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The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) cover

The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2)

Chapter 110: BOOK V.
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About This Book

The work expounds a Neoplatonic theology in which an ineffable first principle emanates successive orders—intellect, soul, natures, and the world—each sustaining series of beings that descend to corporeal existence. It argues that multiplicity issues from unity by similitude and that divine hypostases function as intermediate causes between the first principle and the sensible realm. Additional treatises consider providence, fate, and the subsistence of evil, while a concise set of doctrinal propositions lays out systematic metaphysical demonstrations. The style combines symbolic imagery with geometric and dialectical reasoning to reconcile mystical theism with rigorous philosophical argument.

BOOK V.

CHAPTER I.

In the next place, let us survey another order of Gods, which is called intellectual, being indeed conjoined to the orders prior to it, but terminating the total progressions of the Gods, converting them to their principle, and producing one circle of the primarily-efficient and all-perfect orders. Let us also extend the intellect that is in us to the imparticipable and divine intellect, and distinguish the orders and diminutions of essence that are in it, according to the narration of Plato.

This intellectual hypostasis therefore of the Gods, is suspended indeed from more ancient causes, and is filled from them with total goodness and self-sufficiency. But after these causes, it establishes an illustrious empire over all secondary natures, binding to its dominion all the partial progressions of the Gods. And it is denominated indeed intellectual, because it generates an impartible and divine intellect. But it is filled from intelligibles, not as from those intelligibles which are co-arranged with intellect, nor as with those which are alone divided from intellect by the conception of the mind, but as establishing in itself unically all multitudes, and occultly containing the evolutions of the Gods into light, and the hyparxes of intelligibles. It is likewise allotted the total intellect of intellectuals, the variety of beings, and the multiform orders of divine natures; and it convolves the end of the whole progression[251] [of the Gods] to the one intelligible principle. For intellectuals are converted to intelligibles. And some intellectuals indeed are united and[252] firmly established prior to the divided Gods; but others are multiplied and through conversion are conjoined to primarily-efficient causes. The intellectual Gods however proceed from all the Gods prior to them, receiving indeed unions from the one that is prior to intelligibles; but essences from intelligibles; and being allotted lives all-perfect, connective and generative of divine natures, from the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods; but the intellectual peculiarity from themselves. They likewise convert to themselves all the divided orders, but establish themselves in intelligibles, existing wholly through the whole, pure and unknown knowledges, and fervid lives. Besides these things also, they are all-perfect essences, producing all secondary natures through subsisting from themselves, and being neither diminished by their progression, nor receiving an addition by their progeny; but through their own never-failing and infinite powers, being the fathers, causes, and leaders of all things. Nor are they co-divided with their progeny, nor do they depart from themselves in their progressions; but at once, and according to union they govern total multitudes, and all orders, and convolve them to the intelligible, and to occult good.

Whether therefore I may speak of life, it is not proper to think that it is such a life as we surveyed a little before. For that was imparticipable, but this is participated. And that indeed, was generative, but this is vivific. But it is not immanifest that these differ from each other. For the vivific cause indeed, is also evidently generative; but the generative cause is not entirely vivific. For it imparts figure to things unfigured, bound to things indefinite, and perfection to things imperfect. Or whether I may denominate the cause in intellectuals intelligible, it must not immediately be conceived to be such an intelligible, as that of which we have before spoken. For that was imparticipable, and prior to intellectuals, itself pre-existing by itself, and exempt from wholes; not being denominated intelligible, as the plenitude of intellect, but as the prior-cause of it, and the object of desire and love to it, subsisting uniformly uncoordinated with it. The intelligible however which is now the subject of consideration, is participated, and co-arranged with intellect, is multiform, and contains in itself the divided causes of all things. Or whether we may call the Gods in this order fathers and fabricators, it must be admitted that this paternal and fabricative characteristic, is different from the hyparxis of the intelligible[253] fathers. For they indeed were generative of whole essences; but these pre-exist as the causes of divisible emanations, and of definite productions of form. And they indeed contained in themselves powers fabricative of the divine progressions; but these separate from themselves prolific causes, and are not conjoined to them according to union, but according to a communion subordinate to union. For the marriages which are celebrated by fables, and the concordant conjunction of divine natures, are in the intellectual Gods. But the demiurgic being mingled with the vivific effluxions, every genus of the Gods is unfolded into light, both the supermundane, and the mundane. This, however, will be hereafter discussed.