The Swiss Republic

“On the main-land only two little spots at the two extremities of the old Teutonic world came out of the mediæval crucible with their self-government substantially intact. At the mouth of the Rhine, the little Dutch communities were prepared to lead the attack in the terrible battle for freedom with which the drama of modern history was ushered in. In the impregnable mountain fastnesses of upper Germany, the Swiss Cantons had bid defiance alike to Austrian tyrant and to Burgundian invader, and had preserved in its purest form the rustic democracy of their Aryan forefathers. By a curious coincidence, both these free peoples in their efforts towards national unity were led to frame federal unions, and one of these political achievements is from the stand-point of universal history of very great significance.”14 Writers, as a rule, properly consider a federal government, owing to its nice balances in regard to a division of power between the union and the members, and in regard to the conflicting interests of the parts, as a peculiarly delicate and almost unadjustable framework.

“The federative system,” says Guizot, “is one which evidently requires the greatest maturity of reason, of morality, of civilization in the society to which it is applied.” The two poles of a federal government are independent action of the members in certain things, and a central power or government which in certain things is equally independent. The aim is to gain the advantages of the concentrated power of great states, while retaining the advantages of local interest found in small states. On the one hand, each of the members of the union must be wholly independent in those matters which concern each member only. On the other hand, all must be subject to a common power in those matters which concern the whole body of members collectively. Switzerland represents the happy outcome of the first attempt at such a federal union made by men of Teutonic descent. Complete independence in local affairs combined with adequate representation in the Federal Council has effected such an intense cohesion of interests throughout the nation as no centralized government, however cunningly devised, would ever have secured. The constitutional history of the confederation is a study in federalism. First a mere defensive alliance or league;15 then a Staatenbund, or permanent alliance of several small states, to which the term confederacy nearly corresponds; then a Bundesstaat, or an organized state with central legislative, executive, and judicial departments, which answers substantially to the term federation as usually employed, and as realized in the Constitution of 1848, and perfected in that of 1874. The distinction which German publicists have introduced into political science between a Staatenbund and a Bundesstaat, constituting the two chief forms of union between states, is a very valuable one,—the former word denoting a league or confederation of states; the latter, a state formed by means of a league or confederation. In order to know to which of the two classes a given state belongs, we need to inquire only whether the political body in question has the essential qualities of a state or not. Confederation and federation; both are composite political bodies, and in so far different from mere alliances which form no new state. Staatenbund, or confederation, is rather a conglomeration of states than a real state; it retains the character of a contractual combination of states. Bundesstaat, or federation, implies the advance from the incomplete and transitional form to the formation of a collective state or union; it is a more highly developed Staatenbund, the difference is only one of degree in purpose, form, and powers to carry out the national will. A confederation, by joining several states in a political association, presents at least externally the appearance of one state of an international personality; but yet is not organized into one central state distinct from the particular states. The management of the collective state is left either to some particular state as President (Vorort), or to an assembly of delegates and representatives of all the several states. The former was the case with the Greek leagues under the hegemony of Sparta and Athens; the latter with the American Union under the ancient articles of 1778, and the German confederation of 1815. In a federation there are not merely completely organized particular states, each remaining sovereign and independent within the range of such powers as it does not hand over to the federal authority; but there is an independently organized common or central state, that within the range of the powers handed over to it forms a single commonwealth under a government with its own executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The Achæan league was already in some measure such a federal state. This form of state first appears in modern times in the Constitution of the United States adopted in 1787, and subsequently imitated by Switzerland. The Swiss Confederation previous to 1848 joined the members of the league only on such terms and for such purposes as were agreed on, and their common affairs were administered by a federal Diet. Still each Canton remained perfectly independent in all its internal concerns; even keeping the right of separate dealings with foreign governments. There was nothing which could be strictly called a federal government, whose one will makes the constitution, and demands obedience from the minority, even of particular Cantons. The foundation of the Swiss Constitution is the old Swiss league, which lasted from 1291 to 1798. But there had been simply alliances between different Cantons, and no real federal constitution existed. The establishment of the Helvetic Republic, one and indivisible, was the first attempt at a constitution. The representative democracy of the United States found a soil ready prepared for it in Switzerland, to which it was transplanted by French intervention. The constitution unitaire was imposed on Switzerland most tyrannically, but it was not in itself a bad one. Under what may be called the French readjustment of Switzerland, constitutions rose and fell and succeeded each other in rapid rotation from 1798 to 1803. First appears a project of the Constitution of March, 1798; by this a single centralized state was substituted for the thirteen old Cantons. It served with modifications as the groundwork of another sketched in April of the same year. This latter was prevented by the outbreak of war between France and Austria in 1799 from taking root. Another Constitution of May, 1801, approved by Bonaparte, then First Consul, was acceptable to few in its political and territorial arrangements. The Cantons became mere divisions, like counties or departments. One of its earliest provisions abolishes the ancient democracies of the Forest Cantons. The traditions of independence in these older Cantons, and the elements of internal opposition, were too strong to admit of submission. The inhabitants of these sequestered regions, communicating little with the rest of the world, ardently attached to their liberties, inheriting all the dauntless intrepidity of their forefathers, clearly perceived that, in the wreck of all their ancient institutions, the independence of their country could not long be maintained. They saw that the insidious promises of the French envoys had terminated only in ruinous exaction and tyrannical rule. Animated by these feelings, “We have lived,” said they, “for several centuries under a republic based on liberty and equality; possessing no other goods in the world but our religion and our independence; no other riches but our herds; our first duty is to defend them.” This attempt to form the whole of Switzerland into a united representative system could not be permanent, and was soon dissolved. Other constitutions followed in October, 1801, February, 1802, and July, 1802. Then February 2, 1803, came, under the so-called Act of Mediation, a moderately centralized federal government granted by Napoleon. Old family and civic privileges were annulled; all Swiss were made equal in the eye of the law, and vassalage was altogether abolished, and free right of settlement in any part of Switzerland assured to all. All alliances of one Canton with another, or with a foreign state, were interdicted. This was stipulated in consequence of an improper alliance in 1442 by Zurich with the House of Austria. It was ordained that each Canton should send one deputy to the general Diet; that they should have definite instructions and powers of attorney, and should not vote against their instructions. The functions of the Diet were declared to be: 1. To proclaim war or peace, and conclude foreign alliances, which required the consent of three-fourths of the Diet. 2. To fix regulations for foreign commerce, capitulations in foreign service, and the recruiting of soldiers. 3. To levy the contingent, appoint commanders of the armed forces, and the foreign ambassadors. 4. To adopt measures of external utility and settle disputes between one Canton and another. The act concluded in these terms: “The present act, the result of long conference with enlightened persons, appears to us the best that could be devised for the constitution and happiness of the Swiss. As soon as it is carried into execution the French troops shall withdraw. We recognize Helvetia as organized by this act as an independent power, and guarantee the Federal constitution, and that of each Canton in particular, against the enemies of the tranquillity of the state.” This act for the remainder of Napoleon’s reign settled the condition of the Helvetic Confederacy; and although it was peaceful and prosperous, the Act of Mediation was felt to be the work of a foreigner and master, and it fell with the extinction of his power. Here French readjustments came to an end, and after the Congress of Vienna, March, 1815, guaranteed the neutrality of Switzerland, there followed in November of the same year the Federal Pact. This was a looser confederation, and in many respects a return to the state of things previous to the French Revolution, and restored to the Cantons a large portion of their former sovereignty. There continued to be a Tagsatzung, or Diet for general affairs, consisting of “ambassadors from the sovereign estates,” meaning the Cantons, each Canton still having only one voice, and three-fourths of the votes being necessary for war or peace and treaties with foreign powers; but in other matters of business an absolute majority decides. It fixes the rate of troops and taxes for federal purposes; gives every Canton the right to demand defence against internal and external force; provides for the settlement of disputes between the Cantons; puts an end to all dependent territory and exclusive possession of rights by a class of citizens; and continues the old plan of having a Vorort. Military capitulations and conventions concerning affairs of police or public economy may be made by single Cantons, provided they oppose no federal principles, nor existing league, nor cantonal rights. Ambassadors from the league may be sent to foreign powers when their appointment is thought necessary. In extraordinary cases the Vorort may be invested with especial powers, and a committee can be appointed, composed of the officer of the Vorort, who is intrusted with the management of the federal affairs in conjunction with other representatives of the Confederation. This representative committee is chosen by six circles of Cantons each in turn. The Diet gives the requisite instructions to these federal representatives, and fixes the duration of their duties, which cease, of course, when there is a new Diet. When this assembly is not in session, the Vorort has the charge of federal affairs within the limits existing before 1798. Cloisters and chapters are allowed to continue, but are subject to taxation like private property; and the Helvetic national debt is acknowledged. The Federal Pact became unpopular not merely from its own intrinsic defects and ambiguities, but also from the time and circumstances of its origin. It was a reactionary instrument, bringing back the yoke of the patrician families and the extreme Ultramontane party. The central authority of the Confederation was wreak. It had no powers, either legislative, executive, or administrative, binding upon the several Cantons; no provision for the repression of wars between rival Cantons, nor for the proper restraint of separate alliances with foreign powers which endangered the peace, if not the independence, of the federal state; no federal army, no public treasury, no national mint, no common judiciary, nor any other common marks of sovereignty. The Diet assembled for little more than deliberation, all matters of importance being referred to the determination of the Cantons. National affairs were discussed in general Diets, as in fact they had been from the beginning, but they were Diets which lacked the very essentials of republican government, majority rule, and power of execution. They depended more upon moral authority than legal powers, persuading where they could not command obedience. The difficulties of a union so obviously imperfect and narrow were greatly increased by the Reformation, which alienated the Catholic and Protestant Cantons, causing political and religious struggles that culminated in civil war. There is then a constitutional rest until the next great revolutionary storm, which swept over so many countries of Europe in 1848, when a new constitution, modelled in many respects after that of the United States, was adopted, and superseded the Federal Pact. It changed the federal union of states into a federal republic; a transition from a Staatenbund to a Bundesstaat. The stage of confederation was passed over and the higher state of federation reached; an organized nation, and at the same time the peoples of the particular Cantons also possessing organic unity; a Swiss nation, and yet a Bernese and Genevese people. The Constitution of 1848 was the first which was entirely the work of the Swiss without any foreign influence. For the revolution of 1848, which paralyzed Austria, Rome, and Germany, enabled the Swiss to reassume in full the reins of self-government. Two legislative chambers were for the first time created, and invested with the power of enacting laws and issuing orders which are binding directly on individual citizens. This most important and far-reaching principle, that the Federal head should operate directly on individuals and not on states, involved momentous consequences, forcing the construction of a “Composite State.” The joint action of the two chambers, constituting the Bundesversammlung, or Federal Assembly, became a substantive part of the government of every Canton; and, within the limits of its attributions, made laws which are obeyed by every citizen, and executing them through its own officers, and enforcing them by its own tribunal; powers essential for an effective federal government. The old Diets never ventured on any undertaking of public utility, amelioration, or reform, during more than three hundred years. The Confederation was loose and incomplete even for its essential objects, mutual defence and foreign relations. The principal objects of this new constitution were:

1. The strengthening of the national government, reconciling the supremacy of the Confederation with the autonomy of the Cantons.

2. The overthrow of oligarchies.

3. The protection of the state from the dominion of Rome.

The first two were attained by the direct provisions of the Constitution; the third was afterwards promoted by the expulsion of the Jesuits and their affiliated societies from Swiss territory. A great benefit was conferred upon the Confederation by the unification of such matters as coinage, weight, measures, and posts; and the surrender by the Cantons to the Confederation of the exclusive right to levy duties at the frontiers of the country. For twenty-four years Switzerland enjoyed under this Constitution uninterrupted peace and prosperity; the European wars between 1855 and 1871 did not disturb her neutrality, though military operations offered great temptation to march across her territory. In 1872 a project of amendment was submitted conferring upon the general government many additional powers. By a small popular and a large cantonal majority it was defeated. The agitation for amendment continued, and in 1874 a more moderate revision of the Constitution of 1848 was again presented. This remodelling in 1874 did little more than work out in a complete and logical form the principles laid down in 1848; the most marked difference being a further enlargement of the Federal authority; forming a well compacted union, a Federal state, each portion of which has its sphere of sovereignty. This revised Constitution received the sanction of the Federal Assembly, January 31, 1874, was submitted to the popular vote on Sunday, April 19, following, resulting in a vote of 340,199 in favor of, and 198,013 against, acceptance. The vote by Cantons was fourteen and a half Cantons for, and seven and a half Cantons against, acceptance (the votes of the half-Cantons being counted each as a half vote). The Cantons voting against the adoption of the Constitution were Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden (the original three), Luzern, Zug, Freiburg, Valais, and Appenzell (Inner). A decree of the Federal Assembly, May 28, 1874, after setting forth that the revised Federal Constitution had received both a majority of all the votes cast and the approval of a majority of all the Cantons, says, “That it is, therefore, hereby solemnly declared in effect, bearing date of May 29, 1874.” The Federal Council, on May 30, 1874, ordered the above decree, together with the Constitution, to be enrolled in the official collection of statutes of the Confederation, and the decree to be transmitted to the governments of the Cantons, to be published by them through posting up in public places. The Federal system thus established has many features which are strikingly like, as well as many which are almost as strikingly unlike, those in the system of the United States. The preamble, and Articles I. and II. of the Constitution, point out the aim and lay down the fundamental idea of the Confederation.

The Constitution is divided into three chapters, embracing, respectively, seventy, forty-seven, and four articles, numbered consecutively throughout the whole. The chapters have subdivisions, with descriptive titles to the general heads.

The first chapter is titled General Provisions, and covers a wide field.

A literal transcript of the most important provisions of this chapter will be given.

The second chapter embraces the Federal Authorities:

These are three in number:

The third chapter directs the method by which the Constitution can be amended.

The Constitution closes with five articles, styled Temporary Provisions:

There have been three amendments to the Constitution from the date of its adoption in 1874 to 1889 inclusive:

All amendments to the Swiss Constitution are incorporated in their logical place in the text immediately upon their adoption.

Much legislation called for by the mandatory provisions of the Constitution, and suggested by the discretionary powers vested in the Confederation, has passed into Federal statutory enactments. A few may be mentioned. An elaborate law as to military service, tax for exemption therefrom, and pensions; statutes regulating labor in factories, containing a wide range of provisions for the health and safety of employés; the practice of the professions of medicine and dentistry; the construction and management of railroads; the protection of literary and artistic property and patents; hunting and fishing; the control of forests, dikes, and water-courses in the mountainous regions; the election of members of the Federal Assembly and organization of the Federal Tribunal; the method of taking the Referendum; rights of citizenship and expatriation; banking and bankruptcy; emigration and immigration. There are very comprehensive laws also as to “civil capacity and obligations” and “marriage and divorce.” The Federal law on “civil capacity and obligation” comprises more than nine hundred articles, and deals with every imaginable kind of contract except that relating to the acquisition and transfer of the ownership of land; this forming part of the independent legislation of the several Cantons. The law of “marriage and divorce” includes registration of births and deaths, and presents a law which is a carefully-prepared, scientific whole. The legal age of marriage; degrees of consanguineous or other relationship; consent of parents; rules for notice of intention; provision for verifying the facts alleged; certification both of the fact and means of the dissolution of a previous marriage, whether by death or divorce; strict requirements for publication of the banns; restrictions as to locality within which the marriage must occur; civil marriage made obligatory; and details of the conditions under which marriages may be declared void and divorces granted; these constitute some of the main features of the law.

The Constitution, with the evolution through Federal laws made necessary by it, contains much detail, showing the mind of the German race therein. It is not confined to an enunciation of general principles, but determines specifically and at length, with some confusion of repetition and at times distressing prolixity, many things which, under a general provision, might have been clearly interpreted to belong, as the case might be, to either the Federal or Cantonal authority. It contains a large number of articles which have no reference to the distribution or exercise of sovereign power, but which embody general maxims of policy or special provisions as to matters of detail, to which the Swiss attach great importance, and which therefore they do not wish to be easily alterable. It goes far beyond that of the United States in inscribing among constitutional articles either principles or petty rules which are supposed to have a claim of legal sanctity. It gives to the Federal authorities power and supervision over a variety of special interests; a system that may work well in a small country, but not in one so large as the United States, with such diversified and local aspects. For these reasons the text of the Swiss Constitution is not so brief,27 nor its language so terse, as that of the United States, which a famous English statesman has called, “The most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man.” The Swiss Constitution leaves little room for contention in the construction of its phraseology, meaning the same thing to-day, to-morrow, and forever. Its written provisions, stipulations, and guarantees leave little room for the exercise of “doubtful powers.” With such a mass of detail, the Confederation is not competent to act directly; the execution of much is left to the Cantons acting under the supervision of the Federal authorities, which only interfere where the former neglect or refuse to fulfil their obligation.

The repeated and remarkable stipulations of the Constitution, reaching almost every conceivable exercise of religious action and freedom, present one of its most marked characteristics and radical departures from that of the United States. The latter contains only two allusions to the subject. The first in Article VI.: “No religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States.” The second in the first amendment: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Previous to the Swiss Constitution of 1874 there was no mention of individual religious liberty. That of 1848 guaranteed the free exercise of divine worship to the recognized confessions, the Roman Catholic and the Reformed (i.e., the Church Reformed by Zwingli and Calvin), but forbade the order of Jesuits. It is manifest that the framers of the Constitution of 1874 were resolved to effectually suppress the further exercise of the ecclesiastical narrowness and sectarian antagonism which, as late as the Sonderbund War of 1847, disturbed the peace and threatened the stability of the Confederation. The extreme rigor with which these provisions of the Constitution are enforced, and the latitude of action given under them to Cantonal authority, do appear at times to be strained to an extent deaf to both humanity and common sense. In 1888, “Captain Stirling,” of the Salvation Army, a subject of Great Britain, was sentenced in the Canton of Vaud to one hundred days’ imprisonment in Chillon Castle for attempting to proselyte some children. The appeal made in her behalf to the Federal Council was refused, and she was compelled to complete the term of her sentence. Surely no danger was threatened that might not have been averted by her removal to the frontier, or the offence atoned for by a slight fine. The case presented an appeal to that unknown quantity, the Swiss sense of the ridiculous. The sanctity of the law is all very well; but when the law is one against persons who sing hymns to children in the street, and its terrors are those of Bonnivard’s prison, the plot of the drama seems hardly equal to the majesty of the scene. To put a young lady, for so trivial an offence, under triple bolts and bars for months is a piling up of the agony which indicates a singular weakness of dramatic resource. Perhaps the military style of the movements in these days of alarming concentrations on Continental frontiers may have invested the “colonels” and “captains” in the Salvationist train, even of the gentler sex, with undue importance and alarm. It is difficult to reconcile Federal and Cantonal action in Switzerland in this and other instances with the spirit of the inviolability of freedom of faith and conscience guaranteed by the Constitution. Religious liberty encounters no little restriction and abridgment in several of the Cantons. Each Canton has still its own established Church, supported and ruled by the civil magistrate. In recent times free churches have been founded in Geneva, Neuchâtel, and Vaud, and are showing a high degree of spiritual vitality and liberality. It would be better if it could work out an entire dissolution of the connection between Church and State throughout the Confederation, and religion be allowed to take its natural course.

The Constitution of Switzerland is a conscious and sagacious reproduction of the Constitution of the United States, with noteworthy variations called for by the different conditions of the two commonwealths. The Government of the United States is one of limited and enumerated powers; “the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” The restrictions under the Swiss Constitution apply mostly to the Cantons. In Switzerland, as in the United States, there is no single determinate sovereign body or assembly, or any real sovereign other than the people themselves. In the Swiss Confederation the popular will does everything; the legislative power being directly exercised by the body of the people by way of Referendums. In the Republic of France the tendency is to centralize the direction of public affairs almost entirely in the Chamber of Deputies. In the United States it is claimed, with some color of truth, that the initiative and legislation are being gradually taken away from Congress by a very occult, but authoritative, government of committees.

The separation of persons and functions is most complete in the United States; the Constitution enforcing a distribution of powers, and directly or indirectly the powers of every authority existing under it are defined, limited, and carefully regulated. In the Swiss Constitution these respective powers are not at all clearly distinguished; in fact, they seem to have been purposely left indeterminate. There are none of the elaborate checks and interlocking vetoes found in the United States. It is true the Swiss have the three organs,—a Federal Legislature, a Federal Executive, and a Federal Court; but they fail in the strict separation of each of these departments from and its independence of the other. Said John Adams, “Here is a complication and refinement of balances, which for anything I recollect, is an invention of our own and peculiar to us.”

There is also an entire absence from the Swiss Constitution of any provisions touching those personal rights and ancient muniments of liberty designated as the “Bill of Rights;” such as are contained in the first ten amendments of the Constitution of the United States; those fundamental principles that guarantee to the individual a sphere of liberty upon which the government may not encroach; a branch of constitutional law which it has been the peculiar province of American political science to develop. This omission from the Swiss Constitution may have been for the same reason that it occurred in the original Constitution of the United States; that these rights were sufficiently implied and understood in any system of free government. These cardinal rights are claimed by the Swiss to be expressly provided for in the Cantonal constitutions. Again, it is held that all these inherent and indefeasible rights are amply secured by the article of the Federal Constitution requiring the organic law of the Cantons to “insure the exercise of political rights after republican forms.”

Hamilton met the objection to the Constitution of the United States containing no “Bill of Rights,” in the “Federalist” (No. 84), by saying, “Bills of rights are, in their origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects, abridgments of prerogative in favor of privilege, reservation of rights not surrendered to the prince. It is evident, therefore, that, according to their primitive signification, they have no application to constitutions professedly founded upon the power of the people, and executed by their immediate representatives and servants. Here in strictness the people surrender nothing; and as they retain everything they have no need of particular reservations.” But Jefferson expressed the prevalent opinion when he wrote, “The executive in our governments is not the sole, it is scarcely the principal, object of my jealousy. The tyranny of the legislatures is the most formidable dread at present, and will be for many years.” These restraints upon legislative power have proven most fortunate ones in the United States; for the provision, “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,” together with those provisions which forbid the taking of private property for public use without just compensation, and the enactment of laws impairing the obligation of contracts, lies at the foundation of all constitutional protection of private rights in the citizen. Thus a body of constitutional law has been formed which is not yet completely crystallized, but is being daily shaped by the decisions of the courts. In annexing the “Bill of Rights,” the founders of the government may not have had a correct idea as to what would be the full effect of its provisions, but the object they had in view was perfectly clear. They believed that wherever power was placed, it was liable to be abused. They intended to restrain the impulse of popular majorities, and more especially to prevent the legislature from becoming despotic and tyrannous. But the number of rights which can be effectually protected by the Constitution is very limited; and the legislature must always retain sufficient power to disturb seriously all social relations, if it is determined to make use for this purpose of the means at its command. The utmost that a constitution can be expected to do is to protect directly a small number of vested rights, and to discourage and check indirectly the growth of a demand for radical measures.

The power of the general government in Switzerland, as that of the United States, extends not merely to those affairs which are turned over to it by the exact words of the Constitution itself, but also to the relations whose control by the central government appears as a necessity for its performance of the duties devolving upon it. In a comparison of the Swiss Federal polity with that of the United States, it must be borne in mind that the infinite variety in the local and otherwise peculiar circumstances of different nations, produces wide discrepancies between governments bearing a common appellation. There exists, indeed, but little community of opinion or uniformity of practice beyond the circumscribed limits of those maxims in politics which are deducible by direct inference from moral truths. The great mass of those rules and principles which have a more immediate influence on practice, and give to government its tone and peculiar organization, are of a description purely local; deriving their force from local interests, and therefore, however just, are only applicable in their full extent to the particular case. Hence it is that constitutions, nominally and externally the same, have little or no interior resemblance, and in many instances only so far correspond as to justify us in referring them to one common standard. The United States and Switzerland have republican states joined in a republican union, with a division of powers between states and union approximately the same; and they present the most completely developed types of that federalism “which desires union and does not desire unity;” the same problem upon which all civilized peoples have been working ever since civilization began,—how to insure peaceful concerted action throughout the whole, without infringing upon local and individual freedom in the parts; to reconcile the welfare and security of the whole with the local claims and diversified institutions of the component parts. The Swiss Constitution blends these ends harmoniously in a government not too centralized to act in the interest of the localities; but a little too closely wedded to routine to adapt itself to changing conditions. The federative principle implies the existence of opposing tendencies, active within a superior agency, which is capable of regulating their mutual aggression, and of securing their harmony. Over the two historical forces, Nationalism and Localism, the federative principle asserts its supremacy, and gives them simultaneous, correlated, and adequate expression. Under confederation, both Nationalism and Localism by different processes increase each its original determinative strength; and the danger arises that either alone might force a union of but partial means and incapable of the highest end. The federative principle by its own creative energy chooses the time and method of its complete self-assertion, and brings its factors to the work of “forming the more perfect union.” Thus Nationalism and Localism, though their methods are in constant warfare, their aim is one,—the good of the individual, who in his dual relation is an epitome of the controlling principle. A complete harmony of the two elements of the federative principle can never be realized; but the tendency is ever towards harmony, thus placing before our hopes an ideal state. In constructing his ideal republic, Plato rejects discordant powers and forces which would bring false harmony, and leaves but two essential elements: “These two harmonies I ask you to leave,—the strain of necessity and the strain of freedom, the strain of courage and the strain of temperance.” In a republic, national will and local self-rule—the one federative principle—constitute true harmony.28

The question of government is a question of the application of means to an end; that end being, in general terms, the happiness and prosperity of the people. Government considered as comprehending those laws and principles which regulate the conduct of the individual in his relative capacity to the state, being continually present to his mind, must invariably influence his habits of thinking and acting. The genius of the organic law, the Constitution, is transfused into the national mind, and in the character of the citizens we recognize the congenial spirit of the laws.

The history of the Swiss Constitution is the history of a confederation of free Cantons, uniting city and rural communities in a common league; providing at once for separate autonomies, and for confederate union and government; insuring mutual protection and a national policy. It represents a wise and politic union; a union constituting an honorable European state in the full enjoyment of its ancient franchises; a union of strength and national life and enduring liberty. Times and circumstances taught their own lesson; civil and religious establishments were imperfectly produced, roughly moulded, and slowly improved, but they were adequate to dispense the blessings of a free government to a brave and artless people, in a state of great comparative independence and honor, security and happiness.

A constitution is valuable in proportion as it is suited to the circumstances, desires, and aspirations of the people, and as it contains within itself the elements of stability and security against disorder and revolution. Measured by this standard, the Swiss Constitution is an excellent adaptation to the conditions of a most varied and composite nationality. With a strong paternal tendency, the Constitution takes cognizance of the citizen at his birth by registration, and guarding him through life with legislative scrutiny, vigilant and minute, it insures him a “decent burial.” Yet this searching, far-reaching, central authority is administered in a beneficent and patriotic spirit, with a jealous regard for all the highest natural rights of man.

Federalism tends to conservatism; it is almost certain to impress on the minds of citizens the idea that any provision included in the organic law is immutable and, so to speak, sacred. History shows that those states have been most stable and prosperous which, in casting off an old allegiance or in ordering their political constitutions afresh, made no more changes than were absolutely needful, and did not violently snap the tie between the old and the new state of things; that the best form of government will commonly be that which the events of its history have given it,—a government which has arisen out of the events and necessities of the country. Switzerland and the United States are examples of commonwealths whose success has been largely owing to the comparatively small amount of change which accompanied their acquisition of independence. Each has that form of government which the events of its history have made natural for it. In each the existing political system is founded on the practical needs of the time and place. Referring to the preamble of the Declaration of Rights, wherein the prayer is made, “That it may be declared and enacted that all and singular the rights and liberties asserted and declared, are the true ancient and indubitable rights and liberties of the people of this kingdom,” Burke says, “By adhering in this manner to our forefathers, we are guided, not by the superstition of antiquarians, but the spirit of philosophic analogy. In this choice of inheritance we have given to our frame of policy the image of a relation in blood, binding up the constitution of our country with our dearest domestic ties, adopting our fundamental laws into the bosom of our family affections; keeping inseparable, and cherishing with the warmth of all their combined and mutually reflected charities, our state, our hearths, our sepulchres, and our altars.” Switzerland and the United States in their organic law and its application, while presenting many and essential differences, constitute the only two genuine and thorough republics in existence; and each system better suits the position of the nation which has adopted it. Switzerland, though beyond all others a regenerate nation, was still an old nation; above all things a system was needed which should preserve everything and jeopardize nothing. She seized on a rare and happy moment, when all the despots of Europe had enough to do at home, to reform her constitution without foreign intermeddling; and she formed a system which exactly suits the position of a small, free, conservative power, ready as ever to defend its own, but neither capable nor desirous of aggrandizement at the expense of others. The Swiss have a way of keeping their current history to themselves; or the outside world has a way of not asking for it, which is much the same thing. They are unique among civilized people for the extreme modesty of their claim upon the attention of mankind. This might imply the highest qualities or the lowest; but no one who knows anything of the little republic will doubt to which of them it is to be assigned. She lives, moves, and works without fuss or friction; and is constantly solving in her own way some of the hardest problems of politics. She has found out how to maintain perfect peace between diverse races and conflicting creeds; to adjust and harmonize discordant views and principles; and preserve to the several elements of the confederacy a due proportion of constitutional authority. This difficult task has been accomplished, not indeed without frictions, not without armed collisions, and not until after many trials and experiments; but it has been done, and on the whole successfully.

Nothing is so easy as to find fault in every form of government, and nothing so hard as to show a perfect one reduced to practice. Most of the plans of government seem to have been formed like houses built at several times; for as the old parts of them always deface the new and render them irregular, so upon the establishment of any new frame something of the old is still preserved and enters into the frame of the new, which is not of a piece with it, and consequently spoils its symmetry. No one can look closely into the Constitution of Switzerland and fail to discover that, in its provisions, the principles of a democratic confederation find the elements of sound and vigorous health.

Enlightened freedom, governed and secured by law, upholds the fabric of the Constitution; salubrious streams issuing from education and patriotism, consecrated by religion, mingle with each other, and unite in diffusing fertility through every channel of the state. The everlasting league still lives on, to shame the novel and momentary devices of the kingdoms and commonwealths which rise and fall around it.29