The Swiss Republic

Bundesversammlung; Assemblée fédérale.

“A legislative, and an executive, and a judicial power comprehend the whole of what is meant by government.”30 We find in Switzerland this general division of powers, with many interesting and instructive peculiarities, which give the Swiss federalism an individual character.

The need for two chambers in a federal state has become an axiom of political science. Where there is a twofold sovereignty, that of the whole nation, and that of the states or Cantons, which are joined together to form it, each sovereignty must be represented in the legislature. With the two chambers, one representing the people as a whole, the other the integral parts as constituent members of the whole, each element is a check upon the other by the coexistence of equal authority. By the Constitution of 1874, “With reservation of the rights of the people and of the Cantons the supreme authority of the Swiss Confederation is exercised by the Federal Assembly, which consists of two sections or councils, to wit:

“1. The National Council (Nationalrath; Conseil National).

2. The Council of States (Ständerath; Conseil des États).”

Relating to the National Council, the Constitution has eight articles, viz.:

1. The National Council is composed of representatives of the Swiss people, chosen in the ratio of one member for each twenty thousand persons of the total population. Fractions of upward of ten thousand persons are reckoned as twenty thousand. Every Canton, and in the divided Cantons every half-Canton, chooses at least one representative.

2. The elections for the National Council are direct. They are held in federal electoral districts, which in no case shall be formed out of parts of different Cantons.

3. Every male Swiss who has completed twenty years of age, and who in addition is not excluded from the rights of active citizenship by the legislation of the Canton in which he is domiciled, has the right to take part in elections and popular votes. Nevertheless, the Confederation by law may establish uniform regulations for the exercise of such right.

4. Every lay Swiss citizen who has the right to vote is eligible as member of the National Council.

5. The National Council is elected for three years, and entirely renewed at each general election.

6. Members of the Council of States, or of the Federal Council, or officials appointed by the latter, shall not at the same time be members of the National Council.

7. The National Council chooses from among its members, for each regular or extraordinary session, a President and a Vice-President. A member who has held the office of President during the regular session is not eligible either for President or Vice-President of the next regular session. The same member may not be Vice-President for two consecutive regular sessions. The President shall have the casting vote in case of a tie; in elections, he votes in the same manner as any other member.

8. The members of the National Council receive a compensation from the federal treasury.

The qualification of the elector, as above described, is that of being in the enjoyment of the “active right of citizenship,”—i.e., not excluded from the rights of a voter by the legislation of his Canton. This also applies to those who have been deprived of their civic rights by virtue of the penal law, and in consequence of a judicial sentence; and in some Cantons embraces insolvents and paupers. The limitation of eligibility to “lay” Swiss citizens does not necessarily exclude ecclesiastics, as illustrated in a recent case of a Bernese clergyman, who, being chosen a member of the National Council, simply laid aside temporarily, by resignation, his clerical robes; should he fail any time of re-election he may return to the pulpit. Naturalized citizens are not eligible until five years after they have become citizens. The provision forbidding a member to hold the office of President for two consecutive ordinary sessions makes it possible, during the life of a National Council, for one-fourth of the Cantons (even counting the half-Cantons) to be honored with this officer; and certainly gives but little opportunity for the building up of a one-man power, just this side of absolute. The power of the presiding officer of the National Council is too insignificant to justify any parallel with that of the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives. A federal law regulates in a uniform manner, and by ballot, the election for members of the National Council; the execution of the law is entirely under the direction of the Canton, and in immaterial details there is a great diversity. There are registers in each Commune, in which every citizen having a vote must be inscribed. These registers are open two weeks before the day of the election, and close three days previous to it. In some Cantons, a card from the Commune where the voter is registered is left at his house; in others, he must present himself at the proper office and obtain his card. The election takes place on the last Sunday in October triennially. The polls generally are in the churches, and no one is permitted to enter except upon the presentation of the requisite proof as to his right to vote. Candidates must be elected by an absolute majority of the votes cast. Should there be a failure of election, a second ballot under the same conditions is had the following Sunday. If a third ballot becomes necessary, the election is again repeated the next Sunday, when the scrutin de liste is restricted to a number not exceeding three times the number of members to be chosen; and these must be taken in order from those receiving the largest vote in the previous tours de scrutin. In this final trial the candidate or candidates, as the case may be, having a plurality are elected. The members are elected on a general ticket,—that is, “at large” for the district, not for the Canton. These districts are called arrondissements, and the method of voting is known as scrutin d’arrondissement.

The National Council at present consists of one hundred and forty-five members, apportioned among forty-nine electoral districts. The number returned from these districts varies from one to five members each. The Cantons of Uri and Zug, and the half-Cantons of Obwald, Nidwald, and Inner-Rhoden compose only one district each. Bern has six districts and twenty-seven members; Zurich, four districts and sixteen members. Every elector is entitled to vote for as many members as his district is entitled to, but not cumulatively. A federal census for the apportionment of representation is taken every ten years. Members receive a compensation of twenty francs per day (about $3⁸⁶⁄₁₀₀) when the National Council is in session,31 and a travelling allowance of twenty centimes per kilometre (a fraction under .03 per mile). A member loses his per diem if he does not answer the roll-call at the opening of the day’s session, unless he should appear later and give to the secretary a sufficient excuse for his dilatoriness. If subsequently, during that day’s session, there is a vote by roll-call (appel nominal), or if there is a count of the House to ascertain the presence of a quorum, the compensation of the members whose absence is disclosed is forfeited for that day. This law is not a “dead letter,” but is strictly enforced, and with a frugal-minded people tends to keep the members in their seats.

The Council of States (Ständerath; Conseil des États).

The space devoted to the Council of States in the Constitution is one-half of that given to the National Council, and is comprised within four articles:

1. The Council of States consists of forty-four representatives of the Cantons. Each Canton elects two representatives, and in the divided Cantons, each half-Canton elects one.

2. No member of the National Council or of the Federal Council may be at the same time a member of the Council of States.

3. The Council of States elects from among its members a President and Vice-President for each regular and extraordinary session. From among the representatives of that Canton from which a President has been elected for a regular session, neither the President nor Vice-President can be taken for the next following regular session. Representatives of the same Canton cannot occupy the position of Vice-President during two consecutive regular sessions. When the votes are equally divided, the President has a casting vote; in elections, he votes in the same manner as the other members.

4. Members of the Council of States receive compensation from their respective Cantons.

The constitution of the two Houses is manifestly borrowed from the model of the United States; but it is apparent that the Council of States does not so closely correspond with the Senate of the United States as the National Council does to the House of Representatives. It has no such clearly-defined character as the Senate in distinctively representing the federal feature of the union between the Cantons. For the mode in which its members shall be elected, the qualifications which they shall possess, the length of time which they shall serve, the salary which they shall receive, and the relations they shall bear to those whom they represent, in fact, every element of their character as representatives is left to the Canton, and a great variety of provisions prevail.32 The small Cantons in which the people assemble annually (Landsgemeinde) have their members elected by this assembly, by the raising up of hands for such or such a candidate. In other Cantons, including Zurich, Thurgau, and Basel-rural, the whole Canton forms but one district for the nomination of the members; the votes are deposited in the ballot-box of the Commune, and are collected and counted by a cantonal board. In the Cantons having the representative system, such as Geneva, Freiburg, Ticino, and Bern, they are chosen by the cantonal legislative body. The terms of the members vary from one to three years; twelve Cantons elect for one year, twelve for three years, with Valais holding to the mean of two years. Their compensation, paid by the Canton, is the same as that received by the members of the National Council, with the exception of Geneva, where it is double the amount, or forty francs. When serving on committees during recess, the members of the Council of States are paid by the Confederation. The Vice-Chancellor serves as Secretary of the Council of States.

The Council of States has no special executive powers apart from the National Council like the United States Senate; which in some respect give that body a further strength and dignity of its own. The Swiss Senate rests solely on its general position as one necessary element of the federal system. The two branches of the Assembly are co-ordinate, standing in all respects on an equal footing. The work of each session, so far as known at its opening, is divided between the two Houses by a conference of their Presidents. The right of initiative belongs to each House, and to each member of the Assembly. There may be a shade of superior consequence and dignity attaching to the National Council. It is designated first in order by the Constitution, it has a fixed term of service, and when the two Houses are in joint session, the President of the National Council takes the chair. In the National Council are to be found the more ambitious and active men in political life, for the members of the Federal Council are sure to be chosen from this body. The members of both Houses equally enjoy the usual privileges and immunities of members of representative bodies. The two Houses act separately in all strictly legislative matters; coming together for deliberation in common only for the exercise of certain electoral and judicial functions.

The powers of the Federal Assembly are thus set forth in the Constitution

1. The National Council and the Council of States have jurisdiction over all subjects which the present constitution places within the competence of the Confederation, and which are not assigned to other federal authorities.

2. The subjects which fall within the competence of the two Councils are particularly the following:

Laws pertaining to the organization and election of federal authorities.

Laws and ordinances on subjects intrusted by the Federal Constitution to the Confederation.

The salary and compensation of members of the federal governing bodies, and of the Federal Chancellery; the establishment of federal offices, and determination of their salaries.

The election of the Federal Council, of the Federal Tribunal, of the Federal Chancellor, and of the General of the Federal Army.33

Alliances and treaties with foreign countries, and the approval of treaties made by the Cantons between themselves or with foreign powers; such cantonal treaties shall, however, not be submitted to the Federal Assembly, unless objection be raised to them by the Federal Council or by another Canton.

Measures for external safety; for the maintenance of the independence and neutrality of Switzerland; the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace.

The guarantee of the constitutions and the territory of the Cantons; intervention in consequence of such guarantee; measures for the internal safety of Switzerland, for the maintenance of peace and order; amnesty and pardon.34

Measures for securing observance of the Federal constitution; for carrying out the guarantee of the Cantonal constitutions, and for the fulfilment of federal obligations.

The power of controlling the federal army.

The determination of the yearly budget, the audit of public accounts, and federal ordinances authorizing loans.

General supervision of the federal administration and of federal courts; appeals from the decisions of the Federal Council upon administrative conflicts of jurisdiction between federal authorities.

Revision of the Federal constitution.

3. Both Councils shall assemble once each year in regular session, on a day to be fixed by the standing orders.35 They may be convened in extra session by the Federal Council, or on demand of one-fourth of the members of the National Council, or of five Cantons.

4. In either Council a quorum is a majority of the total number of its members.

5. In the National Council and in the Council of States, a majority of those voting shall decide the question.

6. For federal laws, decrees, and resolutions, the consent of both Councils is necessary. Federal laws shall be submitted for acceptance or rejection by the people upon the demand of thirty thousand qualified voters, or of eight Cantons. The same principle applies to federal resolutions, which have a general application, and which are not of an urgent nature.

7. The Confederation shall by law establish the forms and times of popular voting.

8. Members of either Council vote without instructions.

9. The Councils deliberate separately. But in the case of the elections (specified in Section 2), of pardons, or of deciding a conflict of jurisdiction, the two Councils meet in joint session, under the direction of the President of the National Council. Votes shall be decided by simple majority of the members of both Councils, present and voting.

10. Measures may originate in either Council, and may be introduced by any member of each Council.

11. The sittings of both Councils shall, as a rule, be public.

The law-making department in any sovereign state is the repository of most power; consequently the constitution of Switzerland, like that of the United States, after enumerating the powers which shall be exercised by authority of the general government, confers them in terms upon the most immediate representative of the sovereignty. In Switzerland this is the Federal Assembly; in the United States it is Congress. The scope of powers conferred upon the Swiss Federal Assembly enables it to exercise not only legislative, but supervisory, executive, and judicial functions. The separation of its powers from those of the Federal Council and the Federal Tribunal—the executive and judicial departments—is neither clearly set forth nor in practice is it strictly observed. Cases have occurred, the jurisdiction over which being involved in so much doubt, the interested parties, from abundance of caution, submitted their memorials simultaneously to two of these federal departments. The Swiss Federal Assembly exercises a power more comprehensive and greater than that given probably to any legislative body; at least in a republic, where there is a professed organic distribution of the three great heads. It elects the Federal Executive, Federal Judiciary, and the Commander of the Army. It is the final arbiter on all questions as to the respective jurisdiction of the Executive and the Federal Court. It would appear that there is no decision of the Executive which cannot be revised by it. It is the chief power in the land. No veto can intervene nor any judicial power question the constitutionality of its statutes. Its acts form the law which the court must execute. The Swiss people, as it were, speak in each legislative enactment; and the only check or revision to which it is amenable rests with the people themselves by means of the Referendum. The authority of the Swiss Assembly, it is true, exceeds that of the Congress of the United States, and yet it may be regarded as a weaker body. For while in each case there lies in the background a legislative sovereign, capable of controlling the action of the ordinary legislature, the sovereign power is far more easily brought into play in Switzerland than in the United States. Again, every ordinary law passed by the Swiss Assembly may be annulled by a popular vote. The freedom from instruction secured to the members of the Federal Assembly was first declared in the Swiss Constitution of 1848. The whole history of the representative principle proves the soundness of the doctrine, that the vesting an entire discretion in the representative is an essential part of the definition. It is not to the power of instructing the representative that constituents are to look for an assurance that his efforts will be faithfully applied to the public service; but it is to the power of reducing him from the elevation to which their suffrages have raised him. The object to be obtained is not to compel the representative to decide agreeably to the opinions of his constituents, for that would be compelling him often to decide against his better judgment; but it is to force him to decide with a single view to the public good. It is by leaving him unshackled with positive instructions, while he is subject to the ultimate tribunal of the opinion of his constituents, that the end in view is to be accomplished of bringing into action, in the proceedings of the legislature, the greatest practicable quantity of intelligence under the guidance of the purest disposition to promote the welfare of the community. The view which Burke takes of the relation between a representative and his constituents is in the main so correct, and is so luminously expressed, that no one can read it without pleasure and instruction. The passage occurs in his celebrated speech at Bristol on the conclusion of the poll. “Certainly, gentlemen,” he says, “it ought to be the happiness and glory of a representative to live in the strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with his constituents. Their wishes ought to have great weight with him; their opinion high respect; their business unremitted attention. It is his duty to sacrifice his repose, his pleasures, his satisfactions to theirs; and above all, ever and in all cases to prefer their interest to his own. But his unbiased opinion, his matured judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of men living. These he does not derive from your pleasure; no, nor from the law and the constitution. They are a trust from Providence, for the abuse of which he is deeply answerable. Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays instead of serving you if he sacrifices it to your opinion.”

Neither the Constitution of the United States, nor that of Switzerland, vests anywhere any power of dissolution of the legislative body. The Swiss Assembly is chosen for a definite time; when that time is up it dissolves by the operation of the law; before that time is up no power can lawfully dissolve it.

Either the National Council or Council of States can recommend to the Federal Council that it shall prepare and present for its consideration certain bills; or a member can suggest one to his own House, and, if agreeable, the matter will be referred to the Federal Council with instruction to draft the necessary bill; or the Federal Council itself presents bills upon its own initiative. The Assembly recommends to the Federal Council by motions, called postulats, such alterations or reform in bills submitted by it as seem to them to be proper. If the Federal Council does not assent to a particular postulat coming from one of the Houses, it makes a report to that effect to the House, and if the latter insists upon its view, then a formal proposition is drawn up, and if carried in both Houses, the Federal Council is bound to execute its provisions. It must be understood that every bill must pass through the hands of the Federal Council, and by it laid before the Assembly. When a bill is presented by the Federal Council, the House, which has first to take it up, appoints a committee to examine and report upon it. These committees or commissions are appointed as the occasion arises,—there being no standing committees,—by the President of the House and the scrutateurs; constituting together what is called a bureau. These scrutateurs, four in the National Council and two in the Council of States, are elected every session from the members of their respective Houses; and it is also their duty to determine and to announce the result, whenever a vote is had, either by ballot, division, or viva voce; they occupy an elevated position to the right of the President. On the submission of a committee’s report, the bill is discussed, and ultimately either passed with or without amendments, or rejected. If passed, it goes to the other House, where a similar process is undergone. When passed by both Houses it becomes law, and is published as such by the Federal Council in the Feuille fédérale Suisse; subject, however, to the Referendum, if duly demanded. The Federal Council, in publishing a law, decree, or resolution not subject to the Referendum, fixes the date when it shall go into force, if this is not done in the text of the bill. Generally, this date is the day of publication. For all measures liable to the Referendum, what is termed délai d’opposition is named, being a period of three months, during which the appeal to the popular vote can be demanded. In case of no appeal being taken, the law goes into force after the expiration of the three months.

The daily sittings of the Assembly open at eight o’clock in the morning during the June session, and nine o’clock during the December session; the adjournments are usually from one to two o’clock P.M. The sessions never extend beyond three weeks. It requires from the federal treasury a small sum to defray the entire annual cost of the Assembly. In the legislative appropriation bill for 1889 the following sums were provided for the compensation of the two Houses of the Assembly: Ständerath, salaries and mileage of committees, 10,000 francs; salary and mileage of translator, 3000 francs; service, 2500 francs; total, 15,500 francs; Nationalrath, salaries and mileage of members and members of committees, 200,000 francs; translator, 3000 francs; service, 3000 francs; total, 206,000 francs. So the entire outlay of the country for its legislative department for the year was 221,500 francs, or about $44,000; one thousand dollars less than is annually paid to nine members of Congress.

One in visiting the chambers of the Assembly is much impressed with the smooth and quiet despatch of business. The members are not seated with any reference to their political affiliations. There are no “filibustering,” no vexatious points of order, no drastic rules of “clôture,” to delay or ruffle the decorum of its proceedings. Interruptions are few, and angry personal bickerings never occur. There are no official stenographers, or verbatim reports made of the proceedings; press reporters represent only the local papers and furnish a very meagre synopsis of the daily business. The small gallery set apart for the public is rarely occupied. “Leave to print” or a written speech memorized and passionately declaimed are unknown; there are none of these extraneous and soliciting conditions to invite “buncombe” speeches or flights of oratory for the press and the gallery. The debates are more in the nature of an informal consultation of business-men about common interests; they talk and vote, and there is an end of it. This easy colloquial disposition of affairs by no means implies any slipshod indifference, or superficial method of legislation. There is no legislative body where important questions are treated in a more fundamental and critical manner. The members of the National Council stand up to speak, while those of the Council of States speak from their seats. The tri-lingual characteristic of the country is carried into the Assembly; and within a brief visit to either House, different members may be heard to speak successively in German, French, and Italian. If the presiding officer of either House is a German and cannot speak French, his remarks are immediately repeated by a French official interpreter who stands at his side; and with a President who is French and cannot speak German the process is reversed. The members from the Italian Cantons, as a rule, understand French or German sufficiently not to require special translation into their tongue. All bills, reports, resolutions, and laws are published in the three languages. The Swiss have been as successful in reconciling the difficulties of diverse dialects in the federal legislature as in the harmonious union of Cantons. It was a serious obstacle in the way of the union, when the legislature of the kingdom of the Netherlands, founded in 1814, had three different languages spoken in its Halls,—Dutch, Flemish, and French. This was considered to foreshadow the disruption in 1830, as it intensified every prejudice and difficulty. The personnel of the Assembly is grave and sedate, dignified and serious. A large majority of the members are past middle age,—men of education, culture, and experience in public life. Many of them have held office first in their Communes and then in their Cantons. It is curious that, in a country where it is hard to find the court-house or a lawyer’s sign, one-fourth of the members of the Assembly report themselves as advokats; next in number come merchants, then farmers, physicians, bankers, and professors. One-third are given as incumbents of various other cantonal and communal offices. It is very common for a person to fill at the same time a federal, cantonal, and communal office, where the duties do not conflict and belong to the same general class. This is regarded as both simplifying and cheapening the public service. The very dress of the members, in its severe sombreness and uniformity, bespeaks the stable and serious bent of their minds. Scarcely the change of a cravat would be required for the entire body to appear at a funeral de rigueur. The oath administered to the members of the Assembly is calculated to emphasize the high and sacred trust assumed. It runs thus: “I swear, by God the Almighty! to maintain the constitution and the laws of the Confederation, faithfully and truly to guard the unity, power, and honor of the Swiss nation, to defend the independence of the Fatherland, the freedom and rights of the people, and its citizens in the whole, to fulfil conscientiously all duties conferred upon me, as truly, as God blesses me.” In taking this oath the member stands with his right hand uplifted, the thumb and first two fingers extended, indicating the Trinity.

The members of the Assembly practically enjoy a life-tenure; once chosen a member, one is likely to be re-elected so long as he is willing to serve. Re-election, alike in the whole Confederation and in the single Canton, is the rule; rejection of a sitting member, a rare exception. Death and voluntary retirement accounted for nineteen out of twenty-one new members at the last general election. There are members who have served continuously since the organization of the Assembly in 1848. Referring to this sure tenure of officials generally, the President of the Confederation, in a public address, said, “Facts and not persons are what interest us. If you were to take ten Swiss, every one of them would know whether the country was well governed or not; but I venture to say that nine of them would not be able to tell the name of the President, and the tenth, who might think he knew it, would be mistaken.” To some extent this remarkable retention of members of the Assembly may be ascribed to the fact that the people feel that they are masters of the situation through the power of rejecting all measures which are put to the popular vote. The position of a member is haloed with dignity, and is not a place sought from material motives, a perquisite more than an honor. The absence of this fiscal view of the office of the legislator brings in its train an equal absence of the “rotation” notion. The Assembly is not made up on the theory of mutation or by agencies more malign. Some are fond of declaring against the caprice and ingratitude of the people, says Mr. Freeman in his “Growth of the English Constitution,” and of telling us that under a democratic government neither men nor measures can remain for an hour unchanged. The spirit which made democratic Athens, year by year, bestow her highest offices on the patrician Pericles and the reactionary Phocion, still lives in the democracies of Switzerland, in the Landsgemeinde of Uri, and the Federal Assembly at Bern. The ministers of kings, whether despotic or constitutional, may vainly envy the sure tenure of office which falls to the lot of those who are chosen to rule by the voice of the people. Grote, who wrote his “History of Greece” in Switzerland, stated that his interest in the Swiss Cantons arose from the analogy they presented to the ancient Greek states; and specially as confirming the tendency of popular governments to adhere to their leaders with the utmost tenacity of attachment.

Corruption at the polls, civic jobbery, the declension of legislative character, the greed for official pelf,—these evils are not restricted to any people or country. An imperfect answer as to the cause and remedy is difficult; a complete answer is impossible. Some of these evils are connected with political problems that are vexing our epoch in every state and country where constitutional government and a liberal suffrage prevail. Switzerland, with a government so adequate for a simple people and small country, appears to have firmly resisted the impact of these political ills. Service in the federal legislature is accepted from a sense of patriotic duty; neither emolument nor self-aggrandizement being an element of its membership worthy of consideration. The election of deputies to the Swiss Assembly is an event which creates no violent commotion or even general interest in the great body of the people. A large majority of the candidates are unopposed; there is no opportunity for bribery to sap the public morale, or any field for the unscrupulous plying of the disgraceful artifices and incidents which too often mark a hotly-contested election in the United States. An election, general or local, is not an occasion of bustle or clamor, turbulence or revelry; there are no processions, no party badges, no music, no “pole-raising,” probably not a speech, and no candidate present when the exercise of this important privilege is going on. It is an affair of deliberation and decision, of sobriety and wisdom. The electors themselves feel that they are called upon to exercise a serious and elevating duty; the solemn and deliberate act of choosing men to govern the destinies of a civilized and enlightened people. It may be that the Swiss elections, being held on Sunday, and the polls often in the churches, in part contribute to inspire the elector with respect for himself, for the character which he has to sustain, and for the institution in which he thus bears an honorable part. It is feared that the suggestion of such a remedial agency in the United States would be regarded by our churchmen as ægrescit medendo. The excitement attending the popular elections in the United States as now conducted is in the main of a vicious and degrading character. Instead of infusing into the hearts of the people a spirit of patriotism, leading them to value the blessings of the government under which they live, it infuses little but rancor and malignity; giving an opportunity for the indulgence of vicious passions which are born but do not die with the emergency; evolving the gross, vulgar morality which, provided you do no injury to a man’s person or possessions, sees nothing in your conduct towards him to condemn; which is near-sighted to the turpitude of slander and misrepresentation directed against him, and blind to the iniquity of needlessly invading a man’s private life; a morality which is incapable of comprehending that one source of happiness ought to be as sacred from wanton encroachment and disturbance as another; and that visible property is not the only thing which can be purloined or invaded. These evils are being submitted to, without any strenuous effort to remove them, as if they were not a mere excrescence, but formed an integral or essential part of the system, which they deform and debase.

There can scarcely be said to be any party alignments in the Swiss Assembly. It is comparatively free from the “offensive partisanship,” “pernicious activity,” and system of party organization and activity which flourish in the United States with exuberant and, in some respects, ominous vigor. While nominally three political divisions exist in the Swiss Assembly, the Right, Centre, and Left, the accepted general classification reduces them to two, Radicals and Conservatives. The main line of separation is the same perplexing issue running through all political history, the rivalry between the state and nation, one seeking to minimize, the other to magnify the sphere of the central government. The Radicals are those who seek to give the broadest interpretation to the constitution, so as to enlarge the field of federal authority. The Conservatives are jealous of every encroachment upon the traditional prerogative of the Cantons, and desire to restrict and confine the limits of federal action. The Radicals are the most numerous, commanding an absolute majority in both the National Council and the Council of States. Within these two broad divisions there are many different shades that separate on questions of a social, religious, and economic character. Then these grand and subdivisions have an entirely different significance, as applied to federal or cantonal questions; a Radical as to the one, may be a Conservative as to the other. The Radical and Conservative of the Canton of Vaud is by no means the same as the Radical and Conservative of the Cantons of Zurich and Aargau; the Radical of Geneva is very different from the Radical of St. Gallen. The two parties are not distinguished from each other by any systematic respect or disrespect for cantonal independence. So the purely political question between privilege on one side and the sovereignty of the people on the other is one of subordinate moment; the former does not find expression in any party formula. It is an error to estimate the character and tendencies of the Swiss parties by the names which they bear, Radical and Conservative, in the light of the footing these names have obtained in every language in Europe, and the strong feelings of esteem or hatred associated with them. As such they are nowise fully correct designations of the political divisions, prominently opposed in Switzerland, and of the points at issue between them. It is not true that the Swiss Radical desires over-centralization to the extent of unitary government; but, with the Conservative, holds to the great theory of local self-government as founded upon these propositions; that government is most wise, which is in the hands of those best informed about the particular questions on which they legislate; most economical and honest when in the hands of those most interested in preserving frugality and virtue; most strong when it only exercises authority which is beneficial in its action to the governed. There is a feeling common to the population of every Canton and Commune, which puts all idea of any party advocating one concentrated system out of the question. Madison says, “An extinction of parties necessarily implies, either a universal alarm for the public safety, or an absolute extinction of liberty.” Political parties perform functions of the greatest possible importance; through their organizations is fulfilled that obligation which is incumbent upon every citizen of a republic, to give an earnest, careful, and habitual attention to the conduct of government. Parties are the exponents and representatives of the great issues that constantly arise in every free community. By the discussions that arise between them public opinion is formed, the people educated in their political rights, a due sense of citizenship generated and fostered; they are a great centripetal force in every system of home-rule government.

The strong attachment to party, with its resultant full crop of political dissension, in the United States has at the same time awakened a zeal for turning the powers of government to profitable public account, and a sensibility to the exposure of wrong or abuse, which manifest themselves in a thousand beneficial ways. “It is one of the advantages of free government,” declares Sir James Mackintosh, “that they excite sometimes to an inconvenient degree, but upon the whole, with the utmost benefit, all the generous feelings, all the efforts for a public cause, of which human nature is capable.” Switzerland, in the legislative branch of her federal system, gathers together a body of men remarkable for that generous and patriotic impulse which moves noble minds to sacrifice private interests to the public good, and that public spirit that is the sense of duty applied to public affairs; none of the cowardly and unpatriotic sentiment expressed in the speech of Cato, “when vice prevails and impious men bear sway, the post of honor is a private station.” With a Swiss, the post of honor is always the post of duty, and the call of duty is loudest from the public service, and secures the ready response of the best citizens. Nowhere does popular government rest upon a firmer foundation of public spirit and the willing and active interest of the people.