CHAPTER X.
That therefore which is primarily being is through these things denominated by Plato that which is mixed. And through the similitude of it, generation also is mingled from bound and infinity. And the infinite indeed in this is imperfect power; but the bound in it is form and the morphe of this power. On this account we establish this power to be matter, not possessing existence in energy, and requiring to be bounded by something else. We no longer however say that it is lawful to call the power of being matter, since it is generative of energies, produces all beings from itself, and is prolific of the perfect powers in beings. For the power of matter being imperfect dissimilarly imitates the power of being; and becoming multitude in capacity, it expresses the parturition of multitude in the power of being.[182] Moreover, the form of matter imitates ultimately bound, since it gives limits to matter, and terminates its infinity. But it is multiplied and divided about it. It is also mingled with the privation of matter, and represents the supreme union of the hyparxis of being, by its essence always advancing to existence, and always tending to decay. For those things which subsist in the first natures according to transcendency, are in such as are last according to deficiency. For that also which is primarily being is mixed, is exempt from the bound of infinite life, and is the cause of it. But that which consists of the last[183] of forms and the first matter, is in its own nature void of life; since it possesses life in capacity. For there indeed generative causes subsist prior to their progeny, and things perfect prior to such as are imperfect. But here things in capacity are prior to such as are in energy, and concauses are subject to the things which are produced from them. This however, I think, happens naturally, because the gifts of the first principles pervade as far as to the last of things, and not only generate more perfect natures, but also such as have a more imperfect subsistence. And on this account that which is mixed is the cause of generation, and of the nature which is mingled here. The bound and infinity however, which are prior to being, are not only the causes of this nature, but also of the elements of it, of which that which is mixed is not the cause, so far as it is mixed. For bound and infinity are twofold. And one kind of these is exempt from the things mingled, but another kind is assumed to the completion of the mixture. For I think it is every where necessary that prior to things that are mingled, there should be such as are unmingled, prior to things imperfect, such as are perfect, prior to parts, wholes, and prior to things that are in others, such as are in themselves; and this Socrates persuades us to admit not in one thing only, but also in beauty and symmetry, and in all forms. If therefore the second and third genera of being and forms subsist prior to their participants, how can we assert that bound and infinity which pervade through all beings have their first subsistence as things mingled? It must be admitted therefore, that they are unmingled and separate from being, and that being is derived from them, and at the same time consists of them. It is derived from them indeed, because they have a prior subsistence; but it consists of them, because they subsist in being according to a second progression.
The genera of being also are twofold; some of them indeed being fabricative of beings, but others existing as the elements of the nature of each being. For some of them indeed presubsist themselves by themselves, as possessing a productive power; but others being generated from these, constitute each particular being. Let no one therefore any longer wonder, how Socrates indeed in the Philebus establishes that which is mingled, prior to bound and infinity, but we on the contrary evince that bound and infinity are exempt from that which is mixed. For each is twofold, and the one indeed is prior to being, but the other is in being; and the one is generative, but the other is the element of the mixture. Of this kind also, are the bound and infinity of the mixed life, each being the element of the whole of felicity. Hence also each is indigent of each. And neither is intellect by itself desirable, nor perfect pleasure. It is necessary however, that the good should consist of all these, viz. of the desirable, the sufficient, and the perfect. Bound itself therefore and infinity, which are separate, subsist according to cause prior to that which is mixed. But the bound and infinity which are mixed are more imperfect than the mixture. Hence, from what has been said, it is evident what the things are of which the mixture consists.