The story of the Congo Free State

Can independent chiefs of savage tribes cede to private citizens the whole or part of their states, with the sovereign rights which pertain to them, conformably to the traditional customs of the country?

This question, as it is propounded, presents two aspects. It must be considered:

 I. From the point of view of the right of the one who cedes.
II. From the point of view of the one to whom the cession is made.

I

In examining this question from the standpoint of international law, we must first ask if the chiefs of savage tribes can, generally, make treaties, conventions, cessions of territories; in other words, if the tribes which they represent are considered as states, having the capacity to make international treaties, which would be respected as such by all civilised or non-civilised nations.

From the fifteenth century till early in the nineteenth century, the rules of international law were regarded as being to some extent an exclusive privilege of Christian peoples, for the establishment of regular relations between them. With regard to pagan peoples, they were not considered as participating in the political community which international law established between Christians; and it was only by Article VII. of the treaty of Paris of the 30th of March, 1856, that the Sublime Porte was admitted “to participate in the advantages of the European concert.”

We can easily understand that Christian nations could not admit to participation in the advantages of international law the people of nations who did not recognise this law as binding upon themselves, and who did not practise its precepts. Publicists and moralists teach that in their relations with pagan and savage populations, Christian sovereigns should always conduct themselves honestly, and observe the rules of justice, equity, and Christian morality.

It would be too long to enter here into the details of the discussions which the authors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had on the subject of the conduct of European nations in regard to the Indians. We shall limit ourselves to saying that the relations of the states of Europe with other nations had no fixed rules, that they varied much, according to the power and importance of the foreign nations, according to the communications more or less numerous which Europeans had with them, and according to the manners and customs practised by them.[66]

Thanks to the progress of humanitarian ideas, of a better practice of Christian morality, and the greater influence of principles of international justice, feeble people, almost savage, although not possessed of the benefits of civilisation, are no longer considered in our days, as destined to serve as a mine for civilised nations to “work.” All those having a human face, turned towards the heavens, are considered as members of the great human family, children of the common Father, animated by the same Divine breath, having the same destiny to accomplish, and meriting the respect due to human dignity.

These ideas have prevailed with jurisconsults and publicists, have permeated their doctrines, and happily have guided their practices. Savage tribes, although living in very imperfect communities, as well as their territories, are no longer regarded to-day as things without a master, and belonging to the first occupier, that is, to the first comer stronger than themselves. Want of civilisation can no longer serve as a pretext to civilised nations to put them under subjection, or to control them by violence.

The law of nations is a science still imperfectly moulded or stereotyped, and especially is it a science which ought not to be, and cannot be, formulated a priori. Its fundamental principle is, no doubt, philosophy, but it has its positive base in the facts of history and authoritative doctrine.

What are the conditions to enable a state to exist, as such, and to qualify it to treat?

“A certain number of men and families, who, being united, in a country, and having fixed their abode there, associate and submit themselves to a common chief, with the intention of providing for the safety of all, form a state,” says Klüber,[67] and to the same effect says G. F. Von Marten.[68]

“Sovereignty [continues Klüber[69]] in this extended sense consists in the ensemble of rights belonging to a state, independent as regards its object. It comprises, first, the entire independence of the state in the face of foreign nations; second, legitimate power of the Government or of the authority which the purpose of the state demands.”

The same author says[70]:

“Sovereignty is acquired by a state either at its foundation or when it separates itself legitimately from the dependence under which it was. To be valid, it does not need to be recognised or guaranteed by any foreign power whatever, provided its possession is not faulty (vicieuse).”

It is useless to multiply extracts. The principles summarised by Klüber on the sovereignty, the independence, and the equality of states, from the legal point of view, are equally professed by all authors. We will limit ourselves to the following: Heffter, par. 15, 16, pp. 32-34; par. 23, pp. 42, 43; par. 26, 27, pp. 47-49. Wheaton, vol. i., pp. 32, 43. Vattel, lib. i., chap. i., sec. 4. W. E. Hall, International Law, par. 2, 4, pp. 16-20; par. 6-8, pp. 34-37; par. 9, 10, pp. 39-42. Calvo, Droit international, par. 39-41, pp. 143-147.

Tribes inhabiting determined territory, represented by their chiefs, form, therefore, independent states.

From this the first consequence is that the territories which they occupy are not things without masters (res nullius), and cannot be occupied by other states. It is only territories without master, that is to say, upon which no sovereign power is yet established, that can be the object of occupation.

As regards the right of occupation, see the following authors:

“Christian people cannot rightfully take possession of lands which savages already really occupy,” says George Frederick von Marten.[71]

Klüber[72] says: “A state can acquire things which belong to no one (res nullius) by occupation (original), and the goods of others by means of conventions (derivative occupation) ... In order that the occupation may be legitimate, the thing itself should be susceptible of exclusive property and belong to no one. (A) The state should have the intention of acquiring the property thereof.”

In the note (A) the author says: “Property thus is acquired rightfully by an occupation without flaw; it is preserved by continuous possession. In consequence no nation is authorised, no matter what its pretensions, especially if of a higher degree of culture, to seize upon the property of another nation. It cannot even take it from savages or nomads.”

The author cites in support of this, Gunther, Völkerrecht, vol. ii., p. 10 et seq. See also the beautiful and energetic passage from Heffter, Le droit international public, vol. i., par. 70, pp. 141, 142: “Droit d’Occupation.”

To give validity of occupation it is necessary that the property should be without master, and that the intention to acquire the domain should be joined to the fact of an effective taking possession. Let us examine each of the three conditions:

1. Occupation is only to be applied to property which, although susceptible of being possessed, has no master. It does not extend to persons, who can only be the object of a submission, whether voluntary or forced. Occupation is to be applied notably to countries and islands uninhabited or not entirely occupied; but no power on earth has the right to impose its laws upon wandering or even savage peoples. Its subjects can seek to establish commercial relations with these latter, can remain among them, in case of necessity can demand of them indispensable articles of provisions, and even negotiate with them the voluntary cession of a portion of the territory, with the object of colonising it. Nature, it is true, does not forbid nations to extend their empire upon the earth; but it does not give the right to a single one among them to establish its dominion anywhere wherever it chooses to do it. The propaganda of civilisation, the development of commercial and industrial interests, the putting into activity of unproductive values, do not justify it either. All that can be accorded on the subject is, that in the interest of the preservation of the human kind, it may be permitted to nations to unite in order to open by common accord the ports of a country hermetically sealed to their commerce.

See, to the same effect, Bluntschli, Droits des gens, codifié, par. 20, p. 63.

Similar citations could be multiplied.

Communities of non-civilised tribes, forming according to the law of nations, as to-day admitted, independent states, the first logical consequence which follows is that these states cannot be acquired by reason of occupation by other states. A second consequence which necessarily follows from the same premises is, that these states, or their chiefs, can make international treaties of every kind—treaties which have obligatory force for the contracting parties, and which should be respected by all other states, if they do not interfere with existing rights.

We would remark here, with Calvo,[73] that “international treaties may be concluded, even with nomadic peoples, having no territory of their own nor fixed domicile, when they have an expressed political organisation and a common council by the intermediary of their chiefs or their assemblies.” “In this category [adds the same author] may be classed the Bedouins, scattered over the deserts of Arabia, Syria, Egypt, and barbarous Africa, and the Turcomans, who wander over the plains of Central Asia.”

“There are conglomerated populations which do not compose a state.... But the nomads and the savages have, either among themselves or with civilised people, an international law which is observed equally with the international law of civilised nations,” say Funck, Brentano, and Sorel.[74]

By still stronger reasoning the tribes composing states dwelling in determined territory can make international treaties. Savage African tribes, possessing determined territories, can make all kinds of treaties. Their chiefs can therefore cede territory, in whole or in part, to whom, we will see under No. 2. This rule, or rather this consequence, cannot be impeached in theory.

“Sovereignty of a state, in the sense of international law [says Klüber, Droits des gens moderne de l’Europe, p. 22], consists essentially in independence of all foreign control in relation to the exercise of rights of sovereignty; it ought by its nature even to be exercised independently of the antiquity of the state, or the form of its constitution of government, or the order established for the succession to the throne, or the rank, title, or state of its sovereign; of the extent of its territory; of its population, political importance, manners, religion, state of culture in general, the commerce of its inhabitants,” etc.

And the same author, par. 127, says:

“In regard to public domain, the state has, over the things which form part thereof, all rights of property, not only of exclusive possession and the right to enjoy it as owner, but also that of disposing freely thereof. The conventions or arrangements which it may make in this respect, whether with its subjects or with foreigners, are absolutely independent of other Governments. Nothing forbids it alienating its property, its putting it in pledge, or abandoning it. It has the capacity to acquire by accession.”[75]

Without going back to antiquity, modern history, since the seventeenth century up to our own days, furnishes us numerous examples of treaties, of cessions of territories, etc., concluded between civilised states on the one hand and savage tribes on the other. It is sufficient to recall the most noted cases:

In 1620 the English Puritans embarked on board the Mayflower, after establishing themselves in the northern part of Virginia, concluded with the chief or sachem of the Indians, Massasoit, a treaty of friendship, the most ancient treaty concluded by New England.[76]

In 1639 the founders of the colony of New Hampshire concluded with the Indians conventions for the purchase of land situated between the Piscataqua and the Merrimac, and there established the town of Exeter.[77]

Later, William Penn made treaties with chiefs of Indians. It is useless to cite here the numerous treaties between the different States of New England and the chiefs of Indian tribes.

Wheaton[78] recounts that some of these Indian tribes have recognised by conventions that they held their existence entirely at the will of the State within the limits of which they resided, and that others preserved a limited sovereignty and the absolute dominion of the territory inhabited by them; and he adds that by two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, in 1831 and 1832, the Cherokee Nation, residing within the limits of the State of Georgia, are held to constitute a distinct political society; that numerous treaties made by this nation with the United States recognise it as a people capable of maintaining relations of peace and war; that the English Government, having preceded the United States, bought their lands by contracts of sale, freely assented to, and never forced them to make sale against their will.

Let us pass from America to Africa and Asia. In the course of the last fifty years England has concluded with the chiefs of countries adjacent to the Congo thirteen treaties, of which we mention specially two, one concluded the 11th of February, 1853, with the King and chiefs of Cabinda, the other concluded the 20th June, 1854, with divers chiefs of the river Congo.

The treaty concluded by M. Savorgnan de Brazza with the King Makoko is of public notoriety.

To terminate the series of historical documents in support of the theory that chiefs of savage tribes can validly make treaties and cessions of territories in full sovereignty, let us recall further the recent treaties of the 29th of December, 1877, and the 22nd of January, 1878, by which the Sultans of Brunei and of Sulu, in the island of Borneo, ceded a part of their territory to Mr. Alfred Dent and Baron Overbeck.

If, from the point of view of international law, it is indisputable that no state, civilised or not, has the right to arbitrarily trouble the chiefs of savage tribes in the possession of their sovereignty, the same prohibition applies to those to whom they have conceded, whoever they may be.

The cessionnaires have the same rights as the ceders. Under what pretext could another state trouble them? Their cession is valid, and thus all motive, or even all pretext for trouble is wanting; or, the cession is null, according to the law of nations, and then the sovereign who made the cession has, in right, preserved all his sovereignty, and no other state has the right to trouble it, or even to intervene to make good the nullity of the cession.

II

Let us take the second question. Can a cession be made to a private citizen?

We are happy to be able to abridge this part of our work by referring to the article, “The Free Navigation of the Congo,” published by our eminent colleague of the Institute, Sir Travers Twiss, in the sixth number of the Revue du droit international for 1883.

It is true that Sir Travers Twiss occupies himself with the question whether those associations which are not organised as States can exercise sovereign rights, rather than whether these rights of sovereignty can be conceded to private individuals; but the argument which he invokes in support of his thesis applies in great part to cessions made to individuals.

When writers establish their point of departure to arrive at a demonstration they commence often by saying:

“It is an established principle,” etc. Or, “It is a principle of law,” etc. And they employ this form when their principles are the most contestable. In the article we have just cited, Sir Travers Twiss mentions an article in the Revue de géographie of Paris,[79] in which Mr. Delavand says: “It is a principle of law that states alone can exercise sovereign rights, and that no private company can have them.” He (Sir Travers Twiss) adds, with reason, that this proposition is affirmed in too absolute a manner, and he proves conclusively by historical facts that his criticism is just.

Doubtless an individual, as such, and a private society, in that capacity, are not sovereigns, and exercise no act of sovereignty. This needs no demonstration. But, in virtue of what principle of international law is it sought to be shown that one who is a private citizen to-day cannot become a sovereign to-morrow, and be in possession of the plenitude of sovereignty? Such a principle does not exist. No author of international law has ever sustained it, and all the history of humanity, from the earliest down to modern times, denies it.

Individuals can become sovereigns, and exercise the rights of sovereigns, in two ways:

First. By creating themselves into a state—that is to say, by establishing themselves upon a territory which belongs to them, and forming themselves into a community with a regular government, and legal organs of public power—in a word, with all the constituent elements of a state.

Most of the states of antiquity, according to legends and traditions, or positive historical information, have been created in no other way.

The states of the Middle Ages had the same origin. The Franks, the Visigoths, the Ostrogoths, the Burgundians, and others, were only nomadic peoples, composed of chiefs who, in the eyes of international law, were only individuals, but who founded states.

The Italian republics of the Middle Ages were only municipalities without international sovereignty, and they have become sovereign states. Simple individuals, poor fishermen, caused the republic of Venice to rise from the waves of the Adriatic and to become its queen.

Almost all the States of New England, in America, have been founded by individuals.[80]

States, to exist, have no need to be recognised by other states. Those who have founded them are the sovereigns, and therefore have the right to exercise the rights of sovereignty in so far as this exercise has not been delegated to an authority instituted under the constitution of the state.

And a revolution which has for result the detaching from a state of one of its parts, is it not at the commencement the work of individuals? And those individuals, if they unite themselves in their enterprise, can erect a simple province or provinces into a new and sovereign state, and exercise then sovereign rights.

And if to-day, simple individuals should establish themselves on a desert island, or on territory unoccupied by another state, they can establish a new state, with all the rights of sovereignty. We have seen Texas thus formed.

Second. An individual can become sovereign by succeeding to another sovereign in the exercise of the sovereignty of a state. From a private individual he becomes a sovereign.

The question whether a private individual can accept a sovereignty when the interior laws of his state forbid him is outside of our subject, and we do not treat of it.

Philip, Duke of Anjou, great-grandson of Louis XIV., was, from the point of view of international law, a simple individual. After the death of Charles II., by the treaty of Utrecht the states belonging to the Crown of Spain were dismembered, and Philip V. was recognised as the King of Spain, and acquired part of the states of the Spanish monarchy. Other examples might be cited.

When a prince was elected King of Germany he became a sovereign from a private individual that he was.

Or, again, when a chief of an African tribe, forming a sovereign state, cedes to an individual in full sovereignty a part of his state, does he do other than to call another person to the exercise of rights of sovereignty over one part of his state, erected into a new state? What difference is there between the case of a European prince who is called as sovereign to a state, or part of a state, and that where an African chief calls upon an individual to exercise sovereign powers over part of his state? In the fact undoubtedly there is much difference, but in law there is none; and that is the question. It is a question of law (droit) we have to study here.

It is even possible that an individual may remain a subject of the state to which he belongs, and may be the sovereign of another country. The sovereign, therefore, can have a double personality. Thus, Ernest Augustus, and George V., Dukes of Cumberland, were subjects of Queen Victoria and peers of England and at the same time Kings of Hanover. In 1787 the sovereign bishop of the principality of Osnabruck, the Duke of York, sat as a peer of England in the House of Lords.[81]

The question which has been laid down at the head of this opinion is a novel one. It has not been foreseen or treated in works of international law. Many authors treat a question which touches upon this one, but which differs from it a good deal. They ask if an individual can make in his own name an act of occupation of a territory newly discovered without a master. They reply negatively to this question, and, in their line of ideas, they are right; for those who discover new territories are almost always navigators, travelling in a public ship, often public officers or individuals commissioned by their governments—agents of the government—and they cannot occupy in their own name.

A recent event furnishes a powerful support to the theory that rights of sovereignty can be ceded to individuals, namely, the treaty between the Sultans of Borneo and Sulu and Mr. Dent and Baron Overbeck, who, in their turn, have ceded their rights to a private British company, the “British North Borneo Company.” This fact has importance in itself, as a new event which enlarges juridical science; but what especially gives strong support to our thesis is the manner in which this event has been appreciated, be it inferentially or explicitly, by several governments, by jurisconsults, and by eminent statesmen whose opinions can be invoked as having authority.

The opinions of jurisconsults and publicists are ranged among the sources of international law.[82]

In the first place, the Governments of Holland and of Spain, who believed themselves most directly affected by the concessions, accorded by the two Sultans of Borneo, did not deny the principle of the capacity of individuals or of associations to have ceded to them rights of sovereignty, but they raised reclamations against these treaties by invoking rights previously acquired.

Let us reproduce here the passage written by M. de Laveleye upon the discussion to which the giving of a charter of incorporation to the British North Borneo Company gave rise in the English Parliament[83]:

“Certain members of the left, adversaries of what is called in England the imperial policy, that is to say of the policy which seeks extension of territory and of influence, criticised the measure because it created a new responsibility for the country; but no one contested the right of individuals or of the company—rights resulting from treaties concluded with indigenous chiefs. In the reply made in the House of Commons by the attorney-general, Sir Henry James, we read:

“‘These rights were conceded to the company and became legally its property. The Government of Her Majesty had no power to enter into a general examination of the propriety of the occupation of Borneo by a commercial company. It would have been an act of confiscation if, after what had happened, the Government had interfered, and had endeavoured to take from it the rights which it had acquired. ... The only thing the Government had to decide was whether or
not it was necessary to leave the company to act without impediment and entirely without control.’

“Mr. Gladstone was not less affirmative. Said he, at the same sitting:

“‘The charter has not conferred upon the company a single privilege above and beyond what it had already acquired by virtue of a title sufficient to enable it to exercise all these powers.’

“From the explanations given by Lord Granville in the House of Lords, the 13th March, 1882, it appears that if Holland and Spain have protested against the rights invoked by the Overbeck-Dent Company, it was because of anterior rights which these states pretend to have over the northern part of Borneo; but, no more than Germany, formally consulted in the matter by the British Government, have they raised any doubt as to the capacity of individuals and companies to obtain from non-civilised sovereigns the cession of rights implying the exercise of sovereignty. This capacity also was not denied by the members on the opposition side of the House of Commons.”

Thus, the opinion of four Governments, the opinion of two English ministers, Lord Granville and Mr. Gladstone, and of the attorney-general, Sir Henry James, that of Sir Travers Twiss, and of M. de Laveleye, to which we would add the considerations developed in the open letter addressed, the 23d April, 1883, by a member of the African International Association to the Courrier des États-Unis, form an assemblage of authorities of a nature to fortify us in our conviction if we had any doubts.

We conclude with these observations:

1. It is evident that if some powers have raised against similar concessions, made by chiefs of savage tribes to individuals and associations, reclamations founded upon rights previously acquired, there would be ground to submit these pretensions to serious examination, or perhaps they might be submitted to arbitration, as Great Britain and Portugal, in 1875, submitted to the arbitration of the President of the French Republic, M. MacMahon, the contest in regard to certain lands situated on the bay of Delagoa.

2. New sovereignties, at the head of which are individuals or associations, the concessionaries of the chiefs of savage tribes, exist of themselves, of their own right and their own strength, without having need of the recognition of other States. (See Klüber, par. 24; Heffter, par. 23, p. 42, and par. 51, p. 104; Bluntschli, pars. 28 and 38; and all the authors.)

It depends upon the convenance of other States to recognise or not to recognise these new sovereignties. But whatever may be their determination in this respect, the want of recognition does not give them the right to act as if these sovereignties did not exist, and to consider their territories susceptible of occupation.

3. According to the practice of international law, at this day, the recognition of one to whom sovereignty has been conceded, as a sovereign, can even follow of itself, in certain cases. Almost all governments, especially Great Britain and the United States of America[84] have adopted the rule of considering de facto governments as legitimate, as far as they themselves are concerned. (See Heffter, pars. 51, 53, pp. 101-105.)

Let us suppose a European nation had concluded a treaty of friendship or commerce with the chief of a savage tribe, inhabiting a fixed territory. This treaty is supposed to be concluded, and is effectively concluded with the State which the chief represents. The chief had ceded his rights of sovereignty to a European individual or a European association, who are put in real possession of the sovereignty. Could the European nation deny the legitimacy of this new Government if it was a government de facto, according to international usages? No. At least, Great Britain and the United States would recognise it, and probably other States also. And if the preceding chief had been displaced by internal revolution—which can break out among blacks as among whites—and if the black chief had ceded his sovereignty to another Negro, a relation or even a stranger to his family, would that be a reason for refusing recognition to the new sovereign? And if the chief of the tribe had ceded his sovereignty to a white man, in place of choosing for his successor a black man, or an association composed of whites, certainly the difference of colour could not be a reason for refusing recognition to the new sovereign.

Thus it is seen that in wandering away from true and simple principles difficulties of every kind are encountered.

Therefore I am of opinion that independent chiefs of savage tribes can validly cede to a private individual the whole or part of their State, with the sovereign rights which belong to them, and conformably to the traditional customs of the country.

Brussels, December 15, 1883.

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED

(Page 68, paragraph 35): A new State has the right to enter into the international association of States, and to be recognised by other powers when its existence cannot be put in doubt and is assured. It has the right because it exists, because international law unites existing States by common laws and principles based upon justice and humanity.

Recognition by other sovereign States is a voluntary act on a part of these latter. It is not, nevertheless, an absolutely arbitrary act, because international law unites, even against their will, diverse existing States, and makes of them a kind of political association.

The opinion is frequently advanced by the older publicists that it depends upon the good pleasure of each State to recognise or not to recognise another, outside of the necessary and absolute line of international law. If this law rested solely upon the arbitrary will of States, it would not be just that it should be simply a conventional law.

(Page 164): A State has evidently the right to constitute itself without the ratification of another State. This would be the case when emigrants, for example, found a State upon an uninhabited island, as did the Norwegians in Iceland in the middle ages. A number of new States of North America were founded by individuals; it was only later that they were recognised by England, and to this day they proceed in the same manner in the United States. If new states can in this way constitute themselves, by still stronger reasoning analogous extensions of territory already existing should be recognised.

ANOTHER MANNER OF ACQUIRING THE SOVEREIGNTY OF A FREE COUNTRY

If free families, scattered over an independent country, unite to form themselves into a nation or a State, they acquire the sovereignty over the whole State which they inhabit, for they possess already the domain; and since they wish to form a political society and to establish a public authority to which all will owe obedience, it is quite manifest that their intention is to confer upon this public authority the right of sovereignty of the whole country.

(Pages 32 and 33): The existence of a state supposes the following conditions, to wit:

I. A society capable of existing by itself and independently.

II. A collective will regularly organised, or a public authority charged with the direction of society for the end which we have just indicated.

III. A permanent status of society, the natural base of a free and permanent development, and which depends essentially on the fixity of the tenure of real estate and the intellectual and moral tendencies of its members.

We regard as idle the questions discussed by the schools, such as, What is the number of persons necessary to form a state? or, If one or three persons are sufficient? The distinctive characteristics of a state which we have just indicated sufficiently answer these questions.

(Page 42): A state exists de facto so soon as it unites the necessary elements indicated above; that is to say, will, united to the indispensable means and strength to defend its independence.

(Page 43): The entry of a new state upon the political scene depends in no wise upon an express preliminary recognition by foreign powers. It is fully accomplished the day when it commences to exist. On the other hand, political reasons alone may decide foreign powers to recognise or enter into direct relations with it. Recognition only confirms what legally exists by admitting the new member into the grand European family.

(From the Commentary upon the Elements of International Law, and History of the Progress of International Law, by William Beach Lawrence.)

(Page 162): It is not necessary that there should be a determined number of persons to form a state.

(Page 197): Texas was recognised by England in 1839, when its population was not more than 60,000 souls. Lord Palmerston said on that occasion to Mr. O’Connell that “the principle of the Government was to recognise every state which had a de facto independence.”

At an adjourned meeting of the Chamber of Commerce, held January 10, 1884, the following resolutions, presented by Mr. A. A. Low, were adopted:

Whereas, the President of the United States has, in his recent message, called attention to the fact that the rich and populous valley of the Congo is now being opened to commerce by the International African Association, and has especially dwelt upon the interest, for the purposes of trade and commerce, that we have, as a people, in the neutrality of that valley, free from the interference or political control of any one nation: Therefore,

Be it resolved, As the opinion of this Chamber that it is incumbent upon the Government of the United States, through its accredited representative, to apprise the Portuguese Government that it will not recognise, but denies the right of the latter to interfere with the free navigation of the Congo; that the discovery of this great waterway into the interior of Central Africa is not due to Portugal, but was the discovery of an explorer in the interest of no one nationality; and that the entry, 400 years ago, into the mouth of the Congo, by the Portuguese, not having been followed up by actual and continued occupation, can give that nation no territorial right to the river, or to the countries upon its banks.

Resolved, That the recognition by the Government of the United States of the flag of the International African Association, now extending over twenty-two settlements, in the heart of Africa, will be but an acknowledgment of the fact that that organisation, under rights ceded to it by African chiefs of independent territories, is exercising rule and authority over a large part of Africa in the protection of life and property, the extinguishment of the slave trade, the facilitating of commercial intercourse, and other attributes of sovereignty; and that it be recommended to the President to send an accredited agent of the Government to the Congo, to confer with that association in the adopting of such measures as may secure to American citizens free commercial intercourse along the course of that river, and through the various settlements or stations established by the association.

A true copy.

Jas. M. Brown,
President.

George Wilson,
Secretary.

(From copy of correspondence of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.)

His Majesty the King of the Belgians has, during the last two years, incurred considerable expense in an expedition to the Upper Congo for the purposes of opening roads, establishing stations for trade, and for communication with the vast tribes inhabiting the interior of Africa. For the result of this expedition merchants are watching with interest, believing that this river will ultimately become one of the great highways for trade in the heart of Africa.

... It is, therefore, both manifest and notorious that the African tribes who inhabit the coast-line claimed by Portugal, between 5° 12´, and 8th degree south latitude, are in reality independent, and that the right acquired by Portugal from priority of discovery at the end of the fifteenth century has for a long time been suffered to lapse, owing to the Portuguese Government not having occupied the country so discovered. In the presence of these facts the undersigned must repeat the declaration of Her Majesty’s Government that the interests of commerce imperatively required it to maintain the right of unrestricted intercourse with that part of the coast of Western Africa extending between 5°, 12´, and the 8th degree of south latitude....

I have the honour to be, my lord, your lordship’s obedient, very humble servant,

John Slagg,
President.

(From Earl Granville’s reply to Lord Mount Temple in the House of Lords, March 9, 1883.)

... The labours of men like Livingstone, Stanley, and others have given us a knowledge of the physical character of Central Africa, and of the populations which inhabit it, showing that there are great capabilities for the development of trade, and of the civilising effects which are the result of commerce. The work of the philanthropic International Association, in which the King of the Belgians takes a great interest, the mission of M. de Brazza, the increasing trade in different degrees, of the English, the Portuguese, the French, the Germans, the Dutch, and the Belgians, on the Congo and its banks, are acting as a stimulus and afford grounds why no reasonable endeavours should be neglected to insure freedom of commerce and navigation, and to anticipate possible jealousies, which so easily check trade, and which, under the pretence of securing peculiar advantages to some, are really injurious to all....