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The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) cover

The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2)

Chapter 11: CHAPTER VIII.
By Proclus
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About This Book

The work expounds a Neoplatonic theology in which an ineffable first principle emanates successive orders—intellect, soul, natures, and the world—each sustaining series of beings that descend to corporeal existence. It argues that multiplicity issues from unity by similitude and that divine hypostases function as intermediate causes between the first principle and the sensible realm. Additional treatises consider providence, fate, and the subsistence of evil, while a concise set of doctrinal propositions lays out systematic metaphysical demonstrations. The style combines symbolic imagery with geometric and dialectical reasoning to reconcile mystical theism with rigorous philosophical argument.

CHAPTER VIII.

I appear, however, by these means, to have excited for myself a twofold contest against those who attempt to investigate the writings of Plato; and I see two sorts of persons, who will oppose what has been said. One of these does not think proper to explore any other design in the Parmenides, than exercise through opposite arguments, or to introduce in this dialogue a croud of arcane and intellectual dogmas, which are foreign from its intention. But the other sort, who are more venerable than these, and lovers of forms assert, that one of the hypotheses is about the first God, another about the second God, and the whole of an intellectual nature, and a third, about the natures posterior to this, whether they are the more excellent genera, or souls, or any other kind of beings. For the investigation of these particulars does not pertain to the present discourse.

These, therefore, distribute three of the hypotheses after this manner. But they do not think proper to busy themselves about the multitude of Gods, the intelligible, and the intellectual genera, the supermundane and mundane natures, or to unfold all these by division, or busily explore them. For according to them, though Plato in the second hypothesis, treats about intellectual beings, yet the nature of intellect is one, simple and indivisible. Against both these therefore, must he contend, who entertains that opinion of the Parmenides, which we have before mentioned. The contest however against these is not equal. But those who make the Parmenides a logical exercise, are again attacked by those who embrace the divine mode of interpretation. And those who do not unfold the multitude of beings, and the orders of divine natures, are indeed, as Homer says, in every respect venerable and skilful men, but yet for the sake of the Platonic philosophy, we must doubt against them, following in this our leader to the most holy and mystic truth. It is proper likewise to relate as far as contributes to our purpose, what appears to us to be the truth respecting the hypotheses of the Parmenides; for thus perhaps by a reasoning process, we may embrace the whole theology of Plato.