WeRead Powered by ReaderPub
The Panama Canal cover

The Panama Canal

Chapter 49: CHAPTER XXII
Open in WeRead

About This Book

The text provides a layperson-focused account of the planning, diplomacy, construction, and operation of the interoceanic canal at Panama, explaining key engineering works such as Gatun Dam, the lock systems, and the Culebra Cut, and describing the Panama Railroad, sanitation measures, workforce composition, daily life on the Zone, and administrative organization. It recounts earlier isthmian efforts and controversies over route selection and relations with neighboring states, outlines fortifications, toll-setting, traffic handling, and operating arrangements, and surveys anticipated commercial effects. Construction chapters were reviewed by the chief engineer and the volume is illustrated with official photographs and maps.

Under the new Government all old laws, not specifically repealed, or contrary to the new ones, will be continued in force. All executive orders issued by the President, and all orders and ordinances promulgated by the Canal Commission, during the construction period, not inconsistent with the act creating a permanent form of government, are made laws of the Canal Zone to continue as such until specifically repealed by act of Congress.


CHAPTER XXII

CONGRESS AND THE CANAL

While the Congress of the United States ever has been charged with a lack of appreciation of the needs of the executive branch of the Government, spending money foolishly here and being niggardly with its appropriations there, the history of the legislation under which the Panama Canal was undertaken and completed shows that American lawmakers backed up the canal diggers in every necessary way.

One may read in all the hearings that were conducted, both on the Isthmus and in Washington, a desire on the part of the congressional committees having to do with the canal matters, to promote the work, and to enable those directly concerned in its execution to carry out their plans without hindrance.

It is probable that no project ever carried to completion under the aegis of the United States Government was studied more carefully by the legislators than the Panama Canal. There was a standing invitation from the Isthmian Canal Commission to members of the Senate and House of Representatives to visit the Isthmus, collectively or individually, for the purpose of acquainting themselves with the character of the work and its needs. This invitation was accepted by a large percentage of the members of the House and Senate who served during the construction period. When a member of either branch of Congress visited the Isthmus and saw there the character of the work being done, and the spirit of the men behind it, he never failed to return an enthusiastic supporter of the work, ready by vote and voice to contribute his share to the legislation needed.

When the final Isthmian Canal Commission came into power a policy of absolute candor with Congress was adopted. When the annual estimates for appropriations were submitted, they came to Congress with the understanding that they represented exactly what was needed, no more and no less. Instead of recommending from 10 to 25 per cent more than they hoped to get, upon the assumption that Congress would scale down the appropriations—a policy long followed in many of the bureaus of the Government—the canal officials asked Congress to understand from the beginning that the figures they submitted had been pared down to the bone. The result was a happy one. Congress learned to depend upon the figures and to make its appropriations accordingly; consequently, the work was never handicapped by appropriations deficient in one branch and overabundant in another.

Congress for several years made its appropriations for building the canal under the assumption that it was to cost about $145,000,000, exclusive of government, sanitation, purchase price, and payments to the Republic of Panama. It was not until 1908 that a straightforward, definite effort was made to fix the ultimate cost. Experience showed clearly that all hands had hopelessly underestimated both the total amount of work to be done and the unit cost of doing it.

After a year's experience of carrying forward the work at full swing, the commission decided to face the situation frankly and attempt to ascertain exactly what might be expected. This investigation disclosed the fact that the estimates of the amount of work to be done were a little over 50 per cent short. Under the experience of one year's work it was calculated that the total cost of the canal would be $375,000,000, including sanitation, government, and payments to the New Panama Canal Company and the Republic of Panama, instead of $210,000,000, as these items would have aggregated under the estimates made in 1906. This was about one and a half times as much as the estimated cost of a sea-level canal. But, although Congress had fixed the limit upon the basis of an aggregate cost of $210,000,000, it cheerfully faced the restatement of the anticipated cost, and finally set the limit at $375,000,000.

From that day forward the great effort at Panama was to live within this limit, in spite of the extra work required. While Congress might have been willing to increase this limit, in view of the fact that an additional 97,000,000 cubic yards of material had to be removed, it was not asked to do so. The engineers desired above everything else to stay within their own estimates, and they did the extra work with money saved by increasing the efficiency of the force.

The first law providing for the government of the Canal Zone was enacted in 1904. It gave to the President and those appointed by him the right to govern the Zone and imposed the duty "of maintaining and protecting its inhabitants in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion."

In 1907 an effort was made to reduce wages on the canal. The sundry civil bill of that year carried a provision that wages on the Isthmus for skilled and unskilled labor should not exceed more than 25 per cent the average wage paid in the United States for similar labor. This proposition was urged by Representative James A. Tawney, of Minnesota, then chairman of the Appropriations Committee of the House. When it came to a vote the wages fixed under Chief Engineers Wallace and Stevens were upheld by a vote of 101 to 10. Congress took the ground that the canal could be built only by the most liberal treatment of the people who were building it.

At another time a provision was inserted in the appropriation law establishing the 8-hour day law for American workers on the canal. A fight was made by the American Federation of Labor and other organizations to make it apply to the common laborer as well as to the Americans, but this was unsuccessful. The 8-hour provision did not work well, since the foremen and superintendents were permitted to stop work after 8 hours, while the laborers under them had to work an hour longer. This was later rectified by providing that the 8-hour law should not affect foremen and superintendents in charge of alien labor; and thus was overcome the difficulty of having an army of common laborers at work an hour or so each day without superintendence or direction.

In 1906 it was provided by a joint resolution of the Senate and House that the purchase of material and equipment for use in the construction of the canal should be restricted to articles of American production and manufacture, except in cases where the President should deem prices extortionate or unreasonable. This provision undoubtedly increased by many millions of dollars the cost of the machinery with which the canal work was executed. While some dredges and other equipment were purchased in Europe, foreign purchases were the exception rather than the rule. When bids were submitted there were times when European prices of dredges were placed at less than $700,000, while American prices for the same dredges would amount to more than $1,000,000. When there were such marked difference in bids the awards were made to the European manufacturers.

Although the construction of the canal was authorized by the Spooner Act in 1902, it was not until 1906 that Congress expressed its views in legislation on the question of the type of canal that should be built. It was then that it declared the canal should be of the general lock type proposed by the minority of the board of consulting engineers, which was a complete approval of the plans urged by President Roosevelt. In order to make certain this decision as to the type of canal, a provision was incorporated in the appropriation bill of that year, setting forth that no part of the sums therein appropriated should be used for the construction of a sea-level canal.

Congress was always willing to aid the engineers in meeting unforeseen contingencies by giving them unusual liberties in the application of moneys appropriated. It was provided that as much as 10 per cent of any appropriation might be used for any of the other purposes for which money was appropriated, thus allowing the necessary leeway to insure a systematic progress of the work throughout all its features. This provision many times came to the rescue of the chief engineer, when he found that more money was needed at one point and less at another than had been estimated 16 or 18 months before.

While President Roosevelt was in the White House Congress gave him abundant authority over all phases of the task at Panama. He was empowered to do almost anything he thought expedient for hastening the work. For instance, in 1907 when he considered building the canal by contract, Congress provided that nothing in the Spooner Act should prevent him from entering into such contract or contracts as he might deem expedient for the construction of the canal. This practically gave him full authority over the limit of cost and the methods of building. He was thus the sole judge of the character of the contracts that he might make. No President in the history of the country ever was vested with fuller jurisdiction and control over a great matter than was President Roosevelt in this case. That he did not enter into such contract was due mainly to the reports made to him by Col. George W. Goethals, who had just been appointed chief engineer.

In 1908 the Secretary of War was authorized to purchase for the Panama Railroad Company two steamships of American registry of not less than 9,000 gross tons each, the cost of which should not exceed $1,550,000, for the transportation of supplies, equipment, and material, and of officers and employees of the Canal Commission. These ships, when no longer required for that service were to be transferred to the Secretary of the Navy for use as colliers or other auxiliary naval vessels. These ships carried the bulk of the cement used in building of the great locks, and more than paid for themselves in the saving of transportation charges which would have been levied by private carriers. In the appropriation act of 1909 Congress decided that the carrying of marine or fire insurance was bad policy for the Government, and provided that no such insurance should be carried by the Panama Railroad Company, but that it should be reimbursed for any loss it might sustain from the appropriations made by Congress for the building of the canal.

There were a number of committees in Congress which dealt with canal legislation. Principal among these were the Committees on Appropriations of the two Houses, the Committee on Interoceanic Canals of the Senate, and the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House. The Appropriations Committees dealt with the question of appropriations. The House Appropriations Committee usually made a trip to the Isthmus before each session of Congress. There it would hold hearings, questioning closely every person connected with the work who had made estimates for its benefit, its members seeing with their own eyes the projects for which each individual appropriation was asked. The practice was, during these visits, to go over a part of the work and then to hold sessions of the committee for the purpose of asking questions about that phase of the undertaking. The testimony was taken down by an official stenographer and printed for the use of every Member of Congress. A few months later the chairman and chief engineer would make a trip to Washington and furnish the committee with such supplementary information as the intervening time might have disclosed.

The Senate Committee did not visit the Isthmus as frequently, as it usually found that the hearings held by the House Committee afforded it sufficient information on which to predicate its action. All matters having to do with organization traffic, or general laws for the Canal Zone, were handled by the Committee on Interoceanic Canals of the Senate and the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House. It was the latter committee, under the chairmanship of Representative William C. Adamson, of Georgia, which framed the permanent Canal Law, under which the Isthmian waterway will be governed and operated. The big fight in Congress over the type of canal was waged before the Senate Committee on Interoceanic Canals. The records of this committee, together with the additional records in the hands of Congress, constitute one of the most extensive accounts of a great work anywhere to be found. The official literature of the Panama Canal is almost as voluminous as the canal is big.

Although Congress usually left the details of canal construction to be worked out by the Canal Commission and the President, from start to finish it showed a determination so to deal with the big project that it could look back over the work with the feeling that it had contributed its share to the triumph of the undertaking.


CHAPTER XXIII

SEA-LEVEL CANAL IMPOSSIBLE

No one can dispute the wisdom of the United States in deciding to build a lock canal. To have undertaken a sea-level canal would have involved this Government in difficulties so great that even with all the wealth and determination of America, failure would have ensued. It is, perhaps, putting it too strongly to say that a sea-level canal is a physical impossibility, but it is not too much to say that such a canal would take so much money and so much time to build that the resources and patience of the American people would be exhausted long before it could be made navigable.

The advocates of a sea-level canal declared that a channel could be dug through Culebra Mountain with the excavation of 110,000,000 cubic yards. As a matter of fact, Culebra Cut, with its bottom 85 feet above sea level, required the excavation of almost that same amount.

Engineers who advocated a sea-level canal declared that the material in Culebra Mountain was stable, and that only moderate slopes would be necessary. As a matter of fact, the material in the mountain proved highly unstable, and, except for a few short sections, slides and breaks were encountered all during the construction period. The result was that practically two Culebra Cuts were dug. The engineers, in beginning the present canal, calculated that 53,000,000 cubic yards would be excavated in Culebra; the amount actually removed was 105,000,000 cubic yards. Upon this basis a sea-level Culebra Cut might have required the excavation of 230,000,000 cubic yards.

Calculating an average monthly excavation of a million cubic yards, the task would have required 17 years to complete. In other words, if a sea-level canal had been undertaken and had been physically possible, the celebration of the opening of the waterway would have been set for 1925 instead of 1915.

Among all of the members of the majority of the board of consulting engineers who favored a sea-level canal, only one, E. Quellenec, Consulting Engineer of the Suez Canal, showed any appreciation of the difficulties which were to be expected in Culebra Cut. He announced, in voting in favor of a sea-level canal, that he could not do so without first reminding the United States Government of the great difficulties that would lie before it in Culebra Cut. Henry Hunter, Engineer of the Manchester Ship Canal, declared that Culebra Cut presented no serious problems at all; that a sea-level cut could be dug more quickly than the locks of the other type of canal could be built. He further declared that it was as clearly demonstrable as any engineering problem could be, that it would be possible to use 100 steam shovels in Culebra Cut. No one has accused the engineers on the canal of lack of ability in maneuvering shovels, yet at no time were they able to use more than 46.

If President Roosevelt had followed the recommendation of the majority of the board of consulting engineers in favor of a sea-level canal, it seems probable that the United States would have followed the French in retiring defeated from the Isthmus, or else would have reconsidered its purpose to build a sea-level canal and have undertaken a lock canal, as the French had done.

But, even if it had been possible to build a sea-level canal at Panama, it appears that such a canal would not have been as satisfactory as the present one. While the canal the United States possesses at Panama to-day is a great waterway 300 feet wide at its narrowest part, in which ships can pass at any point, the sea-level canal projected would have been a narrow channel winding in and out among the hills, too narrow for half its length for the largest ships to pass. Currents, caused by the Chagres River, and by the flow of other streams into the canal, would have made navigation somewhat dangerous.

The principal ground upon which the majority members of the board of consulting engineers voted in favor of a sea-level canal was that it was less vulnerable. This contention, in the light of what has happened at Panama, seems to carry no great weight. Such a canal would have required a masonry dam 180 feet high across the Chagres at Gamboa, to regulate the flow of that river into the canal. This dam, very narrow and very high, would have been a much fairer mark than the great Gatun Dam for the wielder of high explosives. Furthermore, while earth dams, like that at Gatun, have weathered earthquake shocks of great severity, masonry dams, like that proposed for Gamboa, have been tumbled to the earth by shocks of much less power. The regulating works at Gatun will take care of a volume of water approximately twice as great as the Chagres has ever brought down. On the other hand, the proposed dam at Gamboa would have cared for only one-third as great a discharge as the highest known flow of the Chagres.

It was calculated that the lake made by the dam at Gamboa would always be held at low stage between floods, but if two floods came in quick succession this might have been impossible. Such a situation would have made the Chagres River always a menace to the canal, instead of its most essential and beneficent feature.

Those who objected to the lock type, on the ground that the locks could be destroyed, seemed to forget that even the sea-level project demanded a set of locks to regulate the tides of the Pacific. While, contrary to the usual idea, there is no difference in the mean level of the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, the difference in the tides at Panama is about 18 feet. This is due to the shape of the Bay of Panama. As the tide sweeps over the Pacific and into that bay, it meets a funnel-shaped shore line, which gradually contracts as the tide travels landward. The result is that the tide rises higher and higher until it reaches a maximum of 10 feet above average sea level. When it flows out it reaches a point 10 feet below average sea level, thus giving a tidal fluctuation of 20 feet. On the Atlantic side the tidal fluctuation is only 2 feet.

Under these conditions the canal could not be operated during many hours of the 24 without the tidal locks, if at all, and it would be almost as great a hindrance to have the tidal locks destroyed as to have the present locks injured. Another perpetual menace in a canal with a bottom width of only 150 feet for half of its distance, would be the danger of a ship sinking and blocking the channel. When the Cheatham sank in the Suez Canal it wholly blocked the waterway for nine days, and partially blocked it for a month.

According to the Isthmian Canal Commission, the present canal affords greater safety for ships and less danger of interruption to traffic by reason of its wider and deeper channels; it provides for quicker passage across the Isthmus for large ships and for heavy traffic; it is in much less danger of being damaged, and of delays to ships because of the flood waters of the Chagres; it can be enlarged more easily and much more cheaply than could a sea-level canal. The lock canal has a minimum depth of 41 feet, and less than 5 miles of it has a width as narrow as 300 feet. It can take care of 80,000,000 tons of shipping a year, and, by the expenditure of less than $25,000,000 additional, can increase this capacity by at least a third. It can pass at least 48 ships a day, doing all that a sea-level canal could do, and many things that a sea-level canal could not do.

No one denies that if it were possible to have a great Isthmian waterway at sea level as wide as the present lock canal, it would be the ideal interoceanic waterway. But, as such a proposition is out of the question, the American people have at least one thing for which to thank Theodore Roosevelt—that at a critical time in the history of the canal project he allowed himself to be converted from the advocacy of a sea-level canal to the championship of a lock-level canal, in the face of a majority report of one of the strongest boards of engineers ever assembled, and prevented a situation at Panama that would have been humiliating to America, and which probably would have ended for all time the efforts of centuries to let ships through the American Isthmus.


CHAPTER XXIV

FORTIFICATIONS

When Congress decided that the Panama Canal should be regarded as a part of the military defenses of the Nation, it became necessary to fortify it in such a way as to make it practically impregnable to naval attack. It was, therefore, decided that there should be ample coast defenses at the two ends of the canal and that these defenses should be protected from land attack by the quartering of a sufficient number of mobile troops to hold in check any landing parties that might attack the works by an overland route.

In carrying out this plan Congress met every demand of the military experts. When the plans for the fortifications were pending before the Appropriations Committee of the House every military authority, from Gen. Leonard Wood and Col. George W. Goethals down, who appeared before the committee was asked if he considered the defenses recommended as sufficient for the purposes intended, and each replied in the affirmative.

These defenses consist of large forts at each end of the canal, with field works for some 6,000 mobile troops. The defenses on the Pacific side will be somewhat stronger than those on the Atlantic side, probably for the reason that better naval protection ordinarily could be afforded to the Atlantic than to the Pacific entrance, on account of the proximity of the Atlantic Waters of the canal to American shores.

At the forts on the Atlantic side four 12-inch guns, sixteen 12-inch mortars, six 6-inch guns and four 4710-inch howitzers will be mounted. The guns at this end of the canal will be distributed between Toro Point on the west side of the entrance channel and Margarita Island on the east side. There will be two big 14-inch disappearing guns at each of these points. They will be so placed as to sweep the horizon in the seaward direction, and at the same time will be able to concentrate their fire on the enemy as he steams in toward the channel entrance between the great breakwaters which cut off Limon Bay from the ocean.

At the Pacific end all of the defenses will be on the east side of the channel. They will consist of one 16-inch gun, six 14-inch guns, six 6-inch guns and eight 4710-inch howitzers. There are three small islands on the east side of the Pacific entrance channel known as Naos, Perico, and Flamenco. They rise precipitously out of the water and offer ideal sites for heavy defense. A huge dump or breakwater has been built from the mainland at Balboa out to Naos Island and this, in turn, has been connected with Perico and Flamenco by large stone causeways. The great dump has made several hundred acres of available land for quartering the eight companies of coast-defense troops which will be stationed at the Pacific end of the canal. These islands are 3 miles from the mainland and their guns will completely bar the way to any hostile ships which might seek to enter the canal.

On the other side of the channel, at a distance of about 12 miles, lies the island of Taboga where the Canal Commission maintains the sanitarium for its employees. It had been suggested by some that fortifications should be planted there, but it was declared by the military authorities that the guns of Naos, Perico, and Flamenco would completely command this island and prevent a hostile nation from using it as a base of operations.

The range of the guns extends more than a mile beyond Taboga Island. The big 16-inch gun which will be mounted on Perico Island is the largest ever built. It was made at the Watervliet Arsenal. It carries a projectile weighing more than a ton for a distance of 21 miles. At 17 miles it can toss its death-dealing 2,400-pound shell at an enemy as accurately as a base-ball player throws a ball to a team-mate 17 yards away. Its projectiles are filled with powerful explosives, a single one of which in the vitals of any battleship would be enough to place it out of commission. The big guns and the mortars are intended primarily for defending the canal from attack by water. The smaller guns and howitzers would come into play when an enemy approached within a mile and would be used to repel his efforts to effect a landing. Nearly all of these howitzers may be moved from place to place to meet the needs of the field troops in case of land attack. Eight of them will be permanently stationed at Gatun Locks. There will be other field works at Gatun, Miraflores, and Pedro Miguel ready for occupancy at a moment's notice by the field troops stationed on the Isthmus. These howitzers are so located that 12 of them may be concentrated at any given point in case of danger.

The big guns of the permanent forts are all mounted on disappearing carriages so that they are exposed to fire only at the moment of discharge. The 12-inch mortars will not only play their part in defending the canal from water attack, but will be able to sweep the country on the Atlantic side as far inland as the Gatun Locks and on the Pacific side as far inland as the locks at Miraflores. They have a range of nearly 4 miles, and when loaded with shrapnel will prove a most effective weapon against field troops operating anywhere within the vicinity of the locks.

The land lying contiguous to the sea-level ends of the canal will be platted off into squares exactly as a city is laid out. Should hostile troops come upon this territory the men in the fire-control station would simply ascertain the number of the block or blocks on which they were operating, and the mortars would be so oriented as to throw their big projectiles thousands of yards into the air to fall directly on those blocks. They would, therefore, be practically as useful in land operations as in the water defense.

Every feature of the armament defending the entrance of the canal will embody the latest improvements known to military science. The carriages for the big guns have been specially designed, and were put through the most thorough and exacting tests before their adoption. The fire-control stations are said to be the last word in insuring the effective use of the guns. Determining how a big gun shall be aimed so that its projectile will hit a target 10 miles away is not an easy task. Of course, the gun can not be pointed directly at the target, since this would cause the projectile to fall far short of the enemy, and also the effect of the wind and the motion of the enemy would carry it wide of its mark. To guess the range and to secure it by experimentation would be to prevent any effective fire whatever. Therefore, it is necessary first to determine the approximate range, the motion of the enemy and the velocity of the wind.

There is an ingenious instrument known as the range finder, by which the approximate distance of the target is determined. This instrument looks something like a cross between an opera glass and a small telescope. The operator puts his eyes to the opera glass part of the range finder and locates the enemy just as one would with an ordinary pair of glasses. When he locates the hostile ship he sees two images of it. There is an adjusting screw which he turns until the two images blend together and become one. The turning of this screw automatically adjusts a scale on the instrument, and when the two images exactly coalesce the distance of the ship is registered on the scale. The operators in the fire-control station make the necessary calculations as to the effect of the wind, the motion of the enemy and other elements entering into marksmanship, and telephone the results below to the men who aim the gun.

It takes two men to aim each gun; one takes care of its up-and-down movement, and the other of its right-and-left movement. When the man in the fire-control station telephones that the enemy is so many miles away, the man who has charge of the up-and-down movement of the gun so adjusts his telescopic sight on a registering scale that when it is pointed directly on the enemy the muzzle of the gun will be elevated high enough to carry the projectile that distance. The man who has charge of the right-to-left movement adjusts his sight so that when it is pointed directly at the enemy the muzzle of the gun will be pointed far enough to the right or to the left to land its projectile amidship on the enemy. Each man stands on a platform and operates a little wheel on an endless screw. He turns this wheel backward or forward just enough to keep his sight exactly on the enemy.

After the gunners have received their instructions the first shot is fired. This is called a "ranging" shot, and as the best range finder can not register the distance to the exact yard it is necessary for the fire-control station to gauge exactly how far short of, or how far over, the target the projectile has carried. The up-and-down sight is adjusted in accordance therewith and usually the second, or at most the third, shot gets the exact range. This method of locating the enemy will be used on all the fortifications of the canal.

It is unanimously agreed by military authorities that no naval force will risk an open attack upon such fortifications, since almost inevitably it would result in the disabling, if not the sinking, of a number of battleships and a great crippling of the enemy's force that he could not afford to risk unless he had first swept the seas of our own naval strength.

In order to make certain that no surprise attack could be successful, one of the most complete searchlight equipments to be found in any fortress in the world has been authorized for the canal fortifications. There will be 14 searchlights, with 60-inch reflectors, made so that they will send the brightest of white lights out to sea and over the land as far as the range of the guns may reach. These searchlights cost more than $20,000 each, and it requires a year to construct the big mirror which is placed in each of them. Electric plants at each fortress will generate electricity for the operation of the guns and of the searchlights.

In anticipation of sudden need nearly $2,000,000 worth of reserve ammunition will be kept on the Isthmus. There will be 70 rounds for the big 16-inch gun—enough to operate it constantly for two hours, providing for a shot about every two minutes. The big 14-inch guns will carry a shell weighing 1,400 pounds, propelled by a 365-pound charge of smokeless powder which will drive it through the air at an initial speed of nearly half a mile a second—enough momentum to carry it through at least 5 feet of wrought iron. The charge of powder by which these guns will hurl their projectiles on their death-dealing mission, generates a force which would lift the great Masonic Temple of Chicago 2 feet in a single second.

Three regiments of infantry, 1 squadron of cavalry, 1 battalion of field artillery, and 12 companies of coast-defense troops will be permanently stationed on the Isthmus. The field troops, consisting of the infantry, cavalry, and field artillery, will be stationed at Miraflores, where permanent quarters will be provided together with the necessary drill grounds. These quarters will cost in the neighborhood of $3,000,000. At this point they can be maneuvered to advantage and moved to any part of the Canal Zone needing defense. It was originally intended to place these troops at Culebra on the east side of the channel, but this would necessitate their going a distance of about 5 miles to get to a point where they could conveniently cross with the artillery to the other side of the canal.

Quarters for eight companies of coast-defense troops are being established on the Naos Island dumps. Quarters for two companies of these troops are being provided at Toro Point, and for two other companies at Margarita Island. These will afford sufficient strength at the Atlantic side to man the guns temporarily, in case of hostilities, until any additional troops needed can be brought up. All of the troops, both field and coast defense, will be adequately housed and the permanent structures erected for them will be as substantially built as those of any modern army post in continental United States. There will be drill grounds large enough to maneuver the troops stationed on the Isthmus. Roads affording access to all parts of the Canal Zone have been built.

In addition to the provisions for the permanent forces on the Isthmus, additional field works will be provided to accommodate the 20,000 troops which might be brought to the Isthmus in case of war. These field works will take the form of barricaded positions, entrenchments, and other protective breastworks which will enable the troops to undergo a state of siege. It has been estimated by the engineers that behind such works as have been planned one defender can stand off six assailants, so that a body of 20,000 mobile troops under these conditions could hold the Isthmus against a siege of 100,000 for a reasonable time. These field works will be constructed principally around Gatun and Pedro Miguel. The buildings for the permanent force stationed on the Isthmus will be constructed on the unit system so that any necessary expansion can be made.

The question of fortifying the canal was one which engaged the serious attention of Congress for a long time. There were two main viewpoints as to what policy should be pursued. One contention was that the canal should be made neutral, open to the ships of all nations, including the United States, on equal terms even in case of war between the United States and any other country. It was contended by those who took this view that to declare it neutral would render it immune from any attack and guarantee its perpetuity as a great commercial undertaking under the control of the United States.

They contended, furthermore, that the United States was bound, under the terms of its treaty with Great Britain, to make the canal neutral and that to fortify it would be to violate the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. They asserted that the United States was under solemn obligations to recognize the principle of neutrality as applied at Suez and offered the express terms of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty in proof of their contention. This treaty provided that "the United States adopts, as the basis of the neutralization of such a ship canal, the following rules substantially embodied in the Convention of Constantinople, signed the twenty-eighth of October, 1888, for the free navigation of the Suez Canal; that is to say:

"First, the canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war, all nations observing these rules on terms of entire equality so that there shall be no discrimination against any such nation, or its citizens or subjects, in respect of the conditions or charges of traffic, or otherwise. Such conditions and charges of traffic shall be just and equitable.

"Second, the canal shall never be blockaded, nor shall any right of war be exercised, nor any act of hostility be committed within it. The United States, however, shall be at liberty to maintain such military police along the canal as may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness and disorder.

"Third, vessels of war of a belligerent shall not revictual nor take any stores in the canal except so far as may be strictly necessary; and the transit of such vessels through the canal shall be effected with the least possible delay in accordance with the regulations in force, and with only such intermissions as may result from the necessities of the service."

It will be seen from this that the language of the treaty seems plainly to imply that the United States had no right to fortify the canal. It is interesting to note, however, that when the controversy over the tolls between the United States and England arose, the English Government expressly conceded the right of the United States to fortify the canal and to exercise absolute rights of sovereignty so far as military considerations were concerned. It would constitute an interesting chapter in diplomatic history if someone would tell the real reason why the English Government waived its rights of demanding a neutral canal under the Hay-Pauncefote treaty.

Those who advocated the fortification of the canal contended that the United States had acquired practical sovereignty over the Canal Zone, and that thereunder it had a perfect right to provide for the defense of the territory. They asserted that the canal was undertaken because of the military necessities of the United States, as demonstrated by the trip of the Oregon from the Pacific to the Atlantic, during the Spanish-American War and that to fail to fortify the canal would be to lose the military advantages which its construction had given to the United States.

It was further contended that to allow the canal to be neutral would, in the case of war between the United States and some foreign power, compel the United States to keep its own warships out of the canal its own blood and money had built, or else compel its permanent operating force at Panama to commit a sort of legal treason by putting the enemy's ships through the big waterway on the same terms with American ships.

This contention was answered by those who took the opposite view with the statement that all treaties would be suspended in case of war and that neutralization would cease between the United States and its enemies at such a time.

The other side replied that if this were true, it would then be too late properly to fortify the Isthmus, and that if the United States expected ever to deny to any country the neutrality provisions of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, the fortifications should by all means be built in advance.

The long and earnest debate brought forth from some the prediction that England would not acquiesce in such a construction of the treaty, and from others the statement that under the terms of that instrument other nations had a right to protest against the fortification of the canal. In the face of these arguments, however, Congress determined by a substantial majority to fortify the canal, and the whole world has acquiesced. England not only did not protest, but in its toll controversy notes expressly declared that the United States had the right to fortify the canal.


CHAPTER XXV

FIXING THE TOLLS

Long before the Panama Canal was finished shipping interests in every part of the world began inquiring minutely as to probable rates of toll, stating that it would be necessary for them to have this information before making plans to meet the changed conditions. Some wanted to plan construction of new ships, while others desired principally to readjust their transportation lines in accordance with the new conditions.

With this in mind, President Taft in 1912 recommended to Congress the passage of a law fixing the tolls and providing for the permanent operation of the canal. Congress, acting upon this recommendation, passed what is known as the Permanent Canal Law. In this law are stated the terms under which the canal may be used by the shipping world. It authorizes the President to prescribe, and from time to time to change, the tolls that shall be levied by the Government of the United States for the use of the canal. No tolls may be levied on vessels passing through the canal from one United States port to another. Provision was also made that tolls might be based upon gross or net registered tonnage, displacement tonnage, or otherwise, and that they might be lower on vessels in ballast than upon vessels carrying cargo. When based upon net registered tonnage, for ships of commerce, the tolls can not exceed $1.25 per ton, nor be less, other than for vessels of the United States and its citizens, than the estimated proportional cost of the actual maintenance and operation of the canal. The toll for each passenger was fixed at not more than $1.50.

Acting under the law authorizing him to fix the rates within the limitations stated by the law itself, President Taft issued a proclamation fixing the toll at $1.20 per net registered ton on all ships of commerce, other than those carrying cargo from one United States port to another. The net registered ton is the unit of measuring a ship's cargo-carrying capacity, used throughout the world in general, and by British shipping in particular. It consists of 100 cubic feet of space, so that when a ship is measured its net registered tonnage is determined by the number of these units of space it contains. A ton of cargo seldom fills a hundred cubic feet of space; frequently it will not fill more than 40 cubic feet. The charge per ton of actual freight under this toll of $1.20 per net registered ton ranges from 44 to 80 cents a long ton upon the freight carried, depending upon the class of cargo. Such a toll adds from 2 to 4 cents per hundredweight to the freight rate between two points through the canal. It might cost 5 cents to take a barrel of flour from Colon to Panama, or vice versa.

While ships will be charged tolls on the basis of net registered tonnage, not all ships carry freight upon that basis. In the majority of cases cargo is taken on at "ship's option"—either by weight or space. Forty cubic feet is estimated as the space occupied by an ordinary ton of freight, and ships usually carry cargo at rates based on that amount of space for each ton. The 40 cubic feet method of determining the amount of cargo carried is adopted by maritime interests because a long ton of wheat occupies about that amount of space. From this it will be seen that for the purpose of collecting tolls the United States allows 100 cubic feet of space for a ton, while the ordinary shipping firm allows only 40 feet per ton. Thus it happens that a shipowner charges the shipper for carrying 212 tons where the United States charges the shipowner for carrying 1 ton.

Notwithstanding the fact that the shipowner collects for the carrying of 212 tons where he pays toll on 1 ton, he still has to pay what seems, in the aggregate, a large sum of money each time his ship passes through the canal. An ordinary 5,000-ton ship will be charged $6,000 for passing from one ocean to the other. A ship like the Cleveland, the first around the world tourist steamer advertised to pass through the canal, will have to pay $14,000 for the 12-hour trip from Colon to Panama. A steamship like the Lusitania will have to put up some $30,000 for a single passage. The average ship will pay from $5,000 to $10,000 for its passage. This seems like a high rate, even though it does amount to only 2 or 4 cents per hundredweight of cargo, but when one takes into consideration the time saved in passing through the canal, and the cost of maintaining a ship on the high seas, the rate becomes a reasonable one.

The average ship costs about 10 cents per net registered ton per day for keeping it in operation. Thus a 10,000-ton ship will save about a thousand dollars for each day its voyage is shortened. If this voyage be shortened by 20 days, the shipowner makes a net saving of $8,000 when he selects the Panama route over some other route. In fact, he may save even more than this, for the other route might involve the giving of additional space for bunker coal, which otherwise would be used for cargo. Convenient coaling stations mean a minimum of space required for the operation of the ship and a maximum of cargo-carrying capacity. In this way a merchant ship might save several thousand dollars additional by choosing the Panama route over the Strait of Magellan.

It is estimated that the tolls it will be necessary to collect to make the canal self-supporting will be $15,500,000 a year, since that amount will be required to meet the expense of operation and return 3 per cent interest on the investment. The $15,500,000 is made up of $3,500,000 for operations, $250,000 for sanitation and government and $11,250,000 for interest on the $375,000,000 the canal cost. This takes no account of approximately $10,000,000 which will be required for the support of the troops on the Isthmus. Should this be considered, the total annual charges to be made would approximate $25,000,000, but this, in the view of those who have considered the matter, is not a proper charge against the cost of operation.