ, and as Christ was in the Father, so also would Messiah have the disciples to be one in him and in the Father, that they might all be one with the Father and the Son, and with each other, even as the Father and the Son are one (St. John 17; 21,22.) But for the disciples to be "one" with the Father and the Son, in the complete sense in which the Messiah here prayed for that "oneness," necessarily means to be "like" the Father, and that "likeness" can rise to the full height of its perfection only when it reaches equality with those with whom the disciples are to be "one" or "like." If man may not rise to the height of divinity, how shall this prayer of the Christ be realized? Or must we believe that the divine wisdom in the Son of God exercised itself in praying for that which is unattainable, that which is not only absurd but impossible? It is unthinkable that the divine nature shall be brought down to be "one" with men; so that if the "oneness" which also involves "likeness," be realized, in fulfilment of Messiah's prayer, it must be by men rising to divinity, Mr. Van Der Donckt's "impossibilities" to the contrary notwithstanding.
"Behold the Man Has Become as One of Us."
To illustrate his contention that man can never rise to the quality of divinity, Mr. Van Der Donckt indulges in comparisons between man and God; and, to emphasize that contrast, challenges well-known men of science to the exercise of creative powers, contrasts the frequent collisions upon our railroads with the order, regularity, and safety of the movements among the planetary systems where never a collision occurs; and then indulges in such folly as this:
They (astronomers) can indeed predict transits and eclipses; but suppose astronomers from New Zealand, on their way to America to observe this fall's moon eclipse, meet with an accident in mid-ocean, would they at once send this wireless telegram to the United States' stargazers assembled say at Lick Observatory: "Belated by leak. Please retard eclipse two hours that we may not miss it." As well might all the telescope men in the world combined, attempt to fetch down the rings of Saturn for the construction of a royal race track, as pretend to control movements of the heavenly bodies.
The gentleman also points out how precarious are the powers of man:
The helpless babe of yesterday may indeed rival Mozart, Haydn, and Paderewski, but tomorrow he may rise with lame hands and pierced ear-drums; and millions of worshipers of the shattered idol are powerless to restore it to the musical world.
This part of the gentleman's argument sinks far below the general high level of his Reply, and is unworthy of his intelligence. I have already pointed out, that Latter-day Saints do not teach that man in his present state and condition is a God. On the contrary, they admit man's narrowness, weakness, imperfections and limitations; and also recognize the great gulf stretching between man in his present state and that dignity of divinity to which somewhere and sometime in the eternities it is within his province and power to attain. Mr. Van Der Donckt's comparisons, therefore, between God and man, in the latter's present condition, are not in point, for the reason that the Latter-day Saints do not claim that man is now a Deity, only as he may be thought potentially one. Taking the highest type of man to start with, consider him as raised from the dead and hence immortal; give him Gods for guides, teachers, and companions, with the universe for the field of his operations, then let Mr. V. or anyone else, say what man's attainments will be one thousand millions of years hence; and that period, let it be remembered, long as it may seem to man's petty methods of computing duration, is but as a moment in the existence of an immortal being. Let Mr. Van Der Donckt institute his comparisons from that point of man's career, instead of from the present point of man's weakness and mortality, and then say if ultimately divinity seems so unattainable as now. If he shall say he is unable to institute his comparisons at the point proposed, because what man will then be is unknown, I shall agree with him; but let him acknowledge, as perforce he must, that man will be immeasurably advanced beyond what he is now; also let him admit the injustice he does our doctrine by insisting upon making his comparisons between God and man as the latter now stands, under the effects of the fall, and in his humiliation and weakness.
After indulging in the aforesaid comparisons, Mr.V. further remarks:
I fear Mr. B. H. Roberts will be inclined to think God jealous because he gives man no show for comparison with him. This would certainly be a less blunder of the Utah man, ("I will not give my glory to another"—Isaiah 42:8) than his contention, which is a mere echo of Satan's promise in Paradise: "You shall be as Gods." (Genesis 3:5.)
To which I answer, not so; the contention of the "Utah man" is not the echo of Satan's promise, "ye shall be as Gods." On the contrary, the "Utah man's" contention is bottomed on the august and sure word of God, uttered in Eden, when he said of the man Adam—"Behold the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil" (Genesis 3:22)—a passage which the Reverend gentleman seems to have overlooked.
OF THE UNITY OF GOD.
There remains to be considered the Unity of God.
The Latter-day Saints believe in the unity of the creative and governing force or power of the universe as absolutely as any orthodox Christian sect in the world. One cannot help being profoundly impressed with the great truth that creation, throughout its whole extent, bears evidence of being one system, presents at every point unity of design, and harmony in its government. Nor am I unmindful of the force there is in the deduction usually drawn from these premises, viz., that the Creator and Governor of the universe, must necessarily be one. But I am also profoundly impressed by another fact that comes within the experience of man, at least to a limited extent, viz., the possibility of intelligences arriving at perfect agreement, so as to act in absolute unity. We see manifestations of this principle in human governments, and other human associations of various kinds. And this, too, is observable, viz, that the greater and more perfect the intelligence the more perfect can the unity of purpose and of effort become: so that one needs only the existence of perfect intelligences to operate together in order to secure perfect oneness, whence shall come the one system evident in the universe, exhibiting at every point unity of design, and perfect harmony in its government. In other words, "oneness" can be the result of perfect agreement among Many Intelligences as surely as it can be the result of the existence of One Only Intelligence. Also, the decrees and purposes of the perfectly united Many can be as absolute as the decrees and purposes of the One Only Intelligence. One is also confronted with the undeniable fact that inclines him to the latter view as the reasonable explanation of the "Oneness" that is evidently in control of the universe—the fact that there are in existence many Intelligences, and, endowed as they are with free will, it cannot be denied that they influence, to some extent, the course of events and the conditions that obtain. Moreover, it will be found, on careful inquiry, that the explanation of the "Oneness" controlling in the universe, on the theory that it results from the perfect agreement or unity of Many Intelligences,[A] is more in harmony with the revelations of God on the subject than the theory that there is but One Only Intelligence that enters into its government. This theory Mr. Van Der Donckt, of course, denies, and this is the issue between us that remains to be tested.
[Footnote A: John Stuart Mill, in his Essay on Theism, in speaking of the evident unity in nature, which suggests that nature is governed by One Being, comes very near stating the exact truth in an alternative statement to his first remark, viz.: "At least, if a plurality be supposed, it is necessary to assume so complete a concert of action and unity of will among them, that the difference is for most purposes immaterial between such a theory and that of the absolute unity of the Godhead" (Essays on Religion—Theism, p. 133).]
The Reverend gentleman affirms that the first chapter of the Bible "reveals the supreme fact that there is but One Only and Living God." This I deny; and affirm the fact that the first chapter of the Bible reveals the existence of a plurality of Gods.
It is a matter of common knowledge that the word translated "God" in the first chapter of our English version of the Bible, in the Hebrew, is Elohim—plural of Eloah—and should be rendered "Gods"—so as to read "In the beginning the Gods created the heavens and the earth," etc. * * * The Gods said, "Let there be light." * * * The Gods said "Let us make man," etc., etc. So notorious is the fact that the Hebrew plural, Elohim, is used by Moses, that a variety of devices have been employed to make the first chapter of Genesis conform to the "One Only God" idea. Some Jews in explanation of it, and in defense of their belief in One Only God, hold that there are several Hebrew words which have a plural form but singular meaning—of which Elohim is one—and they quote as proof of this the word maim, meaning water, shamaim, meaning heaven, and panim, meaning the face or surface of a person or thing. "But," says a Christian Jewish scholar,[A] "if we examine these words, we shall find that though apparently they may have a singular meaning, yet, in reality, they have a plural or collective one; thus, for instance, 'maim,' water, means a collection of waters, forming one collective whole; and thus again 'shamaim,' heaven, is also, in reality as well as form, of the plural number, meaning what we call in a similar way in English, 'the heavens;' comprehending all the various regions which are included under that title."
[Footnote A: This is Rev. R. Highton, M. A., and Fellow of Queen's College, Oxford. I quote from his lecture on "God a Unity and Plurality," published in a Christian Jewish periodical called The Voice of Israel, February number, 1844.]
Other Jewish scholars content themselves in accounting for this inconvenient plural in the opening chapter of Genesis, by saying that in the Hebrew, Elohim better represents the idea of "Strong," "Mighty," than the singular form would, and for this reason it was used—a view accepted by not a few Christians. Thus, Dr. Elliott, Professor of Hebrew in Lafayette College, Easton, Pennsylvania, says: "The name Elohim (singular Eloah) is the generic name of God, and, being plural in form, is probably a plural of excellence and majesty."[A] Dr. Havernick derives the word Elohim from a Hebrew root now lost, Coluit, and thinks that the plural is used merely to indicate the abundance and super-richness contained in the divine Being.[B] Rabbi Jehuda Hallevi (twelfth century) found in the usage of the plural Elohim a protest against idolators, who call each personified power Eloah and all collectively Elohim. "He interpreted it as the most general name of the Deity, distinguishing him as manifested in the exhibition of his power without reference to his personality or moral qualities, or any special relations which he bears to man."[C] A number of Christian scholars attempt to account for the use of the plural Elohim by saying that it foreshadows the doctrine of the Christian Trinity, that is, it recognizes the existence of the three persons in one God. "It is expressive of omnipotent power; and by its use here (first chap. Genesis) in the plural form is obscurely taught at the opening of the Bible, a doctrine clearly revealed in other parts of it, viz., that though God is one, there is a plurality of persons in the Godhead—Father, Son and Spirit, who were engaged in the creative work."[D] This view was maintained at length by Rev. H. Highton, in the Christian Jewish periodical, The Voice of Israel, before quoted. "But Calvin, Mercer, Dresius and Ballarmine," says Dr. Hackett,[E] of the Theological Institution of Newton, Massachusetts—editor of Smith's Bible Dictionary—"have given the weight of their authority against an explanation so fanciful and arbitrary."
[Footnote A: "Vindication of Mosaic Authorship of Pentateuch," p. 65.]
[Footnote B: See "Kitto's Biblical Literature," Art. "God," Vol. 1, p. 777.]
[Footnote C: Smith's Bible Dict. (Hackett edition), Art. Jehovah, p. 1242.]
[Footnote D: "Critical and Explanatory Commentary" (Jamieson, Faussett and Brown) Gen. 1:1, 2.]
[Footnote E: Smith's Bible Dictionary (Hackett edition), Art. Jehovah, Vol. 2, p. 1242.]
Others explain the use of the plural "we" or "us," by saying that in the first chapter of Genesis Moses represents God as speaking of himself in that manner, in imitation of the custom of kings, who speak of themselves as "we," instead of in the singular, "I." In other words, it is the royal "we," or "us." This theory, however, is answered, as pointed out by Rev. H. Highton, by the fact that the use of what is called the "royal plural" is a modern, not an ancient, custom; and reference to the usage of the kings of the Bible discloses the fact that they always speak of themselves as "I" or "me," not as "we" or "us."[A]
[Footnote A: Voice of Israel, p. 95.]
Modern Bible criticism, usually denominated "The Higher Criticism," is to a great extent—so far as criticism of the five books of Moses is concerned—based upon the exclusive use of the plural Elohim in one section, and the use of Jehovah, singular, in another. "The Pentateuch, therefore, it is asserted, is composed of two different documents, the one Elohistic, and the other Jehovistic, consequently it cannot be the work of a single author."[A]
[Footnote A: "Vindication of Mosaic Authorship of the Pentateuch" (Elliott) p. 64.)]
With the various devices for accounting for the use of the plural form Elohim in the first chapter of the Bible, I have nothing to do here. They are simply pointed out as showing the wide recognition that is given to the fact of the use of the plural form Elohim that should be rendered in English "Gods;" and also the perplexity the use of this plural occasions among those whose principles call upon them to harmonize its use with the belief in "One Only God." Mr. Van Der Donckt admits the use of the plural Elohim, but undertakes to explain away the force of its use as follows:
Whenever Elohim occurs in the Bible, in sense 1, (meaning the True God) it is employed with singular verbs and singular adjectives.
Relative to this, a friend[A] directs my attention to Genesis 1:26: "Let us make man in our image," etc., which in Hebrew is Maach—"we will make," first person plural future of the verb Asah: betsalmaun—be "in;" tselem, "image;" Nu, "our," possessive adjective, first person plural. So that in Genesis 1:26, we have a case where Elohim is used in connection with a plural verb and also a plural possessive adjective, and Mr. Van Der Donckt will not say that Elohim does not, in Genesis 1:26, refer to true Gods. Again in Genesis 3:22—"Man is become as one of us," Mr. Ramseyer suggests that here, again, the pronoun used is in the first person plural. I find this view of both these passages sustained by Rev. H. Highton in the lecture before quoted. First he says:
[Footnote A: Prof. A. Ramseyer, of the Latter-day Saints' University.]
The Hebrew word meaning God, is itself a plural word, implying thereby, as we contend, a plurality of persons in the Godhead * * We find the plural word Elohim, or God, most usually, though not always, coupled with a singular verb or adjective. * * * but lest from the constant use of the word Elohim with the singular number, we should be led to suppose that God is in no sense a plurality, it has pleased him by the inspiration of his Holy Spirit, to cause that it should be sometimes used with a plural verb or adjective. I will mention some of the clearest passages in which it is so used, that you may be enabled to refer to them in the Hebrew. You will find it used in a plural verb in Genesis 20:13. "And it came to pass, when God caused me to wander from my father's house," etc.; and again in Genesis 35:7, "And he built there an altar, and called the place El-Bethel: because their God appeared unto him." And with a plural adjective in Joshua 34:19, and again in Deut. 5:26 (in the original Hebrew, 5:23).
But we have not merely the plural use of the word Elohim to mention in this part of the argument; we have some very distinct passages, still more directly implying the plurality of persons. There is a very remarkable place of the kind in Eccle. 12:1, where it says: "Remember now thy Creator in the days of thy youth." In the original Hebrew the word is in the plural, and if translated literally, would be "Remember now thy Creators," etc. * * * In connection with this expression of Solomon about man's Creators, it is a very remarkable circumstance, that in the account of the creation of man, given by Moses in the book of Genesis, the plural is also directly used, for it is there recorded, Genesis 1, 26, "And God said let us make" etc., or "we will make," etc., so that Moses as well as Solomon very emphatically declares that the great Creator of man consists of more than one person; for whom could God have been addressing when he said, "Let us make," etc.? I know that in order to escape the obvious conclusion to be drawn from the passage, it has been asserted that God was here addressing and taking counsel with the angels but this explanation cannot in any degree bear the test of an accurate examination of the passage; for is there the slightest ground for supposing that the angels took any part in the creation of man, when God said, "Let us make"? or shall we say that man was made in the image and likeness of the angels, when God said, "Let us make" etc., "in our image?" Surely not, for Moses expressly adds, (v. 27) "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him, male and female created he them." But there are some other passages which we ought to examine, where God in the same way speaks of himself in the plural number. Thus in Genesis 3:22, "And the Lord God said, "Behold the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil; and now, lest he put forth his hand and take also of the tree of life, and eat and live forever," etc. There are no words which I know which could more distinctly assert the plurality of persons in God than these, where he says "one of us." M. Leeser, of Philadelphia, the editor of the Occident, which is the American Jewish magazine, in his sermon on the Messiah, explains this passage as spoken to the angels—"one of us," meaning himself and the angels;—but never can I believe that the Great Everlasting Creator could thus put himself on a level with the created angels, and say "one of us," * * * he would either have said to the angels, "Behold, man has become as one of you," or else have said, "Behold, the man has become like me, to know good and evil."
This view of Genesis 1:26 is also maintained by Prof. W. H. Chamberlin, of Brigham Young College, Logan, Utah, in the Era for November, 1902. He says: That Elohim was used in the plural sense is shown in the twenty-sixth verse, where the Elohim, in referring to themselves use the plural suffix Nu "our," twice, and they also use the plural form of the verb Naaseh, "let us make." The Professor also adds the illustration of Genesis 11:7: where Nerdhah, "let us descend," and Nabhlah, "let us confuse," two verbs in the plural, proceed from the mouth of God.[A]
[Footnote A: I commend Professor Chamberlin's whole article to the reader as most worthy of his attention at this point; and personally, I wish to thank the Professor for it as a most timely contribution to the controversy. The whole article is published in Chapter v.]
In the light of these facts, the statement of Mr. V. that whenever Elohim occurs in the Bible, as meaning the true God, it is employed with singular verbs and singular adjectives, seems to have been made without that careful consideration which the importance of the declaration required. The facts adduced in the foregoing stand also against Mr. V.'s contention that whenever the plural "gods" occurs in Holy Writ, it applies only "to false gods and idols;" or "to representatives of God, such as angels, judges, kings." They were not false gods nor representatives of God merely, who said: "Let us make man in our image" (Genesis i:26); nor false gods, or mere representatives of God merely, who said: "The man has become as one of us" (Genesis 2:7); and so also with other passages in the quotation from Rev. Highton's lecture.
Here it may be as well to note the remarks of Mr. Van Der Donckt with reference to the "Mormon" Church leaders' knowledge of Hebrew. The Rev. gentleman is of the opinion that,
Had the "Mormon" Church leaders known Hebrew, the original language of the book of Moses and nearly the whole of the Old Testament, they would not have been guilty of the outrageous blunders of the Pearl of Great Price and of the Catechism.
Mr. V. then quotes from our Catechism the account of the creation taken from the Pearl of Great Price, in which the plural "Gods" is used instead of the singular form "God." It is probable that the "Mormon" Church leaders were better acquainted with Hebrew than Mr. V. gives them credit for. A number of years ago (1870) a certain chaplain of the United States Senate presumed not a little on the ignorance of a "Mormon" Church leader—Elder Orson Pratt—respecting Hebrew, and ventured, in the notable debate held by them in the "Mormon" Tabernacle, at Salt Lake City, to parade the few Hebrew stem-words, and their derivatives, which he had conned with care before leaving Washington, with a view of making them effective in support of the marginal reading of Leviticus 18 and 18 in our common English version. To the chaplain's surprise, the "Mormon" apostle was able to follow him in the discussion of the original Hebrew text, and demonstrated that he had a knowledge of Hebrew which made his opponent's special preparation of a few Hebrew words and passages look very much like a cheap bid for a reputation for learning, which the chaplain's knowledge of Hebrew, at least, did not warrant. Nor is that all the story. Elder Pratt—having observed the stress which the chaplain had laid upon the marginal rendering of Leviticus 18:18, in a discourse delivered in Washington, D. C., before President Grant, members of his cabinet, and members of Congress—to call Dr. Newman out, to give him confidence to introduce his defense of the marginal rendering of the passage in the debate at Salt Lake City—Elder Pratt quoted the marginal reading of an unimportant passage, and thus invited the discussion of the text in the Hebrew. The Elder's bait took, the discussion largely turned, after that, upon the text in question, much to the chagrin of the Senate's chaplain; and Leviticus 18:18 has been somewhat historical hereabouts, and in Washington, ever since.
But how came Orson Pratt acquainted with Hebrew? The fact is, that in the winter of 1835-6 a school of languages was established by the Church, at Kirtland, which many of the leading Elders of the Church attended, Joseph Smith and Orson Pratt being among the number; and Professor Joshua Seixas, of Hudson, Ohio, was employed as teacher. The Elders were enthusiastic in their study of Hebrew, and after Prof. Seixas' term as teacher had expired, the class was continued with Joseph Smith as instructor, Orson Pratt continuing in attendance on the school. The "Mormon" Church leaders, I repeat, were better acquainted with Hebrew than Mr Van Der Donckt gives them credit for; besides, the blunders which Mr. Van Der Donckt has made in his assertions concerning the use of the plural Elohim, in the Old Testament, makes it rather clear that he is scarcely competent to be a judge of anybody's Hebrew. Moreover, the passage he quotes from our Catechism, where, in the account of creation, the plural "Gods" is used, is not a quotation from the Bible at all; but a translation from a record called the "Book of Abraham," which came into the hands of the Prophet Joseph Smith from the catacombs of Egypt. So that Mr. V.'s attempted criticism of what he evidently takes to be extracts of translations from parts of the Bible, is not in point at all, since they are translated extracts from a book that forms no part of the Bible. And is it not evident throughout that Mr. Van Der Donckt has rushed into the discussion without being sufficiently informed concerning the doctrines upon which he undertakes to animadvert?
Of the Father Alone, Being God.
Referring to the admission in my discourse that conceptions of God, to be true, must be in harmony with the New Testament, Mr. Van Der Donckt proceeds to quote passages from the New Testament, in support of the idea that there is but one God:
One is good, God (Matt. 19:17). Thou shalt love the Lord thy God (Luke 10:27). My Father of whom you say that he is your God (John 8:54). Here Christ testified that the Jews believed in only one God.
The Lord is a God of all knowledge (I Kings 2). ("Mormon" Catechism V. Q. 10 and 2.11).
Of that day and hour no one knoweth, no not the angels of heaven, but the Father alone (Matthew 24:36).
No one knoweth who the Son is but the Father (Luke 10:22).
Therefore, no one is God but one, the Heavenly Father.
In another form: the All-knowing alone is God. The Father alone is all-knowing. Therefore, the Father alone is God.