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The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) cover

The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2)

Chapter 108: CHAPTER XXXVIII.
By Proclus
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About This Book

The work expounds a Neoplatonic theology in which an ineffable first principle emanates successive orders—intellect, soul, natures, and the world—each sustaining series of beings that descend to corporeal existence. It argues that multiplicity issues from unity by similitude and that divine hypostases function as intermediate causes between the first principle and the sensible realm. Additional treatises consider providence, fate, and the subsistence of evil, while a concise set of doctrinal propositions lays out systematic metaphysical demonstrations. The style combines symbolic imagery with geometric and dialectical reasoning to reconcile mystical theism with rigorous philosophical argument.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

And do you not see how each of the triads conjoins the summit of itself with the ends placed above it? For the one many was the end of the collective and unknown triad; and the same is the beginning of the connective triad. The end of the connective triad was the finite; and this again is the beginning of the perfective triad. For to have extremes manifests that which consists of ends or bounds. And thus the whole middle order is connected with and united to itself, and is truly the bond of total orders, itself establishing an admirable communion with itself, but conjoining intellectuals to intelligibles, and convolving them to one impartible union; above indeed, having the intelligible and unknown triad, but in the middle producing the triad which is connective of progressions, and at the end, the convertive empire, through which it proximately converts the intellectual to the intelligible Gods.

For on what account does intellect look to itself, and is in itself? Is it not because it is on all sides finite or bounded, converges to itself, and convolves its appropriate energies about itself? But why is it perfect, and full of intellectual goods? Is it not because it first participates of the perfection [of the above mentioned] leaders, and subsists according to them, possessing a self-perfect essence and intellectual perception? After what manner likewise, is it said to be a sphere, both by Plato, and other theologists? Is it not because it is the first participant of figure, and is intellectually figured according to it? All conversion, therefore, all perfection, and every intellectual figure, accede to the intellectual Gods, from the perfective triad. For the intelligible leader of perfection, gives perfection to the ends and summits and hyparxes of wholes. But the intelligible and intellectual leader terminates their progressions which extend from on high as far as to the last of things. And the intellectual leader comprehends in his own perfection, the conversions of all the Gods, and bounds and perfects through figures their progressions to infinity.