CHAPTER XVII.
In the third place therefore, let us purify our conceptions about the demiurgic cause according to other projecting energies of intellect, following for this purpose Timæus. In the first place then, Timæus in the beginning of the theory concerning the demiurgus, sufficiently exhibits his goodness, and his unenvying and abundant communication of demiurgic reasons, being impelled to this from the seat of goodness which is inherent in him, and from his exuberant deity. For his goodness and his unenvying abundance, are not as it were a certain habit of good, and a power, or a form itself by itself existing prior to many goods, but it is one ineffable participation of good, and the one of the demiurgic order; according to which the demiurgus also is a God, and fills all things with their proper good. For because there is deity in him which desires to adorn and arrange all things, and an hyparxis which is extended to the providence of the whole of things, on this account he establishes the principle of fabrication. His goodness therefore is nothing else than demiurgic deity. But his will is the progeny of the energy of his goodness, bounding the end of his power. For since in the demiurgus of wholes there are, as we have said, father, power, and intellect, and these subsist in him intellectually, according to each of these he is filled with the participation of the one. And through goodness indeed, that which is paternal in him, and which is as it were the intelligible of intellect, is illuminated. But through will, his power is governed, and is extended to one intelligible good. And through providence, his intellect is perfect, and gives subsistence to all things. All these likewise are the progeny of the one deity in the demiurgus.
In the first place, therefore, as I have said, Timæus unfolds through these things the divine peculiarity of the demiurgus. But in the second place, he presents to our view the intelligible cause which is in him, and also the united paradigmatic cause of wholes which he contains. For to make all things similar to himself, evinces that he is the intelligible paradigm of every thing beautiful and good in the world. For because he gives subsistence to all things by his very being, that to which he gives subsistence is the image of himself. And according to this reasoning the demiurgus is not only a God, but he contains in himself the intelligible, and true being, and antecedently comprehends not only the final cause of mundane natures, but also the paradigmatic cause. But again, in the third place, Timæus celebrates the demiurgic power, and the principle which abolishes every thing disorderly and indefinite, and prepares the beautiful alone and the good to have dominion in wholes. For the assertion that the demiurgus to the utmost of his power suffered nothing evil and vile to exist, indicates his unconquerable power, which adorns things material in an unpolluted manner, and imparts by illumination bound to indefinite, and order to disorderly natures.
In which part of the Timæus, likewise, this dogma of Plato will appear to you to be admirable, that matter is generated from some one of the Gods situated above the demiurgus. For the demiurgus receiving matter occupied by the vestiges of forms, thus himself introduces into it all the perfection of ornament and arrangement. Matter, therefore, and the whole of that which is the subject of bodies, proceed supernally from the first principles, which on account of their exuberance of power, are able to generate even the last of beings. But the demiurgus of the universe, imparts by illumination, order, bound, and ornament, and the whole world is fabricated an image of intelligibles, through the communication of forms.
In the fourth place therefore, let us survey how Timæus unfolds to us the demiurgic intellect. “By a reasoning process,” says he, “the demiurgus discovered from the things which are visible according to nature, that no work which is destitute of intelligence can ever become more beautiful than that which possesses intellect.” What therefore is this reasoning? What is the discovery, and whence does it originate? Reasoning, therefore, is indeed distributed intellection, looking to itself, and in itself investigating good. For every one who reasons, passes from one thing to another, and being converted to himself, searches after good. The demiurgic intellect, therefore, in adorning and arranging the universe subsists analogously to him who reasons; for he emits the divided causes of mundane natures, which preexist unitedly in intelligibles. For those things which intelligible intellect constitutes uniformly and exemptly, these intellectual intellect separating, distributing into parts, and as it were fabricating by itself, generates. Reasoning therefore is the being filled with the intelligible, and an all-perfect union with it. By which also it is evident that it is not fit to think this reasoning [of the demiurgus] is either investigation or doubt, or a wandering of divine intellect, but that it is stable intelligence intellectually perceiving the multiform causes of beings. For intellect is always united to the intelligible, and is filled with its own intelligibles. And in a similar manner it is intellect in energy, and intelligible. For at one and the same time, it intellectually perceives and is perceived, discovers itself, entering into itself, and the reasoning also finds what this intelligence is, but not according to transition. For the intelligence of the Gods is eternal. And invention with them is not the discovery of that which is absent; for all things are always present to the intellect of the Gods. The intelligible likewise there is not separated from intellect. The conversion, therefore, of intellect to itself may be called reasoning; but the being filled from intelligibles invention. And intelligibles themselves may be denominated things visible according to nature. For because Timæus had denominated the unadorned subject of bodies when it was vanquished by the obscure vestiges of forms, visible, hence, I think, he calls intelligibles visible according to nature. For it is according to nature, to intellect to look to these, and not to things subordinate to these. As, therefore, he says, that intellect itself sees intelligibles, after the same manner also he calls intelligibles things naturally visible, and converts intellect to the intelligible, as that which sees to that which is seen. If, therefore, intellect sees animal itself, and assimilates to it the whole world, it may be said that animal itself is visible to the demiurgus of the universe. For there the most splendid of intelligibles subsists; and this is that which we before demonstrated, when we said that there the fountain of beauty shines forth, which Socrates, in the Phædrus, denominates splendid and fulgid.